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Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 23 2013
Rohani expected to continue to be wary of Azerbaijan
23 June 2013 /LAMÄ°YA ADÄ°LGIZI, Ä°STANBUL
Iranian President-elect Hassan Rohani is not likely to try to
positively effect Iran's currently tense relations with Azerbaijan,
its neighbor on the Caspian Sea which Tehran considers a potential
threat to its interests in the region, although he has stated that he
will endeavor to pursue `amicable and close' relations with
neighboring countries based on mutual respect and interests.
A moderate reformist, the current representative of Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the Supreme National Security Council and a
former head nuclear negotiator, Rohani won the Iranian presidential
election in a surprising, landslide first-round victory last Saturday
over conservative hardliners. Winning 50.7 percent of the vote with
18,613,329 ballots cast in his favor, Rohani shocked international
observers. Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, was believed
to be the front-runner for the presidential post as he was one of
Khamenei's favorites.
Rohani, speaking at his first press conference as president on Monday,
stated that his administration will follow a `moderate' policy line in
serving national objectives. He added that he will seek `constructive
interaction' with the world, including neighboring countries.
However, it is Rohani unlikely that the continuing tension with
Azerbaijan, a neighbor to the north, will be included in this
constructive approach, as Rohani, while still a candidate, called
Azerbaijan in an interview with irdiplomacy.com a real threat to
Iranian interests in the region. This may be an indication that the
further deterioration of ties between the two countries should be
expected. He also said that it is not an exaggeration to say that
Azerbaijan appears to be a challenge to Iranian security and
territorial integrity and that Tehran should not act indifferently to
any risks posed by Azerbaijan.
Baku, a strategic partner of the US in the region, is a potential
rival for Tehran because its rich energy resources in the Caspian Sea
are considered by the West to be a prime alternative source of gas.
Azerbaijan also poses a threat to Iranian interests because it could
boost irredentism among ethnic Azeris in northwestern Iran, which is
also called Persian Azerbaijan and referred to by some groups in
Azerbaijan as South Azerbaijan because it was separated from the
country in an historical treaty between Russia and Iran in 1828. So,
regarding Azerbaijan as its number one risk in the South Caucasus,
Iran is using its relationship with Armenia, with which Azerbaijan has
had severely strained ties for decades, to create a sort of balance in
the region. This in turn further hurts Iranian-Azerbaijani ties.
More than two decades have passed since Azerbaijan and Armenia first
became locked in a deadly conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic
Armenian-majority enclave inside Azerbaijan. The conflict escalated
into a full-scale war in the early 1990s when Armenian-backed forces
under the command of current President Serzh Sarksyan occupied 20
percent of Azerbaijani territories, including Nagorno-Karabakh and
seven adjacent territories, killing some 30,000 people. Hundreds of
thousands fled their homes before a cease-fire was signed in 1994;
however, there is not yet a peace treaty in place and
Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the seven adjacent territories, are still
under Armenian occupation.
Iran is abusing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in its policy in the
region, obviously supporting Armenia instead of Shiite-populated
Azerbaijan, and thereby angering Azerbaijanis. Iranian support for
Armenia also come out of strained ties between Iran and Turkey,
Azerbaijan's strategic partner in the region and the main US ally in
Iran's neighborhood, because Turkey supports Azerbaijan over Armenia
in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Iran has also made frequent attempts at intervening in the settlement
process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by injecting itself into the
situation as a mediator given the lack of progress in the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)-led negotiations due to
the reluctance of the conflicting parties to find a viable solution.
Commenting on Iran's move to enter into the settlement process of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, MesiaÄ?a Mehemmedi, an Azerbaijani analyst
on Iran affiliated with the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies,
told Sunday's Zaman that Iran is not sincere in its actions as regards
Azerbaijan as it has continued for years to strengthen its relations
with Armenia.
`Iran says it supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan but
does not show this in its actions. Instead, it steadily increasing
economic and political ties with Armenia; this confirms that the main
objective of Iran in getting involved in the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not to achieve peace but to strengthen
its influence in the South Caucasus, thus standing up to the influence
of the US and Europe in the region,' Mehemmedi said, adding that the
West and Russia, which are pursuing their interests in the region
through as well as outside of the Nagorno-karabakh conflict, will
never allow Iran to become actively involved in the settlement process
and thus the region.
Mehemmedi noted that Azerbaijan also pursues a more pro-Western
stance; has been boosting its relations with Israel, Iran's avowed
enemy; and will not allow Iran to become directly involved in the
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Mehemmedi also thinks
that with the economic isolation Iran faces, it will not be able to
negatively impact the peaceful settlement of the conflict as the
Rohani administration will be more focused on easing bilateral ties
with the Western powers.
Commenting on Iran's Azerbaijan policy, Elnur Soltanov, an expert from
the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, said it is based on Iran's
relations with the West and Iran's perception of Azerbaijan.
`At almost all levels of the Iranian political realm, there is
consensus regarding what Azerbaijan means to Iran,' Soltanov said,
adding that a change of president will hardly alter the situation. He
thinks that if there is any change in Iran's Azerbaijan policy, it is
more likely to be a byproduct of a changing Iranian attitude vis-Ã-vis
the Western world.
However, whether there will be any significant improvement in the
latter is, of course, the biggest question in the minds of those
analyzing Iran.
Commenting on whether the new Iranian president will make any
comprehensive changes in Iran's crippled affairs with Azerbaijan,
Mehemmedi said that it would be difficult for moderate cleric Rohani
to change the status quo, as was the case in the past when reformist
leader Mohammad Khatami could not make headway with his moderate ideas
during his eight-year tenure.
Although the Rohani-led government is considered to be moderate and
more reformative than the last government, the president of Iran,
regardless of his approach, does not have the means by which to pursue
his own policy because the true power of the Iranian state lies with
its spiritual leader, Khamenei. In other words, waiting to see
positive changes made by Rohani, including the dissipation of tension
with Azerbaijan, would be an exercise in futility even though his
victory is considered legitimate and a mandate from the people to meet
their demands reform as they are weary of long-standing political
restrictions and economic sanctions.
June 23 2013
Rohani expected to continue to be wary of Azerbaijan
23 June 2013 /LAMÄ°YA ADÄ°LGIZI, Ä°STANBUL
Iranian President-elect Hassan Rohani is not likely to try to
positively effect Iran's currently tense relations with Azerbaijan,
its neighbor on the Caspian Sea which Tehran considers a potential
threat to its interests in the region, although he has stated that he
will endeavor to pursue `amicable and close' relations with
neighboring countries based on mutual respect and interests.
A moderate reformist, the current representative of Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the Supreme National Security Council and a
former head nuclear negotiator, Rohani won the Iranian presidential
election in a surprising, landslide first-round victory last Saturday
over conservative hardliners. Winning 50.7 percent of the vote with
18,613,329 ballots cast in his favor, Rohani shocked international
observers. Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, was believed
to be the front-runner for the presidential post as he was one of
Khamenei's favorites.
Rohani, speaking at his first press conference as president on Monday,
stated that his administration will follow a `moderate' policy line in
serving national objectives. He added that he will seek `constructive
interaction' with the world, including neighboring countries.
However, it is Rohani unlikely that the continuing tension with
Azerbaijan, a neighbor to the north, will be included in this
constructive approach, as Rohani, while still a candidate, called
Azerbaijan in an interview with irdiplomacy.com a real threat to
Iranian interests in the region. This may be an indication that the
further deterioration of ties between the two countries should be
expected. He also said that it is not an exaggeration to say that
Azerbaijan appears to be a challenge to Iranian security and
territorial integrity and that Tehran should not act indifferently to
any risks posed by Azerbaijan.
Baku, a strategic partner of the US in the region, is a potential
rival for Tehran because its rich energy resources in the Caspian Sea
are considered by the West to be a prime alternative source of gas.
Azerbaijan also poses a threat to Iranian interests because it could
boost irredentism among ethnic Azeris in northwestern Iran, which is
also called Persian Azerbaijan and referred to by some groups in
Azerbaijan as South Azerbaijan because it was separated from the
country in an historical treaty between Russia and Iran in 1828. So,
regarding Azerbaijan as its number one risk in the South Caucasus,
Iran is using its relationship with Armenia, with which Azerbaijan has
had severely strained ties for decades, to create a sort of balance in
the region. This in turn further hurts Iranian-Azerbaijani ties.
More than two decades have passed since Azerbaijan and Armenia first
became locked in a deadly conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic
Armenian-majority enclave inside Azerbaijan. The conflict escalated
into a full-scale war in the early 1990s when Armenian-backed forces
under the command of current President Serzh Sarksyan occupied 20
percent of Azerbaijani territories, including Nagorno-Karabakh and
seven adjacent territories, killing some 30,000 people. Hundreds of
thousands fled their homes before a cease-fire was signed in 1994;
however, there is not yet a peace treaty in place and
Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the seven adjacent territories, are still
under Armenian occupation.
Iran is abusing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in its policy in the
region, obviously supporting Armenia instead of Shiite-populated
Azerbaijan, and thereby angering Azerbaijanis. Iranian support for
Armenia also come out of strained ties between Iran and Turkey,
Azerbaijan's strategic partner in the region and the main US ally in
Iran's neighborhood, because Turkey supports Azerbaijan over Armenia
in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Iran has also made frequent attempts at intervening in the settlement
process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by injecting itself into the
situation as a mediator given the lack of progress in the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)-led negotiations due to
the reluctance of the conflicting parties to find a viable solution.
Commenting on Iran's move to enter into the settlement process of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, MesiaÄ?a Mehemmedi, an Azerbaijani analyst
on Iran affiliated with the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies,
told Sunday's Zaman that Iran is not sincere in its actions as regards
Azerbaijan as it has continued for years to strengthen its relations
with Armenia.
`Iran says it supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan but
does not show this in its actions. Instead, it steadily increasing
economic and political ties with Armenia; this confirms that the main
objective of Iran in getting involved in the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not to achieve peace but to strengthen
its influence in the South Caucasus, thus standing up to the influence
of the US and Europe in the region,' Mehemmedi said, adding that the
West and Russia, which are pursuing their interests in the region
through as well as outside of the Nagorno-karabakh conflict, will
never allow Iran to become actively involved in the settlement process
and thus the region.
Mehemmedi noted that Azerbaijan also pursues a more pro-Western
stance; has been boosting its relations with Israel, Iran's avowed
enemy; and will not allow Iran to become directly involved in the
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Mehemmedi also thinks
that with the economic isolation Iran faces, it will not be able to
negatively impact the peaceful settlement of the conflict as the
Rohani administration will be more focused on easing bilateral ties
with the Western powers.
Commenting on Iran's Azerbaijan policy, Elnur Soltanov, an expert from
the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, said it is based on Iran's
relations with the West and Iran's perception of Azerbaijan.
`At almost all levels of the Iranian political realm, there is
consensus regarding what Azerbaijan means to Iran,' Soltanov said,
adding that a change of president will hardly alter the situation. He
thinks that if there is any change in Iran's Azerbaijan policy, it is
more likely to be a byproduct of a changing Iranian attitude vis-Ã-vis
the Western world.
However, whether there will be any significant improvement in the
latter is, of course, the biggest question in the minds of those
analyzing Iran.
Commenting on whether the new Iranian president will make any
comprehensive changes in Iran's crippled affairs with Azerbaijan,
Mehemmedi said that it would be difficult for moderate cleric Rohani
to change the status quo, as was the case in the past when reformist
leader Mohammad Khatami could not make headway with his moderate ideas
during his eight-year tenure.
Although the Rohani-led government is considered to be moderate and
more reformative than the last government, the president of Iran,
regardless of his approach, does not have the means by which to pursue
his own policy because the true power of the Iranian state lies with
its spiritual leader, Khamenei. In other words, waiting to see
positive changes made by Rohani, including the dissipation of tension
with Azerbaijan, would be an exercise in futility even though his
victory is considered legitimate and a mandate from the people to meet
their demands reform as they are weary of long-standing political
restrictions and economic sanctions.