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TURKISH CROSSROADS HAS PASSED
American experts who used to work in the State Department admit that
the most difficult thing in foreign policy is pursuing at least two
parallel political priorities. Apparently, it is difficult for a great
power and especially such a country as Turkey which has apparently
overestimated its foreign political and economic opportunities.
After several "peaks" of "independent" ambitious appeals Turkey
understood that it is not able not only to conduct an independent
foreign policy but also to ensure its national security. Sent to
freewheeling in the mid-2000s, Turkey encountered complications and,
most importantly, was unable to resolve regional problems and tasks
in any direction.
None of Turkey's initiatives and claims enjoyed legitimacy at the
Euro-Atlantic arena, which led Turkey to efforts to achieve minimum
goals in the mode of "cooperation" with the United States and NATO.
Neither the United States, nor NATO are interested in supporting
Turkey's regional policy.
Turkey is in the "habit" of returning to its ideas and goals but one
could notice a very important event which can be conventionally listed
to the period of 2010-2011, i.e. configuration of relations between
the United States and Turkey, as well as between NATO and Turkey.
It marks a strange circumstance. Turkey limits its foreign political
ambitions within the framework of interests of the the Euro-Atlantic
community, first of all in regard to regional policy with the support
of the West - only tasks relating to Turkey's national security. In
other words, provided that the problems between Turkey and the West
have not been resolved and cannot be resolved, it may not conduct an
"imperial" policy remaining loyal to the West.
All Ankara can do is to hope for better times but Turkish politicians
have apparently understood that they missed the historical change
and the Western community which already has the experience of curbing
Turkish ambitions will hardly be less pliable in the future.
It should be noted that the West has not made any significant efforts
to limit Turkish ambitions. The West has not hindered Turkish pressure
on the regions and, as a result, Turkey has faced resistance of small
and big neighbor states (there must be claims).
Interestingly, Turkey's neighbors, including Iran, Syria, Iraq, Greece,
Armenia, Georgia, as well as Egypt and probably other states as well,
are absolutely happy with the policy of the West on lack of support
and limitation of Turkey's regional ambitions. These circumstances
influenced Turkish-Russian relations quite ambiguously.
Russia itself has claims to Turkey. First of all, it would not wish
to appear in the same "weight group" with it, as well as understands
that Turkey need not give up its intentions in the regions where
Russia takes interest. But this is not the problem. Loyalty to the
West means that Turkey must rule out its excessive ("critical")
rapprochement with Russia. It is possible that Ankara would agree
to such rapprochement if Russia were able to offer its sufficient
advances and concessions. It did not happen because Russia, like Iran,
does not hurry to set up closer relations with Turkey.
Russia need not hope for desirable rapprochement with Turkey, Russia
cannot offer economic, geopolitical and other preferences. The
"crossroads" of hopes has passed, not only for Turkey.
It does not mean that Russia and Turkey were unable to agree on
regional policy in prejudice to any state of the given regions but
not in regard to the Euro-Atlantic community, and it means that the
relations between Turkey and Russia are not "discretionary".
Igor Muradyan 12:05 30/07/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/30580
From: Baghdasarian
American experts who used to work in the State Department admit that
the most difficult thing in foreign policy is pursuing at least two
parallel political priorities. Apparently, it is difficult for a great
power and especially such a country as Turkey which has apparently
overestimated its foreign political and economic opportunities.
After several "peaks" of "independent" ambitious appeals Turkey
understood that it is not able not only to conduct an independent
foreign policy but also to ensure its national security. Sent to
freewheeling in the mid-2000s, Turkey encountered complications and,
most importantly, was unable to resolve regional problems and tasks
in any direction.
None of Turkey's initiatives and claims enjoyed legitimacy at the
Euro-Atlantic arena, which led Turkey to efforts to achieve minimum
goals in the mode of "cooperation" with the United States and NATO.
Neither the United States, nor NATO are interested in supporting
Turkey's regional policy.
Turkey is in the "habit" of returning to its ideas and goals but one
could notice a very important event which can be conventionally listed
to the period of 2010-2011, i.e. configuration of relations between
the United States and Turkey, as well as between NATO and Turkey.
It marks a strange circumstance. Turkey limits its foreign political
ambitions within the framework of interests of the the Euro-Atlantic
community, first of all in regard to regional policy with the support
of the West - only tasks relating to Turkey's national security. In
other words, provided that the problems between Turkey and the West
have not been resolved and cannot be resolved, it may not conduct an
"imperial" policy remaining loyal to the West.
All Ankara can do is to hope for better times but Turkish politicians
have apparently understood that they missed the historical change
and the Western community which already has the experience of curbing
Turkish ambitions will hardly be less pliable in the future.
It should be noted that the West has not made any significant efforts
to limit Turkish ambitions. The West has not hindered Turkish pressure
on the regions and, as a result, Turkey has faced resistance of small
and big neighbor states (there must be claims).
Interestingly, Turkey's neighbors, including Iran, Syria, Iraq, Greece,
Armenia, Georgia, as well as Egypt and probably other states as well,
are absolutely happy with the policy of the West on lack of support
and limitation of Turkey's regional ambitions. These circumstances
influenced Turkish-Russian relations quite ambiguously.
Russia itself has claims to Turkey. First of all, it would not wish
to appear in the same "weight group" with it, as well as understands
that Turkey need not give up its intentions in the regions where
Russia takes interest. But this is not the problem. Loyalty to the
West means that Turkey must rule out its excessive ("critical")
rapprochement with Russia. It is possible that Ankara would agree
to such rapprochement if Russia were able to offer its sufficient
advances and concessions. It did not happen because Russia, like Iran,
does not hurry to set up closer relations with Turkey.
Russia need not hope for desirable rapprochement with Turkey, Russia
cannot offer economic, geopolitical and other preferences. The
"crossroads" of hopes has passed, not only for Turkey.
It does not mean that Russia and Turkey were unable to agree on
regional policy in prejudice to any state of the given regions but
not in regard to the Euro-Atlantic community, and it means that the
relations between Turkey and Russia are not "discretionary".
Igor Muradyan 12:05 30/07/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/30580
From: Baghdasarian