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NAGORNO-KARABAKH: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO THE PROSPECTS OF THE CONFLICT SETTLEMENT
02.05.2013
Sergei Minasyan
Ph.D. in History, Head of the Department of the Political Studies at
the Caucasus Institute As it is known, today the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic is not fully involved in the negotiation process under
the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. The stance of Stepanakert is
presented in the international arena by Armenia which states that
at this stage it abstains from the recognition of the NKR. Armenia
considers the fact of non-recognition on its behalf as a compromise
directed to non-admission of escalation of the conflict and preserving
of the negotiation process.
At the same time it should be underlined that both co-chairmen
and official Yerevan constantly state that Stepanakert will join
the negotiations when it is time for it. In fact, point at issue is
that in case if the guiding principles of the conflict settlement are
accepted and the negotiation process obtains real shapes, realization
of long-term peace will be impossible without involvement in the
process of Nagorno-Karabakh - the main party to the conflict.
Currently, when Armenia and Azerbaijan with the help of the mediators
simply sound out each other's positions, probably, Stepanakert does not
have serious reasons of being involved in this process and undertaking
additional obligations.
Correspondingly, Nagorno-Karabakh is currently in the position of
the external observer of the conflict settlement process in which his
fate is decided and in which he paradoxically (as the main interested
party to the conflict) is not involved. At the same time, not being
a full-fledged negotiating party, official Stepanakert has elaborated
rather multi-level, but at the same time rather harmonious and logical
approaches to the essence and possible goals of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict settlement.
The stance of Nagorno-Karabakh, first of all, is based on its idea of
legitimacy and consistency of its struggle for independence by the
analogy with many cases from world practice such as Kosovo, North
Cyprus, Eritrea, East Timor, South Sudan, etc. At the same time in
Karabakh they insist on not applying the principle of inviolability of
borders, because here we speak about the borders set by the arbitrary
rule of Stalin and which are the relics of the Soviet regime. In the
opinion of the people of Karabakh two other principles of international
law are decisive - the right of the nations to self-determination
and non-use of force in resolution of the international controversies
and conflicts.
The Karabakh elite says that there is no example in the history when
the nation which won the war for independence and which have been
successfully building its statehood for two decades, voluntarily
renounced from its achievements. Correspondingly the negotiations on
the settlement of the conflict must be held with the participation of
official Stepanakert, because the accords reached without its agreement
cannot be carried out anyway. That is the reason why the NKR insists
on recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh's right on participation in the
negotiation process. Stirring up of the problem of the unrecognized
or de-facto states in the world politics for recent two decades have
caused the crisis of international law system and granted unrecognized
countries an opportunity to reason their stance in the legal terrain.
>From the point of view of traditional international law the issue
of unrecognized states has essential aspect which is inseparable from
the historical context. Primarily, the states are the subjects of the
international law but big historical events, which cause creation
of "new" states and ruin of "old" ones, are occurring outside the
legal terrain and are external in regard of them. That is why many
specialists on international law suppose that historical events
give birth to new legal order. The classic of the world political
science Raymond Aron believed that due to the reason that the birth
and collapse of the states was not a metalegal (transitional-legal)
process and recognition of the state on behalf of the others was rather
political than a legal act or it at least did not form the elements
of law, so the "legal existence of a new state depends rather on
objective fulfillment of some conditions prescribed by international
law to the state than on its recognition by other states".
Trying to convince international community that the NKR has all the
main attributes of the state, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh
also pay attention to the formation of the government institutions
in the NKR based on the free democratic elections which differ from
the domestic political reality existing in the neighboring Azerbaijan.
As for the diplomatic efforts and negotiation process, the reality
formed in the result of the negotiations, which have lasted for recent
20 years, is that any option of returning Karabakh to Azerbaijan is not
even discussed. In case of any of the options of peaceful settlement
of the conflict discussed today (whether these are Madrid principles
or other proposals made by the mediators) Azerbaijan theoretically
can count on reclaiming of some territories but it have to agree that
Nagorno-Karabakh, at least within the administrative borders of the
Soviet period and with the ground corridor connecting it with Armenia,
will never be returned under its jurisdiction. This is the content
of the proposals placed on the OSCE Minsk Group table.
The key element of the Madrid Principles is the referendum which
plays a role of the mechanism of international political and legal
legitimization of separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan.
