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NAGORNO-KARABAGH: PREVENTIVE AND REMEDIAL RECOGNITION VS. AZERBAIJANI THREATS
By Artak Beglaryan // Posted on June 14, 2013 in Featured, Headline,
Opinion // 12 Comments // Email // Print
The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, one of the longest-lasting conflicts
in the region, seems to have passed into an essential phase of its
settlement. On May 30, the Legislature of Louisiana recognized the
independence of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic (NKR; also known as
the Republic of Artsakh). This action at the U.S. state level has
precedents, such as similar resolutions passed by Maine, Massachusetts,
and Rhode Island in the recent months. The recognition of NKR's
independence at the state level has gone beyond America's shores,
as the largest Australian state of New South Wales also passed a
resolution in 2012.
Although such resolutions by non-subjects of international law do not
change the legal status of that de facto state in the international
community, its political significance cannot be underestimated.
Firstly, it warns Azerbaijan that time works towards the final
recognition of the Karabagh. This fact may put pressure on the
Azerbaijani side during negotiations to recede from its maximalist
position. In fact, it is a response to Baku's military rhetoric and
heavy armament, upon which it clearly relies on the long term. The
recognition campaign also raises awareness about the Nagorno-Karabagh
issue and the democratic merits of that non-recognized republic;
that positive awareness will surely increase the chances of further
recognition acts by states and sub-state units.
Beglaryan: The best option will be for the international community
to provide the NKR with preventive recognition.
That recognition campaign, perceived by Azerbaijan as a risk, causes
aggressive counter-reaction. In addition to its traditional military
rhetoric, Azerbaijan regularly provokes tensions with grave incidents
on the frontline and explicitly violates the rules of conventional
arms control. Moreover, Baku recently took two steps that escalated
the tension around the Karabagh issue and deepened the gap of trust
between the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. The first shock was
the extradition to Azerbaijan and the pardon of army officer Ramil
Safarov. He had been serving a life sentence in Hungary for axing to
death Armenian army officer Gurgen Margaryan in his sleep. It happened
in 2004, when both of them were participating in the NATO "Partnership
for Peace" program. As the murderer himself proudly said, the reason
for his brutal action was the hatred he felt towards all Armenians,
a statement widely propagandized by the Azerbaijani authorities.
Safarov's extradition to Azerbaijan in August 2012, organized together
with the government of Hungary, and heroization in his homeland
shocked the international community, causing worldwide outrage. At
the diplomatic level, Armenia's response to Hungary's infamous deal
with Azerbaijan was its suspension of relations with Budapest.
This scandalous step by the Aliyev clan was likely carried out for
the following reasons: First, he aimed to nourish the nationalist
sentiments of the Azerbaijani society, which are directed mainly
against Armenians, and increase the bellicose mood in the society
in preparation for further military actions against Karabagh. Or,
using the Nagorno-Karabagh card and, in this case, pardoning
the axe-murderer, Aliyev aimed to raise his legitimacy among the
considerable nationalist masses of the society. Undoubtedly, that
legitimacy is needed prior to the presidential elections of 2013, when
this authoritarian leader is elected to an undemocratic third term, in
particular since his legitimacy was shaken as a result of continuous
violations of human rights and freedoms in Azerbaijan. Thirdly, it
was a clear message to Armenia and the international community that
Azerbaijan's position in the negotiations would not become softer;
rather, its BATNA (i.e., renewal of the war) would be more probable.
It is arguable whether the message has worked or not. What is clear,
however, is that it spurred a huge negative reaction by the main
great powers involved in south Caucasus affairs.
At the beginning, there was a risk that the Safarov case would freeze
talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan; however, that risk has mostly
been overcome due to the efforts of the mediators. In parallel to
the calming down of the first storm, though, other clouds gathered
in the Armenian-Azerbaijani sky. In recent months, especially, the
tension over the Stepanakert airport has intensified. The authorities
of the Nagorno-Karabagh Republic are planning to run the airport
for humanitarian flights, but Baku has threatened to shoot down any
civilian planes flying to and from Karabagh.
This is another demonstration of the anti-Armenian hysteria of the
Aliyev clan. Who would ever think of attacking civilian aircrafts?
Beyond simply creating/maintaining humanitarian obstacles for
the Nagorno-Karabagh people, Baku is concerned about the legal
consequences of allowing flights over the territory of that
non-recognized state. Those fears made the OSCE Minsk Group (the
main mediator body of the ongoing talks, with French, Russian, and
American co-chairmanship) assert with a statement that the flights
cannot affect the legal status of Nagorno-Karabagh. Despite this
statement, the Azerbaijani authorities still continue to threaten
downing civilian aircraft. This has become the top issue for the
mediators in recent meetings, and it seems that Azerbaijan seeks to
utilize the airport problem in the bargaining process.
After some delay, the NKR authorities said that the airport would
be launched soon. This decision likely took into account Armenia's
statement that its anti-missile systems would secure the Karabagh
flights.
Some experts argue that Russia is seeking to deploy peacekeepers
around the Stepanakert airport as a guarantee of its security, thus
increasing Moscow's weight in the region, since the Karabagh conflict
is believed to be the most significant stability/instability factor in
the South Caucasus. Indisputably, any Russian soldier on that ground
would cause trouble among the other influential actors of and in the
region, including the EU and the U.S. In order to avoid any possible
change in the current balance among the external players around the
conflict, as well as to avoid a new devastating war in the region, all
interested actors must prevent Azerbaijan from attacking the civilian
planes, and instead provide the Armenian side with clear guarantees.
The airport will be launched sooner or later, since it has enormous
humanitarian significance for the Karabagh people and no international
law forbids its operation. However, the question of whether Azerbaijan
will attack the civilian aircrafts is still uncertain. Since any attack
to the planes, logically, will trigger the resumption of the war,
and the great players are strongly interested in sustaining the peace
in the region, they must keep Azerbaijan away from any adventurous
and terrorist behavior. How should they ensure the desirable peace
in and around the conflict zone? The answer is explicit-that is, to
act instead of talking. As the notion of security dilemma assumes, the
arms race in the South Caucasus increases the chance of a new war. The
abovementioned two shocks, along with the frequent incidents on the
frontline, are considerable symptoms of the exhaustion of the security
dilemma. To avoid such a scenario with large-scale humanitarian and
geopolitical crises, as well as to resolve the Karabagh conflict once
and for all, the best option will be for the international community
to provide the NKR with preventive recognition.
Undoubtedly, preventive recognition will become the powerful chain that
keeps Azerbaijan away from attacking an internationally recognized
state, forcing it to abide with reality, like Serbia does in the
case of Kosovo. The concept of remedial recognition could also be
applicable here. It may work not only as a remedy for the 1990's
war and the ongoing deprivations and threats, but also as a response
to the likely effects of possible warfare in the future. Hence, the
resolutions recognizing the Nagorno-Karabagh Republic's independence
by sub-state units have already paved the way to preventive and/or
remedial recognition by the majority of the subjects of international
law. One would hope that the international community will not miss
the opportunity of establishing enduring peace in the region.
Artak Beglaryan is Assistant to the Prime Minister of the
Nagorno-Karabagh Republic, and is currently studying at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy in Massachusetts. This is his first
article for The Armenian Weekly.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/06/14/nagorno-karabagh-preventive-and-remedial-recognition-vs-azerbaijani-threats/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Artak Beglaryan // Posted on June 14, 2013 in Featured, Headline,
Opinion // 12 Comments // Email // Print
The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, one of the longest-lasting conflicts
in the region, seems to have passed into an essential phase of its
settlement. On May 30, the Legislature of Louisiana recognized the
independence of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic (NKR; also known as
the Republic of Artsakh). This action at the U.S. state level has
precedents, such as similar resolutions passed by Maine, Massachusetts,
and Rhode Island in the recent months. The recognition of NKR's
independence at the state level has gone beyond America's shores,
as the largest Australian state of New South Wales also passed a
resolution in 2012.
Although such resolutions by non-subjects of international law do not
change the legal status of that de facto state in the international
community, its political significance cannot be underestimated.
Firstly, it warns Azerbaijan that time works towards the final
recognition of the Karabagh. This fact may put pressure on the
Azerbaijani side during negotiations to recede from its maximalist
position. In fact, it is a response to Baku's military rhetoric and
heavy armament, upon which it clearly relies on the long term. The
recognition campaign also raises awareness about the Nagorno-Karabagh
issue and the democratic merits of that non-recognized republic;
that positive awareness will surely increase the chances of further
recognition acts by states and sub-state units.
Beglaryan: The best option will be for the international community
to provide the NKR with preventive recognition.
That recognition campaign, perceived by Azerbaijan as a risk, causes
aggressive counter-reaction. In addition to its traditional military
rhetoric, Azerbaijan regularly provokes tensions with grave incidents
on the frontline and explicitly violates the rules of conventional
arms control. Moreover, Baku recently took two steps that escalated
the tension around the Karabagh issue and deepened the gap of trust
between the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. The first shock was
the extradition to Azerbaijan and the pardon of army officer Ramil
Safarov. He had been serving a life sentence in Hungary for axing to
death Armenian army officer Gurgen Margaryan in his sleep. It happened
in 2004, when both of them were participating in the NATO "Partnership
for Peace" program. As the murderer himself proudly said, the reason
for his brutal action was the hatred he felt towards all Armenians,
a statement widely propagandized by the Azerbaijani authorities.
Safarov's extradition to Azerbaijan in August 2012, organized together
with the government of Hungary, and heroization in his homeland
shocked the international community, causing worldwide outrage. At
the diplomatic level, Armenia's response to Hungary's infamous deal
with Azerbaijan was its suspension of relations with Budapest.
This scandalous step by the Aliyev clan was likely carried out for
the following reasons: First, he aimed to nourish the nationalist
sentiments of the Azerbaijani society, which are directed mainly
against Armenians, and increase the bellicose mood in the society
in preparation for further military actions against Karabagh. Or,
using the Nagorno-Karabagh card and, in this case, pardoning
the axe-murderer, Aliyev aimed to raise his legitimacy among the
considerable nationalist masses of the society. Undoubtedly, that
legitimacy is needed prior to the presidential elections of 2013, when
this authoritarian leader is elected to an undemocratic third term, in
particular since his legitimacy was shaken as a result of continuous
violations of human rights and freedoms in Azerbaijan. Thirdly, it
was a clear message to Armenia and the international community that
Azerbaijan's position in the negotiations would not become softer;
rather, its BATNA (i.e., renewal of the war) would be more probable.
It is arguable whether the message has worked or not. What is clear,
however, is that it spurred a huge negative reaction by the main
great powers involved in south Caucasus affairs.
At the beginning, there was a risk that the Safarov case would freeze
talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan; however, that risk has mostly
been overcome due to the efforts of the mediators. In parallel to
the calming down of the first storm, though, other clouds gathered
in the Armenian-Azerbaijani sky. In recent months, especially, the
tension over the Stepanakert airport has intensified. The authorities
of the Nagorno-Karabagh Republic are planning to run the airport
for humanitarian flights, but Baku has threatened to shoot down any
civilian planes flying to and from Karabagh.
This is another demonstration of the anti-Armenian hysteria of the
Aliyev clan. Who would ever think of attacking civilian aircrafts?
Beyond simply creating/maintaining humanitarian obstacles for
the Nagorno-Karabagh people, Baku is concerned about the legal
consequences of allowing flights over the territory of that
non-recognized state. Those fears made the OSCE Minsk Group (the
main mediator body of the ongoing talks, with French, Russian, and
American co-chairmanship) assert with a statement that the flights
cannot affect the legal status of Nagorno-Karabagh. Despite this
statement, the Azerbaijani authorities still continue to threaten
downing civilian aircraft. This has become the top issue for the
mediators in recent meetings, and it seems that Azerbaijan seeks to
utilize the airport problem in the bargaining process.
After some delay, the NKR authorities said that the airport would
be launched soon. This decision likely took into account Armenia's
statement that its anti-missile systems would secure the Karabagh
flights.
Some experts argue that Russia is seeking to deploy peacekeepers
around the Stepanakert airport as a guarantee of its security, thus
increasing Moscow's weight in the region, since the Karabagh conflict
is believed to be the most significant stability/instability factor in
the South Caucasus. Indisputably, any Russian soldier on that ground
would cause trouble among the other influential actors of and in the
region, including the EU and the U.S. In order to avoid any possible
change in the current balance among the external players around the
conflict, as well as to avoid a new devastating war in the region, all
interested actors must prevent Azerbaijan from attacking the civilian
planes, and instead provide the Armenian side with clear guarantees.
The airport will be launched sooner or later, since it has enormous
humanitarian significance for the Karabagh people and no international
law forbids its operation. However, the question of whether Azerbaijan
will attack the civilian aircrafts is still uncertain. Since any attack
to the planes, logically, will trigger the resumption of the war,
and the great players are strongly interested in sustaining the peace
in the region, they must keep Azerbaijan away from any adventurous
and terrorist behavior. How should they ensure the desirable peace
in and around the conflict zone? The answer is explicit-that is, to
act instead of talking. As the notion of security dilemma assumes, the
arms race in the South Caucasus increases the chance of a new war. The
abovementioned two shocks, along with the frequent incidents on the
frontline, are considerable symptoms of the exhaustion of the security
dilemma. To avoid such a scenario with large-scale humanitarian and
geopolitical crises, as well as to resolve the Karabagh conflict once
and for all, the best option will be for the international community
to provide the NKR with preventive recognition.
Undoubtedly, preventive recognition will become the powerful chain that
keeps Azerbaijan away from attacking an internationally recognized
state, forcing it to abide with reality, like Serbia does in the
case of Kosovo. The concept of remedial recognition could also be
applicable here. It may work not only as a remedy for the 1990's
war and the ongoing deprivations and threats, but also as a response
to the likely effects of possible warfare in the future. Hence, the
resolutions recognizing the Nagorno-Karabagh Republic's independence
by sub-state units have already paved the way to preventive and/or
remedial recognition by the majority of the subjects of international
law. One would hope that the international community will not miss
the opportunity of establishing enduring peace in the region.
Artak Beglaryan is Assistant to the Prime Minister of the
Nagorno-Karabagh Republic, and is currently studying at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy in Massachusetts. This is his first
article for The Armenian Weekly.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/06/14/nagorno-karabagh-preventive-and-remedial-recognition-vs-azerbaijani-threats/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress