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WAR IN SYRIA AND ARAB NATIONALISM
If the Islamic movements were universal in terms of the national
liberation war in the Arab world, all the ambitious issues would have
resolved a long time ago.
In any Arab world Islamism is only part of the social movement
but the destiny of countries and people determines the potential of
nationalism. So was at all the stages of the Arab national liberation
movement, so is now. Islamism is just a secondary instrument of
politics in Arab countries.
The inter-confessional army in Syria soon transformed to a geopolitical
confrontation, as well as a fight among several Arab nations because
the notion "Arab people" or "Arab nations" is an adequate notion.
Of course, the ambitions of Islamism and nationalism fit into the
same dramatic context but now Syria is sympathized by large and
different layers of Arab countries because besides Saudi Arabia Syria
is threatened by Israel and Turkey, which is a more important factor
of mobilization of Arab nationalism.
Bashar Assad is becoming a leader not only in Syria but also a certain
cluster of Arab nationalism which is closer and safer to the Western
community. In other word, a practically de-ideological state of Arab
nationalism is meant.
If Assad's Syria collapsed in a few months after foreign aggression,
there would be other generalizations and theory but Syria held on
and one needs to figure out why.
Considering the main factor, this is Syrian nationalism which did
not want to commit the country to profanation by foreign aggressors
and invaders. Arabs cannot help sympathizing Syrians, and now Arab
elites in different countries are deliberating on how relations with
Syria, Arab states and the West will be built after the resolution
is in place.
At the same time, significant changes have taken place inside the
Arab Islamic movement. The Muslim brothers demonstrated considerable
stratification and diversity in a single country. One of the leaders
of Muslim Brothers said: "Authentic Sharia is possible in a strong
and legal state which is able to protect itself from foreign enemies."
Here is a controversial but logical pronouncement. "Beating determines
consciousness," the saying is.
In Syria the Muslim Brothers are gradually but steadily taking to
Bashar Assad's side and actively participating in the defense of
the country. The politicians of this association are still trying to
determine their place in future Syria but no doubt they do not link
their status to the fall of the ruling regime.
As to foreign policy, one can state with confidence that the Syrian
politicians were not only able to preserve and receive support from
their traditional partners but also persuade the West that even after
such a bloody scenario and lasting slaughter and mutual accusations
one can maintain quite credible relations with Damask.
Unfortunately, this time the West did not find a reasonable mediator
or partner with the help of which Syria succeeded in implementing
relevant contacts more efficiently but this is a matter of time.
Presently, there are expectations relating to the beginning of more
serious contacts between Syria and the Western states.
In the Arab world everything will depend on the relations of Syria with
three states, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The first two states will
soon review their doubts about Syria and will set to build relations
with Syria anew. With Saudi it will be more complicated but Arabs
are easily appeased, especially towards each other.
Currently, in strategic terms, three countries of the Near East have
lost - Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Most probably, there will
be a different geopolitical layout but it is understood that this
"anti-Russian" troika will hardly be able to offer anything real in
joining their efforts or establishment of an alliance.
Syrian events will lead to rapprochement of Iraq with Syria and Iran,
as well as the growth of the role of Lebanon in the Near East. Most
probably, Jordan and Qatar, UAE and Kuwait will be more reserved in
their relation to Syria. The Shiite "belt" held on and is trying to
conduct a policy of a more or less understandable dialogue with the
United States and Europe rather than confrontation.
Russia's foothold on the Near East will be stronger but will not become
more significant. The role of China will certainly grow like elsewhere
in the world. Saudi Arabia and its close partners in the Arab world
will have nothing else to do but to strengthen their relations with
the United States.
In most general terms it could be suggested that after the defeat of
the Salafite groups and states a period of crisis of not only this
ideology but also radical Sunni Islam will start in Syria. The Arab
states have mostly chosen the way to a legal society on the basis of
post-modern political Islam.
Igor Muradyan 15:03 16/07/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/30470
If the Islamic movements were universal in terms of the national
liberation war in the Arab world, all the ambitious issues would have
resolved a long time ago.
In any Arab world Islamism is only part of the social movement
but the destiny of countries and people determines the potential of
nationalism. So was at all the stages of the Arab national liberation
movement, so is now. Islamism is just a secondary instrument of
politics in Arab countries.
The inter-confessional army in Syria soon transformed to a geopolitical
confrontation, as well as a fight among several Arab nations because
the notion "Arab people" or "Arab nations" is an adequate notion.
Of course, the ambitions of Islamism and nationalism fit into the
same dramatic context but now Syria is sympathized by large and
different layers of Arab countries because besides Saudi Arabia Syria
is threatened by Israel and Turkey, which is a more important factor
of mobilization of Arab nationalism.
Bashar Assad is becoming a leader not only in Syria but also a certain
cluster of Arab nationalism which is closer and safer to the Western
community. In other word, a practically de-ideological state of Arab
nationalism is meant.
If Assad's Syria collapsed in a few months after foreign aggression,
there would be other generalizations and theory but Syria held on
and one needs to figure out why.
Considering the main factor, this is Syrian nationalism which did
not want to commit the country to profanation by foreign aggressors
and invaders. Arabs cannot help sympathizing Syrians, and now Arab
elites in different countries are deliberating on how relations with
Syria, Arab states and the West will be built after the resolution
is in place.
At the same time, significant changes have taken place inside the
Arab Islamic movement. The Muslim brothers demonstrated considerable
stratification and diversity in a single country. One of the leaders
of Muslim Brothers said: "Authentic Sharia is possible in a strong
and legal state which is able to protect itself from foreign enemies."
Here is a controversial but logical pronouncement. "Beating determines
consciousness," the saying is.
In Syria the Muslim Brothers are gradually but steadily taking to
Bashar Assad's side and actively participating in the defense of
the country. The politicians of this association are still trying to
determine their place in future Syria but no doubt they do not link
their status to the fall of the ruling regime.
As to foreign policy, one can state with confidence that the Syrian
politicians were not only able to preserve and receive support from
their traditional partners but also persuade the West that even after
such a bloody scenario and lasting slaughter and mutual accusations
one can maintain quite credible relations with Damask.
Unfortunately, this time the West did not find a reasonable mediator
or partner with the help of which Syria succeeded in implementing
relevant contacts more efficiently but this is a matter of time.
Presently, there are expectations relating to the beginning of more
serious contacts between Syria and the Western states.
In the Arab world everything will depend on the relations of Syria with
three states, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The first two states will
soon review their doubts about Syria and will set to build relations
with Syria anew. With Saudi it will be more complicated but Arabs
are easily appeased, especially towards each other.
Currently, in strategic terms, three countries of the Near East have
lost - Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Most probably, there will
be a different geopolitical layout but it is understood that this
"anti-Russian" troika will hardly be able to offer anything real in
joining their efforts or establishment of an alliance.
Syrian events will lead to rapprochement of Iraq with Syria and Iran,
as well as the growth of the role of Lebanon in the Near East. Most
probably, Jordan and Qatar, UAE and Kuwait will be more reserved in
their relation to Syria. The Shiite "belt" held on and is trying to
conduct a policy of a more or less understandable dialogue with the
United States and Europe rather than confrontation.
Russia's foothold on the Near East will be stronger but will not become
more significant. The role of China will certainly grow like elsewhere
in the world. Saudi Arabia and its close partners in the Arab world
will have nothing else to do but to strengthen their relations with
the United States.
In most general terms it could be suggested that after the defeat of
the Salafite groups and states a period of crisis of not only this
ideology but also radical Sunni Islam will start in Syria. The Arab
states have mostly chosen the way to a legal society on the basis of
post-modern political Islam.
Igor Muradyan 15:03 16/07/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/30470