>From the point of view of Nagorno-Karabakh Kosovo precedent and
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia had good effect on
its positions. And this is not only in the aspect of drawing possible
parallels with Karabakh in legal and political plains but also in
the aspect of an increased legitimacy of creation of new states in
the perception of the international community and leading powers.
At the same time most part of the public and political elites
in Armenia and Karabakh consider that the existence of de-facto
independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic strengthens positions of the
Armenian parties, especially taking into consideration the world
tendency of sovereignization of some unrecognized states and the
so-called "Kosovo precedent". In their opinion every day of in
fact independent existence of Nagorno-Karabakh only strengthen the
sovereignty and inevitability of a state building process.
The fact that the officials in Azerbaijan constantly tend to speed up
the Karabakh process and blame Armenia of slowing it down, most vividly
illustrates on whose side the time is in the Karabakh conflict. In
fact, a syndrome of "sand-glass" begins to appear in Azerbaijan when
every additional day of Karabakh loss strengthens the filling of its
permanent loss among the leadership of Azerbaijan. This feeling is
redoubled by almost everyday but ineffective bellicose statements
which only worsen pessimistic mood of the Azerbaijani society in the
issue of reclaiming Karabakh "by any means".
In the context of negotiations the key issue for Nagorno-Karabakh is
the guarantee of security of its population. Against the background
of combat actions of the first half of the 1990s and constant
threat sounded by Baku, before making compromises to Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic wants to have real guarantees of security,
which will be more efficient (or at least equal) to the ones it has
today. Current guarantees of security of Karabakh are fortified and
convenient for defense borders, availability of transport corridor
connecting Karabakh and Armenia as well as buffering zone around the
administrative borders of the Soviet period Karabakh. And the line
of contact between the Karabakh and Azerbaijani armies is restricted
by the Mrav range in the north and Iranian border in the south. Thus
the front line is shortened several times, which allows Karabakh army
to easier resist to bigger Azerbaijani army.
The key element in the stance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in
regard to the negotiation process is based on the fact that withdrawal
of Karabakh army units at least from one region along the perimeter
of Nagorno-Karabakh borders will weaken the defense line and, in
the absence of final peace agreement, will increase a possibility of
resumption of combat actions, thus enhancing temptation of Azerbaijan
to have a military revanche on more favourable terms. Today the
fortified border line is the best guarantee of non-resumption of
combat actions.
Meanwhile, only recognition of independence of Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic (or similar status) by Baku with political and legal mechanism
of achieving it, prescribed in advance (e.g. by means of additional
plebiscite under the supervision of international mediators and
further recognition by international community and Azerbaijan),
is considered equal substitution to the current guarantees.
Moreover, Nagorno-Karabakh has been tending recently to go beyond
international isolation and take part in the regional projects. In
fact, isolation of Karabakh from international community only moves
away the prospect of reconciliation with Azerbaijan, thus forming
among the people of Karabakh the syndrome of "besieged fortress"
and unpreparedness for the compromise, which will be getting even
deeper in the future.
Threats of official Baku to use force against civilian planes in case
of opening of a new airport in Stepanakert, much talked-of incidents
with Ramil Safarov and Aikram Airisli enroot in the Karabakh society
and political elite of the NKR doubts concerning the possibility
of compromises with Azerbaijan at current stage of development of
the conflict.
"Globus" analytical journal, #4, 2013
Return Another materials of author "ARMENIZATION" OF THE DOMESTIC
POLITICAL LIFE IN GEORGIA?[28.03.2013] ON THE ROLE OF THE ENERGY
FACTOR IN THE KARABAKH CONFLICT: NEW RE-FRAMING?[17.12.2012]
IRANIAN CRISIS AND "IMMEDIATE" DETERRENCE IN THE KARABAKH
CONFLICT[16.10.2012] PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: GEORGIA AHEAD OF THE
CONTROVERSIAL EVENT[24.09.2012] THE DYNAMICS AND TENDENCY OF THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE US: CONCEPTUAL
ANALYSIS [01.09.2011] POSSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN
NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: MYTHS AND REALITIES[14.02.2011] ARMENIAN -
GEORGIAN RELATIONS AFTER "FIVE DAYS" WAR[15.10.2009] ARMENIA-TURKEY:
NEW POLITICAL PHASE? [14.05.2009] SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ON
JANUARY 5, 2008 IN GEORGIA: A VIEW FROM JAVAKHQ[07.02.2008]
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=7062
02.05.2013
Sergei Minasyan
Ph.D. in History, Head of the Department of the Political Studies at
the Caucasus Institute As it is known, today the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic is not fully involved in the negotiation process under
the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. The stance of Stepanakert is
presented in the international arena by Armenia which states that
at this stage it abstains from the recognition of the NKR. Armenia
considers the fact of non-recognition on its behalf as a compromise
directed to non-admission of escalation of the conflict and preserving
of the negotiation process.
