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WHITHER TURKEY?
Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 14 2013
by Fatma Muge Göcek*
14 June 2013 /
On May 25, 2013, my colleague Ron Suny and I flew to Ä°stanbul,
Turkey, to attend the Hrant Dink Memorial Workshop (June 1-2, 2013)
that has been taking place since he was assassinated in front of his
newspaper on Jan. 19, 2007.
We were invited to report on the activities of the Workshop on
Armenian Turkish Scholarship (WATS) that promotes the generation of
new knowledge through the joint collaboration of scholars working on
Turkish and Armenian issues. Even though the 2013 annual workshop
was very successful, much of the attention was drawn away by the
anti-government protests that took a violent turn on May 31 at
Taksim's Gezi Park, a short distance away from Bankalar Caddesi,
where the conference was taking place.
This was an Ä°stanbul district I knew well since I was born and spent
the first 12 years of my life in TepebaÅ~_ı, also near Taksim. Yet,
the whole setting was now very different from the politically muted
Cold War years of my childhood.
The protest initially started with the intent to prevent the removal
of the centuries-old trees from the Gezi Park, planned under a
redevelopment aiming to transform it into yet another neoliberal
space promoting consumption. Until then, the park had been one of
the few green spaces that acted like the lungs of downtown Ä°stanbul
and that could also be accessed by all citizens, rather than a few
chosen, moneyed customers. In addition, it was rumored that the
Ottoman military barracks once housed at Gezi Park were going to
be rebuilt to serve as a city museum. The manifest intent of the
socially conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) government
was innocent: to further beautify the city by creating a renewed park
and a city museum. Yet, the latent objective was not as innocent: This
government move marked the culmination of a neo-liberal spree that
had literally created many malls within a short time span, tearing
down culturally meaningful old movie theatres and pudding shops and
replacing them with cement blocks advocating constant consumption in
the process. The military barracks had also once been historically
significant as the headquarters of the ultimately unsuccessful 1909
conservative reaction to the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. Since the
AKP traced its historical lineage to this reaction rather than the
Young Turk movement that ultimately established the secular Turkish
Republic, it seemed like the AKP in general and Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan in particular wanted to rewrite republican history
from a new point of origin. From this point on, the AKP as a political
actor will be replaced by Prime Minister Erdogan; this is so because
during the last decade of AKP rule (2002-13), Erdogan increasingly
concentrated power in his person alone, leading many to accuse him of
"turning into a sultan."
Yet, Gezi Park also marked the culmination of feeling towards prior
conservative policy moves, moves that ultimately mobilized general
discontent into a protest movement. Among these were policies Erdogan
personally advocated, carrying some into law with amazing speed. One
such proposal (now approved into law by President Abdullah Gul)
stated that alcoholic beverages could not be advertised on social
media and could not be sold after 10 p.m. Upon being asked to comment
on the proposal, Erdogan stated that he considers all those who had
had a single drink in their lives as well as those who opposed the
law for intervening with their lifestyle to be "alcoholics." In the
process, he dismissed former republican leaders for being "a couple
of drunkards." Probably one of the most contentious recent government
moves accompanying the "alcohol fury" was the building of the third
bridge across the Bosporus on yet another green area, further cutting
into the lungs of the city. Almost to add insult to injury, Erdogan
announced that he had decided, after a brief discussion within his
inner circle, to name it the "Yavuz Sultan Selim" bridge, after the
Ottoman Sultan Selim the Grim, best known for conquering the Arabian
peninsula and Egypt and for massacring tens of thousands of Alevis
in Asia Minor in the process. Hence all these factors escalated and
radicalized those opposing such developments.
The initial peaceful protest that started mid-May was met by the
police's pepper gas literally aimed at the faces of the protestors at
close range. The severity of the government reaction, captured and
distributed through smart phones, Facebook and Twitter, galvanized
others, leading tens of thousands to go to Taksim Square in support.
In addition, thousands in other Turkish cities and overseas engaged in
similar protest movements in solidarity. The popular reaction led the
government to withdraw the police force, only to escalate the number
of protestors who kept arriving every night in large numbers. And
this was fully a new social movement in that it united all parts
of the political spectrum from unionists, political activists,
non-governmental organizations as well as many college and high
school students.
