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The Shift in Geopolitical Balance of Power in South Caucasus is Underway
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 23
February 7, 2013 04:32 PM Age: 3 days
By: Vasili Rukhadze
Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili in Armenia (Source: mediamax.am)
On January 17, during his visit to Armenia, Georgian Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili stated that `Armenia provides a good example for
Georgia, and it can be a source of envy in a positive sense,' for
managing to have good relations with Russia and at the same time with
the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member
states (www.civil.ge, January 18). Setting Armenia - a country which
does not aspire to NATO membership and is widely considered to be
Russia's satellite state in the South Caucasus - as an example was quite
an alarming statement for Georgia, which already for more than a
decade seeks to join the North Atlantic Alliance and distance itself
from Moscow.
Ivanishvili, in a somewhat Machiavellian style, never misses an
opportunity to pay verbal tribute to Georgia's Euro-Atlantic
aspirations, while everything that he has done since becoming Prime
Minister in October 2012, clearly shows that he is shifting the
country's foreign policy orientation toward Georgia's former master,
Russia. But this is not merely change in one country's foreign policy.
As a result of Georgia's shift, there is greater change underway in
the geopolitical balance of power in the entire South Caucasus region.
Georgia, because of its sheer geographic location, is a pivotal state
in the entire Caucasus - it is the only country that borders all the
states and political entities in the region (with the exception of
Adygea). Against the background of the ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict and subsequent blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey,
Georgia provides the shortest land connection for Azerbaijan to its
ally Turkey and for Armenia to its ally Russia. Consequently, it does
matter a great deal for the Caucasian states where Georgia stands.
Georgia's foreign policy orientation largely determines which state
becomes isolated in the conflict-ridden and divided South Caucasus.
As Georgia intensely moved toward the West since the 2003 Rose
Revolution, Tbilisi actively cooperated with NATO-member Turkey and
its Caucasian ally, Azerbaijan, in the economic, political as well as
military spheres. Armenia has been left out of all major joint
projects, becoming increasingly isolated in the region. Things are
changing now for the benefit of Armenia, which may, this time, leave
Azerbaijan isolated, indicating a shift in the geopolitical balance of
power in the South Caucasus.
While Ivanishvili gradually reorients Georgia toward Russia, he
simultaneously courts Moscow's closest regional ally, Armenia,
addressing Yerevan's urgent needs and demands. Ivanishvili's statement
in Armenia was not a mere diplomatic quip to please Armenians. He went
further. Ivanishvili agreed to allow teaching Armenian history in
Armenian schools in Georgia (www.iveroni.com.ge, January 20).
Additionally, at the request of the Head of Armenia's Gregorian Church
Karekin II, Ivanishvili's government released from prison Vahagn
Chakhalian, a political activist associated with Armenian extremist
groups in Georgia. He was serving a prison term for the illegal
possession of weapons, armed hooliganism and public disorder in
Georgia's predominantly Armenian-populated Javakheti region
(www.civil.ge, January 25). Most importantly, Ivanishvili stated that
the reopening of the Russia-Armenia railway - which passes through
Georgia, including breakaway Abkhazia - would be possible
(www.radiotavisupleba.ge, January 29). Currently, work is underway to
address some technical problems for reopening the railway
(www.armenpress.am, January 31; www.kvirispalitra.ge, January 31).
This railway has huge significance for isolated Armenia. As Armenia's
jubilant President Serzh Sargsyan correctly noted, it would end the
blockade of Armenia and have crucial importance for the country's
economy and its exports (www.tert.am, February 4). However, the
railway has even greater military and political significance, and not
only for Armenia but also for Russia. If Moscow regains a direct rail
link to its ally, Russia will be able to transport, without any
obstacles, large amounts of military hardware to the Russian 102nd
Military Base in Gyumri and to Armenia, in general. This will
certainly further shift the military balance in the South Caucasus in
Russia and Armenia's favor. In a related development, the Russian
government already announced its intention to double the number of
contract servicemen at the base (www.en.rian.ru, June 19, 2012).
However, the reopening of the Russia-Armenia (North-South) railway via
Georgia seems to be just a piece in much larger scheme. On January 18,
Armenia announced the launch of the Southern Armenian Railway (SAR)
project, with the participation of Russia, Iran, China and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). The SAR will link Armenia with Iran and further
with the Persian Gulf. Most importantly, it will connect regional
Black Sea ports to the Gulf (www.regnum.ru, January 18). Considering
that the Russia-Armenia railway can (and will) connect with the
Armenia-Iran railway, it will create a long, north-south transport
corridor, stretching from Russia to the Persian Gulf. This transport
corridor will have tremendous economic and geopolitical importance
first and foremost for Russia, expanding Moscow's reach all the way to
the southern Middle East.
Georgia's steps to move toward Moscow and court Armenia are also
isolating Azerbaijan on various issues. Georgia's proposal back in
November 2012 to reopen the Russia-Armenia railway (see EDM, November
12, 2012) caused indignation in Baku (www.regnum.ru, November 12,
2012), which opposes any idea to break the blockade of Armenia.
Nevertheless, the railway issue is already at the working stage.
Moreover, in December 2012, the Georgian prime minister questioned the
economic efficiency and profitability of the highly important
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway project, connecting Azerbaijan to
Turkey via Georgia (www.geopalitratv.ge, December 22, 2012; see EDM,
January 31). Although, he later recanted his statement
(www.georgiatoday.ge, December 27, 2012), it showed that Georgia may
no longer walk side by side with Azerbaijan. Such disagreements may
grow, increasing Azerbaijan's isolation in the region. Some in
Azerbaijan now even talk about a possible regime change in Baku by
Russia (www.regnum.ru, February 1).
As Georgia shifts toward Russia, the geopolitical balance of power in
the Caucasus is undoubtedly changing. This process will become even
more visible in the months to come. The window is closing for the
United States and the European Union to show political will and
strength and to activate their policies in the region. Resolute action
by the West will be necessary to salvage Georgia from sliding toward
Moscow and hence avert further expansion of Russia's influence in the
South Caucasus. Failure to act may result in a geopolitical picture of
the region that will look quite different in couple of years.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40434&tx_ttnews[backPid]=620
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 23
February 7, 2013 04:32 PM Age: 3 days
By: Vasili Rukhadze
Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili in Armenia (Source: mediamax.am)
On January 17, during his visit to Armenia, Georgian Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili stated that `Armenia provides a good example for
Georgia, and it can be a source of envy in a positive sense,' for
managing to have good relations with Russia and at the same time with
the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member
states (www.civil.ge, January 18). Setting Armenia - a country which
does not aspire to NATO membership and is widely considered to be
Russia's satellite state in the South Caucasus - as an example was quite
an alarming statement for Georgia, which already for more than a
decade seeks to join the North Atlantic Alliance and distance itself
from Moscow.
Ivanishvili, in a somewhat Machiavellian style, never misses an
opportunity to pay verbal tribute to Georgia's Euro-Atlantic
aspirations, while everything that he has done since becoming Prime
Minister in October 2012, clearly shows that he is shifting the
country's foreign policy orientation toward Georgia's former master,
Russia. But this is not merely change in one country's foreign policy.
As a result of Georgia's shift, there is greater change underway in
the geopolitical balance of power in the entire South Caucasus region.
Georgia, because of its sheer geographic location, is a pivotal state
in the entire Caucasus - it is the only country that borders all the
states and political entities in the region (with the exception of
Adygea). Against the background of the ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict and subsequent blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey,
Georgia provides the shortest land connection for Azerbaijan to its
ally Turkey and for Armenia to its ally Russia. Consequently, it does
matter a great deal for the Caucasian states where Georgia stands.
Georgia's foreign policy orientation largely determines which state
becomes isolated in the conflict-ridden and divided South Caucasus.
As Georgia intensely moved toward the West since the 2003 Rose
Revolution, Tbilisi actively cooperated with NATO-member Turkey and
its Caucasian ally, Azerbaijan, in the economic, political as well as
military spheres. Armenia has been left out of all major joint
projects, becoming increasingly isolated in the region. Things are
changing now for the benefit of Armenia, which may, this time, leave
Azerbaijan isolated, indicating a shift in the geopolitical balance of
power in the South Caucasus.
While Ivanishvili gradually reorients Georgia toward Russia, he
simultaneously courts Moscow's closest regional ally, Armenia,
addressing Yerevan's urgent needs and demands. Ivanishvili's statement
in Armenia was not a mere diplomatic quip to please Armenians. He went
further. Ivanishvili agreed to allow teaching Armenian history in
Armenian schools in Georgia (www.iveroni.com.ge, January 20).
Additionally, at the request of the Head of Armenia's Gregorian Church
Karekin II, Ivanishvili's government released from prison Vahagn
Chakhalian, a political activist associated with Armenian extremist
groups in Georgia. He was serving a prison term for the illegal
possession of weapons, armed hooliganism and public disorder in
Georgia's predominantly Armenian-populated Javakheti region
(www.civil.ge, January 25). Most importantly, Ivanishvili stated that
the reopening of the Russia-Armenia railway - which passes through
Georgia, including breakaway Abkhazia - would be possible
(www.radiotavisupleba.ge, January 29). Currently, work is underway to
address some technical problems for reopening the railway
(www.armenpress.am, January 31; www.kvirispalitra.ge, January 31).
This railway has huge significance for isolated Armenia. As Armenia's
jubilant President Serzh Sargsyan correctly noted, it would end the
blockade of Armenia and have crucial importance for the country's
economy and its exports (www.tert.am, February 4). However, the
railway has even greater military and political significance, and not
only for Armenia but also for Russia. If Moscow regains a direct rail
link to its ally, Russia will be able to transport, without any
obstacles, large amounts of military hardware to the Russian 102nd
Military Base in Gyumri and to Armenia, in general. This will
certainly further shift the military balance in the South Caucasus in
Russia and Armenia's favor. In a related development, the Russian
government already announced its intention to double the number of
contract servicemen at the base (www.en.rian.ru, June 19, 2012).
However, the reopening of the Russia-Armenia (North-South) railway via
Georgia seems to be just a piece in much larger scheme. On January 18,
Armenia announced the launch of the Southern Armenian Railway (SAR)
project, with the participation of Russia, Iran, China and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). The SAR will link Armenia with Iran and further
with the Persian Gulf. Most importantly, it will connect regional
Black Sea ports to the Gulf (www.regnum.ru, January 18). Considering
that the Russia-Armenia railway can (and will) connect with the
Armenia-Iran railway, it will create a long, north-south transport
corridor, stretching from Russia to the Persian Gulf. This transport
corridor will have tremendous economic and geopolitical importance
first and foremost for Russia, expanding Moscow's reach all the way to
the southern Middle East.
Georgia's steps to move toward Moscow and court Armenia are also
isolating Azerbaijan on various issues. Georgia's proposal back in
November 2012 to reopen the Russia-Armenia railway (see EDM, November
12, 2012) caused indignation in Baku (www.regnum.ru, November 12,
2012), which opposes any idea to break the blockade of Armenia.
Nevertheless, the railway issue is already at the working stage.
Moreover, in December 2012, the Georgian prime minister questioned the
economic efficiency and profitability of the highly important
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway project, connecting Azerbaijan to
Turkey via Georgia (www.geopalitratv.ge, December 22, 2012; see EDM,
January 31). Although, he later recanted his statement
(www.georgiatoday.ge, December 27, 2012), it showed that Georgia may
no longer walk side by side with Azerbaijan. Such disagreements may
grow, increasing Azerbaijan's isolation in the region. Some in
Azerbaijan now even talk about a possible regime change in Baku by
Russia (www.regnum.ru, February 1).
As Georgia shifts toward Russia, the geopolitical balance of power in
the Caucasus is undoubtedly changing. This process will become even
more visible in the months to come. The window is closing for the
United States and the European Union to show political will and
strength and to activate their policies in the region. Resolute action
by the West will be necessary to salvage Georgia from sliding toward
Moscow and hence avert further expansion of Russia's influence in the
South Caucasus. Failure to act may result in a geopolitical picture of
the region that will look quite different in couple of years.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40434&tx_ttnews[backPid]=620