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Azerbaijan: Difficult Year Ahead
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 6
January 14, 2013 04:16 PM Age: 27 days
By: Anar Valiyev
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (L) and Georgian Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili in Baku, December 26, 2012 (Source: Bidzina
Ivanishvili Facebook page)
Several key developments in 2012 had a tremendous impact on Azerbaijan
and its foreign policy. First of all, the `reelection' of Vladimir
Putin as president of Russian could be considered one of the major
events that influenced Azerbaijan. Putin's triumphal return buried the
last hopes of some Azerbaijani idealists that Russia would take a
neutral position in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Instead,
the negotiation process on the resolution of the Karabakh conflict
stalled and reverted to where it was four years ago.
Moreover, Azerbaijan's stance over the Gabala Radar Station greatly
irritated the Russian establishment. Azerbaijan had been leasing the
Gabala site to Russia since 2002. The lease expired in 2012, and the
Russian side was urging Azerbaijan to extend it for another 25 years.
The Russian government intended to substitute the old station with a
new mobile, modular station, specifically mentioning that the new,
second station would be the property of Russia. In response,
Azerbaijan then increased its proposed leasing fee by 40 times,
demanding $300 million from Russia instead of the current annual rate
of $7 million. However, none of the visits by high-ranking Russian
authorities were able to force Baku to yield to Moscow's demands.
Finally, Russia gave up all efforts and withdrew from Gabala by the
end of the year
(http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2012/12/russia-to-cease-using-gabala-radar.html).
Another important event that affected Azerbaijani politics was the
agreement signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey to construct the
Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) with further connection to
European markets. Natural gas shipments through TANAP would disrupt
Russia's gas monopoly in Central and Eastern Europe and diminish
Moscow's role as energy supplier to Europe. With this pipeline,
Azerbaijan will thus be able to help bolster the energy security of
Eastern and Central European countries.
Last but not least the election of Bidzina Ivanishvili as prime
minister of neighboring Georgia had a strong effect on Azerbaijan
itself. After the elections, Ivanishvili made several statements
doubting the construction of the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railroad being
built across the South Caucasus. The new Georgian prime minister also
criticized the energy policy of his country's previous government
(Civil Georgia, December 21, 2012). Such statements could endanger
Azerbaijani energy and transportation projects in Georgia and,
therefore, worried Baku. However, after visiting Azerbaijan on
December 26, Ivanishvili retracted his previous statements and spoke
positively about future cooperation between the two countries (Georgia
Today, December 27, 2012). Nevertheless, Baku remains cautious about
Ivanishvili and continues to closely watch the political development
in Georgia.
Azerbaijan will face presidential elections in October of 2013, and
outside powers may use this event to put pressure on Baku. Russia
would hardly be interested in President Ilham Aliyev losing power
since Moscow does not want to destabilize the situation in Azerbaijan.
Russia perfectly understands that stability in Azerbaijan is the key
to stability in the neighboring, volatile Dagestan region where Avar
and Lezgin separatism could take an irreversible course. Nevertheless,
Russia will try to maximize Aliyev's possible vulnerability. With
political uncertainty in Georgia, Azerbaijan remains the only state in
the former Soviet Union (except for the Baltic States) that is
conducting a policy contradictory to Russian interests. Whether it is
the intention of Azerbaijan's State Oil Company (SOCAR) to build an
oil refinery in Kyrgyzstan that would help this Central Asian country
to gain energy security, or rushing to save the Belarusian enterprise
Belaruskaliy from being privatized by the Russian government through a
Kremlin-controlled oligarch, Baku has acted independently without
looking to Moscow. Such policies cannot continue forever and it is
expected that the Kremlin will sooner or later turn its attention
toward Azerbaijan.
It cannot be ruled out that, in order to put pressure on Azerbaijan
during the elections, Russia will use several old and traditional
tools. First, the Russian establishment may use the Karabakh conflict
and the fear of a resumption of war. Russia could easily initiate
military clashes on the contact line between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
for example, to send a certain signal to Baku. Of course, the military
clashes would not be allowed to turn into a full-scale war since that
would undermine Russian efforts to maintain the status quo.
Nonetheless, fresh hostilities would add pressure on the Azerbaijani
establishment. Second, as in Yeltsin's time, Moscow may put pressure
on Azerbaijani labors migrants and create bureaucratic hurdles for
them at border crossings and checkpoints. A consequent return of
hundreds of thousands Azerbaijani migrant laborers from Russia is one
of the nightmares of Azerbaijan's government. Third, Russia will
continue to prolong negotiations over the Caspian Sea's status as long
as the talks of the Trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to
Azerbaijan and further to Europe remains on the agenda.
One also cannot exclude the possibility that Georgia under Ivanishvili
will slowly become more pro-Russian. In its turn, and bolstered by
such developments in Tbilisi, Moscow may act to endanger Azerbaijani
energy and transportation projects. Furthermore, continued
international pressure on Iran and the possibility of military strikes
against Azerbaijan's southern neighbor remain one of the problematic
areas for Baku. Tehran, on the other hand, continues to watch
Azerbaijan closely and from time to time warns Baku to `behave'
properly. Azerbaijan will hardly participate in military actions
directed against Iran. But nevertheless, any scenario involving armed
strikes against Tehran will have a tremendous impact on Baku such as
refugee flows, possible retaliatory attacks or the threat of domestic
political violence instigated by Iranian agents inside Azerbaijan.
Overall, 2013 is expected to be difficult for Azerbaijan. Continued
and mounting Russian political pressure, uncertainty over Iranian,
Armenian provocations and Western indifference to the region will
definitely make this upcoming year quite challenging for Baku to
navigate.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40301&tx_ttnews[backPid]=620
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 6
January 14, 2013 04:16 PM Age: 27 days
By: Anar Valiyev
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (L) and Georgian Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili in Baku, December 26, 2012 (Source: Bidzina
Ivanishvili Facebook page)
Several key developments in 2012 had a tremendous impact on Azerbaijan
and its foreign policy. First of all, the `reelection' of Vladimir
Putin as president of Russian could be considered one of the major
events that influenced Azerbaijan. Putin's triumphal return buried the
last hopes of some Azerbaijani idealists that Russia would take a
neutral position in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Instead,
the negotiation process on the resolution of the Karabakh conflict
stalled and reverted to where it was four years ago.
Moreover, Azerbaijan's stance over the Gabala Radar Station greatly
irritated the Russian establishment. Azerbaijan had been leasing the
Gabala site to Russia since 2002. The lease expired in 2012, and the
Russian side was urging Azerbaijan to extend it for another 25 years.
The Russian government intended to substitute the old station with a
new mobile, modular station, specifically mentioning that the new,
second station would be the property of Russia. In response,
Azerbaijan then increased its proposed leasing fee by 40 times,
demanding $300 million from Russia instead of the current annual rate
of $7 million. However, none of the visits by high-ranking Russian
authorities were able to force Baku to yield to Moscow's demands.
Finally, Russia gave up all efforts and withdrew from Gabala by the
end of the year
(http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2012/12/russia-to-cease-using-gabala-radar.html).
Another important event that affected Azerbaijani politics was the
agreement signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey to construct the
Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) with further connection to
European markets. Natural gas shipments through TANAP would disrupt
Russia's gas monopoly in Central and Eastern Europe and diminish
Moscow's role as energy supplier to Europe. With this pipeline,
Azerbaijan will thus be able to help bolster the energy security of
Eastern and Central European countries.
Last but not least the election of Bidzina Ivanishvili as prime
minister of neighboring Georgia had a strong effect on Azerbaijan
itself. After the elections, Ivanishvili made several statements
doubting the construction of the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railroad being
built across the South Caucasus. The new Georgian prime minister also
criticized the energy policy of his country's previous government
(Civil Georgia, December 21, 2012). Such statements could endanger
Azerbaijani energy and transportation projects in Georgia and,
therefore, worried Baku. However, after visiting Azerbaijan on
December 26, Ivanishvili retracted his previous statements and spoke
positively about future cooperation between the two countries (Georgia
Today, December 27, 2012). Nevertheless, Baku remains cautious about
Ivanishvili and continues to closely watch the political development
in Georgia.
Azerbaijan will face presidential elections in October of 2013, and
outside powers may use this event to put pressure on Baku. Russia
would hardly be interested in President Ilham Aliyev losing power
since Moscow does not want to destabilize the situation in Azerbaijan.
Russia perfectly understands that stability in Azerbaijan is the key
to stability in the neighboring, volatile Dagestan region where Avar
and Lezgin separatism could take an irreversible course. Nevertheless,
Russia will try to maximize Aliyev's possible vulnerability. With
political uncertainty in Georgia, Azerbaijan remains the only state in
the former Soviet Union (except for the Baltic States) that is
conducting a policy contradictory to Russian interests. Whether it is
the intention of Azerbaijan's State Oil Company (SOCAR) to build an
oil refinery in Kyrgyzstan that would help this Central Asian country
to gain energy security, or rushing to save the Belarusian enterprise
Belaruskaliy from being privatized by the Russian government through a
Kremlin-controlled oligarch, Baku has acted independently without
looking to Moscow. Such policies cannot continue forever and it is
expected that the Kremlin will sooner or later turn its attention
toward Azerbaijan.
It cannot be ruled out that, in order to put pressure on Azerbaijan
during the elections, Russia will use several old and traditional
tools. First, the Russian establishment may use the Karabakh conflict
and the fear of a resumption of war. Russia could easily initiate
military clashes on the contact line between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
for example, to send a certain signal to Baku. Of course, the military
clashes would not be allowed to turn into a full-scale war since that
would undermine Russian efforts to maintain the status quo.
Nonetheless, fresh hostilities would add pressure on the Azerbaijani
establishment. Second, as in Yeltsin's time, Moscow may put pressure
on Azerbaijani labors migrants and create bureaucratic hurdles for
them at border crossings and checkpoints. A consequent return of
hundreds of thousands Azerbaijani migrant laborers from Russia is one
of the nightmares of Azerbaijan's government. Third, Russia will
continue to prolong negotiations over the Caspian Sea's status as long
as the talks of the Trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to
Azerbaijan and further to Europe remains on the agenda.
One also cannot exclude the possibility that Georgia under Ivanishvili
will slowly become more pro-Russian. In its turn, and bolstered by
such developments in Tbilisi, Moscow may act to endanger Azerbaijani
energy and transportation projects. Furthermore, continued
international pressure on Iran and the possibility of military strikes
against Azerbaijan's southern neighbor remain one of the problematic
areas for Baku. Tehran, on the other hand, continues to watch
Azerbaijan closely and from time to time warns Baku to `behave'
properly. Azerbaijan will hardly participate in military actions
directed against Iran. But nevertheless, any scenario involving armed
strikes against Tehran will have a tremendous impact on Baku such as
refugee flows, possible retaliatory attacks or the threat of domestic
political violence instigated by Iranian agents inside Azerbaijan.
Overall, 2013 is expected to be difficult for Azerbaijan. Continued
and mounting Russian political pressure, uncertainty over Iranian,
Armenian provocations and Western indifference to the region will
definitely make this upcoming year quite challenging for Baku to
navigate.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40301&tx_ttnews[backPid]=620