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ERDOGAN AND HIS ARMENIAN PROBLEM
Hurriyet, Turkey
June 6 2013
GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN
When the AKP and Erdogan came to power in Turkey in 2002, there
were reasons to think that they would correct the state policies
for dealing with history, particularly regarding the treatment of
Armenians by the Ottoman government during the First World War.
Since their political philosophy is derived mainly from religious
concepts rather than secular statism and nationalism, Erdogan and
the AKP could have denounced those policies outright. In fact they
could have pointed out that it was extreme statist and nationalist
ideology, rather than Islam, that was responsible. He could have saved
that dimension of Ottoman legacy that was tolerant by rejecting the
extremist policies of the wartime Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP) government as inimical to Islamic values; and if CUP policies
can best be characterized as genocide, so be it.
When Erdogan came to power, he was much more open in his treatment
of the Armenian issue; he wanted to leave history to historians. This
was an opening, since the Turkish state had always dictated historical
narratives down to every schoolbook.
The two protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia in October 2009 that
aimed at the normalization of relations between the two countries
had an indirect but clear reference to a joint study of the genocide
issue. It appeared that Erdogan, with support from Gul, wished to
move forward.
Even more significantly, in 2011, Erdogan apologized for the massacre
of civilian Kurdish subjects in 1938 and 1939 in Dersim/Tunceli. The
idea and gesture of an apology itself are more important than the
details. No Turkish leader had ever apologized for an atrocious policy
or crime that the Ottoman or Turkish state had ever committed against
its own subjects. Additionally, Erdogan or Davutoglu have used the
term genocide for situations that are far less sinister than what
happened to Armenians in 1915.
Hence, instead of denying genocide, Erdogan could have opted for
another method: The genocide of the Armenian people was committed
by the CUP in power. And in committing that crime, the CUP was not
acting as a Muslim government but rather as primarily a power-hungry
clique that had taken over the government illegally in the name of a
particular vision and used religion only to help make their policies
work and "seem" sanctioned by the dominant religion, Islam. This is
a perfectly legitimate political argument as well as a historically
valid one.
Prime Minister Erdogan could have made that argument and resolved an
extremely thorny issue; he would have gained international respect
both from governments and from civil societies in a large number
of countries it relates to. But that is not what has happened, not
yet anyway.
By declaring that Muslims, by definition, could not commit genocide -
as was the case regarding Sudan and Darfur - Erdogan might have thought
he was saving Islam. In fact, by exempting authors of genocide who
happen to be Muslims from that charge, Erdogan is making critical
discussion, and historical analysis, irrelevant; and in doing so,
he is creating more problems for the religion he is trying to save.
However, this is not first time that blinders have covered the eyes
of a Turkish leader - no matter how liberal or reformist. The Armenian
issue is, indeed, the blind spot of Turkish leaders' vision.
When CUP came to power in 1908, it had two options. The first was
dealing with the social and economic issues raised by Armenians. The
second option was to see the Armenian Question as a foreign plot,
therefore, subject to justifiable repression. The Young Turks started
with the first and ended up opting for the second. The result was
what happened in 1915.
When Erdogan came to power, he too had options: he could have seen the
Armenian issue as a matter integral to Ottoman and Turkish history,
a revision of which history being necessary to better pursue the
democratization of the country; or, to continue the state policies
on this issue as if it is a foreign-inspired conspiracy fueled by
imperialists' designs to break up Turkey.
Erdogan gave signals opting for the first; the question is, has he,
too, ended up with the second option?
* Gerard J. Libaridian is a historian who served as senior advisor
to the first president of independent Armenia, between 1991 and 1997.
This article is an abbreviated version of the original article
published in Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ).
June/06/2013
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-and-his-armenian-problem.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48286&NewsCatID=396
Hurriyet, Turkey
June 6 2013
GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN
When the AKP and Erdogan came to power in Turkey in 2002, there
were reasons to think that they would correct the state policies
for dealing with history, particularly regarding the treatment of
Armenians by the Ottoman government during the First World War.
Since their political philosophy is derived mainly from religious
concepts rather than secular statism and nationalism, Erdogan and
the AKP could have denounced those policies outright. In fact they
could have pointed out that it was extreme statist and nationalist
ideology, rather than Islam, that was responsible. He could have saved
that dimension of Ottoman legacy that was tolerant by rejecting the
extremist policies of the wartime Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP) government as inimical to Islamic values; and if CUP policies
can best be characterized as genocide, so be it.
When Erdogan came to power, he was much more open in his treatment
of the Armenian issue; he wanted to leave history to historians. This
was an opening, since the Turkish state had always dictated historical
narratives down to every schoolbook.
The two protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia in October 2009 that
aimed at the normalization of relations between the two countries
had an indirect but clear reference to a joint study of the genocide
issue. It appeared that Erdogan, with support from Gul, wished to
move forward.
Even more significantly, in 2011, Erdogan apologized for the massacre
of civilian Kurdish subjects in 1938 and 1939 in Dersim/Tunceli. The
idea and gesture of an apology itself are more important than the
details. No Turkish leader had ever apologized for an atrocious policy
or crime that the Ottoman or Turkish state had ever committed against
its own subjects. Additionally, Erdogan or Davutoglu have used the
term genocide for situations that are far less sinister than what
happened to Armenians in 1915.
Hence, instead of denying genocide, Erdogan could have opted for
another method: The genocide of the Armenian people was committed
by the CUP in power. And in committing that crime, the CUP was not
acting as a Muslim government but rather as primarily a power-hungry
clique that had taken over the government illegally in the name of a
particular vision and used religion only to help make their policies
work and "seem" sanctioned by the dominant religion, Islam. This is
a perfectly legitimate political argument as well as a historically
valid one.
Prime Minister Erdogan could have made that argument and resolved an
extremely thorny issue; he would have gained international respect
both from governments and from civil societies in a large number
of countries it relates to. But that is not what has happened, not
yet anyway.
By declaring that Muslims, by definition, could not commit genocide -
as was the case regarding Sudan and Darfur - Erdogan might have thought
he was saving Islam. In fact, by exempting authors of genocide who
happen to be Muslims from that charge, Erdogan is making critical
discussion, and historical analysis, irrelevant; and in doing so,
he is creating more problems for the religion he is trying to save.
However, this is not first time that blinders have covered the eyes
of a Turkish leader - no matter how liberal or reformist. The Armenian
issue is, indeed, the blind spot of Turkish leaders' vision.
When CUP came to power in 1908, it had two options. The first was
dealing with the social and economic issues raised by Armenians. The
second option was to see the Armenian Question as a foreign plot,
therefore, subject to justifiable repression. The Young Turks started
with the first and ended up opting for the second. The result was
what happened in 1915.
When Erdogan came to power, he too had options: he could have seen the
Armenian issue as a matter integral to Ottoman and Turkish history,
a revision of which history being necessary to better pursue the
democratization of the country; or, to continue the state policies
on this issue as if it is a foreign-inspired conspiracy fueled by
imperialists' designs to break up Turkey.
Erdogan gave signals opting for the first; the question is, has he,
too, ended up with the second option?
* Gerard J. Libaridian is a historian who served as senior advisor
to the first president of independent Armenia, between 1991 and 1997.
This article is an abbreviated version of the original article
published in Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ).
June/06/2013
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-and-his-armenian-problem.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48286&NewsCatID=396