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Iran's nuclear program: a defiant quest for modernity
The Canadian Jewish News
Friday, March 1, 2013
By Sheldon Kirshner, Staff Reporter
Iran's quest to build a nuclear arsenal by hook or by crook has
degenerated into a global crisis, having consumed the efforts of
diplomats for the past decade.
Israel's threat to bomb Iranian nuclear sites, combined with
U.S. President Barack Obama's determination `to prevent [Iran] from
getting a nuclear weapon,' as he stated in his State of Union speech
to Congress last month, only amplifies the issue.
It remains to be seen whether it can be resolved peacefully, but as
British journalist David Patrikarakos correctly observes in Nuclear
Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State (Palgrave Macmillan), the need to
find a solution is critical. Its resolution, he adds, `will affect the
world for at least a generation.'
Although Iran's nuclear program was launched more than 50 years ago,
the full story of its development, from birth to the present day, has
not been told until now. With this book, based mainly on primary
sources, Patrikarakos fills in the gap admirably.
He's a dispassionate writer, but he doesn't bury his opinions. As he
puts it, `If the spectre of a possible attack on Iran is deeply
troubling, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is worse.'
Iran's possession of nuclear arms, he argues, would be catastrophic
--strengthening the Islamic fundamentalist Iranian regime at the
expense of its neighbours, further inflaming the already tense
standoff between Iran and Israel, emboldening Tehran's proxies,
Hezbollah and Hamas, setting off a regional arms race and prompting
non-nuclear states in the Middle East to emulate Iran.
`It is a deeply undesirable outcome, one that must be avoided at all
costs,' he asserts.
In his view, the nuclear program offers Iran an opportunity =80=9Cto
engage with modernity' and `negotiate a place within a perennially
hostile world.' He adds, `Understand the nuclear program and you will
understand modern Iran.'
Iran, unlike its Arab neighbours, has never experienced the impact of
direct colonialism, but it has been subjected to foreign
meddling. Iran lost substantial territories to Russia in a war in the
1820s, and in the same decade, Iran was forced to cede land in Armenia
and Azerbaijan. During World War II, the Soviet Union and Britain
occupied Iran, and in the 1950s, a U.S.-backed coup deposed a
nationalist prime minister.
As a result, he points out, Iran has been zealous to preserve its
independence and territorial integrity.
Iran entered the nuclear age in 1957 when a nuclear training centre
was established in Tehran under the auspices of the Central Treaty
Organization, an alliance composed of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and
Britain. Subsequently, Iran signed a treaty with the United States for
co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran since 1941, believed that
nuclear energy would lessen Iran's dependence on oil for domestic
power, put an end to endemic electrical shortages and place his
underdeveloped country on a path of industrial and economic progress.
With German assistance, Iran built its first nuclear reactor in
Bushehr. By the end of 1978, the eve of the Islamic revolution that
deposed the shah's monarchy, Iran had a civil nuclear program in
place.
The Iranian government, having publicly rejected the allure of nuclear
weapons, signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but
the shah warned he might revise his policy if `20 or 30 ridiculous
little countries are going to develop nuclear weapons.'
The shah's arrogant comment notwithstanding, Iran was really in no
position to build an atomic device because its nuclear program was
based entirely on power plants rather than uranium enrichment.
Nonetheless, as Patrikarakos notes, the nuclear program was probably
the `most developed expression' of the shah's modernization
program. Nuclear power, he elaborates, was `intertwined with notions
of national pride and progress' and personal ambition on the part of
the hubristic shah.
Yet in opposition circles, the nuclear program was synonymous with
corruption, waste and royal excess. Frequent power cuts in the
mid-1970s led critics to conclude that nuclear power was hardly a
panacea for Iran's problems.
The new Islamic regime initially considered the nuclear program
excessively expensive and ideologically unclean, calling it a Trojan
horse for western infiltration and imperialism. Nevertheless, a
decision was taken that nuclear research, particularly in prospecting
and extracting uranium, should continue.
Severe electricity shortages convinced the mullahs that the shah's
nuclear program could be useful. In 1982, with the Iran-Iraq War
raging, the nuclear program was officially restarted. The program was
now `an integral part of how the Islamic republic defined itself in
the modern world,' says the author.
Iranian scientists living abroad were invited back, and Iran began
exploring the possibility of signing co-operation agreements with
Argentina, Pakistan, India and China.
Convinced that a nuclear deterrent would confer prestige on Iran and
protect the Islamic revolution from the schemes of its enemies, namely
the United States and Israel, the regime took concrete steps to
rebuild the nuclear program,
Iran secretly purchased centrifuges from the Khan network in Pakistan
and bought equipment from China. Russia, however, would become Iran's
chief nuclear partner. In 1994, the Russians agreed to complete one of
two unfinished reactors in Bushehr.
Iran's belligerent attitude toward Israel, an undeclared nuclear
power, prompted the Israeli government in 2002 to warn that Iran posed
an existential threat to its statehood. With Mahmoud Ah-ma-di-ne-jad's
election as president in 2005, Israel hardened its policy toward
Iran's nuclear program.
By then, Iran had made headway in its covert pursuit of the full
nuclear cycle and had officially informed the International Atomic
Energy Agency of its uranium enrichment program, says Patrikarakos.
United Nations sanctions, he writes, had no effect on its nuclear
ambitions.
He suggests that Iran's willingness to engage the major powers in
talks has been little more than a stalling tactic. Iran regards its
nuclear program as
`a symbol of a defiant modernizing state' and will not likely abandon
it in the face of international pressure.
Iran's defiance prompts Patrikarakos to write, =80=9CThe supreme irony
... is that Iran's nuclear program is the ultimate expression of its
desire for acceptance (but on its own terms) that is pursued through
the one means that will ensure it remains a pariah.'
From: Baghdasarian
The Canadian Jewish News
Friday, March 1, 2013
By Sheldon Kirshner, Staff Reporter
Iran's quest to build a nuclear arsenal by hook or by crook has
degenerated into a global crisis, having consumed the efforts of
diplomats for the past decade.
Israel's threat to bomb Iranian nuclear sites, combined with
U.S. President Barack Obama's determination `to prevent [Iran] from
getting a nuclear weapon,' as he stated in his State of Union speech
to Congress last month, only amplifies the issue.
It remains to be seen whether it can be resolved peacefully, but as
British journalist David Patrikarakos correctly observes in Nuclear
Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State (Palgrave Macmillan), the need to
find a solution is critical. Its resolution, he adds, `will affect the
world for at least a generation.'
Although Iran's nuclear program was launched more than 50 years ago,
the full story of its development, from birth to the present day, has
not been told until now. With this book, based mainly on primary
sources, Patrikarakos fills in the gap admirably.
He's a dispassionate writer, but he doesn't bury his opinions. As he
puts it, `If the spectre of a possible attack on Iran is deeply
troubling, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is worse.'
Iran's possession of nuclear arms, he argues, would be catastrophic
--strengthening the Islamic fundamentalist Iranian regime at the
expense of its neighbours, further inflaming the already tense
standoff between Iran and Israel, emboldening Tehran's proxies,
Hezbollah and Hamas, setting off a regional arms race and prompting
non-nuclear states in the Middle East to emulate Iran.
`It is a deeply undesirable outcome, one that must be avoided at all
costs,' he asserts.
In his view, the nuclear program offers Iran an opportunity =80=9Cto
engage with modernity' and `negotiate a place within a perennially
hostile world.' He adds, `Understand the nuclear program and you will
understand modern Iran.'
Iran, unlike its Arab neighbours, has never experienced the impact of
direct colonialism, but it has been subjected to foreign
meddling. Iran lost substantial territories to Russia in a war in the
1820s, and in the same decade, Iran was forced to cede land in Armenia
and Azerbaijan. During World War II, the Soviet Union and Britain
occupied Iran, and in the 1950s, a U.S.-backed coup deposed a
nationalist prime minister.
As a result, he points out, Iran has been zealous to preserve its
independence and territorial integrity.
Iran entered the nuclear age in 1957 when a nuclear training centre
was established in Tehran under the auspices of the Central Treaty
Organization, an alliance composed of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and
Britain. Subsequently, Iran signed a treaty with the United States for
co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran since 1941, believed that
nuclear energy would lessen Iran's dependence on oil for domestic
power, put an end to endemic electrical shortages and place his
underdeveloped country on a path of industrial and economic progress.
With German assistance, Iran built its first nuclear reactor in
Bushehr. By the end of 1978, the eve of the Islamic revolution that
deposed the shah's monarchy, Iran had a civil nuclear program in
place.
The Iranian government, having publicly rejected the allure of nuclear
weapons, signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but
the shah warned he might revise his policy if `20 or 30 ridiculous
little countries are going to develop nuclear weapons.'
The shah's arrogant comment notwithstanding, Iran was really in no
position to build an atomic device because its nuclear program was
based entirely on power plants rather than uranium enrichment.
Nonetheless, as Patrikarakos notes, the nuclear program was probably
the `most developed expression' of the shah's modernization
program. Nuclear power, he elaborates, was `intertwined with notions
of national pride and progress' and personal ambition on the part of
the hubristic shah.
Yet in opposition circles, the nuclear program was synonymous with
corruption, waste and royal excess. Frequent power cuts in the
mid-1970s led critics to conclude that nuclear power was hardly a
panacea for Iran's problems.
The new Islamic regime initially considered the nuclear program
excessively expensive and ideologically unclean, calling it a Trojan
horse for western infiltration and imperialism. Nevertheless, a
decision was taken that nuclear research, particularly in prospecting
and extracting uranium, should continue.
Severe electricity shortages convinced the mullahs that the shah's
nuclear program could be useful. In 1982, with the Iran-Iraq War
raging, the nuclear program was officially restarted. The program was
now `an integral part of how the Islamic republic defined itself in
the modern world,' says the author.
Iranian scientists living abroad were invited back, and Iran began
exploring the possibility of signing co-operation agreements with
Argentina, Pakistan, India and China.
Convinced that a nuclear deterrent would confer prestige on Iran and
protect the Islamic revolution from the schemes of its enemies, namely
the United States and Israel, the regime took concrete steps to
rebuild the nuclear program,
Iran secretly purchased centrifuges from the Khan network in Pakistan
and bought equipment from China. Russia, however, would become Iran's
chief nuclear partner. In 1994, the Russians agreed to complete one of
two unfinished reactors in Bushehr.
Iran's belligerent attitude toward Israel, an undeclared nuclear
power, prompted the Israeli government in 2002 to warn that Iran posed
an existential threat to its statehood. With Mahmoud Ah-ma-di-ne-jad's
election as president in 2005, Israel hardened its policy toward
Iran's nuclear program.
By then, Iran had made headway in its covert pursuit of the full
nuclear cycle and had officially informed the International Atomic
Energy Agency of its uranium enrichment program, says Patrikarakos.
United Nations sanctions, he writes, had no effect on its nuclear
ambitions.
He suggests that Iran's willingness to engage the major powers in
talks has been little more than a stalling tactic. Iran regards its
nuclear program as
`a symbol of a defiant modernizing state' and will not likely abandon
it in the face of international pressure.
Iran's defiance prompts Patrikarakos to write, =80=9CThe supreme irony
... is that Iran's nuclear program is the ultimate expression of its
desire for acceptance (but on its own terms) that is pursued through
the one means that will ensure it remains a pariah.'
From: Baghdasarian