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PROBLEMS OF RUSSIA-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS
Simon Kiladze
http://eng.expertclub.ge/portal/cnid__13212/alias__Expertclub/lang__en/tabid__2546/default.aspx
11/01/2013 15:59
Conclusion
Additional motivation was that for prolongation of the agreement Moscow
offered Baku far less for rent than it paid before. According to some
Russian military experts, the Gabala Radar Station lost its former
strategic importance, and over time, its efficiency was reducing,
devices were wearing out and breaking down, and it was very costly to
replace them that it would have been better to transfer the functions
of Gabala radar to a new station in the North Caucasus (Armavir)
construction of which has practically already been completed.
Apparently, the Russian government has taken into account both
"wavering" position of Azerbaijan, and the opinion of Russian military
experts, and stoped using the radar. The Russian Federation sent
a corresponding note to the Azerbaijan side, according to which
on December 10th, 2012 operation of the station was stopped and
respectively, the agreement signed ten years ago was declared expired.
We cannot say that Russia was not interested in Gabala. It was Moscow's
interest that led to a visit to Azerbaijan of the Vice Premier of the
Russian Government (curator of the defense sector) Dmitry Rogozin that
took place on August 15-16th, 2012, when he met with President Ilham
Aliyev. Although, the meeting was confidential, according to leaked
information the parties could not agree on the price of the lease.
Azerbaijani political analysts believe that the delay in deciding the
fate of the Gabala Radar Station was due to bargaining between Putin
and Aliyev, but the role of money in this matter was only formal. The
main thing is that both parties have used this military facility to
resolve foreign policy issues. Ilham Aliyev's interest was to force
Russia to make a positive step in resolving the Karabakh conflict,
and Vladimir Putin sought to use the Gabala Radar Station as a trump
card in case Azerbaijan was to really threaten Russia's ally Armenia
with a war.
What will happen next? Will the Gabala factor worsen the
Azerbaijan-Russia relations? Expert opinions vary. Some believe that
this will not worsen the relations, while others, on the contrary,
claim that the events surrounding the Gabala radar indicate problems
between the two countries, that in the future are likely to multiply.
Azerbaijan is leaning more and more toward the West and its cooperation
with NATO is deepening. Symptoms of "cooling" of relations between
Baku and Moscow are already visible - instead of President Ilham
Aliyev the CIS summit in Ashgabat, held on December 5 was attended
by Prime Minister Artur Rasi-zade.
The Gabala Radar Station is a complex military facility, operation of
which requires a lot of experience and expertise. It is a fact that
Baku can not use that facility. They will have to find a new tenant
for the station, naturally, among countries - members of NATO. So
who will it be - the United States or Turkey?
In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his U.S. counterpart
George W. Bush to jointly use the Gabala station instead of deploying
the U.S. radar in the Czech Republic. The U.S. almost agreed to use
the radar together with Russia, but later declined. The same fate
befell the initiative of Moscow that was put forward by Russia at
the Lisbon Summit in 2010 to make the Gabala station a part of the
joint missile defence system.
Turkey is not interested in using the Gabala station as the outdated
and also expensive facility would be an unnecessary burden on its
economy. This assumption is confirmed by the results of the meeting
of President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, held September 11, 2012 in the town of Gabala, near the
military facility. Apparently, during the negotiations Turkey refused
the Azerbaijan offer to operate the radar. Obviously, even if foreign
tenants are found they cannot, for obvious reasons, fully operate the
Russian-made radar and neither will they be able to use it against
Russia, as a remote control of anti-missile system is in Moscow.
In the end, it seems, after some time, when Russia takes out special
equipment of the station, a question of using this object in the
non-military, peaceful purposes will be definitely put on the agenda.
In favour of this version speaks the fact that development of
tourism and agricultural infrastructure is planned in the Gabala
region. There is already a project for cultivation of 52 hectares of
the area which is now occupied by the station. As for the building
itself, it can accommodate a research institution, or it may become
a tourist attraction.
Problem Four: Supply of Russian weapons to Armenia
Another problem in the Azerbaijan-Russia relations is supply of
Russian arms to Armenia. By assumption of Azerbaijani experts, at the
meeting of Ilham Aliyev and Dmitry Rogozin the issue of the purchase
of the Russian arms and supply of Ukrainian arms to Armenia was also
discussed. Interestingly, the visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister
was preceded by a scandal regarding military relations between Kiev
and Yerevan: as it turns out, Ukraine, that assures Azerbaijan of its
friendship (because of future import of Caspian oil and gas) secretly
from Baku supplied the BUK missile system to Armenia. But this is
nothing compared to the fact that Russia also supplies weapons to
Armenia both to equip the Armenian army, and for the 102nd military
base in Gyumri. (At present, the Russian base is equipped with Russian
anti-aircraft system "S-300" and fighters "MIG-29." Number of personnel
of the military base is 5000 soldiers).
