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GEORGIA: AN ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER IN A NARROW GAUGE
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6835
14.01.2013
Sergei Sargsyan
Deputy Head of the Center for Political Studies at â~@~\Noravankâ~@~]
Foundation
The recent parliamentary elections in Georgia turned out to be
remarkable in many aspects. They were remarkable for the results of the
elections; for the fact that for the first time in the modern history
of the country the change of the regime proceeded in a democratic
path; for the electoral technologies used; for the effectiveness of
the information operations and PR actions of the competitors.
In itself the appearance at the political arena of the countryman who
made a name for himself and gathered wealth abroad, arranged self-PR
and invested his own funds into his electoral campaign which seemed
knowingly failed at first, deserves special scrutiny with respect to
its possible repetition in both Georgia and other post-Soviet states.
But now the most interesting is how the winners will deal with the
credence the electorate had in them and how and in what direction
the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the new leadership
will change.
The issue of the credence of the electorate in the situation when
victory of Bidzina Ivanishvili became possible due to the accumulation
of the protest potential in the society conditioning the protest
voting, which in its essence has irrational, emotionally coloured
character, is most topical and demands speedy justification of the
expectations of the society.
The electorate sees in B.Ivanishvili a politician-deliverer from
the undivided rule of the United National Movement of Georgia and
in particular of Mikhail Saakashvili, a billionaire who is ready to
invest his own money not only into the prospective programmes of the
economic reforms but also into the social sphere, and this conditioned
the fact that he won the majority of the votes without any detailed
electoral programme.
Additional intrigue to the dynamics of the large-scale transformations
in the social and economic situation in the country is also attached
by his statement concerning his intentions to drop out of politics
in a year and a half, i.e. after the local elections in March 2014.
The date of B.Ivanishviliâ~@~Ys retirement put on the agenda of his
supporters the issue of finding substitution for him. And the fact
that his figure plays a cementing role for rather variegated political
parties and movements, which are included into the â~@~\Georgian
Dreamâ~@~] block and are called upon to make this dream come true,
is a cause for concern regarding the issue of preservation of the
unity of winning powers in the nearest future.
After B.Ivanishviliâ~@~Ys statement two â~@~\lame ducksâ~@~] appeared
in the top echelons in Georgia (he and president Saakashvili), but the
possibility of minimization of the losses caused by the reformation
of the political structures of the UNM looks a little more preferable.
In case of keeping pace of passing of the independent deputies or
the deputies who were elected from the UNM to the side of a new
parliamentary majority, the â~@~\Georgian Dreamâ~@~] will gain the
constitutional majority in the parliament which will allow them to
initiate and pass the changes and amendments to legislation. From
that moment on the dynamics of the reforms should rise considerably.
However, all these â~@~S populist election pledges which were
meant rather for the electoral campaign than for the victory on the
elections and their further fulfillment; overstated anticipations of
the electorate from the winners; time trouble B. Ivanishvili was put
into by himself and the whole â~@~\Georgian Dreamâ~@~]; preservation
of a considerable potential of the UNM and M. Saakashviliâ~@~Ys team
â~@~S trigger a necessity to concentrate on the most topical problems
as well as on the aspects of foreign policy which have direct and
considerable impact on the domestic processes in Georgia and the mood
of the electorate. In fact the presidential electoral campaign is
already in the process and this situation of competitive rush will
be preserved in Georgia till the local elections in spring 2014.
Among the main foreign political issues Ivanishviliâ~@~Ys team will
not be able to avoid or postpone are:
Searching for mutually acceptable and realistic policy in regard to
the Republic of Abkhazia and Republic of South Ossetia; Solution
of the current problems with the Russian Federation, including
restoration of diplomatic ties and expansion of economic relations;
Searching for the acceptable balance in the relation, on the one hand,
with NATO, EU and, on the other hand, with Russia. And there are
following issues which are within the framework of the solution of
the aforementioned problems:
Opening of the railway and road service through Abkhazia; Gradual
involvement of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in its social and economic
space; Modifying its foreign policy in regard to the Russian North
Caucasus republics, etc. Even partial normalization of the relations
with Russia will, on the one hand, cause extension of the field of the
foreign political and economic play for Tbilisi on a wide range of
regional issues and, on the other hand, it will lower the influence
of the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. It is alarming for both Ankara
and Baku. That is the reason why all the steps made by Tbilisi in
the direction of the improvement of the relations with Moscow will
be taken by both capitals with vigilance and antagonism.
And one of the most sensitive issues for rather Baku than Ankara is
opening of the roads going through Abkhazia.
In case there are prospects of real normalization of the
Georgian-Russian relations it is not excluded that they will
take counter measures and they will not be only of economic
character. Thus Baku has already made statements that after the
election of B.Ivanishvili the situation in the Azerbaijani populated
region of Georgia Qvemo-Qartli has deteriorated1.
Generally the stirring of the direct talks with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia â~@~S one of the main initiatives by B.Ivanishvili â~@~S is
at the same time the weakest point in his programme of changes:
Now his image will mostly depend on the stance of Sukhumi and
Tskhinvali. Moscow gains a very important trump in the negotiations
with Tbilisi; now it is rather about the continuation of the talks on
different levels (firstly within the framework of the Geneva process)
than about the recognition and status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Actualization of this issue is caused by the fact that this is
practically the only interest of Moscow and Sukhumi and possibility
of gaining real dividends from fence mending with Tbilisi even on
the initial level.
Despite a number of statements by the representatives of the
authorities of the Republic of Abkhazia, as well as some Russian and
Georgian experts on the disinterestedness of Sukhumi in resumption of
transit, the prospects of normalizations of the issue are rather good.
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned without going into a detailed
assumption of the whole complex of the Abkhazian-Russian relations
that:
a. If Moscowâ~@~Ys influence on Sukhumi is really almost unlimited,
it will not be difficult for Russia to promote realization of this
profitable and advantageous scenario;
b. If the influence of Moscow on Sukhumi is restricted to some
extent and Abkhazia tends to carry out as independent policy as it
is possible, it is interested in establishing good relations with all
the regional and non-regional actors and Georgia is not an exception,
at least for creation of some balance and possibility of counter
positioning to the pressure of Moscow. Besides, in this case Sukhumi
should be rather concerned about the creation of additional jobs,
restoration and development of transport infrastructure, acquisition
of income from passenger and cargo traffic. At the same time it should
not be forgotten that the transport policy will be defined by Sukhumi.
In general the prospects of resumption of the transport communication
through the territory of Abkhazia are really feasible proceeding from
the interests of Russia, Abkhazia and Georgia, which came forward
after the change of the cabinet in Tbilisi and under the critical
reconsideration of M.Saakashviliâ~@~Ys legacy.
In this regard it should be mentioned that stirring up of Moscow
in this issue should be expected after Tbilisi will remove all the
restrictions on transportation of military cargo for the 102nd Russian
military base in Gyumri, Armenia, imposed by Georgia unilaterally2.
For its part Sukhumi, within the framework of this project, during
the negotiations with Tbilisi may insist on the foremost necessity
of decreasing subversive-terrorist and criminal activity of the
paramilitary groups of â~@~\undefined submissionâ~@~] mainly acting
in Gali District of Abkhazia.
In this context the events in other region of Georgia â~@~S in Kakhetia
â~@~S when in consequence of a fight in Lapota Gorge, which lasted
for several days, a group of militants, consisting of the citizens
of Georgia and foreign citizens, was destroyed.
The real background of this incident was anybodyâ~@~Ys guess (whether
this was failed and clumsy pre-election PR action of the Saakashvili
team or it was really the operation of the Georgian special services
on interdiction of the activity of the international terrorist
organizations on recruitment, training, equipping of the militants and
creation of the ways of their redeployment to the North Caucasus).
However it should be stated that there are sufficient conditions on
the Georgian territory for organizing illegal armed groups including
the ones, in which mercenaries and volunteers from abroad are involved.
In case of stirring up the negotiations process with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and opening of the transport connection through the
territory of Abkhazia, appearance of new flash-point of activity of
the illegal armed groups, created on the initiative of some powers
from abroad in order to pursue their raw national interests, becomes
rather probable. And this will be another challenge to the foreign
and domestic policy of a new leadership in Georgia.
As for the information operations carried out by B.Ivanishviliâ~@~Ys
team, two examples particularly can be brought:
Firstly it was spreading through the mass media the recording of
abuse and beating of the inmates in Gldan prison #8 in Tbilisi by the
jailers which was probably the most vivid and mobilizing action that
not only shattered the electorateâ~@~Ys confidence in the authorities
and president Saakashvili personally, but also in the ability and wish
of his team to use administrative resource on the s day of elections
and in the votes counting process. However the information about the
illegal actions in the penitentiary facilities in Georgia was not new;
simply it had not been spread in an appropriate way before.
Secondly, it is the triggering by B.Ivanishvili of the issue of joining
NATO. On the one hand, this seems to be logical in the light of the
statements made by B.Ivanishvili that joining NATO and integration
into the European structures were the strategic goals of Georgia
which was proved by the movement on the already beaten track.
On the other hand, the parallels with the Turkish political experience
arise when accession to power of R. Erdoganâ~@~Ys Justice and
Development Party caused step-by-step change of accents in foreign
political priorities of the country.
Besides the fact that the JDP activated negotiations with the EU on
the accession of Turkey to the EU and took the initiative in this
issue in their hands, which was of fundamental importance for the
former secular authorities of the country and the militaries, they
also insisted on specifying clear and distinct requirements after
fulfillment of which the country would automatically join the EU.
Under the pressure of Erdoganâ~@~Ys party the EU was obliged to
formulate its requirements, thus demonstrating to Ankara that the
realization of its expectations was unlikely. As a result Turkey
reconsidered and clarified the priorities of its foreign policy.
In the same way today Ivanishvili appeals to NATO to take fast and
real measures on the accession of Georgia to NATO; against this
background the senior leaders of the organization really pleaded the
member-countries to consider positively Georgiaâ~@~Ys Membership
Action Plan (MAP). In consequence this may bring to the situation
when distinct requirements will be presented to Tbilisi which will
postpone its plans on NATO membership for an indefinite term. It is
suffice to remember the necessity to solve the issue of the territorial
integrity of the country. It is not a mere chance that on November 29,
2012 in the parliament of Georgia closed discussion on the relations
with NATO was held; it featured the representatives of the committees
on the foreign affairs, European integration, defence and security,
as well as NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi. According to the chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs Tedo Japaridze during the discussion
the participants â~@~\frankly discussed the issue of relations and
assessed the feasibility of the approachesâ~@~]3.
Anyway, Ivanishvili receives an objective justification for the lack
of progress in the process of Georgiaâ~@~Ys accession to NATO. In
the long run it is possible to maneuver in narrow gauge only by means
of brakeage.
1 Ð~XÐ~P «РегнÑ~Cм», 27 ноÑ~OбÑ~@Ñ~O 2012г.,
http://www.regnum.ru/news/georgia/1597947.html.
2 This aspect of prospects of opening a transit through Abkhazia is
one of the main irritants for Baku (and in a less marked form for
Ankara either).
3Ð~XÐ~P «РегнÑ~Cм», 29 ноÑ~OбÑ~@Ñ~O 2012г.,
http://www.regnum.ru/news/georgia/1598953.html.
â~@~\Globusâ~@~] analytical journal, #12, 2012
Another materials of author SOME ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION ROUND THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
[02.08.2012] â~@~\IT IS NECESSARY TO RAISE ENERGY EFFICIENCYâ~@~],
- says the deputy head of the Center for Political Studies of
â~@~\Noravankâ~@~] Foundation Sergei SARGSYAN in his interview to
â~@~\Golos Armeniiâ~@~][26.07.2012] TRANS-CASPIAN GAS PIPELINE:
GOALS, PROBLEMS AND RISKS [25.06.2012] TURKEY IN THE US MISSILE
DEFENCE SYSTEM: PRIMARY ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS[13.10.2011]
ARMENIA AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF THE MILITARY AND
POLITICAL BLOCKS[05.09.2011] SHALE GAS GHOST[08.02.2011] GAS FROM
IRAQI KURDISTAN FOR NABUCCO: TURKISH INTEREST [15.12.2010] AZERBAIJAN:
SEARCHING NEW FOREIGN POLICY BALANCE[27.10.2010] TWO â~@~XSTREAMSâ~@~Y
FROM RUSSIA: BREAKING DOWN THE OLD GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURES[21.06.2010]
MILITARY AND POLITICAL RISKS OF TRANSCASPIAN PROJECTS[04.06.2010]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6835
14.01.2013
Sergei Sargsyan
Deputy Head of the Center for Political Studies at â~@~\Noravankâ~@~]
Foundation
The recent parliamentary elections in Georgia turned out to be
remarkable in many aspects. They were remarkable for the results of the
elections; for the fact that for the first time in the modern history
of the country the change of the regime proceeded in a democratic
path; for the electoral technologies used; for the effectiveness of
the information operations and PR actions of the competitors.
In itself the appearance at the political arena of the countryman who
made a name for himself and gathered wealth abroad, arranged self-PR
and invested his own funds into his electoral campaign which seemed
knowingly failed at first, deserves special scrutiny with respect to
its possible repetition in both Georgia and other post-Soviet states.
But now the most interesting is how the winners will deal with the
credence the electorate had in them and how and in what direction
the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the new leadership
will change.
The issue of the credence of the electorate in the situation when
victory of Bidzina Ivanishvili became possible due to the accumulation
of the protest potential in the society conditioning the protest
voting, which in its essence has irrational, emotionally coloured
character, is most topical and demands speedy justification of the
expectations of the society.
The electorate sees in B.Ivanishvili a politician-deliverer from
the undivided rule of the United National Movement of Georgia and
in particular of Mikhail Saakashvili, a billionaire who is ready to
invest his own money not only into the prospective programmes of the
economic reforms but also into the social sphere, and this conditioned
the fact that he won the majority of the votes without any detailed
electoral programme.
Additional intrigue to the dynamics of the large-scale transformations
in the social and economic situation in the country is also attached
by his statement concerning his intentions to drop out of politics
in a year and a half, i.e. after the local elections in March 2014.
The date of B.Ivanishviliâ~@~Ys retirement put on the agenda of his
supporters the issue of finding substitution for him. And the fact
that his figure plays a cementing role for rather variegated political
parties and movements, which are included into the â~@~\Georgian
Dreamâ~@~] block and are called upon to make this dream come true,
is a cause for concern regarding the issue of preservation of the
unity of winning powers in the nearest future.
After B.Ivanishviliâ~@~Ys statement two â~@~\lame ducksâ~@~] appeared
in the top echelons in Georgia (he and president Saakashvili), but the
possibility of minimization of the losses caused by the reformation
of the political structures of the UNM looks a little more preferable.
In case of keeping pace of passing of the independent deputies or
the deputies who were elected from the UNM to the side of a new
parliamentary majority, the â~@~\Georgian Dreamâ~@~] will gain the
constitutional majority in the parliament which will allow them to
initiate and pass the changes and amendments to legislation. From
that moment on the dynamics of the reforms should rise considerably.
However, all these â~@~S populist election pledges which were
meant rather for the electoral campaign than for the victory on the
elections and their further fulfillment; overstated anticipations of
the electorate from the winners; time trouble B. Ivanishvili was put
into by himself and the whole â~@~\Georgian Dreamâ~@~]; preservation
of a considerable potential of the UNM and M. Saakashviliâ~@~Ys team
â~@~S trigger a necessity to concentrate on the most topical problems
as well as on the aspects of foreign policy which have direct and
considerable impact on the domestic processes in Georgia and the mood
of the electorate. In fact the presidential electoral campaign is
already in the process and this situation of competitive rush will
be preserved in Georgia till the local elections in spring 2014.
Among the main foreign political issues Ivanishviliâ~@~Ys team will
not be able to avoid or postpone are:
Searching for mutually acceptable and realistic policy in regard to
the Republic of Abkhazia and Republic of South Ossetia; Solution
of the current problems with the Russian Federation, including
restoration of diplomatic ties and expansion of economic relations;
Searching for the acceptable balance in the relation, on the one hand,
with NATO, EU and, on the other hand, with Russia. And there are
following issues which are within the framework of the solution of
the aforementioned problems:
Opening of the railway and road service through Abkhazia; Gradual
involvement of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in its social and economic
space; Modifying its foreign policy in regard to the Russian North
Caucasus republics, etc. Even partial normalization of the relations
with Russia will, on the one hand, cause extension of the field of the
foreign political and economic play for Tbilisi on a wide range of
regional issues and, on the other hand, it will lower the influence
of the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. It is alarming for both Ankara
and Baku. That is the reason why all the steps made by Tbilisi in
the direction of the improvement of the relations with Moscow will
be taken by both capitals with vigilance and antagonism.
And one of the most sensitive issues for rather Baku than Ankara is
opening of the roads going through Abkhazia.
In case there are prospects of real normalization of the
Georgian-Russian relations it is not excluded that they will
take counter measures and they will not be only of economic
character. Thus Baku has already made statements that after the
election of B.Ivanishvili the situation in the Azerbaijani populated
region of Georgia Qvemo-Qartli has deteriorated1.
Generally the stirring of the direct talks with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia â~@~S one of the main initiatives by B.Ivanishvili â~@~S is
at the same time the weakest point in his programme of changes:
Now his image will mostly depend on the stance of Sukhumi and
Tskhinvali. Moscow gains a very important trump in the negotiations
with Tbilisi; now it is rather about the continuation of the talks on
different levels (firstly within the framework of the Geneva process)
than about the recognition and status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Actualization of this issue is caused by the fact that this is
practically the only interest of Moscow and Sukhumi and possibility
of gaining real dividends from fence mending with Tbilisi even on
the initial level.
Despite a number of statements by the representatives of the
authorities of the Republic of Abkhazia, as well as some Russian and
Georgian experts on the disinterestedness of Sukhumi in resumption of
transit, the prospects of normalizations of the issue are rather good.
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned without going into a detailed
assumption of the whole complex of the Abkhazian-Russian relations
that:
a. If Moscowâ~@~Ys influence on Sukhumi is really almost unlimited,
it will not be difficult for Russia to promote realization of this
profitable and advantageous scenario;
b. If the influence of Moscow on Sukhumi is restricted to some
extent and Abkhazia tends to carry out as independent policy as it
is possible, it is interested in establishing good relations with all
the regional and non-regional actors and Georgia is not an exception,
at least for creation of some balance and possibility of counter
positioning to the pressure of Moscow. Besides, in this case Sukhumi
should be rather concerned about the creation of additional jobs,
restoration and development of transport infrastructure, acquisition
of income from passenger and cargo traffic. At the same time it should
not be forgotten that the transport policy will be defined by Sukhumi.
In general the prospects of resumption of the transport communication
through the territory of Abkhazia are really feasible proceeding from
the interests of Russia, Abkhazia and Georgia, which came forward
after the change of the cabinet in Tbilisi and under the critical
reconsideration of M.Saakashviliâ~@~Ys legacy.
In this regard it should be mentioned that stirring up of Moscow
in this issue should be expected after Tbilisi will remove all the
restrictions on transportation of military cargo for the 102nd Russian
military base in Gyumri, Armenia, imposed by Georgia unilaterally2.
For its part Sukhumi, within the framework of this project, during
the negotiations with Tbilisi may insist on the foremost necessity
of decreasing subversive-terrorist and criminal activity of the
paramilitary groups of â~@~\undefined submissionâ~@~] mainly acting
in Gali District of Abkhazia.
In this context the events in other region of Georgia â~@~S in Kakhetia
â~@~S when in consequence of a fight in Lapota Gorge, which lasted
for several days, a group of militants, consisting of the citizens
of Georgia and foreign citizens, was destroyed.
The real background of this incident was anybodyâ~@~Ys guess (whether
this was failed and clumsy pre-election PR action of the Saakashvili
team or it was really the operation of the Georgian special services
on interdiction of the activity of the international terrorist
organizations on recruitment, training, equipping of the militants and
creation of the ways of their redeployment to the North Caucasus).
However it should be stated that there are sufficient conditions on
the Georgian territory for organizing illegal armed groups including
the ones, in which mercenaries and volunteers from abroad are involved.
In case of stirring up the negotiations process with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and opening of the transport connection through the
territory of Abkhazia, appearance of new flash-point of activity of
the illegal armed groups, created on the initiative of some powers
from abroad in order to pursue their raw national interests, becomes
rather probable. And this will be another challenge to the foreign
and domestic policy of a new leadership in Georgia.
