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GEORGIA'S PM: SOUTH CAUCASUS RAILWAY CAN BE REOPENED
By Eka Janashia (02/03/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst)
During a visit to Armenia on January 17, Georgia's Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili opened for restoring the South Caucasus railway
(SCR) connecting Armenia to Russia via occupied Abkhazia. Ivanishvili
said that the issue can be resolved despite the troubled relations
between Moscow and Tbilisi if all engaged parties are willing to do
so.
The new Georgian government first aired the possibility of reopening
the SCR in November, much to the irritation of Baku which considers
the initiative as a challenge to its national interests. Azerbaijan's
opposition and Abkhazia's negative response to the proposal induced
the Georgian government to temporarily downplay the issue. However, a
statement made by the Georgian PM a month later triggered new concerns
in Baku. At that time, Ivanishvili questioned the economic value of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway (BTKR) for Georgia at an early stage of
its operation. He said that BTKR - a project that links Georgia and
Azerbaijan to Europe via Turkey - may decrease the cargo turnover at
Georgia's Black Sea ports.
Ivanishvili's remarks induced Georgian and Azerbaijani media to
provide extensive coverage of the BTKR issue ahead of the Georgian
PM's visit to Baku. In Azerbaijan, however, Ivanishvili had to
acknowledge that he had made `hasty' and `politically flawed' comments
on BTKR and that he should not have talked about it publicly but
should have discussed it privately with Azerbaijani authorities.
Nonetheless, the statement Ivanishvili made in Yerevan about the
possibility of restoring the SCR renewed the debate over railways.
Commenting on Ivanishvili's statements, President Mikheil Saakshvili
said that they held alarming connotations. Since the BTKR would likely
reduce the viability of Russia's Trans-Siberian Railway, Saakashvili
said Russia could be expected to make far-reaching efforts to
challenge the project, though it should not do so through the Georgian
government itself.
Another problem related to reopening the SCR, according to
Saakashvili, is the fact that Russia is in control of both the Abkhaz
and Armenian segments of the railway and such a move on Georgia's part
would indirectly acknowledge Russia's right to the Abkhaz railway and
facilitate Moscow's efforts to legitimize its occupation of Abkhazia.
`Georgia should not take a single step that will contribute to it,
unless the de-occupation of Abkhazia is fully resolved; or this issue
can be resolved in parallel with the de-occupation of Abkhazia and can
be discussed as part of the de-occupation,' Saakashvili said.
Saakashvili maintained that Tbilisi does seek good relations with
Yerevan though not at the expense of Georgia's strategic interests.
Saakashvili lamented that Ivanishvili's statement on the BTKR had
already complicated the country's relations with Turkey and resulted
in a suspension of Turkish investments. Any problem emerging in
Georgia's ties with Ankara would amount to losing Georgia's historic
chance to join NATO, he said.
Meanwhile, Sokhumi has seemingly changed its stance regarding the
restoration of SCR. Whereas in November, the Abkhaz government
categorically stated that such ploys would never lure Sokhumi into the
political and diplomatic traps set by Tbilisi, at this time it clearly
softened its tone. On January 18, the breakaway region's president
Aleksander Ankvab said that `If there are concrete proposals [on
restoring the SCR] then we will sit down and discuss them together.'
Though it is not clear whether the SCR will be actually restored any
time soon, the continued discussions over it, especially when framed
as a competitor to the BTKR, raises questions regarding the future
viability of the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey (AGT) transportation axis.
In fact, apart from the economic benefits of BTKR, it also represents
a geopolitical endeavor to boost integration between the AGT countries
and reduce Russia's role as the major transit country between Europe
and China. Moreover, after the BTKR will be commissioned this year,
Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries will not be depend on the
Iranian Razi-Sarakhs railway for trade transit to Europe.
The BTKR project is thus intended to bring the region more autonomy
vis-à-vis both Iran and Russia. However, especially in light of
Moscow's proposed Eurasian Union, Russia will plausibly seek to
challenge the project via efforts to undermine unity among the AGT
states that is grounded in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum projects.
Whereas the SCR does not directly overshadow the BTKR perspectives, it
slams Azerbaijan's interest in marginalizing Armenia, fuels tension
between Tbilisi and Baku and hence provokes AGT disunity. In this
context, the questions Ivanishvili has raised regarding the benefits
generating from the BTKR and the possibility of restoring the SCR
could weaken the existing confidence between the AGT states and may
trigger realignment in the region.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5915
By Eka Janashia (02/03/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst)
During a visit to Armenia on January 17, Georgia's Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili opened for restoring the South Caucasus railway
(SCR) connecting Armenia to Russia via occupied Abkhazia. Ivanishvili
said that the issue can be resolved despite the troubled relations
between Moscow and Tbilisi if all engaged parties are willing to do
so.
The new Georgian government first aired the possibility of reopening
the SCR in November, much to the irritation of Baku which considers
the initiative as a challenge to its national interests. Azerbaijan's
opposition and Abkhazia's negative response to the proposal induced
the Georgian government to temporarily downplay the issue. However, a
statement made by the Georgian PM a month later triggered new concerns
in Baku. At that time, Ivanishvili questioned the economic value of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway (BTKR) for Georgia at an early stage of
its operation. He said that BTKR - a project that links Georgia and
Azerbaijan to Europe via Turkey - may decrease the cargo turnover at
Georgia's Black Sea ports.
Ivanishvili's remarks induced Georgian and Azerbaijani media to
provide extensive coverage of the BTKR issue ahead of the Georgian
PM's visit to Baku. In Azerbaijan, however, Ivanishvili had to
acknowledge that he had made `hasty' and `politically flawed' comments
on BTKR and that he should not have talked about it publicly but
should have discussed it privately with Azerbaijani authorities.
Nonetheless, the statement Ivanishvili made in Yerevan about the
possibility of restoring the SCR renewed the debate over railways.
Commenting on Ivanishvili's statements, President Mikheil Saakshvili
said that they held alarming connotations. Since the BTKR would likely
reduce the viability of Russia's Trans-Siberian Railway, Saakashvili
said Russia could be expected to make far-reaching efforts to
challenge the project, though it should not do so through the Georgian
government itself.
Another problem related to reopening the SCR, according to
Saakashvili, is the fact that Russia is in control of both the Abkhaz
and Armenian segments of the railway and such a move on Georgia's part
would indirectly acknowledge Russia's right to the Abkhaz railway and
facilitate Moscow's efforts to legitimize its occupation of Abkhazia.
`Georgia should not take a single step that will contribute to it,
unless the de-occupation of Abkhazia is fully resolved; or this issue
can be resolved in parallel with the de-occupation of Abkhazia and can
be discussed as part of the de-occupation,' Saakashvili said.
Saakashvili maintained that Tbilisi does seek good relations with
Yerevan though not at the expense of Georgia's strategic interests.
Saakashvili lamented that Ivanishvili's statement on the BTKR had
already complicated the country's relations with Turkey and resulted
in a suspension of Turkish investments. Any problem emerging in
Georgia's ties with Ankara would amount to losing Georgia's historic
chance to join NATO, he said.
Meanwhile, Sokhumi has seemingly changed its stance regarding the
restoration of SCR. Whereas in November, the Abkhaz government
categorically stated that such ploys would never lure Sokhumi into the
political and diplomatic traps set by Tbilisi, at this time it clearly
softened its tone. On January 18, the breakaway region's president
Aleksander Ankvab said that `If there are concrete proposals [on
restoring the SCR] then we will sit down and discuss them together.'
Though it is not clear whether the SCR will be actually restored any
time soon, the continued discussions over it, especially when framed
as a competitor to the BTKR, raises questions regarding the future
viability of the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey (AGT) transportation axis.
In fact, apart from the economic benefits of BTKR, it also represents
a geopolitical endeavor to boost integration between the AGT countries
and reduce Russia's role as the major transit country between Europe
and China. Moreover, after the BTKR will be commissioned this year,
Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries will not be depend on the
Iranian Razi-Sarakhs railway for trade transit to Europe.
The BTKR project is thus intended to bring the region more autonomy
vis-à-vis both Iran and Russia. However, especially in light of
Moscow's proposed Eurasian Union, Russia will plausibly seek to
challenge the project via efforts to undermine unity among the AGT
states that is grounded in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum projects.
Whereas the SCR does not directly overshadow the BTKR perspectives, it
slams Azerbaijan's interest in marginalizing Armenia, fuels tension
between Tbilisi and Baku and hence provokes AGT disunity. In this
context, the questions Ivanishvili has raised regarding the benefits
generating from the BTKR and the possibility of restoring the SCR
could weaken the existing confidence between the AGT states and may
trigger realignment in the region.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5915