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DIVIDENDS FOR ISRAEL-TURKEY RECONCILIATION
Today's Zaman, Turkey
March 27 2013
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
This year's celebration of Nevruz (or Nowruz), a traditional
holiday for nations across the Middle East, Caucasus and Central
Asia to mark the beginning of spring, has special importance for
Turkey. Translated literally from Persian, Nevruz means "new day,"
and one of the traditions is to lift grudges. In light of the recent
domestic and international developments, this is in political terms
a new beginning -- springtime for Turkey.
"Spring" arrived on the Turkish political scene when the imprisoned
leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan,
sent a letter calling for a cease-fire and for the PKK's withdrawal
from Turkey, marking a long-awaited and historic moment. Perhaps the
efforts of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) toward resolving
the country's longest running and most damaging problem, namely the
Kurdish issue, have borne fruit via this cease-fire, brought about
through democratic politics and not violence.
Of course, both the AKP government and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan were criticized by opposition parties and others, particularly
nationalist groups and victims of the PKK's acts of terrorism. What
Erdogan needed most at that moment was international support, to
proclaim the AKP government's domestic victory as progress. In fact,
this came a day later when Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
apologized to Turkey for the 2010 flotilla raid, and announced a
full resumption of diplomatic ties as well as compensation for the
families of those killed.
We don't know whether these two steps were strategically coordinated
beforehand by the US or whether the timing of Netanyahu's apology was
just a last-minute gift from the Obama administration to the Turkish
government. If the apology had come a few days before or later, it
would not have had the impact it has had in terms of strengthening
Turkey's position both domestically and internationally. Discussions
between Turkish and Israeli officials were previously thwarted by
disagreements over the wording of the Israeli apology and their
commitment to establish a victims' compensation fund.
What is striking is that the Turkish media, throughout all its
discussions of the Israeli apology, is failing to address the wider
implications of this moment; no one is looking to larger questions
about what this could mean for reconciliation between Turkey and
Israel.
First, it is key that Israel's apology came at the time when the
Turkish government needed international support for its domestic
position, to quell the opposition's criticism for the government's
rapprochement approach to the resolution of the Kurdish issue. As well
as US support for the Turkish government's handling of the PKK issue,
it is also important to note that Israel is building a positive image
of itself in the eyes of the Turkish population. As a result of poor
Turkey-Israel relations, in the wake of past PKK terrorist attacks,
Turkish intelligence officials have accused Israel of aiding the
Kurdish rebel group. The recent apology is an indication from Israel
that there will be no support for the PKK. Israel wants its apology to
carry as much political and diplomatic weight as possible. If it had
been given in the immediate and obvious context of needing Turkey's
support against the possible use of chemical weapons by the Assad
regime in Syria, Ankara might have been less receptive.
Second, some analysts argue that the step toward reconciliation is
due to Israel's discovery of major natural gas basins in the eastern
Mediterranean. Turkey could be a major beneficiary of this gas boom --
and potentially could connect to this network via Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, the gas discovery has not made reconciliation with Israel
an urgent issue for Turkey; Israeli gas reserves are insufficient
to end Turkey's domestic gas dependence on Russia or Iran. In fact,
Russian energy giant Gazprom signed an exclusive 20-year deal with
Levant LNG Marketing Corporation to purchase liquefied natural gas
(LNG) from Israel's Tamar offshore gas field a month ago, and it
seems that Russia is planning to expand its position here. It may
be that Turkey is not particularly interested in this competition,
though in the long term a connection via Azerbaijan cannot be excluded.
Third, reconciliation with Israel could be helpful for Turkey
on the Cyprus issue in various ways. Cyprus has been counting on
Israel taking the risk to extract the gas reserves discovered in the
Aphrodite gas field in Cypriot waters, and Israel has used this to
threaten the interests of Turkish Cypriots. But now even if Israel
does not rescind this threat, due to the bankruptcy in Cyprus, Russia
also has no interest in investing in Cyprus. These circumstances
create an opportunity for Turkey. Ankara could offer gas drilling,
helping Cyprus on the condition that both Turkish and Greek Cyprus
must find a political solution to divisions on the island. However,
given the divergent interests of Russia and Germany (the proponents
of the harsh bailout terms), the gas reserves alone will not save
the Cypriot economy unless it finds a way to normalize the island
and relations with Turkey.
Fourth, for Ankara, the strong Jewish lobby in the US has caused
problems, both by using its veto power in the US Congress relating
to US military contracts and provision of military assistance, and
also through a lack of support for Turkey in recent years. Meanwhile,
another powerful group in Congress, Armenian-Americans, has continued
to lobby for the congressional recognition of the 1915 tragedy as
an act of genocide. But in light of the reconciliation with Israel,
Ankara will likely feel more secure in terms of these potentially
threatening lobbies; in particular, the Jewish lobby may well abandon
its anti-Turkish pursuits.
Finally, it might be that reconciliation with Israel opens doors
for Turkey, enabling it to strengthen its foreign policy profile
in Middle Eastern affairs, where Ankara will be a key player in
the Syrian and Iranian issue. But, most importantly, Turkey will
become more powerful, and only the achievement of domestic peace can
truly bolster Turkey's international stance. This process faltered
two decades ago with the sudden death of Turkey's eighth president,
visionary leader Turgut Ozal, in 1993, marking the end of his efforts
to resolve the Kurdish issue.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=310892
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Today's Zaman, Turkey
March 27 2013
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
This year's celebration of Nevruz (or Nowruz), a traditional
holiday for nations across the Middle East, Caucasus and Central
Asia to mark the beginning of spring, has special importance for
Turkey. Translated literally from Persian, Nevruz means "new day,"
and one of the traditions is to lift grudges. In light of the recent
domestic and international developments, this is in political terms
a new beginning -- springtime for Turkey.
"Spring" arrived on the Turkish political scene when the imprisoned
leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan,
sent a letter calling for a cease-fire and for the PKK's withdrawal
from Turkey, marking a long-awaited and historic moment. Perhaps the
efforts of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) toward resolving
the country's longest running and most damaging problem, namely the
Kurdish issue, have borne fruit via this cease-fire, brought about
through democratic politics and not violence.
Of course, both the AKP government and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan were criticized by opposition parties and others, particularly
nationalist groups and victims of the PKK's acts of terrorism. What
Erdogan needed most at that moment was international support, to
proclaim the AKP government's domestic victory as progress. In fact,
this came a day later when Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
apologized to Turkey for the 2010 flotilla raid, and announced a
full resumption of diplomatic ties as well as compensation for the
families of those killed.
We don't know whether these two steps were strategically coordinated
beforehand by the US or whether the timing of Netanyahu's apology was
just a last-minute gift from the Obama administration to the Turkish
government. If the apology had come a few days before or later, it
would not have had the impact it has had in terms of strengthening
Turkey's position both domestically and internationally. Discussions
between Turkish and Israeli officials were previously thwarted by
disagreements over the wording of the Israeli apology and their
commitment to establish a victims' compensation fund.
What is striking is that the Turkish media, throughout all its
discussions of the Israeli apology, is failing to address the wider
implications of this moment; no one is looking to larger questions
about what this could mean for reconciliation between Turkey and
Israel.
First, it is key that Israel's apology came at the time when the
Turkish government needed international support for its domestic
position, to quell the opposition's criticism for the government's
rapprochement approach to the resolution of the Kurdish issue. As well
as US support for the Turkish government's handling of the PKK issue,
it is also important to note that Israel is building a positive image
of itself in the eyes of the Turkish population. As a result of poor
Turkey-Israel relations, in the wake of past PKK terrorist attacks,
Turkish intelligence officials have accused Israel of aiding the
Kurdish rebel group. The recent apology is an indication from Israel
that there will be no support for the PKK. Israel wants its apology to
carry as much political and diplomatic weight as possible. If it had
been given in the immediate and obvious context of needing Turkey's
support against the possible use of chemical weapons by the Assad
regime in Syria, Ankara might have been less receptive.
Second, some analysts argue that the step toward reconciliation is
due to Israel's discovery of major natural gas basins in the eastern
Mediterranean. Turkey could be a major beneficiary of this gas boom --
and potentially could connect to this network via Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, the gas discovery has not made reconciliation with Israel
an urgent issue for Turkey; Israeli gas reserves are insufficient
to end Turkey's domestic gas dependence on Russia or Iran. In fact,
Russian energy giant Gazprom signed an exclusive 20-year deal with
Levant LNG Marketing Corporation to purchase liquefied natural gas
(LNG) from Israel's Tamar offshore gas field a month ago, and it
seems that Russia is planning to expand its position here. It may
be that Turkey is not particularly interested in this competition,
though in the long term a connection via Azerbaijan cannot be excluded.
Third, reconciliation with Israel could be helpful for Turkey
on the Cyprus issue in various ways. Cyprus has been counting on
Israel taking the risk to extract the gas reserves discovered in the
Aphrodite gas field in Cypriot waters, and Israel has used this to
threaten the interests of Turkish Cypriots. But now even if Israel
does not rescind this threat, due to the bankruptcy in Cyprus, Russia
also has no interest in investing in Cyprus. These circumstances
create an opportunity for Turkey. Ankara could offer gas drilling,
helping Cyprus on the condition that both Turkish and Greek Cyprus
must find a political solution to divisions on the island. However,
given the divergent interests of Russia and Germany (the proponents
of the harsh bailout terms), the gas reserves alone will not save
the Cypriot economy unless it finds a way to normalize the island
and relations with Turkey.
Fourth, for Ankara, the strong Jewish lobby in the US has caused
problems, both by using its veto power in the US Congress relating
to US military contracts and provision of military assistance, and
also through a lack of support for Turkey in recent years. Meanwhile,
another powerful group in Congress, Armenian-Americans, has continued
to lobby for the congressional recognition of the 1915 tragedy as
an act of genocide. But in light of the reconciliation with Israel,
Ankara will likely feel more secure in terms of these potentially
threatening lobbies; in particular, the Jewish lobby may well abandon
its anti-Turkish pursuits.
Finally, it might be that reconciliation with Israel opens doors
for Turkey, enabling it to strengthen its foreign policy profile
in Middle Eastern affairs, where Ankara will be a key player in
the Syrian and Iranian issue. But, most importantly, Turkey will
become more powerful, and only the achievement of domestic peace can
truly bolster Turkey's international stance. This process faltered
two decades ago with the sudden death of Turkey's eighth president,
visionary leader Turgut Ozal, in 1993, marking the end of his efforts
to resolve the Kurdish issue.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=310892
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress