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No radical changes will occur in Armenia's foreign policy after elections
Mon 18 February 2013 07:49 GMT | 7:49 Local Time
News.Az interviews Yuri Sigov, political scientist, expert for issues
of Caucasus and Central Asia.
Can we expect any significant changes in the foreign policy of Armenia
depending on the outcomes of the presidential elections in Armenia?
I think that the winner was known in advance and no radical changes
will occur in the foreign policy of Armenia following the elections
(if certainly, the military conflict around Nagorno Karabakh does not
erupt). In fact, Armenia demonstrates little will to change something
or to change the vector of actions in the foreign policy but much here
will depend on the relations of Yerevan with the neighbors. Here much
will depend on the stiff pressure of Azerbaijan on Karabakh and the
outcomes of this Premier-President diarchy in Georgia (not speaking
about the story with the Iranian nuclear program). After all, tensions
in neighbor states will have a direct impact on Armenia.
One of the main postulates in the election campaign of incumbent
president of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan became the promise to launch the
airport built in occupied Nagorno Karabakh soon. Do you think this
step may affect the situation in the region?
Karabakh is a chronically painful political issue for not only
Azerbaijan but also Armenia. In fact, Yerevan benefits from keeping
the situation in the current status quo and supports the forces
backing its policy in Nagorno Karabakh. Therefore, the matter here is
not about the opening of the airport (which will naturally raise
tensions in the region) but that each party to the conflict seeks to
show its own irreconcilability and principality to its neighbors. But
the matter is about the degree this irreconcilability will be
demonstrated and the reaction of the opposite side.
This year is the year of elections in not only Armenia but also
Azerbaijan. Does it mean that the year of 2013 can be considered
`written off' in terms of settlement of regional problems, like many
analysts believe?
No influential superpower is likely to deal with the Caucasian
problems in the nearest future. The United States and Europe have
their own domestic businesses while Russia has no clear vision on
Caucasus about what to do further and how to build its relations with
countries quite different for their policies. In this connection, the
hands of the South Caucasus countries are untied if they seek to
settle protracted regional conflict as Nagorno Karabakh or change
their political development vector (like in case with Georgia).
Meanwhile, foreign powers will hardly interfere, if certainly the
full-scale hostilities do not erupt in the region, which may occur
only in Karabakh direction.
By the way, I cannot but ask you, as a great expert in US policy,
about your opinion of the views of Obama's new team on South Caucasus.
Will the United States continue the previous course of quite weak
attention to this region or we can expect a definite intensification
here?
The new foreign policy team in Obama's administration causes my great
skepticism and distrust and I'm going to explain the reason. They look
like `political weightlifters', while in fact they are all extremely
discrepant and ambiguous figures.
Former senator J.Kerry, who seems quite respected, but advocates quite
vague and unclear foreign policy views (conditionally, he is either
for peace in the world or ready to punish `the rebels) and this makes
the US policy mostly impulsive and low predictable.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is even more discrepant figure since he
is ready `not to strike against Iran' (though before that the US
military was already preparing for an offensive against Tehran (at the
order of their political leadership) and is not ready to provide
determined support to Israel (again for the US military such unclear
formulations of who is an enemy and who is an ally introduce quite a
serious discomfort).
And the advisor for national security of the President Tom Donilo is
extremely ambitious and rather makes use of the president's personal
trust than is really aware of the state of affairs in the
international arena and, certainly, realizing how to react on them.
It will be quite difficult to find any correct, clear and reasonable
decisions on the foreign policy front of the White House
administration. And this will have a direct impact on other countries
that deal with America, both as partners in cooperation and as enemies
and potential opponents.
We would like learn your opinion about the new US Secretary John
Kerry. During his activity as a senator, he was actively supporting US
interests and in the early 1990s Kerry became the initiator of the
notorious Appendix 907 to the act on support of freedom prohibiting
the direct assistance to Azerbaijan by the US government. Will the
previous views of the new state secretary affect the US foreign policy
in the South Caucasus?
John Kerry theoretically knows the Caucasian affairs not too bad, but
he never dealt with it in detail (there has never been a need for
that). The US policy in this region remains the same-if only there
would be no war for Karabakh or the new Russian-Georgian war for South
Ossetia or Abkhazia (which is highly unlikely). Also it is important
for the United States to ensure the flow of Caspian oil and gas in the
European direction stably and, more desirably, bypassing Russia. If
so, Washington's interference with the regional affairs will be
minimal and Caucasus should not count on Kerry's special attention.
But if the situation grows strainer there, the State Secretary will
not remain aside and will be obliged to turn to the region and its
problems on the level of negotiations.
F.H.
News.Az
Mon 18 February 2013 07:49 GMT | 7:49 Local Time
News.Az interviews Yuri Sigov, political scientist, expert for issues
of Caucasus and Central Asia.
Can we expect any significant changes in the foreign policy of Armenia
depending on the outcomes of the presidential elections in Armenia?
I think that the winner was known in advance and no radical changes
will occur in the foreign policy of Armenia following the elections
(if certainly, the military conflict around Nagorno Karabakh does not
erupt). In fact, Armenia demonstrates little will to change something
or to change the vector of actions in the foreign policy but much here
will depend on the relations of Yerevan with the neighbors. Here much
will depend on the stiff pressure of Azerbaijan on Karabakh and the
outcomes of this Premier-President diarchy in Georgia (not speaking
about the story with the Iranian nuclear program). After all, tensions
in neighbor states will have a direct impact on Armenia.
One of the main postulates in the election campaign of incumbent
president of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan became the promise to launch the
airport built in occupied Nagorno Karabakh soon. Do you think this
step may affect the situation in the region?
Karabakh is a chronically painful political issue for not only
Azerbaijan but also Armenia. In fact, Yerevan benefits from keeping
the situation in the current status quo and supports the forces
backing its policy in Nagorno Karabakh. Therefore, the matter here is
not about the opening of the airport (which will naturally raise
tensions in the region) but that each party to the conflict seeks to
show its own irreconcilability and principality to its neighbors. But
the matter is about the degree this irreconcilability will be
demonstrated and the reaction of the opposite side.
This year is the year of elections in not only Armenia but also
Azerbaijan. Does it mean that the year of 2013 can be considered
`written off' in terms of settlement of regional problems, like many
analysts believe?
No influential superpower is likely to deal with the Caucasian
problems in the nearest future. The United States and Europe have
their own domestic businesses while Russia has no clear vision on
Caucasus about what to do further and how to build its relations with
countries quite different for their policies. In this connection, the
hands of the South Caucasus countries are untied if they seek to
settle protracted regional conflict as Nagorno Karabakh or change
their political development vector (like in case with Georgia).
Meanwhile, foreign powers will hardly interfere, if certainly the
full-scale hostilities do not erupt in the region, which may occur
only in Karabakh direction.
By the way, I cannot but ask you, as a great expert in US policy,
about your opinion of the views of Obama's new team on South Caucasus.
Will the United States continue the previous course of quite weak
attention to this region or we can expect a definite intensification
here?
The new foreign policy team in Obama's administration causes my great
skepticism and distrust and I'm going to explain the reason. They look
like `political weightlifters', while in fact they are all extremely
discrepant and ambiguous figures.
Former senator J.Kerry, who seems quite respected, but advocates quite
vague and unclear foreign policy views (conditionally, he is either
for peace in the world or ready to punish `the rebels) and this makes
the US policy mostly impulsive and low predictable.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is even more discrepant figure since he
is ready `not to strike against Iran' (though before that the US
military was already preparing for an offensive against Tehran (at the
order of their political leadership) and is not ready to provide
determined support to Israel (again for the US military such unclear
formulations of who is an enemy and who is an ally introduce quite a
serious discomfort).
And the advisor for national security of the President Tom Donilo is
extremely ambitious and rather makes use of the president's personal
trust than is really aware of the state of affairs in the
international arena and, certainly, realizing how to react on them.
It will be quite difficult to find any correct, clear and reasonable
decisions on the foreign policy front of the White House
administration. And this will have a direct impact on other countries
that deal with America, both as partners in cooperation and as enemies
and potential opponents.
We would like learn your opinion about the new US Secretary John
Kerry. During his activity as a senator, he was actively supporting US
interests and in the early 1990s Kerry became the initiator of the
notorious Appendix 907 to the act on support of freedom prohibiting
the direct assistance to Azerbaijan by the US government. Will the
previous views of the new state secretary affect the US foreign policy
in the South Caucasus?
John Kerry theoretically knows the Caucasian affairs not too bad, but
he never dealt with it in detail (there has never been a need for
that). The US policy in this region remains the same-if only there
would be no war for Karabakh or the new Russian-Georgian war for South
Ossetia or Abkhazia (which is highly unlikely). Also it is important
for the United States to ensure the flow of Caspian oil and gas in the
European direction stably and, more desirably, bypassing Russia. If
so, Washington's interference with the regional affairs will be
minimal and Caucasus should not count on Kerry's special attention.
But if the situation grows strainer there, the State Secretary will
not remain aside and will be obliged to turn to the region and its
problems on the level of negotiations.
F.H.
News.Az