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A region in flux: recent developments in Armenia's neighborhood
http://times.am/?p=27038&l=en
Today - 12:53
By Vilen Khlgatyan
In the past two weeks several developments have taken place within
Armenia's neighborhood that are likely to present both opportunities
and challenges to official Yerevan. These include the ongoing protests
in Turkey; the election of a moderate candidate to the Iranian
presidency; and Baku's crackdown on dissenters and democracy advocates
ahead of their upcoming presidential elections in October. How these
develop and how Armenian officials react to them will determine
whether Armenia is able to reap any benefits from these recent
sociopolitical changes currently taking place in the region. With that
said, much of what will occur is largely outside the realm of
Yerevan's control.
The protests in Turkey, which began in late May over a government plan
to redevelop Gezi Park, quickly morphed into a national movement
against a regime that a large segment of the Turkish population regard
as overly authoritarian and increasingly Islamist in word and deed.
Prime Minister Erdogan's mishandling of the protests have only made
the situation worse domestically and exposed Turkey to criticisms from
its Western partners. The outcome of the protests and political
upheaval in Turkey may very well determine what course that country
takes. On the one hand if the AKP hold on to power in all likelihood
they will continue with their Islamist agenda, though perhaps at a
slower pace than before. On the other hand if they concede too much
politically than the return of the Kemalists is a likely outcome,
which incidentally means the reappearance of the Turkish military as a
dominant force in shaping Turkey's political agenda, regardless of
whether or not the protesters themselves wish this to transpire. The
protests have also put a serious dent into the Erdogan regime's
neo-Ottoman plans to increase Ankara's sway and soft power projection
over countries of the Near East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. It was
not that long ago that Turkish influence was on the rise in the Middle
East, and Erdogan was treated like a rock star when he would tour
regional states. But with the Turkish stance on the civil war in
Syria, and the current instability within Turkey, the Arab world has
come to see that Turkey is not a model to be emulated nor admired. For
Armenia this is a welcome development as Turkey has worked against
Armenian interests since Armenia's independence and continues to
present an existential threat to Armenia. However, in case Erdogan's
government is thrown out, whichever party comes to power will very
likely continue Turkey's anti-Armenian course. Kemalist or Islamist
does not make much of a difference as far as Armenia is concerned.
The unrest in Turkey contrasts with the relative calm in neighboring
Iran, which elected a new president on June 15th. And contrary to what
some analysts predicted, a moderate candidate won, and no protests
took place. The election of Hassan Rouhani has raised expectations of
a thaw in Iranian-Western relations, which will no doubt have positive
consequences for Armenia should it come to pass. Due to the duel
blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia has had to
partially rely on Iran for access to the outside world, a difficult
task since Iran has been under Western sanctions for several years,
thus limiting the amount and level of interaction Yerevan can pursue
with Tehran. Any easing or lifting of sanctions against Iran will
allow Armenia to deepen its economic, and specifically energy ties
with the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, during his presidential
campaign, president elect Rouhani was quoted as saying that
`Azerbaijan has become a threat to Iran's security.' Rouhani is
evidently referring to several events in the past year and months
which have strained Tehran's ties with Baku. These include the
revelation that Israel may have come to an understanding with
Azerbaijan to use its airbases in case of an aerial attack on Iran;
the arrest of Azerbaijani citizens who were charged with provoking
socio-ethnic unrest in northern Iran; and the support the Azerbaijani
navy continues to receive from the United States, which Iran sees as
ultimately aimed against its geo-economic interests vis-à-vis Caspian
undersea oil and gas deposits. As such, Rouhani's comments are further
evidence that the problems in Iranian-Azerbaijani relations are
systemic, not intermittent and likely to remain that way.
Over the past year or so the geopolitical situation has changed
negatively for Azerbaijan: The election of Ivanishvili in Georgia;
Russia pulling out from the Gabala radar station; and Iran's uptick in
diplomatic and media accusations of Azerbaijani provocations. With the
political marginalization of Saakashvili and his party, Baku lost a
willing partner in its isolation campaign against Armenia. While the
ongoing thaw in Russo-Georgian relations coupled with Russia's exit
>From Gabala decrease the Baku's leverage over Moscow, to the point of
nullification. Meanwhile on the domestic front, the Azerbaijani
dictator, Ilham Aliyev, has decided to run for a third term at a time
when his popularity is at an all time low, and oil and gas revenues
have plateaued. This comes at a time when Western states have upped
their support for democracy promotion activities via local proponents
as well as foreign funded NGOs. Unsurprisingly, the Aliyev regime has
cracked down on democracy advocates and anyone else deemed to be a
threat to Ilham and his clan. Moreover, Aliyev has had to consider
what ramifications the protests in Turkey will have on his own regime.
While Turkey is no beacon of freedom, it is however, more
representative of its citizen's desires than Azerbaijan, and often
imparts its socio-cultural values upon Azerbaijanis. As President
Sargsyan recently stated, Azerbaijan is very likely to face turbulent
times internally and externally, which is why Armenia must remain
vigilant in case hot-heads in Baku convince Aliyev to launch a new war
so as to divert public attention from his misrule.
Thus far, Aliyev has fully understood that resumption of hostilities
against Armenia is fraught with many negative consequences for his
reign, but should he be pressed into a corner due to domestic turmoil
he may very well take the risk and resume the conflict. Incidentally,
now may be the worst time for Azerbaijan to gamble on a war since its
main partner, Turkey, is embroiled in an identity crisis; regional
power Iran has scored one geopolitical victory after another; and the
Russian Federation has further strengthened its strategic position in
the South Caucasus with the regime change in Tbilisi, and with the
recent stationing of Iskander-M ballistic missile systems in Armenia.
Yet, as Albert Einstein once said: `only two things are infinite, the
universe and human stupidity.'
Vilen Khlgatyan is the Vice-Chairman of the Political Developments
Research Center (PDRC).
From: Baghdasarian
http://times.am/?p=27038&l=en
Today - 12:53
By Vilen Khlgatyan
In the past two weeks several developments have taken place within
Armenia's neighborhood that are likely to present both opportunities
and challenges to official Yerevan. These include the ongoing protests
in Turkey; the election of a moderate candidate to the Iranian
presidency; and Baku's crackdown on dissenters and democracy advocates
ahead of their upcoming presidential elections in October. How these
develop and how Armenian officials react to them will determine
whether Armenia is able to reap any benefits from these recent
sociopolitical changes currently taking place in the region. With that
said, much of what will occur is largely outside the realm of
Yerevan's control.
The protests in Turkey, which began in late May over a government plan
to redevelop Gezi Park, quickly morphed into a national movement
against a regime that a large segment of the Turkish population regard
as overly authoritarian and increasingly Islamist in word and deed.
Prime Minister Erdogan's mishandling of the protests have only made
the situation worse domestically and exposed Turkey to criticisms from
its Western partners. The outcome of the protests and political
upheaval in Turkey may very well determine what course that country
takes. On the one hand if the AKP hold on to power in all likelihood
they will continue with their Islamist agenda, though perhaps at a
slower pace than before. On the other hand if they concede too much
politically than the return of the Kemalists is a likely outcome,
which incidentally means the reappearance of the Turkish military as a
dominant force in shaping Turkey's political agenda, regardless of
whether or not the protesters themselves wish this to transpire. The
protests have also put a serious dent into the Erdogan regime's
neo-Ottoman plans to increase Ankara's sway and soft power projection
over countries of the Near East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. It was
not that long ago that Turkish influence was on the rise in the Middle
East, and Erdogan was treated like a rock star when he would tour
regional states. But with the Turkish stance on the civil war in
Syria, and the current instability within Turkey, the Arab world has
come to see that Turkey is not a model to be emulated nor admired. For
Armenia this is a welcome development as Turkey has worked against
Armenian interests since Armenia's independence and continues to
present an existential threat to Armenia. However, in case Erdogan's
government is thrown out, whichever party comes to power will very
likely continue Turkey's anti-Armenian course. Kemalist or Islamist
does not make much of a difference as far as Armenia is concerned.
The unrest in Turkey contrasts with the relative calm in neighboring
Iran, which elected a new president on June 15th. And contrary to what
some analysts predicted, a moderate candidate won, and no protests
took place. The election of Hassan Rouhani has raised expectations of
a thaw in Iranian-Western relations, which will no doubt have positive
consequences for Armenia should it come to pass. Due to the duel
blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia has had to
partially rely on Iran for access to the outside world, a difficult
task since Iran has been under Western sanctions for several years,
thus limiting the amount and level of interaction Yerevan can pursue
with Tehran. Any easing or lifting of sanctions against Iran will
allow Armenia to deepen its economic, and specifically energy ties
with the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, during his presidential
campaign, president elect Rouhani was quoted as saying that
`Azerbaijan has become a threat to Iran's security.' Rouhani is
evidently referring to several events in the past year and months
which have strained Tehran's ties with Baku. These include the
revelation that Israel may have come to an understanding with
Azerbaijan to use its airbases in case of an aerial attack on Iran;
the arrest of Azerbaijani citizens who were charged with provoking
socio-ethnic unrest in northern Iran; and the support the Azerbaijani
navy continues to receive from the United States, which Iran sees as
ultimately aimed against its geo-economic interests vis-à-vis Caspian
undersea oil and gas deposits. As such, Rouhani's comments are further
evidence that the problems in Iranian-Azerbaijani relations are
systemic, not intermittent and likely to remain that way.
Over the past year or so the geopolitical situation has changed
negatively for Azerbaijan: The election of Ivanishvili in Georgia;
Russia pulling out from the Gabala radar station; and Iran's uptick in
diplomatic and media accusations of Azerbaijani provocations. With the
political marginalization of Saakashvili and his party, Baku lost a
willing partner in its isolation campaign against Armenia. While the
ongoing thaw in Russo-Georgian relations coupled with Russia's exit
>From Gabala decrease the Baku's leverage over Moscow, to the point of
nullification. Meanwhile on the domestic front, the Azerbaijani
dictator, Ilham Aliyev, has decided to run for a third term at a time
when his popularity is at an all time low, and oil and gas revenues
have plateaued. This comes at a time when Western states have upped
their support for democracy promotion activities via local proponents
as well as foreign funded NGOs. Unsurprisingly, the Aliyev regime has
cracked down on democracy advocates and anyone else deemed to be a
threat to Ilham and his clan. Moreover, Aliyev has had to consider
what ramifications the protests in Turkey will have on his own regime.
While Turkey is no beacon of freedom, it is however, more
representative of its citizen's desires than Azerbaijan, and often
imparts its socio-cultural values upon Azerbaijanis. As President
Sargsyan recently stated, Azerbaijan is very likely to face turbulent
times internally and externally, which is why Armenia must remain
vigilant in case hot-heads in Baku convince Aliyev to launch a new war
so as to divert public attention from his misrule.
Thus far, Aliyev has fully understood that resumption of hostilities
against Armenia is fraught with many negative consequences for his
reign, but should he be pressed into a corner due to domestic turmoil
he may very well take the risk and resume the conflict. Incidentally,
now may be the worst time for Azerbaijan to gamble on a war since its
main partner, Turkey, is embroiled in an identity crisis; regional
power Iran has scored one geopolitical victory after another; and the
Russian Federation has further strengthened its strategic position in
the South Caucasus with the regime change in Tbilisi, and with the
recent stationing of Iskander-M ballistic missile systems in Armenia.
Yet, as Albert Einstein once said: `only two things are infinite, the
universe and human stupidity.'
Vilen Khlgatyan is the Vice-Chairman of the Political Developments
Research Center (PDRC).
From: Baghdasarian