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Karl Rahder: Protests in Ismayilli Are `Organic'
http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3848&Ite mid=49
WASHINGTON, DC. January 25, 2013: 2013 has started with a series of
the protests in Azerbaijan. Demonstrations rocked Baku, Ismayilli
during the past two weeks.
Some observers are already calling the latest developments the
beginning of the `Azeri Spring' comparing them with the Arab
uprisings.
In the meantime, according to the Freedom House's latest global human
rights report, the authoritarian regimes `are learning to manipulate
political system without using brute force for suppression'.
TURAN's Washington DC correspondent Alakbar Raufoglu has interviewed
Karl Rahder, a journalist, lecturer and election observer on Ismayilli
events and the portrait of how Azeri officials are confronting and
controlling activists.
Mr. Rahder currently writes for the Caucasus blog for the
Washington-based Foreign Policy Association. Formerly based in Baku
and Tbilisi, Rahder has deep interest in South Caucasus events, US
regional policy, nuclear deterrence, Cold War history, etc.
He has covered regional policy, human rights, conflicts etc. He has
taught international politics at Universities in the US, Georgia, and
as a CEP Visiting Faculty Fellow in Azerbaijan. Karl Rahder answered
the questions regarding the recent political developments in
Azerbaijan:
How should we read the events that are happening in Ismayilli during
the past couple of days? Do these rallies describe current situation
in the country? How do you see the next developments?
The reaction of [head of the social political department at the
Presidential Administration] Ali Hasanov is very interesting, and if
he is speaking for the president, we might be seeing a shift in
tactics from last year's Guba events.
The government's response to Guba was swift, and while a large number
of demonstrators were arrested, the governor was also relieved of his
post, a move that was designed to appeal to popular sentiment.
Significantly, there were a few people amongst the protesters who held
up photographs of Ilham Aliyev - perhaps a deliberate and symbolic
effort by government supporters to distance President Aliyev from the
thoughtless comments of Guba's governor.
But Hasanov, who was quoted today [January 24] by local media, seemed
to be taking a two-pronged strategy: firstly, he went to great lengths
to brand the spontaneous riots as an attack on Azerbaijan itself.
Here are a couple of revealing quotes: `The perpetrators of the
incident in Ismayilli region and the individuals willing to use it
against Azerbaijan's statehood will be punished,' he said. "The
perpetrators of this incident and those who seek to use it for
personal interests will be punished."
The second prong of Hasanov's strategy, implied by his pledge to
punish `the perpetrators,' is that we can expect arrests very quickly
- not of local officials, but the demonstrators themselves.
We've seen this sort of tactic before. Whether Hasanov was speaking
for himself or for the government as a whole is yet to be seen. But I
very much doubt that anyone in Azerbaijan will buy into Hasanov's
thesis. It implies a touch of panic at the highest level of government
as they search for someone to blame. (It's mildly surprising that no
one in the government has blamed Armenia yet!)
The prosecutor's office has to be careful, though. Arresting
well-known activists and Public Chamber supporters during typical
demonstrations in Baku is one thing, but how the government will build
a convincing narrative around the arrests of ordinary, angry citizens
in the regions is altogether different, and could very well backfire.
Traditionally, neither Ismailli, nor Guba people are known for their
violent temper, but their problems aren't worse than in the rest of
the country. What kind of messages should ordinary people;
oppositional parties and the government take from such rear events?
To me, the real importance of incidents in the last year such as the
Guba riots, the controversy involving musicians Jamal Ali and Natig
Kamilov in March of 2012, the demonstrations after the death of Jeyhun
Gubadov, and now the violent protests in Ismayilli is that they all
have one very significant factor in common: these are `organic'
protests. That is, they are not `top-down.'
The formal opposition parties did not announce a demonstration in
Ismayilli or Guba. These events - spontaneous, unexpected, and
violent - erupted from the ground up: hence, they were `organic.' And
this is hugely significant. It means the usual opposition party
apparatus, beleaguered by years of government pressure against it, is
no longer necessary to motivate ordinary people.
And when you have sudden protests taking place, especially outside of
Baku, the government must be experiencing a certain degree of
confusion and disarray over just how to react.
Do these event remind you of the uprisings during the Arab Spring at
some point? If so, then at what stage of the `spring' are we?
There has been no impulse on the part of the Azeri people to overthrow
the government, at least so far. And I would caution anyone not to
read too much into the events we've seen since last year. They
certainly point to widespread disaffection, especially in those areas
where people continue to live in poverty and where they feel
voiceless.
But that doesn't mean that the country is at a tipping point yet. No
one in Guba, for example, was calling for revolution...
What do all these mean in the election year?
President Aliyev has expanded and deepened the support mechanisms he
inherited from his father. Thus, I don't see a reaction at the polls
in October unless a truly tectonic shift takes place in Azerbaijani
society and the pace of incidents such as the one in Ismayilli
increases.
Interestingly, the scandal involving Gular Ahmedova and Elshan
Abdullayev is taking place at precisely the wrong time for the
government, but I would expect the president to defuse it in the
coming weeks.
What reaction should we expect from the west, it this situation?
My guess is that at this stage, most Western governments will take a
`wait and see' approach while they monitor just how the Aliyev
government plans to handle the aftermath of Ismayilli.
If mass arrests and convictions do take place, we might see some
disapproving comments from foreign embassies, but I think it's simply
too early in the process for any major reaction (Turan).
From: A. Papazian
http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3848&Ite mid=49
WASHINGTON, DC. January 25, 2013: 2013 has started with a series of
the protests in Azerbaijan. Demonstrations rocked Baku, Ismayilli
during the past two weeks.
Some observers are already calling the latest developments the
beginning of the `Azeri Spring' comparing them with the Arab
uprisings.
In the meantime, according to the Freedom House's latest global human
rights report, the authoritarian regimes `are learning to manipulate
political system without using brute force for suppression'.
TURAN's Washington DC correspondent Alakbar Raufoglu has interviewed
Karl Rahder, a journalist, lecturer and election observer on Ismayilli
events and the portrait of how Azeri officials are confronting and
controlling activists.
Mr. Rahder currently writes for the Caucasus blog for the
Washington-based Foreign Policy Association. Formerly based in Baku
and Tbilisi, Rahder has deep interest in South Caucasus events, US
regional policy, nuclear deterrence, Cold War history, etc.
He has covered regional policy, human rights, conflicts etc. He has
taught international politics at Universities in the US, Georgia, and
as a CEP Visiting Faculty Fellow in Azerbaijan. Karl Rahder answered
the questions regarding the recent political developments in
Azerbaijan:
How should we read the events that are happening in Ismayilli during
the past couple of days? Do these rallies describe current situation
in the country? How do you see the next developments?
The reaction of [head of the social political department at the
Presidential Administration] Ali Hasanov is very interesting, and if
he is speaking for the president, we might be seeing a shift in
tactics from last year's Guba events.
The government's response to Guba was swift, and while a large number
of demonstrators were arrested, the governor was also relieved of his
post, a move that was designed to appeal to popular sentiment.
Significantly, there were a few people amongst the protesters who held
up photographs of Ilham Aliyev - perhaps a deliberate and symbolic
effort by government supporters to distance President Aliyev from the
thoughtless comments of Guba's governor.
But Hasanov, who was quoted today [January 24] by local media, seemed
to be taking a two-pronged strategy: firstly, he went to great lengths
to brand the spontaneous riots as an attack on Azerbaijan itself.
Here are a couple of revealing quotes: `The perpetrators of the
incident in Ismayilli region and the individuals willing to use it
against Azerbaijan's statehood will be punished,' he said. "The
perpetrators of this incident and those who seek to use it for
personal interests will be punished."
The second prong of Hasanov's strategy, implied by his pledge to
punish `the perpetrators,' is that we can expect arrests very quickly
- not of local officials, but the demonstrators themselves.
We've seen this sort of tactic before. Whether Hasanov was speaking
for himself or for the government as a whole is yet to be seen. But I
very much doubt that anyone in Azerbaijan will buy into Hasanov's
thesis. It implies a touch of panic at the highest level of government
as they search for someone to blame. (It's mildly surprising that no
one in the government has blamed Armenia yet!)
The prosecutor's office has to be careful, though. Arresting
well-known activists and Public Chamber supporters during typical
demonstrations in Baku is one thing, but how the government will build
a convincing narrative around the arrests of ordinary, angry citizens
in the regions is altogether different, and could very well backfire.
Traditionally, neither Ismailli, nor Guba people are known for their
violent temper, but their problems aren't worse than in the rest of
the country. What kind of messages should ordinary people;
oppositional parties and the government take from such rear events?
To me, the real importance of incidents in the last year such as the
Guba riots, the controversy involving musicians Jamal Ali and Natig
Kamilov in March of 2012, the demonstrations after the death of Jeyhun
Gubadov, and now the violent protests in Ismayilli is that they all
have one very significant factor in common: these are `organic'
protests. That is, they are not `top-down.'
The formal opposition parties did not announce a demonstration in
Ismayilli or Guba. These events - spontaneous, unexpected, and
violent - erupted from the ground up: hence, they were `organic.' And
this is hugely significant. It means the usual opposition party
apparatus, beleaguered by years of government pressure against it, is
no longer necessary to motivate ordinary people.
And when you have sudden protests taking place, especially outside of
Baku, the government must be experiencing a certain degree of
confusion and disarray over just how to react.
Do these event remind you of the uprisings during the Arab Spring at
some point? If so, then at what stage of the `spring' are we?
There has been no impulse on the part of the Azeri people to overthrow
the government, at least so far. And I would caution anyone not to
read too much into the events we've seen since last year. They
certainly point to widespread disaffection, especially in those areas
where people continue to live in poverty and where they feel
voiceless.
But that doesn't mean that the country is at a tipping point yet. No
one in Guba, for example, was calling for revolution...
What do all these mean in the election year?
President Aliyev has expanded and deepened the support mechanisms he
inherited from his father. Thus, I don't see a reaction at the polls
in October unless a truly tectonic shift takes place in Azerbaijani
society and the pace of incidents such as the one in Ismayilli
increases.
Interestingly, the scandal involving Gular Ahmedova and Elshan
Abdullayev is taking place at precisely the wrong time for the
government, but I would expect the president to defuse it in the
coming weeks.
What reaction should we expect from the west, it this situation?
My guess is that at this stage, most Western governments will take a
`wait and see' approach while they monitor just how the Aliyev
government plans to handle the aftermath of Ismayilli.
If mass arrests and convictions do take place, we might see some
disapproving comments from foreign embassies, but I think it's simply
too early in the process for any major reaction (Turan).
From: A. Papazian