At the same time it should be underlined that both co-chairmen
and official Yerevan constantly state that Stepanakert will join
the negotiations when it is time for it. In fact, point at issue is
that in case if the guiding principles of the conflict settlement are
accepted and the negotiation process obtains real shapes, realization
of long-term peace will be impossible without involvement in the
process of Nagorno-Karabakh - the main party to the conflict.
Currently, when Armenia and Azerbaijan with the help of the mediators
simply sound out each other's positions, probably, Stepanakert does not
have serious reasons of being involved in this process and undertaking
additional obligations.
Correspondingly, Nagorno-Karabakh is currently in the position of
the external observer of the conflict settlement process in which his
fate is decided and in which he paradoxically (as the main interested
party to the conflict) is not involved. At the same time, not being
a full-fledged negotiating party, official Stepanakert has elaborated
rather multi-level, but at the same time rather harmonious and logical
approaches to the essence and possible goals of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict settlement.
The stance of Nagorno-Karabakh, first of all, is based on its idea of
legitimacy and consistency of its struggle for independence by the
analogy with many cases from world practice such as Kosovo, North
Cyprus, Eritrea, East Timor, South Sudan, etc. At the same time in
Karabakh they insist on not applying the principle of inviolability of
borders, because here we speak about the borders set by the arbitrary
rule of Stalin and which are the relics of the Soviet regime. In the
opinion of the people of Karabakh two other principles of international
law are decisive - the right of the nations to self-determination
and non-use of force in resolution of the international controversies
and conflicts.
The Karabakh elite says that there is no example in the history when
the nation which won the war for independence and which have been
successfully building its statehood for two decades, voluntarily
renounced from its achievements. Correspondingly the negotiations on
the settlement of the conflict must be held with the participation of
official Stepanakert, because the accords reached without its agreement
cannot be carried out anyway. That is the reason why the NKR insists
on recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh's right on participation in the
negotiation process. Stirring up of the problem of the unrecognized
or de-facto states in the world politics for recent two decades have
caused the crisis of international law system and granted unrecognized
countries an opportunity to reason their stance in the legal terrain.
>From the point of view of traditional international law the issue
of unrecognized states has essential aspect which is inseparable from
the historical context. Primarily, the states are the subjects of the
international law but big historical events, which cause creation
of "new" states and ruin of "old" ones, are occurring outside the
legal terrain and are external in regard of them. That is why many
specialists on international law suppose that historical events
give birth to new legal order. The classic of the world political
science Raymond Aron believed that due to the reason that the birth
and collapse of the states was not a metalegal (transitional-legal)
process and recognition of the state on behalf of the others was rather
political than a legal act or it at least did not form the elements
of law, so the "legal existence of a new state depends rather on
objective fulfillment of some conditions prescribed by international
law to the state than on its recognition by other states".
Trying to convince international community that the NKR has all the
main attributes of the state, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh
also pay attention to the formation of the government institutions
in the NKR based on the free democratic elections which differ from
the domestic political reality existing in the neighboring Azerbaijan.
As for the diplomatic efforts and negotiation process, the reality
formed in the result of the negotiations, which have lasted for recent
20 years, is that any option of returning Karabakh to Azerbaijan is not
even discussed. In case of any of the options of peaceful settlement
of the conflict discussed today (whether these are Madrid principles
or other proposals made by the mediators) Azerbaijan theoretically
can count on reclaiming of some territories but it have to agree that
Nagorno-Karabakh, at least within the administrative borders of the
Soviet period and with the ground corridor connecting it with Armenia,
will never be returned under its jurisdiction. This is the content
of the proposals placed on the OSCE Minsk Group table.
The key element of the Madrid Principles is the referendum which
plays a role of the mechanism of international political and legal
legitimization of separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan.
