Tweet
MAY 5 AND BEYOND: CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE
By Houry Mayissian
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/05/02/may-5-and-beyond-continuing-the-struggle/
May 2, 2013
Yerevan residents go to the polls again on May 5 for municipal
elections that are being widely viewed as a continuation of the
February presidential elections and an important battlefront in
the ongoing quest to weaken the ruling Republican Party's monopoly
on power.
However, the state of affairs ahead of these municipal elections
stands in sharp contrast to the pre-presidential election situation,
even if both paint a bleak picture of Armenian politics. From what
was considered a non-competitive presidential election, we have
"progressed" to potentially very competitive municipal elections
where opposition forces once again failed to join forces.
In total, 7 parties are vying for seats in the 65-member Council of the
Elderly that oversees the activities of the city's mayor. If any one
of the competing parties receives more than 50 percent of the votes,
the candidate heading that party's list will be elected as the city's
mayor. Otherwise, the mayor will be elected by the Council of the
Elderly. Naturally, the party that secures the most seats within the
council gains the political clout necessary to have its top candidate
elected as mayor.
Alongside the ruling party and its coalition partner, the Rule of Law
Party, competing in the elections are the "Barev Yerevan" coalition of
political, civic, and cultural leaders endorsed by Raffi Hohvannisian's
Heritage Party; Levon Ter-Petrossian's newly emerged Armenian
National Congress Party; Prosperous Armenia, with former Foreign
Affairs Minister Vartan Oskanian heading the list of candidates;
the Armenian Revolutionary Federation; and the Arakelutyun Party.
In this divided opposition "front" the possibilities for vote-sharing
are difficult to predict. On the one hand, the following that
Hovhannisian generated after the presidential elections offers him
an advantage over the other parties. On the other hand, two factors
may work less in favor of the Barev Yerevan coalition: the inability
of the movement to thus far deliver concrete actions and proposals in
its struggle for regime change, and the re-entry into the competition
of other opposition parties whose supporters may have voted for
Hovhannisian in the previous elections.
In any case, given the power, experience, and readiness of the ruling
party to manipulate the elections, predicting their outcome is a
futile exercise. Looking back at the February presidential elections,
we have every reason to hope that Yerevan's residents will come out
in large numbers to vote with their conscience; and yet we have every
reason to expect that vote results will be rigged.
The implications for the opposition parties are two-fold. The city
council elections are indeed an important battlefront given both the
highly influential position that is up for grabs and the opportunity
to break the power monopoly existing in the country today. At the
same time, however, these elections should not be treated as the
be-all or end-all of the struggle for regime change.
Regardless of the results of the elections, moving forward the
opposition has the opportunity to capitalize on several other factors
or avenues of struggle. One such factor is the emerging generation
of political activists in Armenia. We saw them in the days after
the February presidential elections. They made their voices heard
to foreign election observers; they toured the streets of Yerevan
chanting for others to join them; and they protested in front of
foreign embassies. They represent a new phenomenon in post-Soviet
era Armenian politics-citizens that understand their rights and are
willing to fight for them even if that means taking matters into their
own hands. These young activists and civil society representatives
are valuable allies to have for the opposition.
Another important factor in the post-presidential election period
is the increased spotlight in the diaspora on internal political
developments in Armenia, which could mark the beginning of a
qualitatively new phase in Armenia-diaspora relations. Opposition
political parties with an organized presence in the diaspora,
particularly the ARF, could play a significant role in realizing this.
A more vocal and critical diaspora that is willing to maintain
long-term pressure on the authorities will be an important contributor
to internal reform.
The most important factor in the ongoing struggle for a better Armenia,
however, is unity. Whether it is within the Council of the Elderly or
the National Assembly; on the streets of Armenia and among the ranks
of its activists; in preparation of upcoming elections or in ongoing
public opposition to corrupt and unfair government practices; and
even in ensuring a more proactive diasporan engagement, an opposition
united around the principles of democracy will be a much more powerful
and credible force to reckon with for the authorities.
This will require certain political parties to determine which side
of the struggle they sit on, others to re-organize their forces
and re-evaluate their strategies. Whatever the differences keeping
them apart thus far, those opposition forces that are determined
to change the state of affairs in Armenia must come to realize that
their failure to unite will inevitably translate into their failure
to achieve this change.
By Houry Mayissian
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/05/02/may-5-and-beyond-continuing-the-struggle/
May 2, 2013
Yerevan residents go to the polls again on May 5 for municipal
elections that are being widely viewed as a continuation of the
February presidential elections and an important battlefront in
the ongoing quest to weaken the ruling Republican Party's monopoly
on power.
However, the state of affairs ahead of these municipal elections
stands in sharp contrast to the pre-presidential election situation,
even if both paint a bleak picture of Armenian politics. From what
was considered a non-competitive presidential election, we have
"progressed" to potentially very competitive municipal elections
where opposition forces once again failed to join forces.
In total, 7 parties are vying for seats in the 65-member Council of the
Elderly that oversees the activities of the city's mayor. If any one
of the competing parties receives more than 50 percent of the votes,
the candidate heading that party's list will be elected as the city's
mayor. Otherwise, the mayor will be elected by the Council of the
Elderly. Naturally, the party that secures the most seats within the
council gains the political clout necessary to have its top candidate
elected as mayor.
Alongside the ruling party and its coalition partner, the Rule of Law
Party, competing in the elections are the "Barev Yerevan" coalition of
political, civic, and cultural leaders endorsed by Raffi Hohvannisian's
Heritage Party; Levon Ter-Petrossian's newly emerged Armenian
National Congress Party; Prosperous Armenia, with former Foreign
Affairs Minister Vartan Oskanian heading the list of candidates;
the Armenian Revolutionary Federation; and the Arakelutyun Party.
In this divided opposition "front" the possibilities for vote-sharing
are difficult to predict. On the one hand, the following that
Hovhannisian generated after the presidential elections offers him
an advantage over the other parties. On the other hand, two factors
may work less in favor of the Barev Yerevan coalition: the inability
of the movement to thus far deliver concrete actions and proposals in
its struggle for regime change, and the re-entry into the competition
of other opposition parties whose supporters may have voted for
Hovhannisian in the previous elections.
In any case, given the power, experience, and readiness of the ruling
party to manipulate the elections, predicting their outcome is a
futile exercise. Looking back at the February presidential elections,
we have every reason to hope that Yerevan's residents will come out
in large numbers to vote with their conscience; and yet we have every
reason to expect that vote results will be rigged.
The implications for the opposition parties are two-fold. The city
council elections are indeed an important battlefront given both the
highly influential position that is up for grabs and the opportunity
to break the power monopoly existing in the country today. At the
same time, however, these elections should not be treated as the
be-all or end-all of the struggle for regime change.
Regardless of the results of the elections, moving forward the
opposition has the opportunity to capitalize on several other factors
or avenues of struggle. One such factor is the emerging generation
of political activists in Armenia. We saw them in the days after
the February presidential elections. They made their voices heard
to foreign election observers; they toured the streets of Yerevan
chanting for others to join them; and they protested in front of
foreign embassies. They represent a new phenomenon in post-Soviet
era Armenian politics-citizens that understand their rights and are
willing to fight for them even if that means taking matters into their
own hands. These young activists and civil society representatives
are valuable allies to have for the opposition.
Another important factor in the post-presidential election period
is the increased spotlight in the diaspora on internal political
developments in Armenia, which could mark the beginning of a
qualitatively new phase in Armenia-diaspora relations. Opposition
political parties with an organized presence in the diaspora,
particularly the ARF, could play a significant role in realizing this.
A more vocal and critical diaspora that is willing to maintain
long-term pressure on the authorities will be an important contributor
to internal reform.
The most important factor in the ongoing struggle for a better Armenia,
however, is unity. Whether it is within the Council of the Elderly or
the National Assembly; on the streets of Armenia and among the ranks
of its activists; in preparation of upcoming elections or in ongoing
public opposition to corrupt and unfair government practices; and
even in ensuring a more proactive diasporan engagement, an opposition
united around the principles of democracy will be a much more powerful
and credible force to reckon with for the authorities.
This will require certain political parties to determine which side
of the struggle they sit on, others to re-organize their forces
and re-evaluate their strategies. Whatever the differences keeping
them apart thus far, those opposition forces that are determined
to change the state of affairs in Armenia must come to realize that
their failure to unite will inevitably translate into their failure
to achieve this change.