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Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey
July 13 2013
We are good, neighbors aren't
MURAT YETKÄ°N
Bashar al-Assad, who should have left his place to his deputy Faruk
al-Shara as Syrian president almost a year ago according to the
expectations of Ankara, convened the Baath Party executive committee
on July 9 and fired almost all other members, including al-Shara.
This was an interesting move. His hand against the Muslim Brotherhood,
or `Ikhwan-i Muslimin' opposition, with which he has been in a civil
war for more than two years now, has been strengthened by two major
developments over the last few weeks. First, there was the in-house
coup in Qatar where the former prime minister, a main supporter of the
Ikhwan in Syria, was removed from office by the emir, who stepped down
at the same time on June 25. Second, the Egyptian army took down the
elected president Mohamed Morsi, a prominent member of the Ikhwan
movement, on July 3. One may speculate that al-Assad had acted as if
he thought there was a secret consensus between the U.S. and Russia to
get rid of his current Syrian regime but not leave it to the hands of
Ikhwan before the Second Geneva talks, which will hopefully take place
in the autumn. Al-Assad's explanation for his move was different. He
said that all those aides had misled him into mistakes; in a way, he
was saying that he was good, but his inner circle was not.
Those words reminded the Turkish people of an excuse cliché used for
those high up when corruption allegations are widespread: He (or she)
is good, but the close circuit is not.
Turkish foreign policy experienced two of its high points when
President Abdullah Gül started diplomacy with Armenia in 2008, and
when then-new Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu started open diplomacy
with Iraqi Kurds by visiting Arbil in 2009. Then proud of Ankara's
`zero problems with neighbors' policy, DavutoÄ?lu was underlining that
only Turkey was able to talk to all political actors - official or
unofficial - in its region, from fighting factions in Iraq to Hamas,
from Iran to Israel.
Now, following the overthrow in Egypt, Ankara is not happy, mainly for
two reasons. One of them is because of the coup against the elected
president. Secondly, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK
Parti) has developed very special relations with the Ikhwan movement,
especially after it started to adopt a more legalistic, political
approach. This is the case not only in Egypt; AK Parti advisors also
helped the Ä°khwanist election campaigns in Tunisia and Egypt. The main
opposition group in Syria against al-Assad are the Ikhwanists, while
Hamas in the Gaza Strip of Palestine also have close links with
Ikhwan.
Ankara has not been talking to Israel since the Mavi Marmara tragedy
in 2010 anyway. Plus, the polarization in the region since the Syrian
civil war started in 2011 has affected Ankara's links with Iran,
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shiite majority in Iraq.
Over the last few weeks Ankara's relations with its western allies,
the U.S. and the European Union, have been going though a test as
well. This is not only over Middle Eastern issues, but also over
rights and freedoms regarding the anti-government demonstrations in
Turkey and over the coup in Egypt.
DavutoÄ?lu had convened some of his ambassadors in key countries, the
intelligence organization MÄ°T, and the prime minister's foreign
relations staff, as the ideological dynamo of the policy. He clearly
needs a fine tuning for Turkish foreign policy following the trauma of
Egypt. To repeat, `we are good, neighbors aren't' as an answer to
explain the stumbles in the `zero problems with neighbors' policy is
no longer convincing.
July/13/2013
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-are-good-neighbors-arent.aspx?pageID=449&nID=50617&NewsCatID=409
July 13 2013
We are good, neighbors aren't
MURAT YETKÄ°N
Bashar al-Assad, who should have left his place to his deputy Faruk
al-Shara as Syrian president almost a year ago according to the
expectations of Ankara, convened the Baath Party executive committee
on July 9 and fired almost all other members, including al-Shara.
This was an interesting move. His hand against the Muslim Brotherhood,
or `Ikhwan-i Muslimin' opposition, with which he has been in a civil
war for more than two years now, has been strengthened by two major
developments over the last few weeks. First, there was the in-house
coup in Qatar where the former prime minister, a main supporter of the
Ikhwan in Syria, was removed from office by the emir, who stepped down
at the same time on June 25. Second, the Egyptian army took down the
elected president Mohamed Morsi, a prominent member of the Ikhwan
movement, on July 3. One may speculate that al-Assad had acted as if
he thought there was a secret consensus between the U.S. and Russia to
get rid of his current Syrian regime but not leave it to the hands of
Ikhwan before the Second Geneva talks, which will hopefully take place
in the autumn. Al-Assad's explanation for his move was different. He
said that all those aides had misled him into mistakes; in a way, he
was saying that he was good, but his inner circle was not.
Those words reminded the Turkish people of an excuse cliché used for
those high up when corruption allegations are widespread: He (or she)
is good, but the close circuit is not.
Turkish foreign policy experienced two of its high points when
President Abdullah Gül started diplomacy with Armenia in 2008, and
when then-new Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu started open diplomacy
with Iraqi Kurds by visiting Arbil in 2009. Then proud of Ankara's
`zero problems with neighbors' policy, DavutoÄ?lu was underlining that
only Turkey was able to talk to all political actors - official or
unofficial - in its region, from fighting factions in Iraq to Hamas,
from Iran to Israel.
Now, following the overthrow in Egypt, Ankara is not happy, mainly for
two reasons. One of them is because of the coup against the elected
president. Secondly, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK
Parti) has developed very special relations with the Ikhwan movement,
especially after it started to adopt a more legalistic, political
approach. This is the case not only in Egypt; AK Parti advisors also
helped the Ä°khwanist election campaigns in Tunisia and Egypt. The main
opposition group in Syria against al-Assad are the Ikhwanists, while
Hamas in the Gaza Strip of Palestine also have close links with
Ikhwan.
Ankara has not been talking to Israel since the Mavi Marmara tragedy
in 2010 anyway. Plus, the polarization in the region since the Syrian
civil war started in 2011 has affected Ankara's links with Iran,
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shiite majority in Iraq.
Over the last few weeks Ankara's relations with its western allies,
the U.S. and the European Union, have been going though a test as
well. This is not only over Middle Eastern issues, but also over
rights and freedoms regarding the anti-government demonstrations in
Turkey and over the coup in Egypt.
DavutoÄ?lu had convened some of his ambassadors in key countries, the
intelligence organization MÄ°T, and the prime minister's foreign
relations staff, as the ideological dynamo of the policy. He clearly
needs a fine tuning for Turkish foreign policy following the trauma of
Egypt. To repeat, `we are good, neighbors aren't' as an answer to
explain the stumbles in the `zero problems with neighbors' policy is
no longer convincing.
July/13/2013
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-are-good-neighbors-arent.aspx?pageID=449&nID=50617&NewsCatID=409