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WHEN ALL THAT GOVERNMENT DOES IS SURRENDER ITS HEAD
Armenia interpreted Russian supply of offensive arms worth 1 billion
dollars to Azerbaijan as a punitive action against the policy of
official Yerevan to associate with the EU. It is followed by a campaign
the purpose of which is to ensure backup of possible war to be launched
by Russia in the context that the pro-West policy will force Russia
to launch a war to punish Armenia and Armenia will lose Artsakh.
Even historical arguments are brought which, however, exclude the
developments when Armenia underwent big strategic defeats due to its
pro-Russian policy.
In fact, the words "pro-West" and "pro-Russian" that are used to
describe the current behavior of official Yerevan which is hard to
call a policy are examples of misinterpretation of notions and a
primitive presentation of the situation which intend to guide the
discussion along extremities and thereby shift the discussion from
the conscious to the subconscious level, to the level of instincts.
In reality, the issue is simple but not as primitive as the statements
"pro-West" and "pro-Russian". Since a certain period the Armenian
government has understood or was thoroughly and convincingly explained
that Russia will start a war sooner or later. And the more irrevocable
the Russian dominance on Armenia, the closer the war.
The point is that for Russia in global economic and political
stagnation an armed conflict in the area of Artsakh is more or less the
only way of staying viable in the important Caucasian region. It has
been a long time that Russia has been trying to invade Armenia instead
of conducting a policy in the South Caucasus. Now Russia is facing
the danger it has created. Moscow has deprived Armenia of existence
as a subject of international politics rendering it a blind tool.
In other words, Moscow has deprived itself of a reliable partner
of combined policy in the Caucasus. The Kremlin has understood the
mistake but not fully. In other words, they have understood that
Russia cannot cope with the West conducting a combined policy in the
Caucasus despite controversies. However, they have not understood that
Armenia is an irreplaceable partner for Russia because Turks can be
a partner to Russia to divide and rule Armenia but not the Caucasus.
By depriving Armenia of being subject Moscow has chosen Turkey and
Azerbaijan as partners to remain a subject of big politics. Naturally,
the price for this partnership are Armenia and Artsakh which will be
the the trophy for Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia. Taking on the role
of the chief military supplier of the future war, Russia is trying to
ensure the maximum size of its trophy, rendering the military actions
highly controllable and the war and its outcome fully manageable.
The relation between Armenia and the West is a singular tool for
curbing Russia's intentions. Russia will not wage a war for which
Armenia will pay unless it is confident of full influence on Armenia.
Otherwise, Moscow cannot pay for a war unless it can pay with Armenia
and Artsakh.
In this situation, deepening relations with the West, economic and
political diversification is one of the few opportunities for Armenia
to reduce probability of war. Or, if the war starts, Yerevan will
avoid the destiny of trophy thanks to such diversification.
The government of Armenia understands that it will be beheaded by
Russia in case war starts and someone has to pay for it because Moscow
will have to ascribe defeat to the government of Armenia. Therefore,
economic and political diversification is a key issue for Yerevan.
Western or Russian sentiments have nothing to do with it. Security
is the issue, first of all our own security ahead of an inevitable
and a highly probable war.
So, the "business" between Azerbaijan and Russia must not be justified
by relations between Armenia and the West. Russia started its business
a long time ago, before Armenia had anything in common with the EU.
Russia has been building strategic relations with Azerbaijan since
mid-2000s and since mid-2000s Armenia has been silent on this
"building" and, on top of all, giving away its strategic facilities
to Russia.
Finally, it has been explained to Armenia that surrender is endless.
And the Armenian government has understood this, at least because it
has felt that very little is left to surrender and eventually it is the
turn of one's own head. It has already made the head start thinking.
Although there is little work to do because the head is thinking that
it is enough to surrender itself to Europe, as well to save itself. In
reality, the head will be saved if the body is fixed. In this case,
the body is Armenia with its economy and society. Any external subject
is only an opportunity that must be used for one's own interest rather
than lean the body against it.
By the way, since history has a big place in the war advocacy, perhaps
there is no need to go far back. The history of war in Artsakh is
enough to understand that victory comes when one stops looking for
victory in Russia or the West but looks for it in oneself. One takes
from Russia or the West only what may be of additional use. Thanks
to this consciousness the Armenian troops in Artsakh were able to
overcome the advantage that Azerbaijan obtained with the help of the
Russian troops.
Hakob Badalyan 17:55 11/07/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/30437
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Armenia interpreted Russian supply of offensive arms worth 1 billion
dollars to Azerbaijan as a punitive action against the policy of
official Yerevan to associate with the EU. It is followed by a campaign
the purpose of which is to ensure backup of possible war to be launched
by Russia in the context that the pro-West policy will force Russia
to launch a war to punish Armenia and Armenia will lose Artsakh.
Even historical arguments are brought which, however, exclude the
developments when Armenia underwent big strategic defeats due to its
pro-Russian policy.
In fact, the words "pro-West" and "pro-Russian" that are used to
describe the current behavior of official Yerevan which is hard to
call a policy are examples of misinterpretation of notions and a
primitive presentation of the situation which intend to guide the
discussion along extremities and thereby shift the discussion from
the conscious to the subconscious level, to the level of instincts.
In reality, the issue is simple but not as primitive as the statements
"pro-West" and "pro-Russian". Since a certain period the Armenian
government has understood or was thoroughly and convincingly explained
that Russia will start a war sooner or later. And the more irrevocable
the Russian dominance on Armenia, the closer the war.
The point is that for Russia in global economic and political
stagnation an armed conflict in the area of Artsakh is more or less the
only way of staying viable in the important Caucasian region. It has
been a long time that Russia has been trying to invade Armenia instead
of conducting a policy in the South Caucasus. Now Russia is facing
the danger it has created. Moscow has deprived Armenia of existence
as a subject of international politics rendering it a blind tool.
In other words, Moscow has deprived itself of a reliable partner
of combined policy in the Caucasus. The Kremlin has understood the
mistake but not fully. In other words, they have understood that
Russia cannot cope with the West conducting a combined policy in the
Caucasus despite controversies. However, they have not understood that
Armenia is an irreplaceable partner for Russia because Turks can be
a partner to Russia to divide and rule Armenia but not the Caucasus.
By depriving Armenia of being subject Moscow has chosen Turkey and
Azerbaijan as partners to remain a subject of big politics. Naturally,
the price for this partnership are Armenia and Artsakh which will be
the the trophy for Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia. Taking on the role
of the chief military supplier of the future war, Russia is trying to
ensure the maximum size of its trophy, rendering the military actions
highly controllable and the war and its outcome fully manageable.
The relation between Armenia and the West is a singular tool for
curbing Russia's intentions. Russia will not wage a war for which
Armenia will pay unless it is confident of full influence on Armenia.
Otherwise, Moscow cannot pay for a war unless it can pay with Armenia
and Artsakh.
In this situation, deepening relations with the West, economic and
political diversification is one of the few opportunities for Armenia
to reduce probability of war. Or, if the war starts, Yerevan will
avoid the destiny of trophy thanks to such diversification.
The government of Armenia understands that it will be beheaded by
Russia in case war starts and someone has to pay for it because Moscow
will have to ascribe defeat to the government of Armenia. Therefore,
economic and political diversification is a key issue for Yerevan.
Western or Russian sentiments have nothing to do with it. Security
is the issue, first of all our own security ahead of an inevitable
and a highly probable war.
So, the "business" between Azerbaijan and Russia must not be justified
by relations between Armenia and the West. Russia started its business
a long time ago, before Armenia had anything in common with the EU.
Russia has been building strategic relations with Azerbaijan since
mid-2000s and since mid-2000s Armenia has been silent on this
"building" and, on top of all, giving away its strategic facilities
to Russia.
Finally, it has been explained to Armenia that surrender is endless.
And the Armenian government has understood this, at least because it
has felt that very little is left to surrender and eventually it is the
turn of one's own head. It has already made the head start thinking.
Although there is little work to do because the head is thinking that
it is enough to surrender itself to Europe, as well to save itself. In
reality, the head will be saved if the body is fixed. In this case,
the body is Armenia with its economy and society. Any external subject
is only an opportunity that must be used for one's own interest rather
than lean the body against it.
By the way, since history has a big place in the war advocacy, perhaps
there is no need to go far back. The history of war in Artsakh is
enough to understand that victory comes when one stops looking for
victory in Russia or the West but looks for it in oneself. One takes
from Russia or the West only what may be of additional use. Thanks
to this consciousness the Armenian troops in Artsakh were able to
overcome the advantage that Azerbaijan obtained with the help of the
Russian troops.
Hakob Badalyan 17:55 11/07/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/30437
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress