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ISN - International Relations & Security Network, Zurich
March 1 2013
Lessons Learned? The EU and the South Caucasus De Facto States
The EU views its 'Non-Recognition and Engagement' strategy as the best
way to manage its relations with the putative republics of Abkhazia
and North Ossetia. Today, Franziska Smolnik analyzes the effectiveness
of this strategy and wonders whether it can also be applied to the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
By Franziska Smolnik
The South Caucasus conflicts have long been on the EU radar. Despite a
general awareness, however, concrete EU engagement as regards the
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts has been
limited. It was only after the 2008 August war pitting Georgia against
South Ossetia and Russia that the EU started to re-evaluate its
approach to Georgia's conflicts. Not only did the EU in general step
up its engagement but it also re-thought its policy on the so-called
de facto states [1] which have emerged as a result of the conflict. In
September 2008 the position of EU Special Representative (EUSR) for
the Crisis in Georgia was introduced, complementing the work of the
EUSR for the South Caucasus that was created in 2003. Moreover, the EU
formulated the Non-Recognition and Engagement policy to directly
address Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Nagorno-Karabakh, the
third South Caucasus de facto state, has been left unaddressed by the
strategy - despite the EU's awareness of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict's highly fragile status quo. While the Non-Recognition and
Engagement policy arguably is not the most visible of the EU's
policies in the region, it nonetheless constitutes a significant
adjustment in the EU's approach towards Georgia's conflicts in general
and the de facto states in particular. It is therefore worth taking a
closer look at it: First, this article assesses the policy's
implementation in the context of Georgia's break away regions. Then,
with reference to the former, it examines the possibilities of
extending the strategy to the de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Even though the Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy is directed at
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the evaluation of its implementation
focuses on the Abkhazian case. Since, as a consequence of the August
war, entry to South Ossetia has been practically closed for
international assistance (Russia excluded), implementation of the
Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy in South Ossetia has been
postponed.
New realities - new strategy: engaging Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Similar to South Ossetia and Abkhazia which gained de facto
independence from Georgia, the secessionist entity Nagorno-Karabakh
has developed empirical statehood in the course of about 20 years of
de facto independence from Azerbaijan. While all three conflicts as
well as the respective de facto states have featured their own
specific characteristics even before the events of summer 2008, the
five-day war and its aftermath set conflicts and de facto states even
further apart: whereas after the war Russia recognized South Ossetia
and Abkhazia as independent states - and a couple of further countries
have by now followed Russia's lead, Nagorno-Karabakh remains without
partial recognition - with even its closest ally and kin state, Armenia,
failing to recognize it. In the context of partial recognition,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been furthermore re-positioned on the
EU's agenda for the South Caucasus.
As concerns Nagorno-Karabakh, given the frequent criticism of the OSCE
Minsk Group, the official conflict mediator, calls for enhanced EU
engagement have likewise become more numerous. The EU itself is
considering enhanced involvement. While, on the one hand, a possible
role for the EU as one of the Minsk Group's co-chairs is discussed
(currently the Minsk Group is co-chaired by representatives from
Russia, the US and France), a second line of thinking focuses on
extending the EU's Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy to the de
facto state of Nagorno- Karabakh. Yet neither of these possibilities
has been implemented.
In the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU had channeled some
of its assistance to these de facto states even before the events of
2008. EU donor assistance focused in particular on ameliorating the
situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as on
socio-economic reconstruction in the conflict-affected areas. While
humanitarian in nature, the EU thought of this assistance as part of
its efforts towards conflict resolution. Since 2003, the EU moreover
has been present in the region in the form of its Special
Representative for the South Caucasus, whose mandate explicitly
included engagement with the South Caucasus conflicts. While the work
of the EUSR has often been carried out without much public ado, the
EUSR has been crucial in maintaining links with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, not least facilitated by his not being affiliated with a
European embassy or the EU delegation based in Tbilisi. EU policies as
regards conflict resolution in general, however, have been assessed in
rather negative terms. It was the war of 2008 as well as the partial
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that marked a turning point
as concerns the realities on the ground - and thus the conditions for
international engagement in the region. These new conditions include
an almost complete foreclosure for EU (funded) projects to South
Ossetia, an increased Russian presence in the de facto states - not
least in the form of thousands of Russian troops stationed there to
defend the new status quo - as well as boosted selfesteem especially on
the part of Abkhazia and its bid for independent statehood. It seems
as if Russia's even further increased role in the partially recognized
statelets led to heightened sensitivity and necessitated a
re-evaluation and re-orientation of the EU's engagement with the
conflicts. While in discussion even before 2008 and in several regards
only the formalization of assistance that the EU has already provided,
the approval of what came to be known as the Non-Recognition and
Engagement strategy in December 2009 nonetheless marks a certain
change of approach in the EU's efforts towards conflict resolution.
With this step EU policy directly addresses the de facto states of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thus holding the potential for EU
assistance that thoroughly takes into account local conditions in the
de facto states and the (new) realities of the region.
The Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy was adopted by the
Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union
and has to be considered in light of the European Commission's
proposal to provide for enhanced targeting of regional conflicts
within the EU's Neighborhood Policy. The strategy's essence is already
given by its name. Central are two, inseparable building blocks:
engagement with the de facto states while at the same time clearly
stating the EU's adherence to Georgia's territorial integrity. The
formula therefore reflects the difficult position the EU finds itself
in where its adherence to Georgia's internationally recognized borders
remains in tension with addressing the new realities. Despite the
explicit bias towards an ultimate resolution of the conflicts which
favors the Georgian (and Western) standpoint, the strategy seems
however rather directed at countering Russia's growing influence
rather than actively supporting Georgia's regaining of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The strategy's central objective of de-isolation is
thus to provide and foster, as former EU Special Representative Peter
Semneby put it, `an alternative perspective to the predominant Russian
one'. Such de-isolation is thought possible via upholding or
establishing contacts on different levels - contact with the de facto
authorities not explicitly excluded but practically restricted by the
statement on Georgia's territorial integrity. Centrally, the strategy
aims at focusing on people-to-people contacts and the implementation
of projects in different realms such as rehabilitation, education,
information or training. Yet, the strategy still largely waits to be
animated - thus far rather than being a generator of new initiatives it
constitutes rather a new umbrella label for ongoing projects.
Engagement with obstacles
The events of 2008 constitute a further rupture as regards relations
between Tbilisi and Sukhum/i and between Sukhum/i and the
international community. While in the context of the cease-fire
agreement brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy a new
negotiation format, the Geneva talks, was established, both the UN
mission that monitored the Georgian-Abkhaz ceasefire and the OSCE
presence in South Ossetia were disbanded in mid-2009 after Russia
vetoed their extensions. The Geneva talks regularly bring together
representatives of Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia as well as
of the UN, OSCE and the EU with the objective of arriving at conflict
resolution. The latter three organizations function as the Geneva
process' co-chairs with the EU being represented by its Special
Representative for the Crisis in Georgia. Even though such a steady
communication platform has been welcomed, critics complain that a
means to an end has become an end in itself: Given a lack of tangible
progress as concerns relations between Tbilisi and Tskhinval/i and
Sukhum/i, mediators are forced to settle for maintaining the
status-quo.
Despite such a rather bleak picture, there is also experience of
engagement and mutual contact beyond the track one-level to draw upon.
International organizations and NGOs have, and continue, to implement
projects in Abkhazia, while communication channels between Georgia and
separatist Abkhazia were never completely closed either. The
administrative boundary line (ABL) between Georgia and Abkhazia has
been permeable, not least due to several thousands of ethnic Georgian
IDPs who returned to their homes in Abkhazcontrolled Gal/i region and
have subsequently commuted across the ABL. However, for Abkhazia's
non- Georgian population, too, crossing the ABL was possible, for
example in the context of medical treatment. Moreover, until the
events of 2008 there even was direct, that is non-mediated, contact
between Abkhazian and Georgian top-level officials. It is such fragile
forms of contact and pragmatic cooperation that the EU's policy may
aim to revitalize or draw upon and possibly expand. On the other hand,
obstacles which were already present before 2008 have become even more
critical now. These can be located on different levels: On the one
side project implementers are confronted with obstacles on an
operational level such as which passports to accept, where to issue
necessary visas, from where to import materials, etc. On the other
side, a further difficulty presents itself on the more conceptual
level: commonly, in Abkhazia the EU is regarded as pro-Georgian and
its new policy therefore viewed with suspicion. This, however,
influences the policy's possible impact. The strategy's perceived
Georgia bias is not only linked to the EU's vocal commitment to
Georgia's territorial integrity, but also to its prior record of
assistance. People in Abkhazia criticize the EU as well as other
international organizations for having channeled their help
predominantly to Gal/i region, facilitating IDP return, therefore
favoring ethnic Georgians. The internationals justify their engagement
by pointing to stipulations of the 1994 framework agreement and by
arguing that this area in particular has been most severely affected
by the persistent conflict and that it is the ethnic Georgian IDPs who
are most vulnerable. Ethnic Abkhaz interlocutors, however, stress that
they have likewise experienced tremendous hardships due to the war and
the economic blockade, having waited in vain for help.
While in Abkhazia there have been, and still are, groups of people who
adhere to a `multi-vector-foreign policy' and, in this context,
welcome cooperation with the EU, the EU's offers are not able to
seriously challenge Russian influence in Abkhazia. Not only is Russia
militarily present in the region and seen as the protector of Abkhaz
independence, it also possesses tremendous economic leverage - to name
only the two most striking aspects of Abkhaz-Russian relations. Even
though the Russian-Abkhaz honeymoon has likely ended, or at least has
been beclouded by a couple of contested issues such as the question of
real estate purchases by non-Abkhaz, the territorial dispute as
regards the village Aibga or the dispute concerning the Abkhaz church,
Russia's influence and elevated position will remain for the
foreseeable future. Therefore, the more the Non-Recognition and
Engagement policy's central objective to promote an alternative
perspective is interpreted by the Abkhaz side as aimed at
substituting, rather than complementing, Russia's presence, the less
likely are its chances for substantial realization.
No recognition, no Engagement: the EU and Nagorno-Karabakh
Turning to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, we face a different picture.
Compared to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the EU's efforts as regards
conflict resolution in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are
even smaller and more inconsistent. [2] This is not least due to local
circumstances and the configuration of forces, which are quite
different from the Georgian-Abkhaz case. While it is the ABL that
separates Abkhazia and Georgia proper, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan
are separated by the `line of contact'. This is the official name for
what actually are World War I-like fortified trenches, mine fields and
thousands of soldiers from the Azerbaijani, Nagorno- Karabakh and
Armenian armies standing guard against each other and exchanging
sniper fire on an almost daily basis. In contrast with the
Georgian-Abkhaz case, the `line of contact' is completely sealed and
the implementation of cross-community projects is possible only
indirectly, traffic to and from the de facto state of Nagorno-
Karabakh occurs - much to Azerbaijan's resentment - via the Lachin
corridor that connects Nagorno-Karabakh with the Republic of Armenia.
At the conflict's current stage, therefore, struggling with practical
questions, as in the case of Abkhazia, is wishful thinking.
Nonetheless, the question of how to approach Armenia as
Nagorno-Karabakh's protector and kin state remains to be tackled. Even
more than is the case with Russia and Georgia after the events of
2008, Armenia adds an international dimension to the secessionist
conflict. While Nagorno-Karabakh features largely separate political
and administrative structures, it is tightly connected to Armenia via,
for example, a common financial, educational and defense space.
Despite Georgia's increased efforts at monitoring international
assistance to Abkhazia, Tbilisi has started to question the
fruitfulness of its isolation strategy. Parallel to the EU's
introduction of the Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy, Georgia
presented its own pol icy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia - the Law
on Occupied Territories as well as the corresponding strategy, action
plan and modalities, adopted between the fall of 2009 and fall of
2010. Despite its being largely dismissed by the Abkhaz side and
despite its contested origin - it is debated whether it was a genuine
Georgian initiative. Developed in close cooperation with Georgia's
Western partners, this policy presents an attempt to open up
communication and cooperation channels, something that is missing in
the case of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Even more than is the
case with Georgia, Azerbaijan fears that any EU engagement with
Nagorno-Karabakh potentially helps the de facto state's ability to
build institutional capacity which then might be exploited to further
back Nagorno-Karabakh's claim for independence. Azerbaijan therefore
regards any international engagement with Nagorno-Karabakh as a
further challenge to its territorial integrity. Such concern is
moreover related to an Azerbaijani perception of the EU as less
clearly supporting Azerbaijan's territorial integrity - contrary to the
case with Georgia.
