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Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 23 2013
Russia's arms sales to Azerbaijan: A political balancing act?
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
A few days ago and to the surprise of many observers, Russia made a
large arms delivery to Azerbaijan, estimated to worth between $700
million and $1 billion. The news came as surprise in the context of
tensions in Moscow-Baku relations, particularly over recent months.
During the run up to the presidential election in Azerbaijan,
scheduled for October 2013, there have been rumors that Russia wants
to influence the outcome by supporting a pro-Russian candidate, though
it is doubtful whether such a plan exists.
The other factor that made the arms delivery a `surprise' was the
timing: It arrived just a few days before the statement from the
Russian, US and French presidents on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
settlement during the G8 summit. Another factor in play is the
deterioration of Moscow-Yerevan relations due to Russia's decision to
increase the price of gas supplied to Armenia. In addition, there were
rumors in April that Russia had cut off arms sales to Azerbaijan.
The media in both Azerbaijan and Armenia have speculated broadly about
the meaning of the arms sale; however, there are a number of
implausible arguments being offered:
`Russia is selling off old military equipment.' This type of argument
has been used before when Azerbaijan bought equipment from Israel or
Russia. But this recent delivery contains new technologies: nearly 100
T-90C tanks, Smerch and TOS-1A multiple rocket launchers and Msta-A
and Vena artillery cannons.
`Russia is providing military support to Azerbaijan.' This is another
misconception; traditionally, Russia likes to negotiate a balance
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but the main difference is that
ultimately Azerbaijan buys military equipment from Moscow at market
value, and Armenia gets a discount or pays nothing. Superficially, it
looks like Armenia is benefitting, though in reality, it is simply
becoming more dependent on Russia. Moscow often ensures that such
sales (or donations) happen close together -- the Russian
understanding of `balance.' In this regard, Dmitri Trenin, director of
the Carnegie Moscow Center, tweeted on June 18 that Russia is to
Armenia and Azerbaijan what the US is to Israel and the Arabs: selling
weapons to both in the hope that there is no war.
`Armenia will rethink its membership in the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO).' When Russia sells military equipment to
Azerbaijan, it is always perceived by Armenia as a threat to its
alliance with Moscow, and the media speculates about a possible shift
in bilateral relations. This situation is no different; Naira
Hayrumyan, writing for the Armenian online media outlet Lragir, asks,
`What is the meaning of being a member of this organization [CSTO] if
it assumes the responsibility to defend Armenia's interests in case of
aggression against Karabakh but sells weapons to Armenia's enemy?' In
reality, however, this line of questioning will soon be abandoned and
discussions turn once more to strategic relations with Russia and will
probably generate a new agreement or commitment by Moscow to Armenia,
which in turn increases Yerevan's reliance on Russia.
The next question is what Russia is gaining from selling arms to Azerbaijan.
First and foremost, Russia wants to make Baku dependent on
Russian-made technology, thereby reducing the likelihood that Baku
will look elsewhere for its military technology in the future.
Second, Moscow opposes Azerbaijan's plan to build and invest in its
defense industry. In the past month, it has become clear that
Azerbaijan in partnership with Georgia and Turkey is planning for
integrated defense industry cooperation in the future. Moscow is
angered by this `trilateral' cooperation, demonstrated by the March 28
meeting between the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish foreign
ministers where they approved a cooperative plan for 2013-2015. On the
very same day, President Vladimir Putin ordered unscheduled military
exercises involving thousands of troops and dozens of ships in the
Black Sea region in order to test their battle readiness. It is hard
to see that this was a mere coincidence; it seems clear evidence of
Moscow's dissatisfaction with the deepening and expanding trilateral
cooperation.
Thirdly, among experts and politicians in Baku, there is a great deal
of criticism for the current Russian leadership due to their perceived
lack of interest in continuing mediation on the solution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Former president and current Prime Minister
Dmitri Medvedev was the anchor for the trilateral meetings between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, under which format the latest -- or last --
meeting was held in Sochi in January 2012. To avoid criticism in this
area, Russia has appeased Baku by other means -- supplying arms. The
latest statement of the US, Russian and French presidents is
interesting. While the language of the statement is harsh, it lacks
any hint on the possibility of including new details or ideas for the
settlement process. That kind of statement -- i.e. more open to other
possibilities -- was last seen before the 2011 Kazan meeting, at which
point the conflict parties were close to a settlement. Arguably, this
latest development cannot be considered a goodwill gesture by Moscow.
There are still significant doubts in Azerbaijan about Putin's desire
to strengthen the bilateral relationship. Under Putin's third
presidency, the formula of the Kremlin is different. During the
Medvedev presidency, Medvedev made proposals for Russia's foreign
policy on Azerbaijan and Armenia, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey
Viktorovich Lavrov made changes to the proposals, and Putin made the
final decision. Now, no one is making proposals.
Arguably, such a high-value arms sale to Azerbaijan on the eve of its
military parade, suggests that Moscow sought to get a reaction from
Armenia. Due to the gas crisis, Yerevan is frustrated with Moscow, and
by flaunting its military and economic muscle Russia is demonstrating
its ultimate power.
Ultimately, the overall situation suggests that when Azerbaijan or
Armenia show dissatisfaction with Moscow, Russia reinvests in the
relationship through arms sales -- a good deal for Moscow, without a
doubt.
From: A. Papazian
June 23 2013
Russia's arms sales to Azerbaijan: A political balancing act?
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
A few days ago and to the surprise of many observers, Russia made a
large arms delivery to Azerbaijan, estimated to worth between $700
million and $1 billion. The news came as surprise in the context of
tensions in Moscow-Baku relations, particularly over recent months.
During the run up to the presidential election in Azerbaijan,
scheduled for October 2013, there have been rumors that Russia wants
to influence the outcome by supporting a pro-Russian candidate, though
it is doubtful whether such a plan exists.
The other factor that made the arms delivery a `surprise' was the
timing: It arrived just a few days before the statement from the
Russian, US and French presidents on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
settlement during the G8 summit. Another factor in play is the
deterioration of Moscow-Yerevan relations due to Russia's decision to
increase the price of gas supplied to Armenia. In addition, there were
rumors in April that Russia had cut off arms sales to Azerbaijan.
The media in both Azerbaijan and Armenia have speculated broadly about
the meaning of the arms sale; however, there are a number of
implausible arguments being offered:
`Russia is selling off old military equipment.' This type of argument
has been used before when Azerbaijan bought equipment from Israel or
Russia. But this recent delivery contains new technologies: nearly 100
T-90C tanks, Smerch and TOS-1A multiple rocket launchers and Msta-A
and Vena artillery cannons.
`Russia is providing military support to Azerbaijan.' This is another
misconception; traditionally, Russia likes to negotiate a balance
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but the main difference is that
ultimately Azerbaijan buys military equipment from Moscow at market
value, and Armenia gets a discount or pays nothing. Superficially, it
looks like Armenia is benefitting, though in reality, it is simply
becoming more dependent on Russia. Moscow often ensures that such
sales (or donations) happen close together -- the Russian
understanding of `balance.' In this regard, Dmitri Trenin, director of
the Carnegie Moscow Center, tweeted on June 18 that Russia is to
Armenia and Azerbaijan what the US is to Israel and the Arabs: selling
weapons to both in the hope that there is no war.
`Armenia will rethink its membership in the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO).' When Russia sells military equipment to
Azerbaijan, it is always perceived by Armenia as a threat to its
alliance with Moscow, and the media speculates about a possible shift
in bilateral relations. This situation is no different; Naira
Hayrumyan, writing for the Armenian online media outlet Lragir, asks,
`What is the meaning of being a member of this organization [CSTO] if
it assumes the responsibility to defend Armenia's interests in case of
aggression against Karabakh but sells weapons to Armenia's enemy?' In
reality, however, this line of questioning will soon be abandoned and
discussions turn once more to strategic relations with Russia and will
probably generate a new agreement or commitment by Moscow to Armenia,
which in turn increases Yerevan's reliance on Russia.
The next question is what Russia is gaining from selling arms to Azerbaijan.
First and foremost, Russia wants to make Baku dependent on
Russian-made technology, thereby reducing the likelihood that Baku
will look elsewhere for its military technology in the future.
Second, Moscow opposes Azerbaijan's plan to build and invest in its
defense industry. In the past month, it has become clear that
Azerbaijan in partnership with Georgia and Turkey is planning for
integrated defense industry cooperation in the future. Moscow is
angered by this `trilateral' cooperation, demonstrated by the March 28
meeting between the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish foreign
ministers where they approved a cooperative plan for 2013-2015. On the
very same day, President Vladimir Putin ordered unscheduled military
exercises involving thousands of troops and dozens of ships in the
Black Sea region in order to test their battle readiness. It is hard
to see that this was a mere coincidence; it seems clear evidence of
Moscow's dissatisfaction with the deepening and expanding trilateral
cooperation.
Thirdly, among experts and politicians in Baku, there is a great deal
of criticism for the current Russian leadership due to their perceived
lack of interest in continuing mediation on the solution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Former president and current Prime Minister
Dmitri Medvedev was the anchor for the trilateral meetings between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, under which format the latest -- or last --
meeting was held in Sochi in January 2012. To avoid criticism in this
area, Russia has appeased Baku by other means -- supplying arms. The
latest statement of the US, Russian and French presidents is
interesting. While the language of the statement is harsh, it lacks
any hint on the possibility of including new details or ideas for the
settlement process. That kind of statement -- i.e. more open to other
possibilities -- was last seen before the 2011 Kazan meeting, at which
point the conflict parties were close to a settlement. Arguably, this
latest development cannot be considered a goodwill gesture by Moscow.
There are still significant doubts in Azerbaijan about Putin's desire
to strengthen the bilateral relationship. Under Putin's third
presidency, the formula of the Kremlin is different. During the
Medvedev presidency, Medvedev made proposals for Russia's foreign
policy on Azerbaijan and Armenia, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey
Viktorovich Lavrov made changes to the proposals, and Putin made the
final decision. Now, no one is making proposals.
Arguably, such a high-value arms sale to Azerbaijan on the eve of its
military parade, suggests that Moscow sought to get a reaction from
Armenia. Due to the gas crisis, Yerevan is frustrated with Moscow, and
by flaunting its military and economic muscle Russia is demonstrating
its ultimate power.
Ultimately, the overall situation suggests that when Azerbaijan or
Armenia show dissatisfaction with Moscow, Russia reinvests in the
relationship through arms sales -- a good deal for Moscow, without a
doubt.
From: A. Papazian