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ARMENIA'S LOOMING ELECTIONS
Sergey Markedonov
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/armenias-looming-elections-8018
January 28, 2013
2013 will be a presidential election year for all of the countries
of the South Caucasus, with Armenia becoming the first state to begin
its contest. The campaign kicked off in Armenia with the beginning of
the nomination process for candidates on December 25. The vote itself
is scheduled for February 18. What surprises, if any, can we expect
from this election? And how will this campaign impact the general
situation in the South Caucasus?
The upcoming elections look as if they will be primarily symbolic.
First, no matter the manner in which the current election race is held,
it will inevitably be compared to the previous campaign of 2008.
During that race, then-incumbent Robert Kocharyan had served two
terms in office and was prohibited by the Armenian Constitution
from running for a third consecutive term. The transfer of power to
current Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan was accompanied by clashes
between the government and the opposition, resulting in the deaths
of ten people, including eight civilians. This tragedy has haunted
the republic's political community, ruling elites and the opposition
alike. Thus, the political class of Armenia must, regardless of the
views of the different representatives, demonstrate to the voters they
have learned from the tragedy and that such a civil confrontation
will not happen again. During the parliamentary elections of 2012,
the political system and the political class demonstrated the ability
to avoid clashes and open hostility. The presidential campaign should
serve to consolidate this trend.
For current president Serzh Sargsyan, the elections of 2013 will
bring him a different status within Armenian politics. He will not
be taking part as the successor of the acting head of the state. In
his first term, he has proven to be a self-sufficient politician who
does not fall under the shadow of his predecessor.
In foreign policy, Sargsyan has managed to avoid any serious mistakes.
In the beginning of his term as president, he was strongly criticized
for the forced normalization of relations with Ankara (the so-called
"football diplomacy"). But he has not passed the red line separating
diplomatic compromises from unilateral concessions to the Turkish
government. At the same time he has managed to keep Armenia's foreign
relations with both Russia and the West in equilibrium.
In relations with the United States and Europe, Sargsyan was
even able to make gains. Washington and Brussels regarded his
predecessor with suspicion and clear displeasure, especially after
the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections and his hot,
nationalist propaganda. Unlike Kocharyan, Sargzyan was committed to
the peacekeeping rhetoric supported by both Russia and the West on the
issues of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations or the Armenian-Turkish
rapprochement. At the same time, he did so without departing from
the previously stated goals of Armenia's foreign policy.
This same approach was applied to the relationship with Russia. On the
one hand, during the Sargzyan presidency Russia and Armenia agreed
(in August 2010) to extend the presence of the a Russian military
base in Gyumri until 2044. On the other, Yerevan has taken an official
line of cautious skepticism towards membership in the Custom Union or
Eurasian Union, both of which are integration projects led by Russia.
The Armenian leadership has based its foreign policy on the principles
of realism and rationalism above all else. As a result, Sargsyan is
perceived to be the best presidential option by both Moscow and the
political leadership of the Western countries.
Sargsyan has also demonstrated his effectiveness in dealing with
the domestic situation in Armenia. Like his predecessor, he has
shown willingness to utilize his soft power domestically in addition
to using more traditional hard pressure on his opponents. In this
context it is impossible to underestimate the role of last year's
parliamentary campaign in defining the present-day domestic political
configuration. The most important result during that election was
that the Armenian National Congress, led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan (the
first post-Soviet president of Armenia and a thorn in the side of the
Armenian leadership over the past five years), obtained seats in the
legislature. This party had not previously been represented in the
parliament and had instead concentrated its energies on mass public
protests, engaging in clashes that marred the election of 2008.
The inclusion of the Armenian National Congress in the legislature
has promoted opposition activity. This, however, has not been purely
attributable to the personal success of Sargsyan. The opposition has
not been able to put forward any new ideas or viable new political
leaders. And of course the different pillars of the variegated
opposition have not been able to come together on a common language
or common cause with one another, making the work of the ruling
authorities that much easier. As a result, Levon Ter-Petrosyan refused
to participate in this year's presidential campaign.
The second, equally important issue on the domestic political front
is the search for balance within the ruling elite. The political
landscape in Armenia today is much more complex than that of
the neighboring states in the Caucasus. Unlike Russia, Georgia or
Azerbaijan, Armenia has a number of ruling parties rather than just
one. As such, the real domestic political intrigue in Armenia is
found not between the authorities and opposition, as is common in
the other Caucasus countries, but between the various elite groups
within the administration.
During the 2012 parliamentary campaign, the second most powerful ruling
party, "Prosperous Armenia," mounted a challenge to the dominant
political force, the Republican Party, which supports Sargsyan. For
this reason the possible nomination of a candidate from "Prosperous
Armenia" became the primary intrigue in Armenian politics during the
run-up to the presidential nominations. On December, 2012 this issue
was removed from the agenda. The leader of "Prosperous Armenia,"
Gagik Tsarukyan, refused to participate in the campaign and the
party itself stated that it would not place its support behind any
of the candidates. For the Republicans and Sargsyan, their nominee,
this decision demonstrated passive support from "Prosperous Armenia"
for their candidate, outlining the current president's ability to
negotiate with the representatives of various influential groups
within the elite.
The upcoming elections will thus be much less competitive than
the previous campaign. There are serious doubts that the opponents
of the incumbent will be able to offer an entirely new agenda on
either domestic or foreign policy. This does not mean that there is
no intrigue in the elections, just that in this case the intrigue
is not found in considerations of public policy but rather in the
internal dynamics of the administration and the bureaucracy. Moreover,
the current pacified situation in Armenia has been a result of
parliamentary competitiveness, the street activities of opposition and
complicated intra-elite negotiations. The consequences of the current
campaign would be more visible due to new appointments that are likely
to take place this spring. Hence it is critical that those in power do
not make the fatal mistake of succumbing to "dizziness from success."
The temptation is very great, however, since the main political
troublemakers have decided to step aside during this election.
We should not forget that Armenia is not a strong regional power and
that it does not boast a nuclear deterrent. In many situations, the
domestic dynamics of Armenia are more closely aligned with a variety
of "background factors," whether in the Middle East or the South
Caucasus. And, of course, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will continue
to have a profound impact on the domestic and foreign policy of the
country. However, it is obvious that without a somewhat harmonious
domestic situation, Armenia will find it much more difficult to carry
out its foreign policy.
Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow in the Russia and Eurasia
Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Image: Wikimedia Commons/Serouj. CC BY-SA 3.0.
Sergey Markedonov
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/armenias-looming-elections-8018
January 28, 2013
2013 will be a presidential election year for all of the countries
of the South Caucasus, with Armenia becoming the first state to begin
its contest. The campaign kicked off in Armenia with the beginning of
the nomination process for candidates on December 25. The vote itself
is scheduled for February 18. What surprises, if any, can we expect
from this election? And how will this campaign impact the general
situation in the South Caucasus?
The upcoming elections look as if they will be primarily symbolic.
First, no matter the manner in which the current election race is held,
it will inevitably be compared to the previous campaign of 2008.
During that race, then-incumbent Robert Kocharyan had served two
terms in office and was prohibited by the Armenian Constitution
from running for a third consecutive term. The transfer of power to
current Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan was accompanied by clashes
between the government and the opposition, resulting in the deaths
of ten people, including eight civilians. This tragedy has haunted
the republic's political community, ruling elites and the opposition
alike. Thus, the political class of Armenia must, regardless of the
views of the different representatives, demonstrate to the voters they
have learned from the tragedy and that such a civil confrontation
will not happen again. During the parliamentary elections of 2012,
the political system and the political class demonstrated the ability
to avoid clashes and open hostility. The presidential campaign should
serve to consolidate this trend.
For current president Serzh Sargsyan, the elections of 2013 will
bring him a different status within Armenian politics. He will not
be taking part as the successor of the acting head of the state. In
his first term, he has proven to be a self-sufficient politician who
does not fall under the shadow of his predecessor.
In foreign policy, Sargsyan has managed to avoid any serious mistakes.
In the beginning of his term as president, he was strongly criticized
for the forced normalization of relations with Ankara (the so-called
"football diplomacy"). But he has not passed the red line separating
diplomatic compromises from unilateral concessions to the Turkish
government. At the same time he has managed to keep Armenia's foreign
relations with both Russia and the West in equilibrium.
In relations with the United States and Europe, Sargsyan was
even able to make gains. Washington and Brussels regarded his
predecessor with suspicion and clear displeasure, especially after
the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections and his hot,
nationalist propaganda. Unlike Kocharyan, Sargzyan was committed to
the peacekeeping rhetoric supported by both Russia and the West on the
issues of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations or the Armenian-Turkish
rapprochement. At the same time, he did so without departing from
the previously stated goals of Armenia's foreign policy.
This same approach was applied to the relationship with Russia. On the
one hand, during the Sargzyan presidency Russia and Armenia agreed
(in August 2010) to extend the presence of the a Russian military
base in Gyumri until 2044. On the other, Yerevan has taken an official
line of cautious skepticism towards membership in the Custom Union or
Eurasian Union, both of which are integration projects led by Russia.
The Armenian leadership has based its foreign policy on the principles
of realism and rationalism above all else. As a result, Sargsyan is
perceived to be the best presidential option by both Moscow and the
political leadership of the Western countries.
Sargsyan has also demonstrated his effectiveness in dealing with
the domestic situation in Armenia. Like his predecessor, he has
shown willingness to utilize his soft power domestically in addition
to using more traditional hard pressure on his opponents. In this
context it is impossible to underestimate the role of last year's
parliamentary campaign in defining the present-day domestic political
configuration. The most important result during that election was
that the Armenian National Congress, led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan (the
first post-Soviet president of Armenia and a thorn in the side of the
Armenian leadership over the past five years), obtained seats in the
legislature. This party had not previously been represented in the
parliament and had instead concentrated its energies on mass public
protests, engaging in clashes that marred the election of 2008.
The inclusion of the Armenian National Congress in the legislature
has promoted opposition activity. This, however, has not been purely
attributable to the personal success of Sargsyan. The opposition has
not been able to put forward any new ideas or viable new political
leaders. And of course the different pillars of the variegated
opposition have not been able to come together on a common language
or common cause with one another, making the work of the ruling
authorities that much easier. As a result, Levon Ter-Petrosyan refused
to participate in this year's presidential campaign.
The second, equally important issue on the domestic political front
is the search for balance within the ruling elite. The political
landscape in Armenia today is much more complex than that of
the neighboring states in the Caucasus. Unlike Russia, Georgia or
Azerbaijan, Armenia has a number of ruling parties rather than just
one. As such, the real domestic political intrigue in Armenia is
found not between the authorities and opposition, as is common in
the other Caucasus countries, but between the various elite groups
within the administration.
During the 2012 parliamentary campaign, the second most powerful ruling
party, "Prosperous Armenia," mounted a challenge to the dominant
political force, the Republican Party, which supports Sargsyan. For
this reason the possible nomination of a candidate from "Prosperous
Armenia" became the primary intrigue in Armenian politics during the
run-up to the presidential nominations. On December, 2012 this issue
was removed from the agenda. The leader of "Prosperous Armenia,"
Gagik Tsarukyan, refused to participate in the campaign and the
party itself stated that it would not place its support behind any
of the candidates. For the Republicans and Sargsyan, their nominee,
this decision demonstrated passive support from "Prosperous Armenia"
for their candidate, outlining the current president's ability to
negotiate with the representatives of various influential groups
within the elite.
The upcoming elections will thus be much less competitive than
the previous campaign. There are serious doubts that the opponents
of the incumbent will be able to offer an entirely new agenda on
either domestic or foreign policy. This does not mean that there is
no intrigue in the elections, just that in this case the intrigue
is not found in considerations of public policy but rather in the
internal dynamics of the administration and the bureaucracy. Moreover,
the current pacified situation in Armenia has been a result of
parliamentary competitiveness, the street activities of opposition and
complicated intra-elite negotiations. The consequences of the current
campaign would be more visible due to new appointments that are likely
to take place this spring. Hence it is critical that those in power do
not make the fatal mistake of succumbing to "dizziness from success."
The temptation is very great, however, since the main political
troublemakers have decided to step aside during this election.
We should not forget that Armenia is not a strong regional power and
that it does not boast a nuclear deterrent. In many situations, the
domestic dynamics of Armenia are more closely aligned with a variety
of "background factors," whether in the Middle East or the South
Caucasus. And, of course, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will continue
to have a profound impact on the domestic and foreign policy of the
country. However, it is obvious that without a somewhat harmonious
domestic situation, Armenia will find it much more difficult to carry
out its foreign policy.
Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow in the Russia and Eurasia
Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Image: Wikimedia Commons/Serouj. CC BY-SA 3.0.