The Gyumri military base confirms the presence of Russia in the South
Caucasus, which is a dangerous factor for Azerbaijan. Therefore,
sensitivity of Baku to the issue of arms supply to its neighbour
is quite obvious: Armenia is its enemy and military adversary, and
at the same time - the strategic partner of Russia. Let us suppose
that Azerbaijan declared war to Armenia. In this case, presumably,
the personnel of the 102nd base and weapons will be used against
Azerbaijan. All the more that Armenia and Russia are members of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Charter of which
states that in case of declaration of war by a third country to one of
its members (take for example Azerbaijan - Armenia) all others (and
first of all Russia ) must come to the aid of the victim (Armenia)
(against Azerbaijan).
Interesting is the question of equipping of the Gyumri military base.
At present, according to Azerbaijani sources, Russia carries out
provision of the said military facility with manpower, weapons and
other ammunition through the territory of Asia and Iran - due to
blockage of the Transcaucasian transport communications passing
through the territory of Georgia (the Abkhazian section of the
Georgian railway). That is very expensive for Russia. In addition,
the transit of military cargo through the territory of foreign
countries increases the risk factor. That is why Russia would benefit
from restoration of the railway movement on the Abkhazian section,
which was discussed by official Tbilisi as one of the key factors in
improving the Georgian-Russian relations and the settlement of the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.
Problem five: Azerbaijan in the context of Russia-Iran relations
If we look at the map of the Caucasus and the Caspian region,
we note that Azerbaijan is "wedged" between Russia and Iran. The
fact is that in spite of the "cooling" of the recent relations
between Moscow and Tehran, the relationship still remains close. On
the international arena Russia permanently defends Iranian nuclear
projects, Russia is a member of the transport corridor "North-South"
in which Iran also is actively involved, positions of Russia and
Iran also coincide in the matter of definition of the status of the
Caspian Sea. While Azerbaijan has its problems with Iran, namely,
the issue of Azeri-language provinces of Iran. In addition, the
position of Baku is different from those of Moscow and Iran on the
Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan clearly does not like military manoeuvres of
the West against Iran in the Caspian Sea. As Baku is concerned that
in case of beginning of military actions by the West against Iran
Russia will try to use its land and sea territory.
Of course, we should not think that there are just problems in the
Russian-Azerbaijani relations solution of which are not expected
in the short term. On the contrary, in recent years, after some
attempts and bilateral efforts, a number of inter-state disputes were
successfully resolved. For example, the question of delimitation and
demarcation of the state border, the problem of the legal status
of inhabitants of the Russian enclaves in Azerbaijan - Khrakhuba
and Uryanuba decision on which had been delayed for years. Also, it
should be noted that against the backdrop of the above issues, trade
and economic relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are developing
very rapidly. In 2011 trade turnover between the countries amounted
to almost three billion dollars, which is a significant increase
compared to the previous period.
On the basis of the above, we can make a brief summary and some
conclusions:
So far Russia's foreign policy toward Azerbaijan has encountered
some problems, Moscow has no conceptual understanding of relations
with this country, which is a significant barrier in the relations
of the two neighbouring countries. Clearly, these challenges have a
permanent character;
The most difficult problem is the Karabakh conflict, during the
process of settlement of which Moscow resorts to a double standard.
Accordingly, if Russia does not change its policy towards Armenia, does
not reduce its solidarity with this country, distrust of Azerbaijan
towards Moscow will not be neutralized;
It is possible that Russia could use "Iranian lever" against Azerbaijan
- to turn a blind eye to "mistakes" made by Tehran in the sphere of
protection of the rights of Azerbaijan, and in the discussion of the
problems of the Caspian Sea, to counterbalance the position of Baku
act in tandem with Iran;
In turn, Azerbaijan has the potential to successfully use the
confrontation between Russia and the West, and on this background
implement its interests. It is a fact that there is a very strong
Armenian lobby in the U.S., at the same time, the West needs
Azerbaijan's energy resources, and if Baku once again reaches out to
Moscow, thus Aliyev will show the West alternative. But if Russia
will continue strategic cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan may
refuse mediation of Russia and move fully to the West.
Simon Kiladze
http://eng.expertclub.ge/portal/cnid__13212/alias__Expertclub/lang__en/tabid__2546/default.aspx
11/01/2013 15:59
Conclusion
Additional motivation was that for prolongation of the agreement Moscow
offered Baku far less for rent than it paid before. According to some
Russian military experts, the Gabala Radar Station lost its former
strategic importance, and over time, its efficiency was reducing,
devices were wearing out and breaking down, and it was very costly to
replace them that it would have been better to transfer the functions
of Gabala radar to a new station in the North Caucasus (Armavir)
construction of which has practically already been completed.
Apparently, the Russian government has taken into account both
"wavering" position of Azerbaijan, and the opinion of Russian military
experts, and stoped using the radar. The Russian Federation sent
a corresponding note to the Azerbaijan side, according to which
on December 10th, 2012 operation of the station was stopped and
respectively, the agreement signed ten years ago was declared expired.
We cannot say that Russia was not interested in Gabala. It was Moscow's
interest that led to a visit to Azerbaijan of the Vice Premier of the
Russian Government (curator of the defense sector) Dmitry Rogozin that
took place on August 15-16th, 2012, when he met with President Ilham
Aliyev. Although, the meeting was confidential, according to leaked
information the parties could not agree on the price of the lease.
Azerbaijani political analysts believe that the delay in deciding the
fate of the Gabala Radar Station was due to bargaining between Putin
and Aliyev, but the role of money in this matter was only formal. The
main thing is that both parties have used this military facility to
resolve foreign policy issues. Ilham Aliyev's interest was to force
Russia to make a positive step in resolving the Karabakh conflict,
and Vladimir Putin sought to use the Gabala Radar Station as a trump
card in case Azerbaijan was to really threaten Russia's ally Armenia
with a war.
What will happen next? Will the Gabala factor worsen the
Azerbaijan-Russia relations? Expert opinions vary. Some believe that
this will not worsen the relations, while others, on the contrary,
claim that the events surrounding the Gabala radar indicate problems
between the two countries, that in the future are likely to multiply.
Azerbaijan is leaning more and more toward the West and its cooperation
with NATO is deepening. Symptoms of "cooling" of relations between
Baku and Moscow are already visible - instead of President Ilham
Aliyev the CIS summit in Ashgabat, held on December 5 was attended
by Prime Minister Artur Rasi-zade.
The Gabala Radar Station is a complex military facility, operation of
which requires a lot of experience and expertise. It is a fact that
Baku can not use that facility. They will have to find a new tenant
for the station, naturally, among countries - members of NATO. So
who will it be - the United States or Turkey?
In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his U.S. counterpart
George W. Bush to jointly use the Gabala station instead of deploying
the U.S. radar in the Czech Republic. The U.S. almost agreed to use
the radar together with Russia, but later declined. The same fate
befell the initiative of Moscow that was put forward by Russia at
the Lisbon Summit in 2010 to make the Gabala station a part of the
joint missile defence system.
Turkey is not interested in using the Gabala station as the outdated
and also expensive facility would be an unnecessary burden on its
economy. This assumption is confirmed by the results of the meeting
of President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, held September 11, 2012 in the town of Gabala, near the
military facility. Apparently, during the negotiations Turkey refused
the Azerbaijan offer to operate the radar. Obviously, even if foreign
tenants are found they cannot, for obvious reasons, fully operate the
Russian-made radar and neither will they be able to use it against
Russia, as a remote control of anti-missile system is in Moscow.
In the end, it seems, after some time, when Russia takes out special
equipment of the station, a question of using this object in the
non-military, peaceful purposes will be definitely put on the agenda.
In favour of this version speaks the fact that development of
tourism and agricultural infrastructure is planned in the Gabala
region. There is already a project for cultivation of 52 hectares of
the area which is now occupied by the station. As for the building
itself, it can accommodate a research institution, or it may become
a tourist attraction.
Problem Four: Supply of Russian weapons to Armenia
Another problem in the Azerbaijan-Russia relations is supply of
Russian arms to Armenia. By assumption of Azerbaijani experts, at the
meeting of Ilham Aliyev and Dmitry Rogozin the issue of the purchase
of the Russian arms and supply of Ukrainian arms to Armenia was also
discussed. Interestingly, the visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister
was preceded by a scandal regarding military relations between Kiev
and Yerevan: as it turns out, Ukraine, that assures Azerbaijan of its
friendship (because of future import of Caspian oil and gas) secretly
from Baku supplied the BUK missile system to Armenia. But this is
nothing compared to the fact that Russia also supplies weapons to
Armenia both to equip the Armenian army, and for the 102nd military
base in Gyumri. (At present, the Russian base is equipped with Russian
anti-aircraft system "S-300" and fighters "MIG-29." Number of personnel
of the military base is 5000 soldiers).