This civil unrest has now been going on for two weeks. Erdogan's
reaction revealed his innate beliefs: He first withdrew the police when
casualties escalated, then claimed all protestors were plunderers and
then argued they were infiltrated by marginal dangerous forces intent
on destroying Turkey. Hence, he steadfastly refused to acknowledge
this was a spontaneous protest movement, always trying to locate
foreign and domestic provocateurs among them. Perhaps the most
telling of Erdogan's statements was that "he could barely contain the
50 percent who had voted for him" from taking to the streets. This
statement starkly reveals Erdogan's conception of democracy: He sees
himself as the political representative of not all Turkish citizens,
but the 50 percent that voted for him, a numerical majority he sees
as enabling him to do whatever he sees fit.
Yet the health of democracies is not judged by how well they meet the
demands of the majority. After all, since "demos," "cratos" stands for
the "power" of the "people," in this political context, the power of
the majority is easily met. The ultimate challenge is to acknowledge
and ensure the rights of all its citizens, especially the rights of
minorities that are most vulnerable to populist pressures. Rather
than acting on this premise, Erdogan instead set out to demonstrate
and presumably reinstate his political power by publicly parading the
populist majority. He has planned two public "counter" demonstrations
manned by his AKP followers in Ankara on June 15 and in Ä°stanbul
on June 16. After meeting with some of the Gezi protestors, he also
proposed that what will happen at the park be determined through a
"referendum," or a "plebiscite," both measures that would display
the numerical strength of the majority.
Such display of political power is fickle. Erdogan wants to get AKP
followers on the streets this weekend in Ankara and Ä°stanbul to
demonstrate his political power. He may accomplish what he endeavors.
Yet, what takes place, be it peaceful or not, could just as quickly
undermine his current political hold. Such destabilization and
ensuing polarization between pro and anti-government forces would
then lead Turkey down an uncertain, undemocratic path. It would be
uncertain because Erdogan would have played all his cards; it would be
undemocratic because with no powerful political opposition in place,
only two political actors would benefit from the ensuing melee -- the
radical political fringe or, more probably, the military. If there is
a military intervention, Turkey will have to start the democratization
process of removing the military from politics all over again. I still
cannot believe that Prime Minister Erdogan is willing to take such
a risk, one that would undermine all that he and his followers have
worked for in the last decade. And that is why I wanted to share my
concerns with you.
*Fatma Muge Göcek is a professor of sociology and women's studies
at the University of Michigan.
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-318290-whither-turkeyby-fatma-muge-gocek-.html
From: A. Papazian
Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 14 2013
by Fatma Muge Göcek*
14 June 2013 /
On May 25, 2013, my colleague Ron Suny and I flew to Ä°stanbul,
Turkey, to attend the Hrant Dink Memorial Workshop (June 1-2, 2013)
that has been taking place since he was assassinated in front of his
newspaper on Jan. 19, 2007.
We were invited to report on the activities of the Workshop on
Armenian Turkish Scholarship (WATS) that promotes the generation of
new knowledge through the joint collaboration of scholars working on
Turkish and Armenian issues. Even though the 2013 annual workshop
was very successful, much of the attention was drawn away by the
anti-government protests that took a violent turn on May 31 at
Taksim's Gezi Park, a short distance away from Bankalar Caddesi,
where the conference was taking place.
This was an Ä°stanbul district I knew well since I was born and spent
the first 12 years of my life in TepebaÅ~_ı, also near Taksim. Yet,
the whole setting was now very different from the politically muted
Cold War years of my childhood.
The protest initially started with the intent to prevent the removal
of the centuries-old trees from the Gezi Park, planned under a
redevelopment aiming to transform it into yet another neoliberal
space promoting consumption. Until then, the park had been one of
the few green spaces that acted like the lungs of downtown Ä°stanbul
and that could also be accessed by all citizens, rather than a few
chosen, moneyed customers. In addition, it was rumored that the
Ottoman military barracks once housed at Gezi Park were going to
be rebuilt to serve as a city museum. The manifest intent of the
socially conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) government
was innocent: to further beautify the city by creating a renewed park
and a city museum. Yet, the latent objective was not as innocent: This
government move marked the culmination of a neo-liberal spree that
had literally created many malls within a short time span, tearing
down culturally meaningful old movie theatres and pudding shops and
replacing them with cement blocks advocating constant consumption in
the process. The military barracks had also once been historically
significant as the headquarters of the ultimately unsuccessful 1909
conservative reaction to the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. Since the
AKP traced its historical lineage to this reaction rather than the
Young Turk movement that ultimately established the secular Turkish
Republic, it seemed like the AKP in general and Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan in particular wanted to rewrite republican history
from a new point of origin. From this point on, the AKP as a political
actor will be replaced by Prime Minister Erdogan; this is so because
during the last decade of AKP rule (2002-13), Erdogan increasingly
concentrated power in his person alone, leading many to accuse him of
"turning into a sultan."
Yet, Gezi Park also marked the culmination of feeling towards prior
conservative policy moves, moves that ultimately mobilized general
discontent into a protest movement. Among these were policies Erdogan
personally advocated, carrying some into law with amazing speed. One
such proposal (now approved into law by President Abdullah Gul)
stated that alcoholic beverages could not be advertised on social
media and could not be sold after 10 p.m. Upon being asked to comment
on the proposal, Erdogan stated that he considers all those who had
had a single drink in their lives as well as those who opposed the
law for intervening with their lifestyle to be "alcoholics." In the
process, he dismissed former republican leaders for being "a couple
of drunkards." Probably one of the most contentious recent government
moves accompanying the "alcohol fury" was the building of the third
bridge across the Bosporus on yet another green area, further cutting
into the lungs of the city. Almost to add insult to injury, Erdogan
announced that he had decided, after a brief discussion within his
inner circle, to name it the "Yavuz Sultan Selim" bridge, after the
Ottoman Sultan Selim the Grim, best known for conquering the Arabian
peninsula and Egypt and for massacring tens of thousands of Alevis
in Asia Minor in the process. Hence all these factors escalated and
radicalized those opposing such developments.
The initial peaceful protest that started mid-May was met by the
police's pepper gas literally aimed at the faces of the protestors at
close range. The severity of the government reaction, captured and
distributed through smart phones, Facebook and Twitter, galvanized
others, leading tens of thousands to go to Taksim Square in support.
In addition, thousands in other Turkish cities and overseas engaged in
similar protest movements in solidarity. The popular reaction led the
government to withdraw the police force, only to escalate the number
of protestors who kept arriving every night in large numbers. And
this was fully a new social movement in that it united all parts
of the political spectrum from unionists, political activists,
non-governmental organizations as well as many college and high
school students.
This civil unrest has now been going on for two weeks. Erdogan's
reaction revealed his innate beliefs: He first withdrew the police when
casualties escalated, then claimed all protestors were plunderers and
then argued they were infiltrated by marginal dangerous forces intent
on destroying Turkey. Hence, he steadfastly refused to acknowledge
this was a spontaneous protest movement, always trying to locate
foreign and domestic provocateurs among them. Perhaps the most
telling of Erdogan's statements was that "he could barely contain the
50 percent who had voted for him" from taking to the streets. This
statement starkly reveals Erdogan's conception of democracy: He sees
himself as the political representative of not all Turkish citizens,
but the 50 percent that voted for him, a numerical majority he sees
as enabling him to do whatever he sees fit.
Yet the health of democracies is not judged by how well they meet the
demands of the majority. After all, since "demos," "cratos" stands for
the "power" of the "people," in this political context, the power of
the majority is easily met. The ultimate challenge is to acknowledge
and ensure the rights of all its citizens, especially the rights of
minorities that are most vulnerable to populist pressures. Rather
than acting on this premise, Erdogan instead set out to demonstrate
and presumably reinstate his political power by publicly parading the
populist majority. He has planned two public "counter" demonstrations
manned by his AKP followers in Ankara on June 15 and in Ä°stanbul
on June 16. After meeting with some of the Gezi protestors, he also
proposed that what will happen at the park be determined through a
"referendum," or a "plebiscite," both measures that would display
the numerical strength of the majority.
Such display of political power is fickle. Erdogan wants to get AKP
followers on the streets this weekend in Ankara and Ä°stanbul to
demonstrate his political power. He may accomplish what he endeavors.
Yet, what takes place, be it peaceful or not, could just as quickly
undermine his current political hold. Such destabilization and
ensuing polarization between pro and anti-government forces would
then lead Turkey down an uncertain, undemocratic path. It would be
uncertain because Erdogan would have played all his cards; it would be
undemocratic because with no powerful political opposition in place,
only two political actors would benefit from the ensuing melee -- the
radical political fringe or, more probably, the military. If there is
a military intervention, Turkey will have to start the democratization
process of removing the military from politics all over again. I still
cannot believe that Prime Minister Erdogan is willing to take such
a risk, one that would undermine all that he and his followers have
worked for in the last decade. And that is why I wanted to share my
concerns with you.
*Fatma Muge Göcek is a professor of sociology and women's studies
at the University of Michigan.
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-318290-whither-turkeyby-fatma-muge-gocek-.html
From: A. Papazian