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AZERBAIJAN AND THE EU: RECALIBRATING RELATIONS?
AzeriReport
Feb 28 2013
By Eldar Mamedov, Eurasianet.org
BAKU. February 28, 2013: Azerbaijan's efforts to host the European
Olympic Games and other high-profile international events show that
Azerbaijani leaders yearn to be taken seriously in European Union
capitals. But that doesn't mean Baku is willing to listen to Brussels.
When the EU foreign policy supremo Catherine Ashton and the enlargement
and neighborhood commissioner Stefan Fule criticized the Azerbaijani
government for the recent arrests of an opposition leader Ilgar
Mammadov and journalist Tofiq Yaqublu, President Ilham Aliyev retorted
that Azerbaijan had no obligations toward organizations of which it
is not a member. EU representatives "had no right to interfere in
Azerbaijan's internal affairs," Aliyev stated bluntly.
The signs of a chill in relations were also evident on February 18,
when EU foreign ministers announced that they expected the signature
of the EU association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and
Armenia in time for the Eastern Partnership summit scheduled for the
fall of 2013. On Azerbaijan, they merely "welcomed progress achieved
during the negotiations." In diplo-speak this meant Azerbaijan is
lagging behind other countries of the Eastern Partnership - a formula
invented by the EU to seek a closer association, in fact a privileged
partnership of sorts with a number of countries lying between the EU
and Russia.
The underlying philosophy of the Eastern Partnership is "more for
more" - more benefits, such as free trade and visa liberalization, in
exchange for more EU-aligned reforms in the partner countries. While
the logic, by and large, works with many formerly Soviet states, it
doesn't in the case of Azerbaijan. This is so because the Azerbaijani
government feels it does not need "more" from the EU.
In recent years, Baku´s perception of its own importance has grown
vastly. It sees its energy reserves as a potent card that can be played
in its dealings with the EU, which is seeking to diversify its energy
supplies away from Russia. The tendency of Western states to view Baku
as a key partner in addressing regional security issues is another
confidence booster. In addition, steady domestic growth rates, driven
mainly by energy-export revenue, inflate Baku's sense of its own worth.
Perceptions of its own ascendancy, combined with the sense of that the
EU's stature is diminished by its own internal fiscal difficulties,
have led Baku to conclude that it has little to gain from closer
alignment with EU norms. Accordingly, Azerbaijan will not be content
with the status of junior partner to the EU. Baku wants a strictly
equal relationship based on shared interests, such as energy supplies
and security cooperation. And even in the case of such a strategic
partnership, Azerbaijani officials would likely be unbending on
two issues where it sees fundamental differences with the EU; the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and human rights and democratization in
Azerbaijan.
On Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku is irritated by what it sees as the
EU failure to acknowledge unambiguously Azerbaijan's territorial
integrity, i.e. including Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also puzzled by
what it sees as EU reluctance to play a more direct role in conflict
resolution within the Minsk Group framework.
On the democratization question, officials in Baku insist that the
expansion of individual rights can come only after political and
economic conditions in the country are modernized. A preoccupation with
the concept of "modernity" is evident in President Aliyev´s speeches
and visible in Baku´s cutting edge architecture. Democracy is seen as
a messy distraction. This helps explain why Aliyev´s reaction to Ashton
and Fule´s criticism was not an occasional outburst, but an indication
of a fundamental disagreement on democratization and human rights.
So far, Azerbaijani leaders have done whatever they think is necessary
for maintaining the domestic status quo, occasional protests from the
EU notwithstanding. Baku feels it has nothing to fear from the EU,
even if Brussels was to apply the "less for less" principle towards
it, as opposed to the "more for more" approach.
But Baku better be careful not to overplay its hand. If the EU
is interested in diversifying its sources of energy supply, so
is Azerbaijan in diversifying its exports. Despite the questions
surrounding individual government debt and the euro, the EU is a stable
and reliable buyer of Azerbaijani oil, but it has other alternatives.
In terms of regional security, the withdrawal of Western troops from
Afghanistan in 2014 will lessen Western attention given to Azerbaijan
in exchange for over-flight and transit privileges. At the same time,
to prevent the resurgence of the Taliban, the West will have to work
with Russia, Iran and India. If there is a normalization of relations
with Iran - something that is clearly not imminent, but is conceivable
- Azerbaijan´s strategic value for the West could greatly decrease.
And there is an incongruity between Baku´s increasingly vehement
denunciations of the EU and its wish to see the EU more involved
in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on terms favorable
to Azerbaijan.
If current trends are not reversed, the most likely outcome would be
a recalibration of the EU-Azerbaijan relations: away from a closer
association based on a progressive alignment by Azerbaijan with the EU
norms and values and towards a relationship based purely on selected
shared interests - not unlike those the EU had in the past with the
Mubarak´s Egypt and has currently with Saudi Arabia.
Such a development would be bad news for the democratization process
in Azerbaijan over the near term. But by unnecessarily and imprudently
alienating the EU, the Azerbaijani government could significantly
narrow its room for geo-strategic maneuver, and, in so doing, damaging
its national interests. -0-
* Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists & Democrats
Group in the European Parliament, who writes in his personal capacity.
http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3888&Ite mid=48
AzeriReport
Feb 28 2013
By Eldar Mamedov, Eurasianet.org
BAKU. February 28, 2013: Azerbaijan's efforts to host the European
Olympic Games and other high-profile international events show that
Azerbaijani leaders yearn to be taken seriously in European Union
capitals. But that doesn't mean Baku is willing to listen to Brussels.
When the EU foreign policy supremo Catherine Ashton and the enlargement
and neighborhood commissioner Stefan Fule criticized the Azerbaijani
government for the recent arrests of an opposition leader Ilgar
Mammadov and journalist Tofiq Yaqublu, President Ilham Aliyev retorted
that Azerbaijan had no obligations toward organizations of which it
is not a member. EU representatives "had no right to interfere in
Azerbaijan's internal affairs," Aliyev stated bluntly.
The signs of a chill in relations were also evident on February 18,
when EU foreign ministers announced that they expected the signature
of the EU association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and
Armenia in time for the Eastern Partnership summit scheduled for the
fall of 2013. On Azerbaijan, they merely "welcomed progress achieved
during the negotiations." In diplo-speak this meant Azerbaijan is
lagging behind other countries of the Eastern Partnership - a formula
invented by the EU to seek a closer association, in fact a privileged
partnership of sorts with a number of countries lying between the EU
and Russia.
The underlying philosophy of the Eastern Partnership is "more for
more" - more benefits, such as free trade and visa liberalization, in
exchange for more EU-aligned reforms in the partner countries. While
the logic, by and large, works with many formerly Soviet states, it
doesn't in the case of Azerbaijan. This is so because the Azerbaijani
government feels it does not need "more" from the EU.
In recent years, Baku´s perception of its own importance has grown
vastly. It sees its energy reserves as a potent card that can be played
in its dealings with the EU, which is seeking to diversify its energy
supplies away from Russia. The tendency of Western states to view Baku
as a key partner in addressing regional security issues is another
confidence booster. In addition, steady domestic growth rates, driven
mainly by energy-export revenue, inflate Baku's sense of its own worth.
Perceptions of its own ascendancy, combined with the sense of that the
EU's stature is diminished by its own internal fiscal difficulties,
have led Baku to conclude that it has little to gain from closer
alignment with EU norms. Accordingly, Azerbaijan will not be content
with the status of junior partner to the EU. Baku wants a strictly
equal relationship based on shared interests, such as energy supplies
and security cooperation. And even in the case of such a strategic
partnership, Azerbaijani officials would likely be unbending on
two issues where it sees fundamental differences with the EU; the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and human rights and democratization in
Azerbaijan.
On Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku is irritated by what it sees as the
EU failure to acknowledge unambiguously Azerbaijan's territorial
integrity, i.e. including Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also puzzled by
what it sees as EU reluctance to play a more direct role in conflict
resolution within the Minsk Group framework.
On the democratization question, officials in Baku insist that the
expansion of individual rights can come only after political and
economic conditions in the country are modernized. A preoccupation with
the concept of "modernity" is evident in President Aliyev´s speeches
and visible in Baku´s cutting edge architecture. Democracy is seen as
a messy distraction. This helps explain why Aliyev´s reaction to Ashton
and Fule´s criticism was not an occasional outburst, but an indication
of a fundamental disagreement on democratization and human rights.
So far, Azerbaijani leaders have done whatever they think is necessary
for maintaining the domestic status quo, occasional protests from the
EU notwithstanding. Baku feels it has nothing to fear from the EU,
even if Brussels was to apply the "less for less" principle towards
it, as opposed to the "more for more" approach.
But Baku better be careful not to overplay its hand. If the EU
is interested in diversifying its sources of energy supply, so
is Azerbaijan in diversifying its exports. Despite the questions
surrounding individual government debt and the euro, the EU is a stable
and reliable buyer of Azerbaijani oil, but it has other alternatives.
In terms of regional security, the withdrawal of Western troops from
Afghanistan in 2014 will lessen Western attention given to Azerbaijan
in exchange for over-flight and transit privileges. At the same time,
to prevent the resurgence of the Taliban, the West will have to work
with Russia, Iran and India. If there is a normalization of relations
with Iran - something that is clearly not imminent, but is conceivable
- Azerbaijan´s strategic value for the West could greatly decrease.
And there is an incongruity between Baku´s increasingly vehement
denunciations of the EU and its wish to see the EU more involved
in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on terms favorable
to Azerbaijan.
If current trends are not reversed, the most likely outcome would be
a recalibration of the EU-Azerbaijan relations: away from a closer
association based on a progressive alignment by Azerbaijan with the EU
norms and values and towards a relationship based purely on selected
shared interests - not unlike those the EU had in the past with the
Mubarak´s Egypt and has currently with Saudi Arabia.
Such a development would be bad news for the democratization process
in Azerbaijan over the near term. But by unnecessarily and imprudently
alienating the EU, the Azerbaijani government could significantly
narrow its room for geo-strategic maneuver, and, in so doing, damaging
its national interests. -0-
* Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists & Democrats
Group in the European Parliament, who writes in his personal capacity.
http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3888&Ite mid=48