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Baku: Azerbaijan And The Eu: Recalibrating Relations?

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  • Baku: Azerbaijan And The Eu: Recalibrating Relations?

    AZERBAIJAN AND THE EU: RECALIBRATING RELATIONS?

    AzeriReport
    Feb 28 2013

    By Eldar Mamedov, Eurasianet.org

    BAKU. February 28, 2013: Azerbaijan's efforts to host the European
    Olympic Games and other high-profile international events show that
    Azerbaijani leaders yearn to be taken seriously in European Union
    capitals. But that doesn't mean Baku is willing to listen to Brussels.

    When the EU foreign policy supremo Catherine Ashton and the enlargement
    and neighborhood commissioner Stefan Fule criticized the Azerbaijani
    government for the recent arrests of an opposition leader Ilgar
    Mammadov and journalist Tofiq Yaqublu, President Ilham Aliyev retorted
    that Azerbaijan had no obligations toward organizations of which it
    is not a member. EU representatives "had no right to interfere in
    Azerbaijan's internal affairs," Aliyev stated bluntly.

    The signs of a chill in relations were also evident on February 18,
    when EU foreign ministers announced that they expected the signature
    of the EU association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and
    Armenia in time for the Eastern Partnership summit scheduled for the
    fall of 2013. On Azerbaijan, they merely "welcomed progress achieved
    during the negotiations." In diplo-speak this meant Azerbaijan is
    lagging behind other countries of the Eastern Partnership - a formula
    invented by the EU to seek a closer association, in fact a privileged
    partnership of sorts with a number of countries lying between the EU
    and Russia.

    The underlying philosophy of the Eastern Partnership is "more for
    more" - more benefits, such as free trade and visa liberalization, in
    exchange for more EU-aligned reforms in the partner countries. While
    the logic, by and large, works with many formerly Soviet states, it
    doesn't in the case of Azerbaijan. This is so because the Azerbaijani
    government feels it does not need "more" from the EU.

    In recent years, Baku´s perception of its own importance has grown
    vastly. It sees its energy reserves as a potent card that can be played
    in its dealings with the EU, which is seeking to diversify its energy
    supplies away from Russia. The tendency of Western states to view Baku
    as a key partner in addressing regional security issues is another
    confidence booster. In addition, steady domestic growth rates, driven
    mainly by energy-export revenue, inflate Baku's sense of its own worth.

    Perceptions of its own ascendancy, combined with the sense of that the
    EU's stature is diminished by its own internal fiscal difficulties,
    have led Baku to conclude that it has little to gain from closer
    alignment with EU norms. Accordingly, Azerbaijan will not be content
    with the status of junior partner to the EU. Baku wants a strictly
    equal relationship based on shared interests, such as energy supplies
    and security cooperation. And even in the case of such a strategic
    partnership, Azerbaijani officials would likely be unbending on
    two issues where it sees fundamental differences with the EU; the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and human rights and democratization in
    Azerbaijan.

    On Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku is irritated by what it sees as the
    EU failure to acknowledge unambiguously Azerbaijan's territorial
    integrity, i.e. including Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also puzzled by
    what it sees as EU reluctance to play a more direct role in conflict
    resolution within the Minsk Group framework.

    On the democratization question, officials in Baku insist that the
    expansion of individual rights can come only after political and
    economic conditions in the country are modernized. A preoccupation with
    the concept of "modernity" is evident in President Aliyev´s speeches
    and visible in Baku´s cutting edge architecture. Democracy is seen as
    a messy distraction. This helps explain why Aliyev´s reaction to Ashton
    and Fule´s criticism was not an occasional outburst, but an indication
    of a fundamental disagreement on democratization and human rights.

    So far, Azerbaijani leaders have done whatever they think is necessary
    for maintaining the domestic status quo, occasional protests from the
    EU notwithstanding. Baku feels it has nothing to fear from the EU,
    even if Brussels was to apply the "less for less" principle towards
    it, as opposed to the "more for more" approach.

    But Baku better be careful not to overplay its hand. If the EU
    is interested in diversifying its sources of energy supply, so
    is Azerbaijan in diversifying its exports. Despite the questions
    surrounding individual government debt and the euro, the EU is a stable
    and reliable buyer of Azerbaijani oil, but it has other alternatives.

    In terms of regional security, the withdrawal of Western troops from
    Afghanistan in 2014 will lessen Western attention given to Azerbaijan
    in exchange for over-flight and transit privileges. At the same time,
    to prevent the resurgence of the Taliban, the West will have to work
    with Russia, Iran and India. If there is a normalization of relations
    with Iran - something that is clearly not imminent, but is conceivable
    - Azerbaijan´s strategic value for the West could greatly decrease.

    And there is an incongruity between Baku´s increasingly vehement
    denunciations of the EU and its wish to see the EU more involved
    in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on terms favorable
    to Azerbaijan.

    If current trends are not reversed, the most likely outcome would be
    a recalibration of the EU-Azerbaijan relations: away from a closer
    association based on a progressive alignment by Azerbaijan with the EU
    norms and values and towards a relationship based purely on selected
    shared interests - not unlike those the EU had in the past with the
    Mubarak´s Egypt and has currently with Saudi Arabia.

    Such a development would be bad news for the democratization process
    in Azerbaijan over the near term. But by unnecessarily and imprudently
    alienating the EU, the Azerbaijani government could significantly
    narrow its room for geo-strategic maneuver, and, in so doing, damaging
    its national interests. -0-

    * Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists & Democrats
    Group in the European Parliament, who writes in his personal capacity.

    http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3888&Ite mid=48

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