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Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
July 6 2013
I do not view as likely a return to armed conflict in any of the South
Caucasus unresolved conflicts, Mathew Bryza says
6 July 2013 - 7:14pm
Former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and former co-chair of the OSCE
Minks Group Mathew Bryza, who is believed to be one of the best
Western experts dealing with the South Caucasus, talked to VK about
the situation in the region.
- Mr. Bryza, what do you think about the future of the region, are
those, who believe that the situation may change for the worse, right?
- I believe the South Caucasus and Caspian regions have tremendous
potential for economic growth, provided they can continue working
effectively ` especially with the United States and NATO -- to stem
threats to their stability posed by: (a) Islamist radicalism,
aggravated by activists based in Afghanistan and Iran; and (b)
liberalize their political systems to unleash the full productive
potential of their populations.
Maintaining the balance between stability and liberalization is the
key challenge for these countries. Azerbaijan, for example, has a
chance to avoid the two extremes former President Hosni Mubarak left
for Egypt: either Islamist extremism or political authoritarianism.
Striking the balance in Azerbaijan and elsewhere in the region will
require continued courage and true commitment to national interests
and universal values of human rights, not only by government
officials, but by private citizens as well.
I do not view as likely a return to armed conflict in any of the South
Caucasus unresolved conflicts. The Georgian Government is working to
make reintegration more attractive to the residents of Abkhazia, while
South Ossetia has effectively been incorporated into Russia.
Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, I believe renewed armed hostilities would
be likely only if the parties fully lost faith in the Minsk Group's
commitment and ability to negotiate a framework agreement as outlined
by the `Basic Principles.'
- The United States has intensified its efforts to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, should one expect other steps towards
peaceful solution?
- Unfortunately, I do not agree with the premise of this question. I
am disappointed by what I see as the United States having
significantly decreased its activeness in the South Caucasus. In the
case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the next step I recommend to
Washington is to appoint a full-time envoy to serve as Minsk Group
Co-Chair.
Once Washington does appoint a new Minsk Group Co-Chair, it will be
important for Secretary of State Kerry and President Obama to provide
strong political support to a renewed dialogue between Presidents
Aliyev and Sargsian and for any compromise decisions the two South
Caucasus Presidents may decide to take in the context of the Minsk
Group process. It will also be important for the top U.S. leaders to
have Nagorno Karabakh on their agenda for all discussions with their
Russian counterparts.
- Can the changes in the Russian-Georgian relations affect the
situation in the region? What certain changes should be expected?
- In principle, improved Russian-Georgian relations should benefit the
entire South Caucasus. Russia should naturally be one of Georgia's
largest trading partners. There is no reason for the two countries'
trading relations to be disrupted; in fact, during the days when
Russian troops were invading Georgia in August 2008, electricity trade
between Russia and Georgia continued to flourish.
The Georgian Government has made clear that it will not normalize
relations with Russia until the Russia military ends its occupation of
Georgian territory in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is a strong
statement by Prime Minister Ivanishvili.
The most important question is whether Prime Minister Ivanishvili will
continue to lead Georgia's quest to become a member of NATO and other
Euro-Atlantic institutions, while sustaining Georgia's crucial role as
a bridge between Azerbaijan/Central Asia and Europe. Early in his
term, Prime Minister Ivanishvili sent confusing signals suggesting
that he might prefer Georgia to emphasized North-South connections,
(such as reopening of the rail link from Russia to Abkhazia and the
rest of Georgia to Armenia) over East-West connections (such as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad).
It seems Prime Minister Ivanishvili has now corrected his course by
reaffirming Georgia's trajectory toward the Euro-Atlantic community.
This approach reflects the preferences of Georgian voters, who
overwhelmingly favor Georgia's membership in NATO. It also reflects
the unified voice of Georgia's parliament, as articulated in a
statement last March by both the government and opposition factions in
parliament reaffirming their support for Georgia's Western trajectory
in its national security policy.
- What Azerbaijan should do in order to pursue the USA and European
countries to support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity?
- The United States and its European Allies are indeed interested in
the restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The U.S. has
worked intensively and successfully with its NATO ally, France, as
well as with Russi all the members of the OSCE's Minsk Group to
formulate a framework for a final settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict, known as the `Basic Principles. ' This framework was
articulated in the `Madrid Document' of November 2007, as well as in
the statement of Presidents Obama, Sarkozy, and Medvedev during the
G-8 Summit in D'Aquila, Italy, in July 2009. Finalization of the
`Madrid Document' would make a dramatic contribution to Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity by securing Armenia's agreement to return to
Azerbaijan's control the seven Azerbaijani territories surrounding
Nagorno Karabakh in exchange for Nagorno Karabakh receiving an
`interim legal status' until a vote occurs at some point in the
future on the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno Karabakh's `final legal
status.'
So, the most effective step Azerbaijan could take in this regard would
be to resume negotiations at the presidential level to finalize the
Basic Principles. And, as I noted above, the U.S.'s top leaders would
have an important role to play in supporting such negotiations through
public statements, as well as by ensuring mediation of the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict remains on the agenda of the U.S. and its European
Allies in all major meetings with their Russian counterparts.
Azerbaijan can also help by making clear its readiness to supply
Armenia with natural gas and to invest in Armenia's transportation and
communications infrastructure in the context of progress to a
settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Such commercial
diplomacy will provide Yerevan some breathing space to take the bold
decisions required for a breakthrough.
Interview by Fuad Safarov. Exclusively to VK.
Mathew Bryza graduated from Stanford University with a Bachelor of
Arts degree in International relations and obtained his Master of Arts
in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of
Tufts University in 1988.
Bryza joined the United States Foreign Service in August 1988. He then
served in Poland in 1989-1991 at the U.S. Consulate in PoznaÃ?Â? and the
U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, where he covered the Solidarity movement,
reform of Poland's security services, and regional politics. From 1991
through 1995, he worked on European and Russian affairs at the State
Department. Bryza served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during
1995-1997.
In April 2001, Bryza joined the United States National Security
Council as Director for Europe and Eurasia, with responsibility for
coordinating U.S. policy on Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Caspian energy. In June 2005, he assumed duties of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.
In May 2010, the White House appointed Bryza as the United States
Ambassador to Azerbaijan. On September 21, 2010, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee approved his ambassadorial nomination and sent it
to the Senate floor. On December 29, 2010 Bryza's appointment by
President Obama was confirmed by the White House as a recess
appointment. He served as ambassador to Azerbaijan starting from
February 2011.
In January 2012 Bryza left the post and the foreign service as the
Senate did not confirm his nomination due to the opposition by
Armenian-American lobbying groups who alleged his ties with the
Azerbaijani government.
Since March 1, 2012 Bryza has been appointed the Director of the
International Centre for Defense Studies, a Tallinn-based think thank.
His first marriage ended in divorce. On August 23, 2007, he married
Zeyno Baran, from whom he has a daughter. He lives with his family in
Istanbul, Turkey.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/42326.html
July 6 2013
I do not view as likely a return to armed conflict in any of the South
Caucasus unresolved conflicts, Mathew Bryza says
6 July 2013 - 7:14pm
Former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and former co-chair of the OSCE
Minks Group Mathew Bryza, who is believed to be one of the best
Western experts dealing with the South Caucasus, talked to VK about
the situation in the region.
- Mr. Bryza, what do you think about the future of the region, are
those, who believe that the situation may change for the worse, right?
- I believe the South Caucasus and Caspian regions have tremendous
potential for economic growth, provided they can continue working
effectively ` especially with the United States and NATO -- to stem
threats to their stability posed by: (a) Islamist radicalism,
aggravated by activists based in Afghanistan and Iran; and (b)
liberalize their political systems to unleash the full productive
potential of their populations.
Maintaining the balance between stability and liberalization is the
key challenge for these countries. Azerbaijan, for example, has a
chance to avoid the two extremes former President Hosni Mubarak left
for Egypt: either Islamist extremism or political authoritarianism.
Striking the balance in Azerbaijan and elsewhere in the region will
require continued courage and true commitment to national interests
and universal values of human rights, not only by government
officials, but by private citizens as well.
I do not view as likely a return to armed conflict in any of the South
Caucasus unresolved conflicts. The Georgian Government is working to
make reintegration more attractive to the residents of Abkhazia, while
South Ossetia has effectively been incorporated into Russia.
Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, I believe renewed armed hostilities would
be likely only if the parties fully lost faith in the Minsk Group's
commitment and ability to negotiate a framework agreement as outlined
by the `Basic Principles.'
- The United States has intensified its efforts to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, should one expect other steps towards
peaceful solution?
- Unfortunately, I do not agree with the premise of this question. I
am disappointed by what I see as the United States having
significantly decreased its activeness in the South Caucasus. In the
case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the next step I recommend to
Washington is to appoint a full-time envoy to serve as Minsk Group
Co-Chair.
Once Washington does appoint a new Minsk Group Co-Chair, it will be
important for Secretary of State Kerry and President Obama to provide
strong political support to a renewed dialogue between Presidents
Aliyev and Sargsian and for any compromise decisions the two South
Caucasus Presidents may decide to take in the context of the Minsk
Group process. It will also be important for the top U.S. leaders to
have Nagorno Karabakh on their agenda for all discussions with their
Russian counterparts.
- Can the changes in the Russian-Georgian relations affect the
situation in the region? What certain changes should be expected?
- In principle, improved Russian-Georgian relations should benefit the
entire South Caucasus. Russia should naturally be one of Georgia's
largest trading partners. There is no reason for the two countries'
trading relations to be disrupted; in fact, during the days when
Russian troops were invading Georgia in August 2008, electricity trade
between Russia and Georgia continued to flourish.
The Georgian Government has made clear that it will not normalize
relations with Russia until the Russia military ends its occupation of
Georgian territory in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is a strong
statement by Prime Minister Ivanishvili.
The most important question is whether Prime Minister Ivanishvili will
continue to lead Georgia's quest to become a member of NATO and other
Euro-Atlantic institutions, while sustaining Georgia's crucial role as
a bridge between Azerbaijan/Central Asia and Europe. Early in his
term, Prime Minister Ivanishvili sent confusing signals suggesting
that he might prefer Georgia to emphasized North-South connections,
(such as reopening of the rail link from Russia to Abkhazia and the
rest of Georgia to Armenia) over East-West connections (such as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad).
It seems Prime Minister Ivanishvili has now corrected his course by
reaffirming Georgia's trajectory toward the Euro-Atlantic community.
This approach reflects the preferences of Georgian voters, who
overwhelmingly favor Georgia's membership in NATO. It also reflects
the unified voice of Georgia's parliament, as articulated in a
statement last March by both the government and opposition factions in
parliament reaffirming their support for Georgia's Western trajectory
in its national security policy.
- What Azerbaijan should do in order to pursue the USA and European
countries to support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity?
- The United States and its European Allies are indeed interested in
the restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The U.S. has
worked intensively and successfully with its NATO ally, France, as
well as with Russi all the members of the OSCE's Minsk Group to
formulate a framework for a final settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict, known as the `Basic Principles. ' This framework was
articulated in the `Madrid Document' of November 2007, as well as in
the statement of Presidents Obama, Sarkozy, and Medvedev during the
G-8 Summit in D'Aquila, Italy, in July 2009. Finalization of the
`Madrid Document' would make a dramatic contribution to Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity by securing Armenia's agreement to return to
Azerbaijan's control the seven Azerbaijani territories surrounding
Nagorno Karabakh in exchange for Nagorno Karabakh receiving an
`interim legal status' until a vote occurs at some point in the
future on the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno Karabakh's `final legal
status.'
So, the most effective step Azerbaijan could take in this regard would
be to resume negotiations at the presidential level to finalize the
Basic Principles. And, as I noted above, the U.S.'s top leaders would
have an important role to play in supporting such negotiations through
public statements, as well as by ensuring mediation of the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict remains on the agenda of the U.S. and its European
Allies in all major meetings with their Russian counterparts.
Azerbaijan can also help by making clear its readiness to supply
Armenia with natural gas and to invest in Armenia's transportation and
communications infrastructure in the context of progress to a
settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Such commercial
diplomacy will provide Yerevan some breathing space to take the bold
decisions required for a breakthrough.
Interview by Fuad Safarov. Exclusively to VK.
Mathew Bryza graduated from Stanford University with a Bachelor of
Arts degree in International relations and obtained his Master of Arts
in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of
Tufts University in 1988.
Bryza joined the United States Foreign Service in August 1988. He then
served in Poland in 1989-1991 at the U.S. Consulate in PoznaÃ?Â? and the
U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, where he covered the Solidarity movement,
reform of Poland's security services, and regional politics. From 1991
through 1995, he worked on European and Russian affairs at the State
Department. Bryza served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during
1995-1997.
In April 2001, Bryza joined the United States National Security
Council as Director for Europe and Eurasia, with responsibility for
coordinating U.S. policy on Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Caspian energy. In June 2005, he assumed duties of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.
In May 2010, the White House appointed Bryza as the United States
Ambassador to Azerbaijan. On September 21, 2010, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee approved his ambassadorial nomination and sent it
to the Senate floor. On December 29, 2010 Bryza's appointment by
President Obama was confirmed by the White House as a recess
appointment. He served as ambassador to Azerbaijan starting from
February 2011.
In January 2012 Bryza left the post and the foreign service as the
Senate did not confirm his nomination due to the opposition by
Armenian-American lobbying groups who alleged his ties with the
Azerbaijani government.
Since March 1, 2012 Bryza has been appointed the Director of the
International Centre for Defense Studies, a Tallinn-based think thank.
His first marriage ended in divorce. On August 23, 2007, he married
Zeyno Baran, from whom he has a daughter. He lives with his family in
Istanbul, Turkey.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/42326.html