As for the information operations carried out by B.Ivanishviliâ~@~Ys
team, two examples particularly can be brought:
Firstly it was spreading through the mass media the recording of
abuse and beating of the inmates in Gldan prison #8 in Tbilisi by the
jailers which was probably the most vivid and mobilizing action that
not only shattered the electorateâ~@~Ys confidence in the authorities
and president Saakashvili personally, but also in the ability and wish
of his team to use administrative resource on the s day of elections
and in the votes counting process. However the information about the
illegal actions in the penitentiary facilities in Georgia was not new;
simply it had not been spread in an appropriate way before.
Secondly, it is the triggering by B.Ivanishvili of the issue of joining
NATO. On the one hand, this seems to be logical in the light of the
statements made by B.Ivanishvili that joining NATO and integration
into the European structures were the strategic goals of Georgia
which was proved by the movement on the already beaten track.
On the other hand, the parallels with the Turkish political experience
arise when accession to power of R. Erdoganâ~@~Ys Justice and
Development Party caused step-by-step change of accents in foreign
political priorities of the country.
Besides the fact that the JDP activated negotiations with the EU on
the accession of Turkey to the EU and took the initiative in this
issue in their hands, which was of fundamental importance for the
former secular authorities of the country and the militaries, they
also insisted on specifying clear and distinct requirements after
fulfillment of which the country would automatically join the EU.
Under the pressure of Erdoganâ~@~Ys party the EU was obliged to
formulate its requirements, thus demonstrating to Ankara that the
realization of its expectations was unlikely. As a result Turkey
reconsidered and clarified the priorities of its foreign policy.
In the same way today Ivanishvili appeals to NATO to take fast and
real measures on the accession of Georgia to NATO; against this
background the senior leaders of the organization really pleaded the
member-countries to consider positively Georgiaâ~@~Ys Membership
Action Plan (MAP). In consequence this may bring to the situation
when distinct requirements will be presented to Tbilisi which will
postpone its plans on NATO membership for an indefinite term. It is
suffice to remember the necessity to solve the issue of the territorial
integrity of the country. It is not a mere chance that on November 29,
2012 in the parliament of Georgia closed discussion on the relations
with NATO was held; it featured the representatives of the committees
on the foreign affairs, European integration, defence and security,
as well as NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi. According to the chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs Tedo Japaridze during the discussion
the participants â~@~\frankly discussed the issue of relations and
assessed the feasibility of the approachesâ~@~]3.
Anyway, Ivanishvili receives an objective justification for the lack
of progress in the process of Georgiaâ~@~Ys accession to NATO. In
the long run it is possible to maneuver in narrow gauge only by means
of brakeage.
1 Ð~XÐ~P «РегнÑ~Cм», 27 ноÑ~OбÑ~@Ñ~O 2012г.,
http://www.regnum.ru/news/georgia/1597947.html.
2 This aspect of prospects of opening a transit through Abkhazia is
one of the main irritants for Baku (and in a less marked form for
Ankara either).
3Ð~XÐ~P «РегнÑ~Cм», 29 ноÑ~OбÑ~@Ñ~O 2012г.,
http://www.regnum.ru/news/georgia/1598953.html.
â~@~\Globusâ~@~] analytical journal, #12, 2012
Another materials of author SOME ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION ROUND THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
[02.08.2012] â~@~\IT IS NECESSARY TO RAISE ENERGY EFFICIENCYâ~@~],
- says the deputy head of the Center for Political Studies of
â~@~\Noravankâ~@~] Foundation Sergei SARGSYAN in his interview to
â~@~\Golos Armeniiâ~@~][26.07.2012] TRANS-CASPIAN GAS PIPELINE:
GOALS, PROBLEMS AND RISKS [25.06.2012] TURKEY IN THE US MISSILE
DEFENCE SYSTEM: PRIMARY ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS[13.10.2011]
ARMENIA AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF THE MILITARY AND
POLITICAL BLOCKS[05.09.2011] SHALE GAS GHOST[08.02.2011] GAS FROM
IRAQI KURDISTAN FOR NABUCCO: TURKISH INTEREST [15.12.2010] AZERBAIJAN:
SEARCHING NEW FOREIGN POLICY BALANCE[27.10.2010] TWO â~@~XSTREAMSâ~@~Y
FROM RUSSIA: BREAKING DOWN THE OLD GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURES[21.06.2010]
MILITARY AND POLITICAL RISKS OF TRANSCASPIAN PROJECTS[04.06.2010]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress