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NEW THINKING FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
The Hill, DC
March 14 2013
By Stephen Blank, professor, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa. - 03/14/13 01:00 PM ET
New administrations often offer openings for new policies. One area
where the US needs new initiatives is the South Caucasus because new
opportunities and new challenges are emerging here and they each
contain serious implications for critical U.S. interests. As the
2008 Russo-Georgian war showed, events in the South Caucasus have
repercussions that go far beyond the region to encompass European
security and that is still true today. Washington needs to grasp that
this area's intrinsic importance and local trends seriously affect
major relationships in Europe and with Russia. The administration
must not confine itself to seeing this region as merely an overflight
or transit route for withdrawal of U.S. forces and equipment from
Afghanistan but as an intrinsically critical region of considerable
strategic significance whose security is also bound up with vital U.S.
interests.
Two opportunities present themselves here. First is the start
of construction of the Trans-Anatolian or TANAP gas pipeline from
Azerbaijan through Turkey to the Turco-Bulgarian border. This pipeline
will bring gas from Azerbaijan into Central Europe once a corresponding
route is chosen from Bulgaria's border with Turkey.
TANAP and the pipeline that is ultimately chosen to connect to the
Balkans will also give Balkan governments an alternative to Russia's
South Stream pipeline that is essentially a political project to
subordinate the Balkans and Ukraine to Russian influence under highly
dubious economic terms. Moreover, to the extent that Azerbaijan
can move ahead with liquefied natural gas (LNG) and other Caspian
producers like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can produce LNG or even
shale gas and bring it to Azerbaijan by ship, thereby bypassing the
issue of demarcating the Caspian Sea, these Caspian producers will
have devised a way to overcome Irano-Russian efforts to block them
from building pipelines to Azerbaijan and then Europe. A U.S.
initiative to ensure diversity of supply from the Caspian to
the Balkans also enhances opportunities for democratizing Balkan
governments and enhancing the security of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan.
The second opportunity in the Caucasus is the beginning of a process
of Russo-Georgian dialogues even if it is a very small first step. The
U.S. should encourage Georgia not only to negotiate with Russia but
also to undertake genuine democratization without being caught up in
a game of political revenge between President Saakashvili and Premier
Ivanishvili. Instead we should encourage a process to expand democracy
in Georgia and deal seriously with the ethnic issues that precipitated
the 2008 war. We should ultimately aim at a democratic Georgia, a
negotiated resolution of the issues pertaining to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory.
Should Abkhazia and South Ossetia gain their independence through
this negotiated settlement with Georgia, one precondition must be the
evacuation of all foreign troops. Then on that basis objections to
Georgia's entering onto a NATO membership track, especially if its
democratization parallels this process, will seriously diminish.
Georgia will then have new opportunities to improve its security and
Russian concerns will have been answered by the resolution of those
outstanding ethnic issues. Of course, if Moscow refuses to withdraw its
forces from sovereign Georgian territory, U.S. diplomacy should see
to it that Russia then pays a price commensurate with this violation
of international accords.
At the same time there are also major challenges. The most urgent one
is devising and implementing a mechanism for negotiating an end to
the Azeri-Armenian war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Absent such a solution,
Moscow entrenches itself further in Armenia thereby threatening both
Azerbaijan and Georgia. Meanwhile Armenian politics are hostage to
Yerevan's claims on what is still generally recognized formally as
Azerbaijan's territory and Azerbaijan spends enormous amounts of its
energy revenues on its armed forces to prepare for a second round. At
the same time the lack of a resolution causes Baku to worry about the
Azeri refugees' susceptibility to extremist Islamic ideologies and
Iranian subversion. The more positions on both sides harden the less
disposition there is to seek a negotiated settlement, more partisan
forces come to dominate the two sides, and the number of incidents
that could trigger a new regional war grow. Turkey could be easily
drawn into this conflict, but the only winner would be Russia, an
outcome wholly detrimental to U.S. Turkish, and European interests,
not to mention Azerbaijan's and Armenia's true vital interests.
Moscow's seeming negotiations here aim only at assuring for itself
military bases in perpetuity, not peace. But the U.S. could broker
such an agreement with the added provision of persuading Turkey as
part of a negotiated settlement to normalize its ties with Armenia,
stop blockading this border with Armenia, and provide Yerevan
with economic opportunities to Europe that it now lacks. Armenia,
who now loses up to to 15 percent of its GDP from this blockaded,
would, over time, gain economic and security options beyond Russia
and could become integrated into regional economic processes. This
trend might also reduce Iran's ability to threaten Azerbaijan and
Iranian influence in Armenia. It also could even open European eyes
to the wisdom of reconsidering Turkey's application to the EU. But if
the opportunity to launch this virtuous circle is lost the continuing
high degree of tensions or even a vicious circle will replace it and
nobody will benefit from that outcome.
These challenges and opportunities underscore the linkages among the
South Caucasus, vital issues of European energy security, and the
security not only of the South Caucasian states but also Turkey and
Russia's future regional roles. Failure to grasp the opportunities
now being presented to us can only increase the possibility that the
challenges to security here will go unmet. And, as in 2008, we all
know what happens when conflicts are left to fester.
Blank is a professor at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army,
Defense Department, or the U.S. government.
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/288159-new-thinking-for-the-south-caucasus
The Hill, DC
March 14 2013
By Stephen Blank, professor, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa. - 03/14/13 01:00 PM ET
New administrations often offer openings for new policies. One area
where the US needs new initiatives is the South Caucasus because new
opportunities and new challenges are emerging here and they each
contain serious implications for critical U.S. interests. As the
2008 Russo-Georgian war showed, events in the South Caucasus have
repercussions that go far beyond the region to encompass European
security and that is still true today. Washington needs to grasp that
this area's intrinsic importance and local trends seriously affect
major relationships in Europe and with Russia. The administration
must not confine itself to seeing this region as merely an overflight
or transit route for withdrawal of U.S. forces and equipment from
Afghanistan but as an intrinsically critical region of considerable
strategic significance whose security is also bound up with vital U.S.
interests.
Two opportunities present themselves here. First is the start
of construction of the Trans-Anatolian or TANAP gas pipeline from
Azerbaijan through Turkey to the Turco-Bulgarian border. This pipeline
will bring gas from Azerbaijan into Central Europe once a corresponding
route is chosen from Bulgaria's border with Turkey.
TANAP and the pipeline that is ultimately chosen to connect to the
Balkans will also give Balkan governments an alternative to Russia's
South Stream pipeline that is essentially a political project to
subordinate the Balkans and Ukraine to Russian influence under highly
dubious economic terms. Moreover, to the extent that Azerbaijan
can move ahead with liquefied natural gas (LNG) and other Caspian
producers like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can produce LNG or even
shale gas and bring it to Azerbaijan by ship, thereby bypassing the
issue of demarcating the Caspian Sea, these Caspian producers will
have devised a way to overcome Irano-Russian efforts to block them
from building pipelines to Azerbaijan and then Europe. A U.S.
initiative to ensure diversity of supply from the Caspian to
the Balkans also enhances opportunities for democratizing Balkan
governments and enhancing the security of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan.
The second opportunity in the Caucasus is the beginning of a process
of Russo-Georgian dialogues even if it is a very small first step. The
U.S. should encourage Georgia not only to negotiate with Russia but
also to undertake genuine democratization without being caught up in
a game of political revenge between President Saakashvili and Premier
Ivanishvili. Instead we should encourage a process to expand democracy
in Georgia and deal seriously with the ethnic issues that precipitated
the 2008 war. We should ultimately aim at a democratic Georgia, a
negotiated resolution of the issues pertaining to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory.
Should Abkhazia and South Ossetia gain their independence through
this negotiated settlement with Georgia, one precondition must be the
evacuation of all foreign troops. Then on that basis objections to
Georgia's entering onto a NATO membership track, especially if its
democratization parallels this process, will seriously diminish.
Georgia will then have new opportunities to improve its security and
Russian concerns will have been answered by the resolution of those
outstanding ethnic issues. Of course, if Moscow refuses to withdraw its
forces from sovereign Georgian territory, U.S. diplomacy should see
to it that Russia then pays a price commensurate with this violation
of international accords.
At the same time there are also major challenges. The most urgent one
is devising and implementing a mechanism for negotiating an end to
the Azeri-Armenian war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Absent such a solution,
Moscow entrenches itself further in Armenia thereby threatening both
Azerbaijan and Georgia. Meanwhile Armenian politics are hostage to
Yerevan's claims on what is still generally recognized formally as
Azerbaijan's territory and Azerbaijan spends enormous amounts of its
energy revenues on its armed forces to prepare for a second round. At
the same time the lack of a resolution causes Baku to worry about the
Azeri refugees' susceptibility to extremist Islamic ideologies and
Iranian subversion. The more positions on both sides harden the less
disposition there is to seek a negotiated settlement, more partisan
forces come to dominate the two sides, and the number of incidents
that could trigger a new regional war grow. Turkey could be easily
drawn into this conflict, but the only winner would be Russia, an
outcome wholly detrimental to U.S. Turkish, and European interests,
not to mention Azerbaijan's and Armenia's true vital interests.
Moscow's seeming negotiations here aim only at assuring for itself
military bases in perpetuity, not peace. But the U.S. could broker
such an agreement with the added provision of persuading Turkey as
part of a negotiated settlement to normalize its ties with Armenia,
stop blockading this border with Armenia, and provide Yerevan
with economic opportunities to Europe that it now lacks. Armenia,
who now loses up to to 15 percent of its GDP from this blockaded,
would, over time, gain economic and security options beyond Russia
and could become integrated into regional economic processes. This
trend might also reduce Iran's ability to threaten Azerbaijan and
Iranian influence in Armenia. It also could even open European eyes
to the wisdom of reconsidering Turkey's application to the EU. But if
the opportunity to launch this virtuous circle is lost the continuing
high degree of tensions or even a vicious circle will replace it and
nobody will benefit from that outcome.
These challenges and opportunities underscore the linkages among the
South Caucasus, vital issues of European energy security, and the
security not only of the South Caucasian states but also Turkey and
Russia's future regional roles. Failure to grasp the opportunities
now being presented to us can only increase the possibility that the
challenges to security here will go unmet. And, as in 2008, we all
know what happens when conflicts are left to fester.
Blank is a professor at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army,
Defense Department, or the U.S. government.
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/288159-new-thinking-for-the-south-caucasus