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TURKEY TO DEPLOY PATRIOT MISSILES
Turkey Analyst,
vol. 5 no. 23
5 December 2012
Richard Weitz
Turkey's membership in NATO has many unique dimensions, including in
the number of missile-related crises the country has experienced.
Washington pledged to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Turkey during
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis in return for securing a Soviet nuclear
pull-out from Cuba. In 1990 and 2003, Turkey had to overcome West
European qualms about deploying NATO air defense systems in Turkey to
counter Saddam Hussein's threats. After considerable wavering, Turkey
averted a major NATO crisis in 2010 when it agreed to host advanced
U.S. ballistic missile defense radar. Now Turkey has secured a NATO
commitment to relocate some of the alliance's most advanced air and
missile interceptors despite considerable foreign and some domestic
opposition.
BACKGROUND: With daily incidents of mortar rounds and shells falling
on Turkish territory, and frequent Syrian airstrikes against
rebel-held towns near the Turkish border, last month the Turkish
government used NATO's Article 4 security consultations to request
deployment of NATO Patriot surface-to-air missiles near its border
with Syria. Turkish officials insist that the deployment would be for
defensive purposes only, as a "precautionary measure" to counter any
threat emanating from Syria. In justifying his original request,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an insisted that `this is entirely a
defensive measure against possible attacks from the other side.''
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen encouraged the request,
arguing that the Patriots would help defend Turkey's population and
territory, `contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along NATO's
south-eastern border,' and serve as `a concrete demonstration of
Alliance solidarity and resolve.' In late November NATO teams surveyed
possible sites for the Patriots, which include the southeastern
provinces of Diyarbakır or Å?anlıurfa or Malatya, which already hosts
the NATO BMD radar.
NATO's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Interceptor
Batteries are some of the most sophisticated air and missile defense
systems in Western inventories. Each battery has 16 PAC-3
interceptors; each weighs 340 kg, carries 50 kilograms of explosives,
and flies at 5,000 km/h. Combined with the high accuracy of their
radar sensors and targeting systems, the Patriots can intercept
warplanes and short-range ballistic missiles as far as 100 km away,
allowing them to command an area well beyond the Turkish-Syrian
border--all of northern Syria up, including the embattled towns of
Aleppo and Homs.
While the earlier 1990 and 2003 Turkish requests for Patriots provoked
major intra-alliance divisions, on this occasion the NATO
decision-making process appears to have been much smoother. Foreign
Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu and other Turkish diplomats engaged in
lengthy and comprehensive consultations with the other NATO
governments even though only Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
States have the PAC-3s. The United States strongly backed the proposed
deployments and the German Foreign Minister acknowledged the
legitimacy of Turkey's security concerns. Public opposition to the
deployments in NATO countries has been minimal.
The December 4 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, citing
the clear threat to Turkey as well as the principle of allied
solidarity, formally approved the deployments. Rasmussen and the NATO
governments issued statements of strong support for Turkey. `To anyone
who would attack Turkey,' the Secretary-General warned, `don't even
think about it.' The national parliaments in Germany and the
Netherlands must now authorize the deployments. Although these
approvals are considered a formality, it will probably take at least
another month before the Patriots are relocated to Turkey and become
operational given the large number and physical size of the PAC-3
systems, which include the interceptor missiles, the launchers, their
radars, an engagement control station, a power plant, and other
components.
IMPLICATIONS: Within Turkey, some opposition groups, unenthusiastic
about ErdoÄ?an's aggressive campaign against Syrian president Bashar
al-Assad, see the deployments as yet another Western-inspired step
towards a Turkey-Syria war that could further strain Turkey's
relations with Iran, Iraq, and Russia for the benefit of NATO.
Resistance to the Patriot deployment was sufficiently strong that
ErdoÄ?an has had to resort to the dubious logic of arguing that the
parliament has no say in the matter since the deployment was a NATO,
and not a Turkish, decision.
Some of Turkey's other neighbors also oppose deployments, though there
is little they can do to stop them. The Syrian government naturally
railed against Turkey's `new act of provocation,' with the Syrian
foreign minister accusing Ankara of `deluding'' Turkish public opinion
that Syria presents a threat. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's
representative in Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, Brigadier General
Yadollah Javani said on Nov.27 that "Turkey will suffer much detriment
from establishing Patriots in their territory."
The missile issue has added yet another burden to the Turkey-Russia
relationship following the Ankara's October 11 decision to force a
Syrian passenger plane from Russia to land in Turkey, Russia has
vetoed UN resolutions that would try to force al-Assad's removal from
office, and Russia has been supplying arms to Syria, while Ankara has
had a leading role in the anti-Assad coalition. At one point, ErdoÄ?an
denounced what he called Moscow's `interference in the internal
affairs of Turkey.' Russia has traditionally objected to NATO
military operations outside the Atlantic region without the
authorization of the UN Security Council.
Nonetheless, Russia and Turkey continue to keep their differences over
Syria from damaging their overall relationship. At a December 3 news
conference with ErdoÄ?an during their one-day summit in Istanbul,
Russian president Vladimir Putin said that the two governments shared
the same goal in Syria even though they differ on tactics. Putin
acknowledged that Turkey had legitimate concerns regarding Syria but
said that deploying Patriots risked escalating the crisis. Ignoring
anti-Putin street protests, most of the public comments of Russian and
Turkish officials focused on energy and economics ' the 11 documents
they signed following the meeting dealt mostly with energy, finance,
and science and technology cooperation agreement.
CONCLUSIONS: Some of the foreign and domestic concerns about NATO's
Patriot deployment in Turkey reflect the diverse effects they could
have on Turkey's foreign policy as well as that they have no ability
to protect Turkey from the stray mortar rounds and artillery shells
that have been striking Turkish territory from Syria. In a way, the
debate over the missile deployments resembles the one between the
U.S./NATO and Russia/China on the former's global BMD initiatives.
NATO and Turkey call the Patriots defensive weapons and deploying them
a `precautionary' measure to prevent an escalation of the conflict.
They see the missiles as directly enhancing Turkey's defenses against
possible Syrian air and missile attacks. They also believe that this
augmented defense capability will help deter such attacks and even
reduce the risk of accidents since the Syrian military will prove more
cautious about its operations near the Turkish border.
But opponents of the Patriot deployments see them as having tactical
capabilities that, while defensive, create potential offensive
opportunities. For example, the Patriots will reduce fears among an
anxious Turkish public about Ankara's aggressive role in organizing
the insurgency against al-Assad. They might also further raise the
Syrian rebels' morale as well as possibly serving to further
demoralize Syrian officers and soldiers, who will increasingly
exercise the option to defect to the insurgency if it looks set to
win. By erecting an effective air and missile shield that could easily
extend deep into Syrian territory, the Patriots could help enforce a
no-fly zone over Syria that extends from Idlib to Shogor Bridge, to
Al-Zaweya Mountain, and finally to Aleppo from Turkey.
In June 2012, Turkey had requested that NATO develop contingency plans
for such a no-fly zone to protect Turkish territory from Syrian
aggression. With this air shield, the insurgents would find it easier
to establish secure logistics and communications corridors to provide
munitions and other supplies to their fighters in Syria. They could
more ambitiously try to establish a base of operations inside Syria
and, as the insurgents used Benghazi in Libya, launch offensives
against the Syrian military more effectively from their new forward
operating bases.
The deployment would also serve to engage NATO more directly in the
Syrian war, something Ankara has long sought but NATO has resisted.
Unlike in the case of Libya, thus far NATO has largely remained aloof
from the Syrian crisis. But with the Patriot systems will come
hundreds of NATO troops to operate, maintain, and protect the
interceptors, their radars, and their other support elements. In
effect, the NATO personnel will become a `trip wire' that would make
NATO military intervention more likely during the inevitable future
Syrian-Turkish border clashes. NATO's Supreme Commander, not the
Turkish government, will operate the systems and decide whether and
how to use them. The issue of Syria's chemical weapons further
complicates matters. Although NATO leaders insisted that the Patriot
deployments would not contribute to any of the offensive actions
described above, international alarm about Syria's chemical weapons
potential ` also cited as a threat by Turkish officials ` has
continued to increase, and could serve as a legitimate pretext for a
more assertive policy by NATO ` and Turkey ` in Syria.
Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director, Center for
Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute.
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/121205B.html
From: A. Papazian
Turkey Analyst,
vol. 5 no. 23
5 December 2012
Richard Weitz
Turkey's membership in NATO has many unique dimensions, including in
the number of missile-related crises the country has experienced.
Washington pledged to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Turkey during
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis in return for securing a Soviet nuclear
pull-out from Cuba. In 1990 and 2003, Turkey had to overcome West
European qualms about deploying NATO air defense systems in Turkey to
counter Saddam Hussein's threats. After considerable wavering, Turkey
averted a major NATO crisis in 2010 when it agreed to host advanced
U.S. ballistic missile defense radar. Now Turkey has secured a NATO
commitment to relocate some of the alliance's most advanced air and
missile interceptors despite considerable foreign and some domestic
opposition.
BACKGROUND: With daily incidents of mortar rounds and shells falling
on Turkish territory, and frequent Syrian airstrikes against
rebel-held towns near the Turkish border, last month the Turkish
government used NATO's Article 4 security consultations to request
deployment of NATO Patriot surface-to-air missiles near its border
with Syria. Turkish officials insist that the deployment would be for
defensive purposes only, as a "precautionary measure" to counter any
threat emanating from Syria. In justifying his original request,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an insisted that `this is entirely a
defensive measure against possible attacks from the other side.''
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen encouraged the request,
arguing that the Patriots would help defend Turkey's population and
territory, `contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along NATO's
south-eastern border,' and serve as `a concrete demonstration of
Alliance solidarity and resolve.' In late November NATO teams surveyed
possible sites for the Patriots, which include the southeastern
provinces of Diyarbakır or Å?anlıurfa or Malatya, which already hosts
the NATO BMD radar.
NATO's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Interceptor
Batteries are some of the most sophisticated air and missile defense
systems in Western inventories. Each battery has 16 PAC-3
interceptors; each weighs 340 kg, carries 50 kilograms of explosives,
and flies at 5,000 km/h. Combined with the high accuracy of their
radar sensors and targeting systems, the Patriots can intercept
warplanes and short-range ballistic missiles as far as 100 km away,
allowing them to command an area well beyond the Turkish-Syrian
border--all of northern Syria up, including the embattled towns of
Aleppo and Homs.
While the earlier 1990 and 2003 Turkish requests for Patriots provoked
major intra-alliance divisions, on this occasion the NATO
decision-making process appears to have been much smoother. Foreign
Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu and other Turkish diplomats engaged in
lengthy and comprehensive consultations with the other NATO
governments even though only Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
States have the PAC-3s. The United States strongly backed the proposed
deployments and the German Foreign Minister acknowledged the
legitimacy of Turkey's security concerns. Public opposition to the
deployments in NATO countries has been minimal.
The December 4 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, citing
the clear threat to Turkey as well as the principle of allied
solidarity, formally approved the deployments. Rasmussen and the NATO
governments issued statements of strong support for Turkey. `To anyone
who would attack Turkey,' the Secretary-General warned, `don't even
think about it.' The national parliaments in Germany and the
Netherlands must now authorize the deployments. Although these
approvals are considered a formality, it will probably take at least
another month before the Patriots are relocated to Turkey and become
operational given the large number and physical size of the PAC-3
systems, which include the interceptor missiles, the launchers, their
radars, an engagement control station, a power plant, and other
components.
IMPLICATIONS: Within Turkey, some opposition groups, unenthusiastic
about ErdoÄ?an's aggressive campaign against Syrian president Bashar
al-Assad, see the deployments as yet another Western-inspired step
towards a Turkey-Syria war that could further strain Turkey's
relations with Iran, Iraq, and Russia for the benefit of NATO.
Resistance to the Patriot deployment was sufficiently strong that
ErdoÄ?an has had to resort to the dubious logic of arguing that the
parliament has no say in the matter since the deployment was a NATO,
and not a Turkish, decision.
Some of Turkey's other neighbors also oppose deployments, though there
is little they can do to stop them. The Syrian government naturally
railed against Turkey's `new act of provocation,' with the Syrian
foreign minister accusing Ankara of `deluding'' Turkish public opinion
that Syria presents a threat. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's
representative in Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, Brigadier General
Yadollah Javani said on Nov.27 that "Turkey will suffer much detriment
from establishing Patriots in their territory."
The missile issue has added yet another burden to the Turkey-Russia
relationship following the Ankara's October 11 decision to force a
Syrian passenger plane from Russia to land in Turkey, Russia has
vetoed UN resolutions that would try to force al-Assad's removal from
office, and Russia has been supplying arms to Syria, while Ankara has
had a leading role in the anti-Assad coalition. At one point, ErdoÄ?an
denounced what he called Moscow's `interference in the internal
affairs of Turkey.' Russia has traditionally objected to NATO
military operations outside the Atlantic region without the
authorization of the UN Security Council.
Nonetheless, Russia and Turkey continue to keep their differences over
Syria from damaging their overall relationship. At a December 3 news
conference with ErdoÄ?an during their one-day summit in Istanbul,
Russian president Vladimir Putin said that the two governments shared
the same goal in Syria even though they differ on tactics. Putin
acknowledged that Turkey had legitimate concerns regarding Syria but
said that deploying Patriots risked escalating the crisis. Ignoring
anti-Putin street protests, most of the public comments of Russian and
Turkish officials focused on energy and economics ' the 11 documents
they signed following the meeting dealt mostly with energy, finance,
and science and technology cooperation agreement.
CONCLUSIONS: Some of the foreign and domestic concerns about NATO's
Patriot deployment in Turkey reflect the diverse effects they could
have on Turkey's foreign policy as well as that they have no ability
to protect Turkey from the stray mortar rounds and artillery shells
that have been striking Turkish territory from Syria. In a way, the
debate over the missile deployments resembles the one between the
U.S./NATO and Russia/China on the former's global BMD initiatives.
NATO and Turkey call the Patriots defensive weapons and deploying them
a `precautionary' measure to prevent an escalation of the conflict.
They see the missiles as directly enhancing Turkey's defenses against
possible Syrian air and missile attacks. They also believe that this
augmented defense capability will help deter such attacks and even
reduce the risk of accidents since the Syrian military will prove more
cautious about its operations near the Turkish border.
But opponents of the Patriot deployments see them as having tactical
capabilities that, while defensive, create potential offensive
opportunities. For example, the Patriots will reduce fears among an
anxious Turkish public about Ankara's aggressive role in organizing
the insurgency against al-Assad. They might also further raise the
Syrian rebels' morale as well as possibly serving to further
demoralize Syrian officers and soldiers, who will increasingly
exercise the option to defect to the insurgency if it looks set to
win. By erecting an effective air and missile shield that could easily
extend deep into Syrian territory, the Patriots could help enforce a
no-fly zone over Syria that extends from Idlib to Shogor Bridge, to
Al-Zaweya Mountain, and finally to Aleppo from Turkey.
In June 2012, Turkey had requested that NATO develop contingency plans
for such a no-fly zone to protect Turkish territory from Syrian
aggression. With this air shield, the insurgents would find it easier
to establish secure logistics and communications corridors to provide
munitions and other supplies to their fighters in Syria. They could
more ambitiously try to establish a base of operations inside Syria
and, as the insurgents used Benghazi in Libya, launch offensives
against the Syrian military more effectively from their new forward
operating bases.
The deployment would also serve to engage NATO more directly in the
Syrian war, something Ankara has long sought but NATO has resisted.
Unlike in the case of Libya, thus far NATO has largely remained aloof
from the Syrian crisis. But with the Patriot systems will come
hundreds of NATO troops to operate, maintain, and protect the
interceptors, their radars, and their other support elements. In
effect, the NATO personnel will become a `trip wire' that would make
NATO military intervention more likely during the inevitable future
Syrian-Turkish border clashes. NATO's Supreme Commander, not the
Turkish government, will operate the systems and decide whether and
how to use them. The issue of Syria's chemical weapons further
complicates matters. Although NATO leaders insisted that the Patriot
deployments would not contribute to any of the offensive actions
described above, international alarm about Syria's chemical weapons
potential ` also cited as a threat by Turkish officials ` has
continued to increase, and could serve as a legitimate pretext for a
more assertive policy by NATO ` and Turkey ` in Syria.
Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director, Center for
Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute.
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/121205B.html
From: A. Papazian