>From the point of view of Nagorno-Karabakh Kosovo precedent and
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia had good effect on
its positions. And this is not only in the aspect of drawing possible
parallels with Karabakh in legal and political plains but also in
the aspect of an increased legitimacy of creation of new states in
the perception of the international community and leading powers.
At the same time most part of the public and political elites
in Armenia and Karabakh consider that the existence of de-facto
independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic strengthens positions of the
Armenian parties, especially taking into consideration the world
tendency of sovereignization of some unrecognized states and the
so-called "Kosovo precedent". In their opinion every day of in
fact independent existence of Nagorno-Karabakh only strengthen the
sovereignty and inevitability of a state building process.
The fact that the officials in Azerbaijan constantly tend to speed up
the Karabakh process and blame Armenia of slowing it down, most vividly
illustrates on whose side the time is in the Karabakh conflict. In
fact, a syndrome of "sand-glass" begins to appear in Azerbaijan when
every additional day of Karabakh loss strengthens the filling of its
permanent loss among the leadership of Azerbaijan. This feeling is
redoubled by almost everyday but ineffective bellicose statements
which only worsen pessimistic mood of the Azerbaijani society in the
issue of reclaiming Karabakh "by any means".
In the context of negotiations the key issue for Nagorno-Karabakh is
the guarantee of security of its population. Against the background
of combat actions of the first half of the 1990s and constant
threat sounded by Baku, before making compromises to Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic wants to have real guarantees of security,
which will be more efficient (or at least equal) to the ones it has
today. Current guarantees of security of Karabakh are fortified and
convenient for defense borders, availability of transport corridor
connecting Karabakh and Armenia as well as buffering zone around the
administrative borders of the Soviet period Karabakh. And the line
of contact between the Karabakh and Azerbaijani armies is restricted
by the Mrav range in the north and Iranian border in the south. Thus
the front line is shortened several times, which allows Karabakh army
to easier resist to bigger Azerbaijani army.
The key element in the stance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in
regard to the negotiation process is based on the fact that withdrawal
of Karabakh army units at least from one region along the perimeter
of Nagorno-Karabakh borders will weaken the defense line and, in
the absence of final peace agreement, will increase a possibility of
resumption of combat actions, thus enhancing temptation of Azerbaijan
to have a military revanche on more favourable terms. Today the
fortified border line is the best guarantee of non-resumption of
combat actions.
Meanwhile, only recognition of independence of Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic (or similar status) by Baku with political and legal mechanism
of achieving it, prescribed in advance (e.g. by means of additional
plebiscite under the supervision of international mediators and
further recognition by international community and Azerbaijan),
is considered equal substitution to the current guarantees.
Moreover, Nagorno-Karabakh has been tending recently to go beyond
international isolation and take part in the regional projects. In
fact, isolation of Karabakh from international community only moves
away the prospect of reconciliation with Azerbaijan, thus forming
among the people of Karabakh the syndrome of "besieged fortress"
and unpreparedness for the compromise, which will be getting even
deeper in the future.
Threats of official Baku to use force against civilian planes in case
of opening of a new airport in Stepanakert, much talked-of incidents
with Ramil Safarov and Aikram Airisli enroot in the Karabakh society
and political elite of the NKR doubts concerning the possibility
of compromises with Azerbaijan at current stage of development of
the conflict.
"Globus" analytical journal, #4, 2013
Return Another materials of author "ARMENIZATION" OF THE DOMESTIC
POLITICAL LIFE IN GEORGIA?[28.03.2013] ON THE ROLE OF THE ENERGY
FACTOR IN THE KARABAKH CONFLICT: NEW RE-FRAMING?[17.12.2012]
IRANIAN CRISIS AND "IMMEDIATE" DETERRENCE IN THE KARABAKH
CONFLICT[16.10.2012] PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: GEORGIA AHEAD OF THE
CONTROVERSIAL EVENT[24.09.2012] THE DYNAMICS AND TENDENCY OF THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE US: CONCEPTUAL
ANALYSIS [01.09.2011] POSSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN
NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: MYTHS AND REALITIES[14.02.2011] ARMENIAN -
GEORGIAN RELATIONS AFTER "FIVE DAYS" WAR[15.10.2009] ARMENIA-TURKEY:
NEW POLITICAL PHASE? [14.05.2009] SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ON
JANUARY 5, 2008 IN GEORGIA: A VIEW FROM JAVAKHQ[07.02.2008]
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=7062