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GEZI'S FOREIGN FRONT
Radikal, Turkey
June 10 2013
by Fehim Tastekin
While the government, with a strategy that positively reeked of
sectarianism, was trying to tighten its conservative ranks with
initiatives to design private life and form a new identity, it swung
the ax in the wrong place and hit Gezi [Park, Istanbul].
Is it a political destiny that leaders experiencing constriction in
foreign relations turn inward and become authoritarian? One example
of this maelstrom that politicians create with their own hands and
which cause the countries to become closed in on themselves has been
drawing Turkey in as well, a process to which the Gezi Park revolt
has suddenly put on a bitter brake. The younger generation, which
no political party has been able to channel for their own purposes,
has shown that it is not going to surrender easily to this fate. The
government, with the psychology of being caught in a tight squeeze as
a result of the turbulence it has encountered in the international
arena, is approaching the tension within the country as follows:
A Prime Minister who since 2011 had displayed a moral stance by
telling the Arab leaders encountering popular revolts to "pay heed to
the voice of the people" is now working to discredit the unrest and
the anger of his own people by calling it "a plot of foreign powers,
interest-rate lobbies, and coup-plotters." He considers the interest
of the foreign press, which has oriented its antennas towards Gezi, as
a sign of the foreign plot that he has spoken of; without considering
that no newspaper would be able to remain indifferent to an event
that could only be seen once in a century in these lands. And he is
putting the masses into a rivalry, without there being any need for
this. He is planning retaliation rallies on 15 June in Ankara, and
on 16 June in Istanbul, without paying attention to their coinciding
with the university entrance examinationsa~@¦
The Discourse of the Turn Inwards is Crude
This is a tragic transformation, slipping from pluralism into
majoritarianism. The impact on this of Turkey's having stumbled on
its foreign policy path, ranging from the relationship with the EU
to the Syria issue, is great.
When the process aimed at normalizing ties with Armenia was tossed into
the trash for the sake of Azerbaijan, when the courageous overtures
aimed at resolving the Cyprus issue were abandoned for a return
once again to the line of reconquering the island, when the spring
atmosphere that had come about in terms of resolving the problems with
Greece in the Aegean was dashed, and finally when the negotiations
with the EU came to an impasse because of Turkey's failure to fulfil
its commitment to open its customs to South Cyprus in accord with the
Supplemental Protocol it had signed in 2005, Erdogan had sought to
dispel the criticisms made with statist and nationalist rhetoric. This
rhetoric, while distancing Turkey from the EU, also served no other
purpose than, domestically, taking the Kurdish issue, in particular,
to a critical point. While the government had been hoping that it
would deal with the Kurdish issue by expelling the BDP [Peace and
Democracy Party] parliamentary deputies from the National Assembly
and tossing thousands of Kurds into prison in the KCK [Assembly of
Communities of Kurdistan] case, it then suddenly pivoted and launched
the peace process. The factor compelling this was the de facto
Kurdish autonomous zone in the north of Syria, which could not have
been anticipated. Even if it came by being imposed by the conditions,
it was no doubt a manoeuvre that deserves applause. The message that
[imprisoned Kurdistan People's Congress, KGK, formerly PKK, leader]
Abdullah Ocalan sent with the latest Imrali delegation, however, to
the effect that "I have fulfilled the responsibility incumbent on me,
and I hope that the government will fulfil, with the same seriousness,
the responsibilities incumbent on it; those who think they can use me
and deceive me will be mistaken" indicates a serious risk of stumbling.
The Impact of Syria
The statist and nationalist rhetoric, the dosage of which had been
reduced for the sake of the health of the Kurdish overture, has now
been replaced by a conservative orientation loaded with religious,
sectarian, and heroic references. This is an effort aimed at closing
the fissures in the AKP rank-and-file, who had begun to become uneasy
with the Syria policy that was causing Turkey to pay a price with
the bomb attacks first at Cilvegozu and then afterwards at Reyhanli.
Pressure from Syria is going to cause even further problems for Turkey
in the months ahead. The Syrian military, after having seized Qusayr,
which is of key importance in the flow of arms to the opposition on
the Lebanese border, plans to make a drive towards the Turkish border
in the form of an arc. If, after Qusayr, Qalamun falls as well, the
opposition's Lebanon link will collapse. There would remain only Aleppo
and Idlib, supplied from Turkey. If the weapons expected from the West
do not come, and if the opposition loses in these two locations, Turkey
will feel the stark reflections of its Syria policy even more. For
the armed groups to concentrate on the border would be a nightmare
scenario for Turkey. Ankara, in order not to face this, sought to
persuade the United States, but it did not work. That Erdogan, who
has gotten at odds with the United States not only on Syria but in
terms of relations with Iraq as well, referred to "foreign powers"
with regard to the Gezi incidents, also reflects the psychology of
having become isolated abroad.
The "Religious" Response to the Gezi Brake
In the final analysis, the government was unable to pursue its policy
of opening up to the outside, which had "neo-Ottoman" connotations,
and thus turned inwards. But the internal reflection of the stumbling
abroad is, unfortunately, quite crude. The naming of the third
bridge for "Yavuz" ["resolute," referring to Ottoman Sultan "Selim
the Grim"], for instance, was a message conveyed to Syria, to the
Alevis who have been ill-treated with sectarian language, to Iran,
which has been experiencing its works period in recent years with
Ankara because of Syria, and to the Shi'i administration of Iraq,
which has been proceeding on the same wavelength as Iran. Speeches
can become lost like writing on water, but the message on the bridge,
like the bridge itself, will be permanent. While the government, with a
strategy that positively reeked of sectarianism, was trying to tighten
its conservative ranks with initiatives to design private life and form
a new identity, it swung the ax in the wrong place and hit Gezi. But
instead of shrugging this off and recalculating, it responded on the
basis of religious sensitivities, as in the accusation of "they went
into the mosque with their shoes on and drank beer." It is a shame.
[Translated from Turkish]
Radikal, Turkey
June 10 2013
by Fehim Tastekin
While the government, with a strategy that positively reeked of
sectarianism, was trying to tighten its conservative ranks with
initiatives to design private life and form a new identity, it swung
the ax in the wrong place and hit Gezi [Park, Istanbul].
Is it a political destiny that leaders experiencing constriction in
foreign relations turn inward and become authoritarian? One example
of this maelstrom that politicians create with their own hands and
which cause the countries to become closed in on themselves has been
drawing Turkey in as well, a process to which the Gezi Park revolt
has suddenly put on a bitter brake. The younger generation, which
no political party has been able to channel for their own purposes,
has shown that it is not going to surrender easily to this fate. The
government, with the psychology of being caught in a tight squeeze as
a result of the turbulence it has encountered in the international
arena, is approaching the tension within the country as follows:
A Prime Minister who since 2011 had displayed a moral stance by
telling the Arab leaders encountering popular revolts to "pay heed to
the voice of the people" is now working to discredit the unrest and
the anger of his own people by calling it "a plot of foreign powers,
interest-rate lobbies, and coup-plotters." He considers the interest
of the foreign press, which has oriented its antennas towards Gezi, as
a sign of the foreign plot that he has spoken of; without considering
that no newspaper would be able to remain indifferent to an event
that could only be seen once in a century in these lands. And he is
putting the masses into a rivalry, without there being any need for
this. He is planning retaliation rallies on 15 June in Ankara, and
on 16 June in Istanbul, without paying attention to their coinciding
with the university entrance examinationsa~@¦
The Discourse of the Turn Inwards is Crude
This is a tragic transformation, slipping from pluralism into
majoritarianism. The impact on this of Turkey's having stumbled on
its foreign policy path, ranging from the relationship with the EU
to the Syria issue, is great.
When the process aimed at normalizing ties with Armenia was tossed into
the trash for the sake of Azerbaijan, when the courageous overtures
aimed at resolving the Cyprus issue were abandoned for a return
once again to the line of reconquering the island, when the spring
atmosphere that had come about in terms of resolving the problems with
Greece in the Aegean was dashed, and finally when the negotiations
with the EU came to an impasse because of Turkey's failure to fulfil
its commitment to open its customs to South Cyprus in accord with the
Supplemental Protocol it had signed in 2005, Erdogan had sought to
dispel the criticisms made with statist and nationalist rhetoric. This
rhetoric, while distancing Turkey from the EU, also served no other
purpose than, domestically, taking the Kurdish issue, in particular,
to a critical point. While the government had been hoping that it
would deal with the Kurdish issue by expelling the BDP [Peace and
Democracy Party] parliamentary deputies from the National Assembly
and tossing thousands of Kurds into prison in the KCK [Assembly of
Communities of Kurdistan] case, it then suddenly pivoted and launched
the peace process. The factor compelling this was the de facto
Kurdish autonomous zone in the north of Syria, which could not have
been anticipated. Even if it came by being imposed by the conditions,
it was no doubt a manoeuvre that deserves applause. The message that
[imprisoned Kurdistan People's Congress, KGK, formerly PKK, leader]
Abdullah Ocalan sent with the latest Imrali delegation, however, to
the effect that "I have fulfilled the responsibility incumbent on me,
and I hope that the government will fulfil, with the same seriousness,
the responsibilities incumbent on it; those who think they can use me
and deceive me will be mistaken" indicates a serious risk of stumbling.
The Impact of Syria
The statist and nationalist rhetoric, the dosage of which had been
reduced for the sake of the health of the Kurdish overture, has now
been replaced by a conservative orientation loaded with religious,
sectarian, and heroic references. This is an effort aimed at closing
the fissures in the AKP rank-and-file, who had begun to become uneasy
with the Syria policy that was causing Turkey to pay a price with
the bomb attacks first at Cilvegozu and then afterwards at Reyhanli.
Pressure from Syria is going to cause even further problems for Turkey
in the months ahead. The Syrian military, after having seized Qusayr,
which is of key importance in the flow of arms to the opposition on
the Lebanese border, plans to make a drive towards the Turkish border
in the form of an arc. If, after Qusayr, Qalamun falls as well, the
opposition's Lebanon link will collapse. There would remain only Aleppo
and Idlib, supplied from Turkey. If the weapons expected from the West
do not come, and if the opposition loses in these two locations, Turkey
will feel the stark reflections of its Syria policy even more. For
the armed groups to concentrate on the border would be a nightmare
scenario for Turkey. Ankara, in order not to face this, sought to
persuade the United States, but it did not work. That Erdogan, who
has gotten at odds with the United States not only on Syria but in
terms of relations with Iraq as well, referred to "foreign powers"
with regard to the Gezi incidents, also reflects the psychology of
having become isolated abroad.
The "Religious" Response to the Gezi Brake
In the final analysis, the government was unable to pursue its policy
of opening up to the outside, which had "neo-Ottoman" connotations,
and thus turned inwards. But the internal reflection of the stumbling
abroad is, unfortunately, quite crude. The naming of the third
bridge for "Yavuz" ["resolute," referring to Ottoman Sultan "Selim
the Grim"], for instance, was a message conveyed to Syria, to the
Alevis who have been ill-treated with sectarian language, to Iran,
which has been experiencing its works period in recent years with
Ankara because of Syria, and to the Shi'i administration of Iraq,
which has been proceeding on the same wavelength as Iran. Speeches
can become lost like writing on water, but the message on the bridge,
like the bridge itself, will be permanent. While the government, with a
strategy that positively reeked of sectarianism, was trying to tighten
its conservative ranks with initiatives to design private life and form
a new identity, it swung the ax in the wrong place and hit Gezi. But
instead of shrugging this off and recalculating, it responded on the
basis of religious sensitivities, as in the accusation of "they went
into the mosque with their shoes on and drank beer." It is a shame.
[Translated from Turkish]