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Journal of Turkish Weekly
June 15 2013
Azeri-Iranian relations: A sibling rivalry in the global family
15 June 2013
JTW
Despite visa free travel for Azeri citizens and dynamic trade, long
mutual borders and some shared interests, Iran and Azerbaijan do not
seem to be able to get along. Good Azeri-Israeli relations, political
and criminal intrigue, Azerbaijan's cooperation with the West, and the
fact that Azerbaijan, due to its Soviet legacy is more secular than
the Islamic Republic of Iran are often cited as the roots of the two
countries issues with each other. But perhaps the true root of trouble
lies in geography; whether it be physical, cultural or political which
has allowed for these other problems to ferment.
In many cases, a common religion, shared history and a like language
can help two states build diplomatic relations; even Azerbaijan and
Iran have used such cultural links to build closer ties with other
states. But when it comes to Azeri-Iranian ties, shared heritage
(something usually cherished between states), becomes the problem.
Being a small, landlocked and very new country that had never before
existed, Azerbaijan wants to assure that it is given due legitimacy by
all. The fact that modern Azerbaijan was once part of its much older
and larger Iranian neighbor only complicates this task for the
developing state wedged in a no man's land of sorts between the back
ends of three world powers who see it as in their sphere of influence.
Just under a third of Iran's population is of Azeri descent and along
with Persian, speaks the Turkic Azerbaijani language. Iran's
Azerbaijanis live in the `Batis Azerbaijan' province, or `West
Azerbaijan' which the Republic of Azerbaijan's entire Southern border
is shared with, leaving room for the question `why isn't Azerbaijan
just part of Iran' to be asked.
Iran, an Islamic republic which because of its fundamentalist nature
views itself as morally superior, has both the 18th largest land area
and population in the world. This, combined with the fact that
economically challenged Iran's largest minority is Azerbaijanis leaves
Iran in a strange position where it both feels threatened by little
Azerbaijan and like it has a rightful sphere of influence that
includes Azerbaijan and therefore more of a right to secure its
interests there than elsewhere. At a late 2012 hearing in front of the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, expert
witnesses testified that in order to preserve its territorial
integrity, Iran had been taking actions aimed at destabilizing the
titular states of its minorities in hopes that such actions will
prevent emigration or the formation of separatist groups. It is
believed that Iran supports Armenia in its attempts to maintain
control over Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh in hopes of achieving this
supremacy over Azerbaijan, a foreign policy choice that is most
certainly not appreciated by Baku. Iran's hulking size and population
make Azerbaijan extra uneasy about Iran's intentions and what it can
potentially do.
Geography is not the only thing laying strain on Azerbaijan and Iran's
relations. Western sanctions against Iran have encouraged Tehran to
turn to the international criminal underworld for revenue. In recent
years, domestic Azerbaijani law enforcement have caught Iranians
engaged in drug trafficking and collusion with terrorist
organizations, according to the experts that spoke in front of the US
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Afghan Heroin
now not only flows through Central Asia and Russia to Europe, but also
through Iran and the Caucasus.
Western sanctions against Iran have made Azerbaijan somewhat reluctant
to open up to its southern neighbor and have made Iran more likely to
be `insistent' in pursuing bilateral opportunities, even if they are
not something that Azerbaijan is interested in. Azerbaijan was
recently in talks with Turkey on a visa free regime. Having caught
wind of the negotiations, Iran then threatened to cut off critical
supply routes to the Azerbaijani exclave of Naxchivan if Azerbaijan
did not consider a like visa regime with Tehran. Much to its
frustration and dismay, Azerbaijan canceled visa negotiations with
Turkey as a result of the Iranian threats, leaving all three neighbors
in a losing situation.
Geographic conditions, a cultural divide and economic despair have
done great harm to Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, and through analysis
of recent Iranian actions towards Azerbaijan, one could deduce that
Iran may see the relationship as beyond repair. In 2012, three men
accused of planning to attack a Jewish school in Baku were found to
have received the arms to do so from Iranian intelligence officers. In
recent months, the Azerbaijani Communications Ministry blamed recent
cyber-attacks against the country on Iran and also arrested 22 people
who had received extensive intelligence training in Iran who were
conspiring to attack the US and Israeli embassies. The fact that the
diplomatically `rude' Iranian disruption of Azeri-Turkish visa
negotiations, two attempted Iranian backed physical attacks and
Iranian cyber-attacks against Azerbaijan all occurred within such a
short period of time shows that Iran no longer feels that the effort
it takes to foster fruitful relations with Azerbaijan is worth what is
being returned and perhaps a point of no return has been crossed with
Ilham Aliyev's Azerbaijani government.
However, harsh treatment towards Baku could be Tehran's way of showing
Azerbaijan that a good relationship with Iran is something that
Azerbaijan does not want to throw away or take for granted. After all,
while Iran was behaving in a somewhat civil manner towards Azerbaijan,
Azerbaijan buddied up to the West, did not follow suit when Tehran
waived the visa regime for Azerbaijani citizens, was found to be
discussing the possibility of hosting Israeli warplanes capable of
striking Iran with Jerusalem and continued to fall deeper into
`Jahalliyah'. It could be argued that Tehran has always been somewhat
`anti-Azerbaijan' and it is therefore factually incorrect to say that
Iran's harsh actions towards Azerbaijan is a way of showing
dissatisfaction with Azerbaijan's choice of allies and a
recommendation that it should work to get on Iran's good side.
Although there is dialogue on the issue, and more states (that get
along with each other) than just Iran and Azerbaijan are involved in
the issue, questions surrounding the demarcation of the hydrocarbon
rich Caspian Sea strain relations between the two nations. As boundary
negotiations flounder, Caspian littoral states fish for maritime
defense solutions in case politics bring the water in the world's
largest lake (the Caspian) to a boil. Iran's general approach is to
militarize its share of the sea, while Russia's is to seek out
cooperation with other Caspian littorals such as Kazakhstan who is
preparing for an Iranian strike on Western oil rigs in its waters in
the event of armed conflict between the West and Iran. Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan have been very open to negotiations and have both
accepted American aid and advising services on military maritime
matters.
It does not look like Azeri-Iranian relations are going to change.
Poor bilateral relations aren't producing any red hot conflict that
needs immediate addressing, the West is only strengthening sanctions,
the two governments have very solidified ways of doing things and
tensions have geographical and historical roots which give them a
chronic nature. However, there are presidential elections in Iran
today. Perhaps the results will bring change to how Baku and Tehran do
business. Even if no great change is to come, Baku is watching the
polls as closely as Tehran and the new government will have a chance
to write the future of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.
By John Storey
15 June 2013
Journal of Turkish Weekly
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/151811/azeri-iranian-relations-a-sibling-rivalry-in-the-global-family.html
June 15 2013
Azeri-Iranian relations: A sibling rivalry in the global family
15 June 2013
JTW
Despite visa free travel for Azeri citizens and dynamic trade, long
mutual borders and some shared interests, Iran and Azerbaijan do not
seem to be able to get along. Good Azeri-Israeli relations, political
and criminal intrigue, Azerbaijan's cooperation with the West, and the
fact that Azerbaijan, due to its Soviet legacy is more secular than
the Islamic Republic of Iran are often cited as the roots of the two
countries issues with each other. But perhaps the true root of trouble
lies in geography; whether it be physical, cultural or political which
has allowed for these other problems to ferment.
In many cases, a common religion, shared history and a like language
can help two states build diplomatic relations; even Azerbaijan and
Iran have used such cultural links to build closer ties with other
states. But when it comes to Azeri-Iranian ties, shared heritage
(something usually cherished between states), becomes the problem.
Being a small, landlocked and very new country that had never before
existed, Azerbaijan wants to assure that it is given due legitimacy by
all. The fact that modern Azerbaijan was once part of its much older
and larger Iranian neighbor only complicates this task for the
developing state wedged in a no man's land of sorts between the back
ends of three world powers who see it as in their sphere of influence.
Just under a third of Iran's population is of Azeri descent and along
with Persian, speaks the Turkic Azerbaijani language. Iran's
Azerbaijanis live in the `Batis Azerbaijan' province, or `West
Azerbaijan' which the Republic of Azerbaijan's entire Southern border
is shared with, leaving room for the question `why isn't Azerbaijan
just part of Iran' to be asked.
Iran, an Islamic republic which because of its fundamentalist nature
views itself as morally superior, has both the 18th largest land area
and population in the world. This, combined with the fact that
economically challenged Iran's largest minority is Azerbaijanis leaves
Iran in a strange position where it both feels threatened by little
Azerbaijan and like it has a rightful sphere of influence that
includes Azerbaijan and therefore more of a right to secure its
interests there than elsewhere. At a late 2012 hearing in front of the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, expert
witnesses testified that in order to preserve its territorial
integrity, Iran had been taking actions aimed at destabilizing the
titular states of its minorities in hopes that such actions will
prevent emigration or the formation of separatist groups. It is
believed that Iran supports Armenia in its attempts to maintain
control over Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh in hopes of achieving this
supremacy over Azerbaijan, a foreign policy choice that is most
certainly not appreciated by Baku. Iran's hulking size and population
make Azerbaijan extra uneasy about Iran's intentions and what it can
potentially do.
Geography is not the only thing laying strain on Azerbaijan and Iran's
relations. Western sanctions against Iran have encouraged Tehran to
turn to the international criminal underworld for revenue. In recent
years, domestic Azerbaijani law enforcement have caught Iranians
engaged in drug trafficking and collusion with terrorist
organizations, according to the experts that spoke in front of the US
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Afghan Heroin
now not only flows through Central Asia and Russia to Europe, but also
through Iran and the Caucasus.
Western sanctions against Iran have made Azerbaijan somewhat reluctant
to open up to its southern neighbor and have made Iran more likely to
be `insistent' in pursuing bilateral opportunities, even if they are
not something that Azerbaijan is interested in. Azerbaijan was
recently in talks with Turkey on a visa free regime. Having caught
wind of the negotiations, Iran then threatened to cut off critical
supply routes to the Azerbaijani exclave of Naxchivan if Azerbaijan
did not consider a like visa regime with Tehran. Much to its
frustration and dismay, Azerbaijan canceled visa negotiations with
Turkey as a result of the Iranian threats, leaving all three neighbors
in a losing situation.
Geographic conditions, a cultural divide and economic despair have
done great harm to Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, and through analysis
of recent Iranian actions towards Azerbaijan, one could deduce that
Iran may see the relationship as beyond repair. In 2012, three men
accused of planning to attack a Jewish school in Baku were found to
have received the arms to do so from Iranian intelligence officers. In
recent months, the Azerbaijani Communications Ministry blamed recent
cyber-attacks against the country on Iran and also arrested 22 people
who had received extensive intelligence training in Iran who were
conspiring to attack the US and Israeli embassies. The fact that the
diplomatically `rude' Iranian disruption of Azeri-Turkish visa
negotiations, two attempted Iranian backed physical attacks and
Iranian cyber-attacks against Azerbaijan all occurred within such a
short period of time shows that Iran no longer feels that the effort
it takes to foster fruitful relations with Azerbaijan is worth what is
being returned and perhaps a point of no return has been crossed with
Ilham Aliyev's Azerbaijani government.
However, harsh treatment towards Baku could be Tehran's way of showing
Azerbaijan that a good relationship with Iran is something that
Azerbaijan does not want to throw away or take for granted. After all,
while Iran was behaving in a somewhat civil manner towards Azerbaijan,
Azerbaijan buddied up to the West, did not follow suit when Tehran
waived the visa regime for Azerbaijani citizens, was found to be
discussing the possibility of hosting Israeli warplanes capable of
striking Iran with Jerusalem and continued to fall deeper into
`Jahalliyah'. It could be argued that Tehran has always been somewhat
`anti-Azerbaijan' and it is therefore factually incorrect to say that
Iran's harsh actions towards Azerbaijan is a way of showing
dissatisfaction with Azerbaijan's choice of allies and a
recommendation that it should work to get on Iran's good side.
Although there is dialogue on the issue, and more states (that get
along with each other) than just Iran and Azerbaijan are involved in
the issue, questions surrounding the demarcation of the hydrocarbon
rich Caspian Sea strain relations between the two nations. As boundary
negotiations flounder, Caspian littoral states fish for maritime
defense solutions in case politics bring the water in the world's
largest lake (the Caspian) to a boil. Iran's general approach is to
militarize its share of the sea, while Russia's is to seek out
cooperation with other Caspian littorals such as Kazakhstan who is
preparing for an Iranian strike on Western oil rigs in its waters in
the event of armed conflict between the West and Iran. Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan have been very open to negotiations and have both
accepted American aid and advising services on military maritime
matters.
It does not look like Azeri-Iranian relations are going to change.
Poor bilateral relations aren't producing any red hot conflict that
needs immediate addressing, the West is only strengthening sanctions,
the two governments have very solidified ways of doing things and
tensions have geographical and historical roots which give them a
chronic nature. However, there are presidential elections in Iran
today. Perhaps the results will bring change to how Baku and Tehran do
business. Even if no great change is to come, Baku is watching the
polls as closely as Tehran and the new government will have a chance
to write the future of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.
By John Storey
15 June 2013
Journal of Turkish Weekly
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/151811/azeri-iranian-relations-a-sibling-rivalry-in-the-global-family.html