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FOUR MYTHS BEHIND END OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN AZERBAIJAN
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 12 2013
Last week, the joint Azerbaijani-Russian working group held a meeting
in Gabala to discuss the withdrawal of Russian equipment from the
Gabala radar station and the final completion date of its operation,
following Russia's declaration last December that Baku and Moscow
had not reached a lease agreement and that the latter was going to
close its military installation in Gabala.
However, for many analysts and politicians, the question remains
whether Russia may return asking for a new agreement. Indeed the
most discussed questions are "Why did Russia leave?" and "What is
the price of its exit?"
Arguably, looking at the last three or four months, which have seen
tensions growing between Russia and Azerbaijan, Moscow has fairly
openly sought to increase tensions in Azerbaijan through non-official
channels, notably by attempts to destabilize the ethno-political
dynamics. Two months after the mutually affirmed closure, many things
remain unclear and myths around this issue abound. I have selected
four of the most prevalent myths surrounding the question of why
Russia left Gabala.
#1 Russia called Azerbaijan's bluff
The first myth is that Azerbaijan raised the annual rent for the
Gabala Radar Station (GRS) from $7 million to $300 million because
Baku wanted to increase its political leverage over Russia. Following
Vladimir Putin's return to office there were concerns that Moscow
would not push forward with active negotiations on the resolution of
the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and would support
Armenia. Thus one could say, yes, Azerbaijan did bluff, raising the
annual rent to $300 million. Interestingly, the Russian Ministry of
Defense leaked this amount to the media in mid-2012, when negotiations
were secret.
It later became clear that Moscow was using the Russian media to put
Azerbaijan under pressure. After mid-2012, Moscow revealed certain
ethnic and political cards that could be played to Baku's disadvantage
-- and indicated that it was ready to use them to gain traction in
the Gabala negotiations. However, it is not fair to say that Baku's
strategy of bluffing backfired in that it provoked this reaction;
rather, Russia's strategy of pressuring Baku backfired, giving rise
to a change in the latter's approach, notably with regard to its
cooperation with Moscow.
#2 Russia left because Gabala is outdated and it has plans to build
new radar stations
Russia is currently operating three Voronezh-type HDR radars: Armavir,
Lekhtusi and Kaliningrad, although the last will only become fully
operational in 2014. The fourth radar station is under construction
at Mishelevka near Irkutsk, and the fifth station will be the second
stage of Armavir. All of these are better equipped than Gabala.
However, here is the misunderstanding: Gabala's geographical location
gives it a number of unique advantages from a military and technical
point of view. As retired Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov stated, several
months before abandoning the Gabala agreement, "If we leave Gabala,
the Voronezh-type radar at Armavir will not be able to take over all
of its functions." The loss of Gabala is significant as it means
that Russia has lost its presence in Azerbaijan and, secondly,
two stations are better than one; i.e., if the one station fails,
the other can take over.
#3 Azerbaijan tried to raise the rent and negotiations failed as
a result
The problem with this interpretation is that while the argument that
the GRS poses a serious environmental threat was true, it was not as
strong as the other strategic arguments. For Azerbaijan, money was
not the motivating factor. The real reason was that Moscow wanted
to change two conditions, neither of which was acceptable to Baku:
First, the duration of the lease agreement and, second, the content
of the agreement. In 2002, both sides signed an agreement whereby the
GRS was approved as an "analytical information center," but Russia
wanted to change its status to that of a military base -- in fact,
to make it part of its anti-ballistic missile system (ABM).
Also, the Moscow-led military organization, the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), agreed last December on the creation
of collective ABMs on CSTO territories, essentially enabling member
countries to use its ABM-type military bases on a common basis. This
would have meant in theory that Moscow would allow Armenia to use the
GRS. All of the above posed real threats -- politically, military and
strategically -- to Azerbaijan's security. In light of this, it is
interesting that before abandoning the GRS agreement on Dec. 5, 2012,
the Azerbaijani leadership boycotted the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) summit.
#4 Azerbaijan will give the GRS to either Turkey or the US and will
use it against Iran
This old myth was revived in the Iranian and Russian media after the
GRS agreement was abandoned. First of all, when Moscow offered the
US joint use of the GRS in 2007, in return for Washington halting
the establishment of ABMs in Eastern Europe, the US declined. The US
already has a powerful system of satellite sensors and radar stations
in the Middle East -- in Kuwait and Bahrain, for example -- as well
as Hawkeye and other Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft, which have greater capabilities than the GRS.
In Turkey's case, the situation is the same. The Turkish military is
part of the NATO system, and it uses this system whenever necessary.
While it is true that Gabala hosted the Azerbaijan-Turkey High-Level
Strategic Cooperation Council meeting when Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyıp Erdogan visited Azerbaijan in September 2012, Azerbaijan did
not issue any kind of tacit threat to Russia about leasing the GRS
to Turkey.
Giving the GRS to Israel is even less likely than the abovementioned
scenarios, and in one sense, the Iranian media's "soft" response
indicated that Iran did not seriously think it was a possibility. In
the Caucasus, the Iranian response is a good measure of the seriousness
and scope of the military issues. Finally, these four myths will remain
myths; the reality is that Russia has left Gabala and Azerbaijan will
not host any Russian military base or personnel on its territory.
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 12 2013
Last week, the joint Azerbaijani-Russian working group held a meeting
in Gabala to discuss the withdrawal of Russian equipment from the
Gabala radar station and the final completion date of its operation,
following Russia's declaration last December that Baku and Moscow
had not reached a lease agreement and that the latter was going to
close its military installation in Gabala.
However, for many analysts and politicians, the question remains
whether Russia may return asking for a new agreement. Indeed the
most discussed questions are "Why did Russia leave?" and "What is
the price of its exit?"
Arguably, looking at the last three or four months, which have seen
tensions growing between Russia and Azerbaijan, Moscow has fairly
openly sought to increase tensions in Azerbaijan through non-official
channels, notably by attempts to destabilize the ethno-political
dynamics. Two months after the mutually affirmed closure, many things
remain unclear and myths around this issue abound. I have selected
four of the most prevalent myths surrounding the question of why
Russia left Gabala.
#1 Russia called Azerbaijan's bluff
The first myth is that Azerbaijan raised the annual rent for the
Gabala Radar Station (GRS) from $7 million to $300 million because
Baku wanted to increase its political leverage over Russia. Following
Vladimir Putin's return to office there were concerns that Moscow
would not push forward with active negotiations on the resolution of
the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and would support
Armenia. Thus one could say, yes, Azerbaijan did bluff, raising the
annual rent to $300 million. Interestingly, the Russian Ministry of
Defense leaked this amount to the media in mid-2012, when negotiations
were secret.
It later became clear that Moscow was using the Russian media to put
Azerbaijan under pressure. After mid-2012, Moscow revealed certain
ethnic and political cards that could be played to Baku's disadvantage
-- and indicated that it was ready to use them to gain traction in
the Gabala negotiations. However, it is not fair to say that Baku's
strategy of bluffing backfired in that it provoked this reaction;
rather, Russia's strategy of pressuring Baku backfired, giving rise
to a change in the latter's approach, notably with regard to its
cooperation with Moscow.
#2 Russia left because Gabala is outdated and it has plans to build
new radar stations
Russia is currently operating three Voronezh-type HDR radars: Armavir,
Lekhtusi and Kaliningrad, although the last will only become fully
operational in 2014. The fourth radar station is under construction
at Mishelevka near Irkutsk, and the fifth station will be the second
stage of Armavir. All of these are better equipped than Gabala.
However, here is the misunderstanding: Gabala's geographical location
gives it a number of unique advantages from a military and technical
point of view. As retired Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov stated, several
months before abandoning the Gabala agreement, "If we leave Gabala,
the Voronezh-type radar at Armavir will not be able to take over all
of its functions." The loss of Gabala is significant as it means
that Russia has lost its presence in Azerbaijan and, secondly,
two stations are better than one; i.e., if the one station fails,
the other can take over.
#3 Azerbaijan tried to raise the rent and negotiations failed as
a result
The problem with this interpretation is that while the argument that
the GRS poses a serious environmental threat was true, it was not as
strong as the other strategic arguments. For Azerbaijan, money was
not the motivating factor. The real reason was that Moscow wanted
to change two conditions, neither of which was acceptable to Baku:
First, the duration of the lease agreement and, second, the content
of the agreement. In 2002, both sides signed an agreement whereby the
GRS was approved as an "analytical information center," but Russia
wanted to change its status to that of a military base -- in fact,
to make it part of its anti-ballistic missile system (ABM).
Also, the Moscow-led military organization, the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), agreed last December on the creation
of collective ABMs on CSTO territories, essentially enabling member
countries to use its ABM-type military bases on a common basis. This
would have meant in theory that Moscow would allow Armenia to use the
GRS. All of the above posed real threats -- politically, military and
strategically -- to Azerbaijan's security. In light of this, it is
interesting that before abandoning the GRS agreement on Dec. 5, 2012,
the Azerbaijani leadership boycotted the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) summit.
#4 Azerbaijan will give the GRS to either Turkey or the US and will
use it against Iran
This old myth was revived in the Iranian and Russian media after the
GRS agreement was abandoned. First of all, when Moscow offered the
US joint use of the GRS in 2007, in return for Washington halting
the establishment of ABMs in Eastern Europe, the US declined. The US
already has a powerful system of satellite sensors and radar stations
in the Middle East -- in Kuwait and Bahrain, for example -- as well
as Hawkeye and other Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft, which have greater capabilities than the GRS.
In Turkey's case, the situation is the same. The Turkish military is
part of the NATO system, and it uses this system whenever necessary.
While it is true that Gabala hosted the Azerbaijan-Turkey High-Level
Strategic Cooperation Council meeting when Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyıp Erdogan visited Azerbaijan in September 2012, Azerbaijan did
not issue any kind of tacit threat to Russia about leasing the GRS
to Turkey.
Giving the GRS to Israel is even less likely than the abovementioned
scenarios, and in one sense, the Iranian media's "soft" response
indicated that Iran did not seriously think it was a possibility. In
the Caucasus, the Iranian response is a good measure of the seriousness
and scope of the military issues. Finally, these four myths will remain
myths; the reality is that Russia has left Gabala and Azerbaijan will
not host any Russian military base or personnel on its territory.