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NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THE EU: TIME TO INCREASE ENGAGEMENT
Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 18 2013
AMANDA PAUL
[email protected]
Of all the international players involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the EU has good reason to
be concerned over the threat the conflict represents for regional
stability and security, which is not in the least related to the
energy and transport corridors the EU is heavily invested in.
Therefore, one would expect that the EU would be playing a proactive
role in efforts toward a solution. Yet this is not the case. To say
the EU has had a cautious approach towards the Karabakh conflict,
would be an understatement.
Still, through a number of regional policies, including the European
Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, the EU has slowly
increased its focus on conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. This
was further accelerated following the 2008 Georgia-Russia War, which
served as an example that the international community should not
take it for granted that frozen conflicts will remain frozen. The EU
became the key actor in negotiating the cease-fire between Moscow and
Tbilisi, which led to the EU taking up a much greater role than it
had had hitherto, including taking on a security presence and being
a key player in the Geneva peace talks.
Today Nagorno-Karabakh remains the biggest threat to the security of
the South Caucasus. While a cease-fire may have been in place since
1993, the conflict remains active with numerous violations of the
cease-fire taking place and both sides actively engaged in spending
massive amounts of money on arms. After some 20 years of efforts,
under the auspices of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to resolve the conflict today we
find ourselves at a very low point. The negotiations on a set of
"basic principles" are in deadlock, with the two presidents having
not met since January 2012.
The EU remains on the sidelines. Its approach is as follows: supporting
the efforts of the Minsk Group co-chairs, financing a number of
confidence-building measures and peace-building initiatives and
shuttling diplomacy of the EU Special Representative for the region.
Earlier this week, the think tank where I work in Brussels, the
European Policy Centre (EPC), presented two policy papers on the
role of the EU in Karabakh. The Azerbaijani perspective came from
well-known analyst and fellow Today's Zaman columnist, Zaur Shiriyev,
while the Armenian view came from Richard Giragosian, who heads
a think tank in Yerevan. What was interesting was that there were
more convergences than divergences, with both experts calling for
an increase in the role of the EU. Interesting recommendations and
ideas were put forward including: The EU should use conditionality
to a greater extent, including making the association agreements that
are presently being negotiated with both countries subject not only to
improving democratic standards, but also progress on the peace-talks.
There is a precedent for this as the EU successfully used the
conditionality principle to gain results in the conflict between
Macedonia security forces and the ethnic Albania National Liberation
Army. Implementation of the Orchid Agreement was used as a precondition
for Macedonia's EU membership aspirations. The role of the European
Union Special Representatives (EUSR) should be enhanced and expanded,
including having greater cooperation between the French OSCE Minsk
Group co-chair and the EUSR; giving the EUSR observer status in
meetings of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs; initiating a more inclusive form
of track two diplomacy that would have a multi-stakeholder approach and
include both Nagorno-Karabakh communities; carrying out great levels
of conflict analysis, including identifying new trends and emerging
actors in the conflict, both external and internal; and enhancing
cooperation with other regional actors, most particularly with Russia.
Of course the EU is an organization with a lot of legs and tails.
Decision-making is more often than not drawn out and complicated and,
for some member states, Nagorno-Karabakh is not important -- even
more so when the EU has so much internal conflict to deal with. But
I believe this to be short sighted. Rather, the EU should be wise
enough to adopt a more proactive and engaged policy towards Karabakh
because, as was the case with Georgia, what we choose to ignore today,
can come back and bite us very hard tomorrow.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=318623
Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 18 2013
AMANDA PAUL
[email protected]
Of all the international players involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the EU has good reason to
be concerned over the threat the conflict represents for regional
stability and security, which is not in the least related to the
energy and transport corridors the EU is heavily invested in.
Therefore, one would expect that the EU would be playing a proactive
role in efforts toward a solution. Yet this is not the case. To say
the EU has had a cautious approach towards the Karabakh conflict,
would be an understatement.
Still, through a number of regional policies, including the European
Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, the EU has slowly
increased its focus on conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. This
was further accelerated following the 2008 Georgia-Russia War, which
served as an example that the international community should not
take it for granted that frozen conflicts will remain frozen. The EU
became the key actor in negotiating the cease-fire between Moscow and
Tbilisi, which led to the EU taking up a much greater role than it
had had hitherto, including taking on a security presence and being
a key player in the Geneva peace talks.
Today Nagorno-Karabakh remains the biggest threat to the security of
the South Caucasus. While a cease-fire may have been in place since
1993, the conflict remains active with numerous violations of the
cease-fire taking place and both sides actively engaged in spending
massive amounts of money on arms. After some 20 years of efforts,
under the auspices of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to resolve the conflict today we
find ourselves at a very low point. The negotiations on a set of
"basic principles" are in deadlock, with the two presidents having
not met since January 2012.
The EU remains on the sidelines. Its approach is as follows: supporting
the efforts of the Minsk Group co-chairs, financing a number of
confidence-building measures and peace-building initiatives and
shuttling diplomacy of the EU Special Representative for the region.
Earlier this week, the think tank where I work in Brussels, the
European Policy Centre (EPC), presented two policy papers on the
role of the EU in Karabakh. The Azerbaijani perspective came from
well-known analyst and fellow Today's Zaman columnist, Zaur Shiriyev,
while the Armenian view came from Richard Giragosian, who heads
a think tank in Yerevan. What was interesting was that there were
more convergences than divergences, with both experts calling for
an increase in the role of the EU. Interesting recommendations and
ideas were put forward including: The EU should use conditionality
to a greater extent, including making the association agreements that
are presently being negotiated with both countries subject not only to
improving democratic standards, but also progress on the peace-talks.
There is a precedent for this as the EU successfully used the
conditionality principle to gain results in the conflict between
Macedonia security forces and the ethnic Albania National Liberation
Army. Implementation of the Orchid Agreement was used as a precondition
for Macedonia's EU membership aspirations. The role of the European
Union Special Representatives (EUSR) should be enhanced and expanded,
including having greater cooperation between the French OSCE Minsk
Group co-chair and the EUSR; giving the EUSR observer status in
meetings of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs; initiating a more inclusive form
of track two diplomacy that would have a multi-stakeholder approach and
include both Nagorno-Karabakh communities; carrying out great levels
of conflict analysis, including identifying new trends and emerging
actors in the conflict, both external and internal; and enhancing
cooperation with other regional actors, most particularly with Russia.
Of course the EU is an organization with a lot of legs and tails.
Decision-making is more often than not drawn out and complicated and,
for some member states, Nagorno-Karabakh is not important -- even
more so when the EU has so much internal conflict to deal with. But
I believe this to be short sighted. Rather, the EU should be wise
enough to adopt a more proactive and engaged policy towards Karabakh
because, as was the case with Georgia, what we choose to ignore today,
can come back and bite us very hard tomorrow.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=318623