The Gyumri military base confirms the presence of Russia in the South
Caucasus, which is a dangerous factor for Azerbaijan. Therefore,
sensitivity of Baku to the issue of arms supply to its neighbour
is quite obvious: Armenia is its enemy and military adversary, and
at the same time - the strategic partner of Russia. Let us suppose
that Azerbaijan declared war to Armenia. In this case, presumably,
the personnel of the 102nd base and weapons will be used against
Azerbaijan. All the more that Armenia and Russia are members of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Charter of which
states that in case of declaration of war by a third country to one of
its members (take for example Azerbaijan - Armenia) all others (and
first of all Russia ) must come to the aid of the victim (Armenia)
(against Azerbaijan).
Interesting is the question of equipping of the Gyumri military base.
At present, according to Azerbaijani sources, Russia carries out
provision of the said military facility with manpower, weapons and
other ammunition through the territory of Asia and Iran - due to
blockage of the Transcaucasian transport communications passing
through the territory of Georgia (the Abkhazian section of the
Georgian railway). That is very expensive for Russia. In addition,
the transit of military cargo through the territory of foreign
countries increases the risk factor. That is why Russia would benefit
from restoration of the railway movement on the Abkhazian section,
which was discussed by official Tbilisi as one of the key factors in
improving the Georgian-Russian relations and the settlement of the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.
Problem five: Azerbaijan in the context of Russia-Iran relations
If we look at the map of the Caucasus and the Caspian region,
we note that Azerbaijan is "wedged" between Russia and Iran. The
fact is that in spite of the "cooling" of the recent relations
between Moscow and Tehran, the relationship still remains close. On
the international arena Russia permanently defends Iranian nuclear
projects, Russia is a member of the transport corridor "North-South"
in which Iran also is actively involved, positions of Russia and
Iran also coincide in the matter of definition of the status of the
Caspian Sea. While Azerbaijan has its problems with Iran, namely,
the issue of Azeri-language provinces of Iran. In addition, the
position of Baku is different from those of Moscow and Iran on the
Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan clearly does not like military manoeuvres of
the West against Iran in the Caspian Sea. As Baku is concerned that
in case of beginning of military actions by the West against Iran
Russia will try to use its land and sea territory.
Of course, we should not think that there are just problems in the
Russian-Azerbaijani relations solution of which are not expected
in the short term. On the contrary, in recent years, after some
attempts and bilateral efforts, a number of inter-state disputes were
successfully resolved. For example, the question of delimitation and
demarcation of the state border, the problem of the legal status
of inhabitants of the Russian enclaves in Azerbaijan - Khrakhuba
and Uryanuba decision on which had been delayed for years. Also, it
should be noted that against the backdrop of the above issues, trade
and economic relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are developing
very rapidly. In 2011 trade turnover between the countries amounted
to almost three billion dollars, which is a significant increase
compared to the previous period.
On the basis of the above, we can make a brief summary and some
conclusions:
So far Russia's foreign policy toward Azerbaijan has encountered
some problems, Moscow has no conceptual understanding of relations
with this country, which is a significant barrier in the relations
of the two neighbouring countries. Clearly, these challenges have a
permanent character;
The most difficult problem is the Karabakh conflict, during the
process of settlement of which Moscow resorts to a double standard.
Accordingly, if Russia does not change its policy towards Armenia, does
not reduce its solidarity with this country, distrust of Azerbaijan
towards Moscow will not be neutralized;
It is possible that Russia could use "Iranian lever" against Azerbaijan
- to turn a blind eye to "mistakes" made by Tehran in the sphere of
protection of the rights of Azerbaijan, and in the discussion of the
problems of the Caspian Sea, to counterbalance the position of Baku
act in tandem with Iran;
In turn, Azerbaijan has the potential to successfully use the
confrontation between Russia and the West, and on this background
implement its interests. It is a fact that there is a very strong
Armenian lobby in the U.S., at the same time, the West needs
Azerbaijan's energy resources, and if Baku once again reaches out to
Moscow, thus Aliyev will show the West alternative. But if Russia
will continue strategic cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan may
refuse mediation of Russia and move fully to the West.