However, the EU's priorities, too, differ in the case of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan - an EU target for closer economic
ties in the context of energy diversification plans - will hardly face
serious EU pressure to change its position as regards international
engagement with Nagorno-Karabakh. Arguably, the 2008 events were not
conducive to bestow more attention upon the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:
Not only is the Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy only oriented
towards Abkhazia and (potentially) South Ossetia, what is more, the
September 2011 merger of the two EUSR mandates related to the South
Caucasus, the EUSR for the South Caucasus (until February 2011 held by
Peter Semneby) and the EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia (until August
2011 held by Pierre Morel), into one - the EUSR for the South Caucasus
and the Crisis in Georgia - equally favors engagement with Georgia's
breakaway regions. The position is held by French diplomat Philippe
Lefort. Commentators have focused on the new EUSR's French
nationality: While some consider this a further upgrade of France's
standing in the region and in particular concerning the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (to recall: France holds one of the three
Minsk Group co-chairs), others thought a transformation of the French
co-chair into an EU-one more likely. While rumors concerning the
latter have already been dismissed, it also remains to be seen whether
the officeholder's personal qualities and traits or the position's
mandate will have a greater influence upon the orientation of the
EUSR's work.
Finally, enhanced EU engagement might be impaired by the EU's
reputation in the de facto state of Nagorno- Karabakh itself - similar
to the case of Abkhazia. The EU's standing among Nagorno-Karabakh's
population is not very high. According to an opinion poll from 2010,
the EU scores lowest - by far compared to Russia, but also compared to
France and the OSCE - as regards people's trust towards it, its role in
the settlement process as well as its perceived interest in peace. It
is in fact the latter question where the EU scores worst. Such
distrust is not least linked to the role of the EUSR: People in
Karabakh blamed Peter Semneby for not having visited Nagorno-Karabakh
once.
Any Good? Prospects for extending the EU's policy of non-recognition
and engagement
Despite the many political challenges to engage directly with the de
facto states which have impeded the implementation of the EU's policy
in Abkhazia, it should nonetheless not be abandoned. Furthermore:
While the political circumstances are equally complex and hostilities
arguably even more protracted in the case of Nagorno- Karabakh, an
extension of the EU's Non-Recognition and Engagement policy to
Nagorno-Karabakh still has the potential to positively affect the
present status quo, albeit indirectly. As regards the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict's mediation process, not only has the top-level- top-secret
character of the Minsk Group-led negotiations been criticized,
Nagorno-Karabakh is neither present in these negotiations, nor is
first track mediation substantially undergirded by efforts aimed at
conflict transformation. Given Nagorno-Karabakh's isolation, even more
severe than in the case of Abkhazia, and the lack of a prior history
of international peacekeeping or monitors on the ground, EU efforts
that in analogy to the Abkhazian case are targeted at diversifying
Nagorno- Karabakh's information field or establishing cooperation in
the area of education might at the least be beneficial to laying the
ground-work for future reconciliation.
The EU often stresses its potential as a neutral, though not
indifferent, mediator and facilitator in the South Caucasus, including
in the realm of conflict transformation. Even though perceptions of
the EU differ across the region, local actors largely regard the EU as
being less partisan than Russia or the US. Yet, the EU has not
capitalized on its standing, or effectively tried to do so for that
matter. Often, its policy in regard to the conflicts has been more
declarative than substantial, more reactive than proactive. The EU's
policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia with its Non-Recognition and
Engagement strategy is a case in point. As concerns the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it might be good advice not to wait for an
escalation to step up engagement.
[1] The term de facto state is used to jointly address the three South
Caucasus self-proclaimed statelets that feature empirical statehood
but are not or only partially recognized internationally. Since in all
three conflicts terminology is debated, where necessary I use both
variants of spelling (e.g. Sukhum/i - for Georgian Sukhumi and Abkhaz
Sukhum).
[2] Only very sporadically has the EU become active as a donor to
projects in Nagorno-Karabakh, such as in the framework of the EU
financed European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the
Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), which is an umbrella for five
organizations that since 2010 has supported peace-building related
activities - also in Nagorno-Karabakh itself.
Franziska Smolnik is working as a research assistant to the Russia/CIS
division of the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs in Berlin and pursuing a PhD on internal developments in the
South Caucasus de facto states.
Editor's note:
This article was originally published in Caucasus Analytical Digest No
35-36 (15 February 2012).
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=160454&contextid774=160454&contextid775 =160429&tabid=1454180080
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
March 1 2013
Lessons Learned? The EU and the South Caucasus De Facto States
The EU views its 'Non-Recognition and Engagement' strategy as the best
way to manage its relations with the putative republics of Abkhazia
and North Ossetia. Today, Franziska Smolnik analyzes the effectiveness
of this strategy and wonders whether it can also be applied to the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
By Franziska Smolnik
The South Caucasus conflicts have long been on the EU radar. Despite a
general awareness, however, concrete EU engagement as regards the
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts has been
limited. It was only after the 2008 August war pitting Georgia against
South Ossetia and Russia that the EU started to re-evaluate its
approach to Georgia's conflicts. Not only did the EU in general step
up its engagement but it also re-thought its policy on the so-called
de facto states [1] which have emerged as a result of the conflict. In
September 2008 the position of EU Special Representative (EUSR) for
the Crisis in Georgia was introduced, complementing the work of the
EUSR for the South Caucasus that was created in 2003. Moreover, the EU
formulated the Non-Recognition and Engagement policy to directly
address Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Nagorno-Karabakh, the
third South Caucasus de facto state, has been left unaddressed by the
strategy - despite the EU's awareness of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict's highly fragile status quo. While the Non-Recognition and
Engagement policy arguably is not the most visible of the EU's
policies in the region, it nonetheless constitutes a significant
adjustment in the EU's approach towards Georgia's conflicts in general
and the de facto states in particular. It is therefore worth taking a
closer look at it: First, this article assesses the policy's
implementation in the context of Georgia's break away regions. Then,
with reference to the former, it examines the possibilities of
extending the strategy to the de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Even though the Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy is directed at
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the evaluation of its implementation
focuses on the Abkhazian case. Since, as a consequence of the August
war, entry to South Ossetia has been practically closed for
international assistance (Russia excluded), implementation of the
Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy in South Ossetia has been
postponed.
New realities - new strategy: engaging Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Similar to South Ossetia and Abkhazia which gained de facto
independence from Georgia, the secessionist entity Nagorno-Karabakh
has developed empirical statehood in the course of about 20 years of
de facto independence from Azerbaijan. While all three conflicts as
well as the respective de facto states have featured their own
specific characteristics even before the events of summer 2008, the
five-day war and its aftermath set conflicts and de facto states even
further apart: whereas after the war Russia recognized South Ossetia
and Abkhazia as independent states - and a couple of further countries
have by now followed Russia's lead, Nagorno-Karabakh remains without
partial recognition - with even its closest ally and kin state, Armenia,
failing to recognize it. In the context of partial recognition,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been furthermore re-positioned on the
EU's agenda for the South Caucasus.
As concerns Nagorno-Karabakh, given the frequent criticism of the OSCE
Minsk Group, the official conflict mediator, calls for enhanced EU
engagement have likewise become more numerous. The EU itself is
considering enhanced involvement. While, on the one hand, a possible
role for the EU as one of the Minsk Group's co-chairs is discussed
(currently the Minsk Group is co-chaired by representatives from
Russia, the US and France), a second line of thinking focuses on
extending the EU's Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy to the de
facto state of Nagorno- Karabakh. Yet neither of these possibilities
has been implemented.
In the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU had channeled some
of its assistance to these de facto states even before the events of
2008. EU donor assistance focused in particular on ameliorating the
situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as on
socio-economic reconstruction in the conflict-affected areas. While
humanitarian in nature, the EU thought of this assistance as part of
its efforts towards conflict resolution. Since 2003, the EU moreover
has been present in the region in the form of its Special
Representative for the South Caucasus, whose mandate explicitly
included engagement with the South Caucasus conflicts. While the work
of the EUSR has often been carried out without much public ado, the
EUSR has been crucial in maintaining links with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, not least facilitated by his not being affiliated with a
European embassy or the EU delegation based in Tbilisi. EU policies as
regards conflict resolution in general, however, have been assessed in
rather negative terms. It was the war of 2008 as well as the partial
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that marked a turning point
as concerns the realities on the ground - and thus the conditions for
international engagement in the region. These new conditions include
an almost complete foreclosure for EU (funded) projects to South
Ossetia, an increased Russian presence in the de facto states - not
least in the form of thousands of Russian troops stationed there to
defend the new status quo - as well as boosted selfesteem especially on
the part of Abkhazia and its bid for independent statehood. It seems
as if Russia's even further increased role in the partially recognized
statelets led to heightened sensitivity and necessitated a
re-evaluation and re-orientation of the EU's engagement with the
conflicts. While in discussion even before 2008 and in several regards
only the formalization of assistance that the EU has already provided,
the approval of what came to be known as the Non-Recognition and
Engagement strategy in December 2009 nonetheless marks a certain
change of approach in the EU's efforts towards conflict resolution.
With this step EU policy directly addresses the de facto states of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thus holding the potential for EU
assistance that thoroughly takes into account local conditions in the
de facto states and the (new) realities of the region.
The Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy was adopted by the
Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union
and has to be considered in light of the European Commission's
proposal to provide for enhanced targeting of regional conflicts
within the EU's Neighborhood Policy. The strategy's essence is already
given by its name. Central are two, inseparable building blocks:
engagement with the de facto states while at the same time clearly
stating the EU's adherence to Georgia's territorial integrity. The
formula therefore reflects the difficult position the EU finds itself
in where its adherence to Georgia's internationally recognized borders
remains in tension with addressing the new realities. Despite the
explicit bias towards an ultimate resolution of the conflicts which
favors the Georgian (and Western) standpoint, the strategy seems
however rather directed at countering Russia's growing influence
rather than actively supporting Georgia's regaining of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The strategy's central objective of de-isolation is
thus to provide and foster, as former EU Special Representative Peter
Semneby put it, `an alternative perspective to the predominant Russian
one'. Such de-isolation is thought possible via upholding or
establishing contacts on different levels - contact with the de facto
authorities not explicitly excluded but practically restricted by the
statement on Georgia's territorial integrity. Centrally, the strategy
aims at focusing on people-to-people contacts and the implementation
of projects in different realms such as rehabilitation, education,
information or training. Yet, the strategy still largely waits to be
animated - thus far rather than being a generator of new initiatives it
constitutes rather a new umbrella label for ongoing projects.
Engagement with obstacles
The events of 2008 constitute a further rupture as regards relations
between Tbilisi and Sukhum/i and between Sukhum/i and the
international community. While in the context of the cease-fire
agreement brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy a new
negotiation format, the Geneva talks, was established, both the UN
mission that monitored the Georgian-Abkhaz ceasefire and the OSCE
presence in South Ossetia were disbanded in mid-2009 after Russia
vetoed their extensions. The Geneva talks regularly bring together
representatives of Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia as well as
of the UN, OSCE and the EU with the objective of arriving at conflict
resolution. The latter three organizations function as the Geneva
process' co-chairs with the EU being represented by its Special
Representative for the Crisis in Georgia. Even though such a steady
communication platform has been welcomed, critics complain that a
means to an end has become an end in itself: Given a lack of tangible
progress as concerns relations between Tbilisi and Tskhinval/i and
Sukhum/i, mediators are forced to settle for maintaining the
status-quo.
Despite such a rather bleak picture, there is also experience of
engagement and mutual contact beyond the track one-level to draw upon.
International organizations and NGOs have, and continue, to implement
projects in Abkhazia, while communication channels between Georgia and
separatist Abkhazia were never completely closed either. The
administrative boundary line (ABL) between Georgia and Abkhazia has
been permeable, not least due to several thousands of ethnic Georgian
IDPs who returned to their homes in Abkhazcontrolled Gal/i region and
have subsequently commuted across the ABL. However, for Abkhazia's
non- Georgian population, too, crossing the ABL was possible, for
example in the context of medical treatment. Moreover, until the
events of 2008 there even was direct, that is non-mediated, contact
between Abkhazian and Georgian top-level officials. It is such fragile
forms of contact and pragmatic cooperation that the EU's policy may
aim to revitalize or draw upon and possibly expand. On the other hand,
obstacles which were already present before 2008 have become even more
critical now. These can be located on different levels: On the one
side project implementers are confronted with obstacles on an
operational level such as which passports to accept, where to issue
necessary visas, from where to import materials, etc. On the other
side, a further difficulty presents itself on the more conceptual
level: commonly, in Abkhazia the EU is regarded as pro-Georgian and
its new policy therefore viewed with suspicion. This, however,
influences the policy's possible impact. The strategy's perceived
Georgia bias is not only linked to the EU's vocal commitment to
Georgia's territorial integrity, but also to its prior record of
assistance. People in Abkhazia criticize the EU as well as other
international organizations for having channeled their help
predominantly to Gal/i region, facilitating IDP return, therefore
favoring ethnic Georgians. The internationals justify their engagement
by pointing to stipulations of the 1994 framework agreement and by
arguing that this area in particular has been most severely affected
by the persistent conflict and that it is the ethnic Georgian IDPs who
are most vulnerable. Ethnic Abkhaz interlocutors, however, stress that
they have likewise experienced tremendous hardships due to the war and
the economic blockade, having waited in vain for help.
While in Abkhazia there have been, and still are, groups of people who
adhere to a `multi-vector-foreign policy' and, in this context,
welcome cooperation with the EU, the EU's offers are not able to
seriously challenge Russian influence in Abkhazia. Not only is Russia
militarily present in the region and seen as the protector of Abkhaz
independence, it also possesses tremendous economic leverage - to name
only the two most striking aspects of Abkhaz-Russian relations. Even
though the Russian-Abkhaz honeymoon has likely ended, or at least has
been beclouded by a couple of contested issues such as the question of
real estate purchases by non-Abkhaz, the territorial dispute as
regards the village Aibga or the dispute concerning the Abkhaz church,
Russia's influence and elevated position will remain for the
foreseeable future. Therefore, the more the Non-Recognition and
Engagement policy's central objective to promote an alternative
perspective is interpreted by the Abkhaz side as aimed at
substituting, rather than complementing, Russia's presence, the less
likely are its chances for substantial realization.
No recognition, no Engagement: the EU and Nagorno-Karabakh
Turning to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, we face a different picture.
Compared to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the EU's efforts as regards
conflict resolution in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are
even smaller and more inconsistent. [2] This is not least due to local
circumstances and the configuration of forces, which are quite
different from the Georgian-Abkhaz case. While it is the ABL that
separates Abkhazia and Georgia proper, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan
are separated by the `line of contact'. This is the official name for
what actually are World War I-like fortified trenches, mine fields and
thousands of soldiers from the Azerbaijani, Nagorno- Karabakh and
Armenian armies standing guard against each other and exchanging
sniper fire on an almost daily basis. In contrast with the
Georgian-Abkhaz case, the `line of contact' is completely sealed and
the implementation of cross-community projects is possible only
indirectly, traffic to and from the de facto state of Nagorno-
Karabakh occurs - much to Azerbaijan's resentment - via the Lachin
corridor that connects Nagorno-Karabakh with the Republic of Armenia.
At the conflict's current stage, therefore, struggling with practical
questions, as in the case of Abkhazia, is wishful thinking.
Nonetheless, the question of how to approach Armenia as
Nagorno-Karabakh's protector and kin state remains to be tackled. Even
more than is the case with Russia and Georgia after the events of
2008, Armenia adds an international dimension to the secessionist
conflict. While Nagorno-Karabakh features largely separate political
and administrative structures, it is tightly connected to Armenia via,
for example, a common financial, educational and defense space.
Despite Georgia's increased efforts at monitoring international
assistance to Abkhazia, Tbilisi has started to question the
fruitfulness of its isolation strategy. Parallel to the EU's
introduction of the Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy, Georgia
presented its own pol icy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia - the Law
on Occupied Territories as well as the corresponding strategy, action
plan and modalities, adopted between the fall of 2009 and fall of
2010. Despite its being largely dismissed by the Abkhaz side and
despite its contested origin - it is debated whether it was a genuine
Georgian initiative. Developed in close cooperation with Georgia's
Western partners, this policy presents an attempt to open up
communication and cooperation channels, something that is missing in
the case of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Even more than is the
case with Georgia, Azerbaijan fears that any EU engagement with
Nagorno-Karabakh potentially helps the de facto state's ability to
build institutional capacity which then might be exploited to further
back Nagorno-Karabakh's claim for independence. Azerbaijan therefore
regards any international engagement with Nagorno-Karabakh as a
further challenge to its territorial integrity. Such concern is
moreover related to an Azerbaijani perception of the EU as less
clearly supporting Azerbaijan's territorial integrity - contrary to the
case with Georgia.
However, the EU's priorities, too, differ in the case of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan - an EU target for closer economic
ties in the context of energy diversification plans - will hardly face
serious EU pressure to change its position as regards international
engagement with Nagorno-Karabakh. Arguably, the 2008 events were not
conducive to bestow more attention upon the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:
Not only is the Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy only oriented
towards Abkhazia and (potentially) South Ossetia, what is more, the
September 2011 merger of the two EUSR mandates related to the South
Caucasus, the EUSR for the South Caucasus (until February 2011 held by
Peter Semneby) and the EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia (until August
2011 held by Pierre Morel), into one - the EUSR for the South Caucasus
and the Crisis in Georgia - equally favors engagement with Georgia's
breakaway regions. The position is held by French diplomat Philippe
Lefort. Commentators have focused on the new EUSR's French
nationality: While some consider this a further upgrade of France's
standing in the region and in particular concerning the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (to recall: France holds one of the three
Minsk Group co-chairs), others thought a transformation of the French
co-chair into an EU-one more likely. While rumors concerning the
latter have already been dismissed, it also remains to be seen whether
the officeholder's personal qualities and traits or the position's
mandate will have a greater influence upon the orientation of the
EUSR's work.
Finally, enhanced EU engagement might be impaired by the EU's
reputation in the de facto state of Nagorno- Karabakh itself - similar
to the case of Abkhazia. The EU's standing among Nagorno-Karabakh's
population is not very high. According to an opinion poll from 2010,
the EU scores lowest - by far compared to Russia, but also compared to
France and the OSCE - as regards people's trust towards it, its role in
the settlement process as well as its perceived interest in peace. It
is in fact the latter question where the EU scores worst. Such
distrust is not least linked to the role of the EUSR: People in
Karabakh blamed Peter Semneby for not having visited Nagorno-Karabakh
once.
Any Good? Prospects for extending the EU's policy of non-recognition
and engagement
Despite the many political challenges to engage directly with the de
facto states which have impeded the implementation of the EU's policy
in Abkhazia, it should nonetheless not be abandoned. Furthermore:
While the political circumstances are equally complex and hostilities
arguably even more protracted in the case of Nagorno- Karabakh, an
extension of the EU's Non-Recognition and Engagement policy to
Nagorno-Karabakh still has the potential to positively affect the
present status quo, albeit indirectly. As regards the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict's mediation process, not only has the top-level- top-secret
character of the Minsk Group-led negotiations been criticized,
Nagorno-Karabakh is neither present in these negotiations, nor is
first track mediation substantially undergirded by efforts aimed at
conflict transformation. Given Nagorno-Karabakh's isolation, even more
severe than in the case of Abkhazia, and the lack of a prior history
of international peacekeeping or monitors on the ground, EU efforts
that in analogy to the Abkhazian case are targeted at diversifying
Nagorno- Karabakh's information field or establishing cooperation in
the area of education might at the least be beneficial to laying the
ground-work for future reconciliation.
The EU often stresses its potential as a neutral, though not
indifferent, mediator and facilitator in the South Caucasus, including
in the realm of conflict transformation. Even though perceptions of
the EU differ across the region, local actors largely regard the EU as
being less partisan than Russia or the US. Yet, the EU has not
capitalized on its standing, or effectively tried to do so for that
matter. Often, its policy in regard to the conflicts has been more
declarative than substantial, more reactive than proactive. The EU's
policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia with its Non-Recognition and
Engagement strategy is a case in point. As concerns the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it might be good advice not to wait for an
escalation to step up engagement.
[1] The term de facto state is used to jointly address the three South
Caucasus self-proclaimed statelets that feature empirical statehood
but are not or only partially recognized internationally. Since in all
three conflicts terminology is debated, where necessary I use both
variants of spelling (e.g. Sukhum/i - for Georgian Sukhumi and Abkhaz
Sukhum).
[2] Only very sporadically has the EU become active as a donor to
projects in Nagorno-Karabakh, such as in the framework of the EU
financed European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the
Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), which is an umbrella for five
organizations that since 2010 has supported peace-building related
activities - also in Nagorno-Karabakh itself.
Franziska Smolnik is working as a research assistant to the Russia/CIS
division of the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs in Berlin and pursuing a PhD on internal developments in the
South Caucasus de facto states.
Editor's note:
This article was originally published in Caucasus Analytical Digest No
35-36 (15 February 2012).
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=160454&contextid774=160454&contextid775 =160429&tabid=1454180080
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress