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THE VICTOR ON THIS PATH IS CONSIDERED THE VANQUISHED
Vatan, Turkey
June 17 2013
by Rusen Cakir
In my column that I wrote on Friday and that was published on Saturday
(http://www.rusencakir.com/Adim-adim-9-hata/2041[1] ) I wrote: "It is
clear that the prime minister wants to put an end to this resistance
as soon as possible. In fact, after this commentary has been written
it may well be that an operation to that end has been launched in the
morning, as has happened before." When a breeze of accord started
blowing after the prime minister talked until late on Friday with a
group of intellectuals and representatives from Taksim Solidarity I
was "wrong-footed." Indeed, the barricades at the entrance to Gezi
Park were lifted on Saturday and it was said that the number of tents
would be reduced to one. But the mood changed again when Erdogan
issued his challenge at the Ankara rally saying, "Leave or we shall
evict you" and we all know what happened next.
Erdogan entered Kazlicesme Square like some "victorious commander" but
we all know how this victory was won despite the best efforts of the
mainstream media to hide, obfuscate and deflect. Kazlicesme was filled
using the state's and the municipality's apparatus like at Esenboga
Airport. We also know that nobody was forced by the state into Taksim,
and so this victory is a questionable one.
Kazlicesme-Taksim
However, it would be wrong to draw up the Gezi Resistance's political
score sheet only by comparing Kazlicesme with Taksim. We have to look
at the entire process. On the very first day of the resistance I said
this on Twitter: "It is clear from the start who the winners (society)
and who the losers (the state) are in this fight. I wonder when the
state is going to concede this fact?" I think the state/government saw
this fact during the first days but never wanted to acknowledge it.
This is because it thought it could easily break a disorganized and
spontaneous resistance using police, tear gas, water cannons and
arrests. It failed to understand that the resistance drew its strength
from this lack of organization, and it failed to predict that after a
certain point the fear barrier could be overcome.
It put too much faith in its control over much of the media. It never
calculated that censorship and self-censorship would create the
opposite effect or that social media would seize the initiative.
After a certain phase the AKP [Justice and Development Party] leader
turned to the solution that had come to his mind during the early days
in fact: To unleash his own voters to counter the Gezi resistance
members. If we do not count the welcome at Ankara Esenboga Airport, it
is clear that the rallies in Ankara on Saturday and in Istanbul
yesterday were not to kick off the local elections but were in fact in
response to Gezi.
What Did The Rallies Bring?
As nobody was allowed to enter Taksim yesterday we have no way of
making a political comparison. However, it is perfectly natural that
the AKP, which has emerged as the number one party for years now under
all conditions, should amass such a huge crowd. That was precisely the
question: What did the AKP and the government gain by these rallies?
I think that Erdogan, who I have been trying to follow for 25 years
ever since he was Istanbul Provincial Chairman for the Welfare Party,
has made the most critical mistakes of his political career at this
time. First off, this time he not demonstrated the cool-headedness and
calmness that he had shown in so many other previous incidents that
were much more critical. This being the case, he is trying to portray
the Gezi resistance as one of the biggest conspiracies ever to be
staged against Turkey.
He holds certain power centers both at home and abroad responsible for
this conspiracy, sometimes naming them and sometimes by implication.
However, there is a serious problem here. Most of the power centers he
mentions have been a kind of insurance for the AKP government for more
than 10 years. For example, would the AKP have been able to overcome
the many obstacles before it in the past were it not for the backing
and the legitimacy provided by the international media and such
institutions as the EU and the European Parliament?
No Longer Needs Them
Perhaps the AKP leader thinks he no longer needs these forces as much
as he used to. Similarly, he might not be feeling any more need for
those non-AKP segments of society plus certain people and institutions
that sided with him during such critical times as his fight against
military tutelage, the trials to dissolve the party and the
referendum.
This is because he might be thinking that the rhetoric he has adopted
recently is going to increase his votes. It is possible. I personally
think the likelihood of the Gezi Resistance increasing the AKP's share
of the vote is higher. But can this be enough in itself?
This is because in a democratic society, the less hostile it makes
those segments of society that do not identify with it, the more
successful and lasting a government will be. Indeed, when you look at
the time period from the end of 2002 until today you will see that the
main reason for the AKP's and Erdogan's success was their ability to
provide political, economic and social stability, and that a major
part here was played by those segments of society that he has been
vilifying in recent days.
If Erdogan keeps up this confrontational and discriminatory language
of his even if he secures 60 percent of the vote he will not get the
chance to stop being cut off and isolated. We saw no sign that he was
capable of change at yesterday's Kazlicesme rally.
[Translated from Turkish]
Vatan, Turkey
June 17 2013
by Rusen Cakir
In my column that I wrote on Friday and that was published on Saturday
(http://www.rusencakir.com/Adim-adim-9-hata/2041[1] ) I wrote: "It is
clear that the prime minister wants to put an end to this resistance
as soon as possible. In fact, after this commentary has been written
it may well be that an operation to that end has been launched in the
morning, as has happened before." When a breeze of accord started
blowing after the prime minister talked until late on Friday with a
group of intellectuals and representatives from Taksim Solidarity I
was "wrong-footed." Indeed, the barricades at the entrance to Gezi
Park were lifted on Saturday and it was said that the number of tents
would be reduced to one. But the mood changed again when Erdogan
issued his challenge at the Ankara rally saying, "Leave or we shall
evict you" and we all know what happened next.
Erdogan entered Kazlicesme Square like some "victorious commander" but
we all know how this victory was won despite the best efforts of the
mainstream media to hide, obfuscate and deflect. Kazlicesme was filled
using the state's and the municipality's apparatus like at Esenboga
Airport. We also know that nobody was forced by the state into Taksim,
and so this victory is a questionable one.
Kazlicesme-Taksim
However, it would be wrong to draw up the Gezi Resistance's political
score sheet only by comparing Kazlicesme with Taksim. We have to look
at the entire process. On the very first day of the resistance I said
this on Twitter: "It is clear from the start who the winners (society)
and who the losers (the state) are in this fight. I wonder when the
state is going to concede this fact?" I think the state/government saw
this fact during the first days but never wanted to acknowledge it.
This is because it thought it could easily break a disorganized and
spontaneous resistance using police, tear gas, water cannons and
arrests. It failed to understand that the resistance drew its strength
from this lack of organization, and it failed to predict that after a
certain point the fear barrier could be overcome.
It put too much faith in its control over much of the media. It never
calculated that censorship and self-censorship would create the
opposite effect or that social media would seize the initiative.
After a certain phase the AKP [Justice and Development Party] leader
turned to the solution that had come to his mind during the early days
in fact: To unleash his own voters to counter the Gezi resistance
members. If we do not count the welcome at Ankara Esenboga Airport, it
is clear that the rallies in Ankara on Saturday and in Istanbul
yesterday were not to kick off the local elections but were in fact in
response to Gezi.
What Did The Rallies Bring?
As nobody was allowed to enter Taksim yesterday we have no way of
making a political comparison. However, it is perfectly natural that
the AKP, which has emerged as the number one party for years now under
all conditions, should amass such a huge crowd. That was precisely the
question: What did the AKP and the government gain by these rallies?
I think that Erdogan, who I have been trying to follow for 25 years
ever since he was Istanbul Provincial Chairman for the Welfare Party,
has made the most critical mistakes of his political career at this
time. First off, this time he not demonstrated the cool-headedness and
calmness that he had shown in so many other previous incidents that
were much more critical. This being the case, he is trying to portray
the Gezi resistance as one of the biggest conspiracies ever to be
staged against Turkey.
He holds certain power centers both at home and abroad responsible for
this conspiracy, sometimes naming them and sometimes by implication.
However, there is a serious problem here. Most of the power centers he
mentions have been a kind of insurance for the AKP government for more
than 10 years. For example, would the AKP have been able to overcome
the many obstacles before it in the past were it not for the backing
and the legitimacy provided by the international media and such
institutions as the EU and the European Parliament?
No Longer Needs Them
Perhaps the AKP leader thinks he no longer needs these forces as much
as he used to. Similarly, he might not be feeling any more need for
those non-AKP segments of society plus certain people and institutions
that sided with him during such critical times as his fight against
military tutelage, the trials to dissolve the party and the
referendum.
This is because he might be thinking that the rhetoric he has adopted
recently is going to increase his votes. It is possible. I personally
think the likelihood of the Gezi Resistance increasing the AKP's share
of the vote is higher. But can this be enough in itself?
This is because in a democratic society, the less hostile it makes
those segments of society that do not identify with it, the more
successful and lasting a government will be. Indeed, when you look at
the time period from the end of 2002 until today you will see that the
main reason for the AKP's and Erdogan's success was their ability to
provide political, economic and social stability, and that a major
part here was played by those segments of society that he has been
vilifying in recent days.
If Erdogan keeps up this confrontational and discriminatory language
of his even if he secures 60 percent of the vote he will not get the
chance to stop being cut off and isolated. We saw no sign that he was
capable of change at yesterday's Kazlicesme rally.
[Translated from Turkish]