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Today's Zaman, Turkey
May 8 2013
15 characteristics of the Armenian narrative
by Tal Buenos*
8 May 2013 /
Following the outpour of media material on April 24 in memory of the
dreadful events of 1915, it is important to take a step back and
evaluate how this reflects on the Turk.
A recently published chapter by UÄ?ur Ã`mit Ã`ngör, titled `The Armenian
Genocide, 1915,' in `The Holocaust and Other Genocides: An
Introduction,' edited by Maria van Haperen et al. (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2012), is perfect for such an analysis. It
does not introduce new aspects to the Armenian narrative of 1915. It
unfolds the same story already told by scholars such as Vahakn
Dadrian, Richard Hovannisian, Taner Akçam and Peter Balakian. It is
not prototypical by any means; rather, it is perfectly typical. It
stands out for its typicality, for being representative of the effort
to strengthen the familiarity and acceptance of this Armenian
narrative. Upon close inspection, one may glean certain overall
characteristics of the Armenian narrative. The following 15 main
characteristics point to a general theme: Turcophobia.
1) European facilitation. The publication of this literature in Europe
is likely not a coincidence and should be considered reflective of
Turcophobic and Islamophobic attitudes that are prevalent in Europe.
Such anti-Turkish content is not only emblematic of these phobias but
may serve as a popular platform for their intensification and
dissemination. One particularly troubling type of Turcophobic
`literature' in Europe is the drafting of laws in parliament to cater
to the anti-Turkish views held by constituencies with political
influence.
2) No room for historical debate. The very title of Ã`ngör's chapter
shows an attempt to apply a political-legal term to the events of
1915, regardless of the hotly contested aspects of historicity.
However, legal determination cannot precede a thorough examination of
what actually took place. The unilateral description of the events as
genocide shows a great level of distrust in what a committee of
established historians of different nationalities may find.
Ultimately, it shows intent to destroy Turkey's name.
Disregard of Armenian revolutionary committees
3) Little to no mention of the Armenian revolutionary committees. The
role played by the Armenian revolutionary committees is typically
played down and, at times, as in Ã`ngör's chapter, there is no mention
of them at all. The absolute omission of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation from the narrative makes the Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP) falsely appear to be the sole actor and therefore the
sole bearer of responsibility. However, the revolutionary aspect of
the events is fundamental to their fair and accurate description.
Historically, `rebellion' is the most basic reason why the
categorization of political massacres, as in modern-day Syria, is
different from those of intended exterminations, as in Auschwitz.
4) Selective reference to Armenian nationalism. There is a tendency to
eat the cake and have it too when it comes to Armenian nationalism. In
discussions involving Armenian territorial claims post-World War I,
there is a strong sense of Armenian nationalism, but it is concealed
in the discussion of the years leading to 1915. In his brief recap of
the ideological trends leading to the massacres, Ã`ngör fails to
mention Armenian nationalism, as if the Young Turks were the only
nationalists in Anatolia.
5) The story always begins with Turkish action. The event that is
described at the start of a narrative determines the perception of
causality all throughout. The Armenian massacres may be put in the
context of the 19th century campaign to rid Christian Europe of the
Turk, but for Ã`ngör there is no question that it starts with the CUP.
For many diaspora Armenians, the narrative does not begin a single day
before April 24, 1915. The Armenian narrative needs the Turks to be
the cause, for otherwise the Turks cannot be guilty of genocide.
6) The Turks are `revanchists.' This French term describes nations
that are warmongering because they seek to reclaim lost territories,
and the Armenian narrative pins it only on the CUP after losing land
in the Balkans. A narrative that is not Turcophobic would consider
Christian revanchism since 1453, and Armenian revanchism since 1890,
to be foundational.
7) The Turks wanted war. The distortion of the causes for World War I
is a significant aspect of the Armenian narrative. The Ottoman state's
preventive strike against Russia, following several threatening
indications, is replaced by a claim that the `Young Turks had
deliberately engineered an armed confrontation.'
Systematic destruction
8) The destruction was systematic. The emphasis on deliberation in the
actions of the CUP is especially strong when describing the actual
`process of destruction,' which for Ã`ngör was `consistent.' This is
claimed because of the desire to accuse Turks of premeditation and of
having a plan. Regardless of the evidence, the Armenian narrative
draws whimsical comparisons to the Nazi Germans and their level of
intent and organization. This is designed to make the Young Turks go
down in history as evil.
9) The CUP was homogenously national socialist. As part of the effort
to Nazify the Young Turks, the Armenian narrative creates a cursory
and simplistic image of Turkification that ignores local aspects as
well as Ottomanist and Islamic streams within the CUP.
10) Muslims killed Christians, but not vice versa. The bilateral
damage incurred by Muslim and Christian communities during this period
of rising national claims for self-determination in the Balkans and
Anatolia is presented in the Armenian narrative as unilateral. Only
the massacres of Christians have a place in the narrative. Reading
Ã`ngör's work, one would conclude that the killings, dispossessions and
deportations of Muslims in the Balkans never happened or have nothing
to do with the Armenian issue. This is an extension of the Turcophobic
elements found in the British narration of events in the 19th century,
which highlighted the killings of Christians in Bulgaria during the
local insurgency but understated the deportations and massacres of
Muslims in Bulgaria during the Russo-Turkish War.
11) Propaganda and memoirs are presented as historical evidence and
used selectively. Even Turkish propaganda is cleverly employed to
present a Turcophobic narrative. Considering that Ã`ngör does not
discuss Armenian rebellion at all, his brief discussion of Turkish
`manipulated photographs of alleged Armenian `terrorists'' gives an
impression that the Armenian rebellion was altogether a Turkish
invention that did not exist beyond the bogus images. Additionally,
Russian propaganda is presented without question of authenticity or
context. The central role played by Britain's wartime propaganda,
known as the Blue Book, and its author, James Bryce, who had called
for Armenian rebellion since the 1870s, in constructing the Armenian
narrative is a prime example of this characteristic. A recent example
would be Akçam's use of forged documents to promote Sarkis Torossian's
story.
12) Slanted presentation of great-power involvement. The Armenian
narrative is selectively critical of the politics of the international
powers. Ã`ngör says that the great powers were `driven by
self-interest' when after the war was over `the Americans, French and
British forgot their Armenian business partners,' yet to him they were
anything but self-interested when they encouraged Armenians to rebel
before World War I and supported national self-determination for
Christians in Ottoman territory. This is based on a Turcophobic
conviction that cooperation with the Armenians is morally sound but
cooperation with the Turks is political.
13) The massacres were religious or racial in nature. The Armenian
narrative shows the massacres as either religious, to rally Christian
support, or racial, to provoke Nazi connotations. Being that there
were no deportations of Armenians in certain areas and that there were
no massacres prior to Armenian rebellion, it would be reasonable to
consider that political reasons and security concerns caused the
change. However, the Armenian narrative looks away from these
historical aspects, possibly because the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not recognize political
massacres as genocide.
Turkish diplomats' assassination rationalized
14) The assassinations of Turkish diplomats are rationalized. In order
to protect its perceived moral leverage from suffering as a result of
the violent assassinations of innocent Turks and non-Turks, the
Armenian narrative seeks to rationalize these terrible actions. Ã`ngör
offers no mention or detailed discussion of the Armenian Secret Army
for the Liberation of Armenia, but, instead, conveniently explains the
assassinations by saying that `surviving family members of the victims
felt deeply insulted by these politics of denial, which prompted a
violent response from Armenian nationalists in the 1970s.' The idea
that somehow there is an element of good reason in the assassinations,
or that they were caused by Turkish politics, is Turcophobic.
15) The Turks are denialists. This is the most telling of the
characteristics. The idea is to liken Turks to Holocaust deniers.
There is a growing number of Turks who are willing to succumb to this
pressure because they have been convinced that that is the responsible
thing to do. However, denial is about refusal to believe, and the
Turks who are at odds with the Armenian narrative are actually more
eager than anybody else to tell the narrative of the events as they
truly unfolded and without ignoring any aspect of Armenian loss.
The idea that the Turks should be excluded from commenting on their
own memory, that they are so distrusted so as to always be suspected
of undermining historical truths, is not only reflective of
Turcophobia in the strongest of ways, but its popularity reflects how
little awareness there is today of Turcophobia and its meaning.
Turcophobia is so widely ignored that even Microsoft's spellchecker
does not recognize it as a word.
How long will Turks suffer from accusations of denialism? Is the only
way forward to disregard history and accept how the Turk is described
in biased Western historiography, of which the Armenian narrative is
only an extension? The modern Armenian narrative in the West was
initiated by Bryce, who, since 1877, repeatedly stated in writing that
Armenian nationalist endeavors should be supported because the
Armenians are racially and religiously superior to Turks. To accept
this aspect of Western historiography is to accept the Turcophobic
beliefs that the Turk is inherently immoral and corrupt, excluded or
looked down upon for not being of a European race and for not being of
a European religion. To accept this false narrative because of current
calls of denialism is to accept the Turk's position as the `other' who
has no access to a Christian European tale. Turks have the right to
explain that they are not in denial of Armenian suffering but that
they are most certainly resolved to deny and weed out the Turcophobic
roots of the current Armenian narrative.
History is filled with cruelty. Turcophobia, however, is the main
reason why genocidal claims are still being made against Turks in the
name of Christian Europe, Western historiography and Armenian
nationalism. Where would one find similar genocide-related pressure
over the bloody `Christian' crimes against Africans, Jews, Indians and
Native Americans known as Indians?
It is time for the Turkish narrative on the history of European
Turcophobia to emerge. The current accusation of denial is one chapter
in this narrative, for it shows how the Turks are treated as outsiders
who are told to shut up and accept the terrible things that are said
about them, and are condemned when they vocalize their view of the
past. It is time for Turks to be insiders, authors of their own
narrative and masters of their own history.
*Tal Buenos has a master of theological studies from Harvard Divinity
School (2005).
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-314870-15-characteristics-of-the-armenian-narrativeby-tal-buenos-.html
May 8 2013
15 characteristics of the Armenian narrative
by Tal Buenos*
8 May 2013 /
Following the outpour of media material on April 24 in memory of the
dreadful events of 1915, it is important to take a step back and
evaluate how this reflects on the Turk.
A recently published chapter by UÄ?ur Ã`mit Ã`ngör, titled `The Armenian
Genocide, 1915,' in `The Holocaust and Other Genocides: An
Introduction,' edited by Maria van Haperen et al. (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2012), is perfect for such an analysis. It
does not introduce new aspects to the Armenian narrative of 1915. It
unfolds the same story already told by scholars such as Vahakn
Dadrian, Richard Hovannisian, Taner Akçam and Peter Balakian. It is
not prototypical by any means; rather, it is perfectly typical. It
stands out for its typicality, for being representative of the effort
to strengthen the familiarity and acceptance of this Armenian
narrative. Upon close inspection, one may glean certain overall
characteristics of the Armenian narrative. The following 15 main
characteristics point to a general theme: Turcophobia.
1) European facilitation. The publication of this literature in Europe
is likely not a coincidence and should be considered reflective of
Turcophobic and Islamophobic attitudes that are prevalent in Europe.
Such anti-Turkish content is not only emblematic of these phobias but
may serve as a popular platform for their intensification and
dissemination. One particularly troubling type of Turcophobic
`literature' in Europe is the drafting of laws in parliament to cater
to the anti-Turkish views held by constituencies with political
influence.
2) No room for historical debate. The very title of Ã`ngör's chapter
shows an attempt to apply a political-legal term to the events of
1915, regardless of the hotly contested aspects of historicity.
However, legal determination cannot precede a thorough examination of
what actually took place. The unilateral description of the events as
genocide shows a great level of distrust in what a committee of
established historians of different nationalities may find.
Ultimately, it shows intent to destroy Turkey's name.
Disregard of Armenian revolutionary committees
3) Little to no mention of the Armenian revolutionary committees. The
role played by the Armenian revolutionary committees is typically
played down and, at times, as in Ã`ngör's chapter, there is no mention
of them at all. The absolute omission of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation from the narrative makes the Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP) falsely appear to be the sole actor and therefore the
sole bearer of responsibility. However, the revolutionary aspect of
the events is fundamental to their fair and accurate description.
Historically, `rebellion' is the most basic reason why the
categorization of political massacres, as in modern-day Syria, is
different from those of intended exterminations, as in Auschwitz.
4) Selective reference to Armenian nationalism. There is a tendency to
eat the cake and have it too when it comes to Armenian nationalism. In
discussions involving Armenian territorial claims post-World War I,
there is a strong sense of Armenian nationalism, but it is concealed
in the discussion of the years leading to 1915. In his brief recap of
the ideological trends leading to the massacres, Ã`ngör fails to
mention Armenian nationalism, as if the Young Turks were the only
nationalists in Anatolia.
5) The story always begins with Turkish action. The event that is
described at the start of a narrative determines the perception of
causality all throughout. The Armenian massacres may be put in the
context of the 19th century campaign to rid Christian Europe of the
Turk, but for Ã`ngör there is no question that it starts with the CUP.
For many diaspora Armenians, the narrative does not begin a single day
before April 24, 1915. The Armenian narrative needs the Turks to be
the cause, for otherwise the Turks cannot be guilty of genocide.
6) The Turks are `revanchists.' This French term describes nations
that are warmongering because they seek to reclaim lost territories,
and the Armenian narrative pins it only on the CUP after losing land
in the Balkans. A narrative that is not Turcophobic would consider
Christian revanchism since 1453, and Armenian revanchism since 1890,
to be foundational.
7) The Turks wanted war. The distortion of the causes for World War I
is a significant aspect of the Armenian narrative. The Ottoman state's
preventive strike against Russia, following several threatening
indications, is replaced by a claim that the `Young Turks had
deliberately engineered an armed confrontation.'
Systematic destruction
8) The destruction was systematic. The emphasis on deliberation in the
actions of the CUP is especially strong when describing the actual
`process of destruction,' which for Ã`ngör was `consistent.' This is
claimed because of the desire to accuse Turks of premeditation and of
having a plan. Regardless of the evidence, the Armenian narrative
draws whimsical comparisons to the Nazi Germans and their level of
intent and organization. This is designed to make the Young Turks go
down in history as evil.
9) The CUP was homogenously national socialist. As part of the effort
to Nazify the Young Turks, the Armenian narrative creates a cursory
and simplistic image of Turkification that ignores local aspects as
well as Ottomanist and Islamic streams within the CUP.
10) Muslims killed Christians, but not vice versa. The bilateral
damage incurred by Muslim and Christian communities during this period
of rising national claims for self-determination in the Balkans and
Anatolia is presented in the Armenian narrative as unilateral. Only
the massacres of Christians have a place in the narrative. Reading
Ã`ngör's work, one would conclude that the killings, dispossessions and
deportations of Muslims in the Balkans never happened or have nothing
to do with the Armenian issue. This is an extension of the Turcophobic
elements found in the British narration of events in the 19th century,
which highlighted the killings of Christians in Bulgaria during the
local insurgency but understated the deportations and massacres of
Muslims in Bulgaria during the Russo-Turkish War.
11) Propaganda and memoirs are presented as historical evidence and
used selectively. Even Turkish propaganda is cleverly employed to
present a Turcophobic narrative. Considering that Ã`ngör does not
discuss Armenian rebellion at all, his brief discussion of Turkish
`manipulated photographs of alleged Armenian `terrorists'' gives an
impression that the Armenian rebellion was altogether a Turkish
invention that did not exist beyond the bogus images. Additionally,
Russian propaganda is presented without question of authenticity or
context. The central role played by Britain's wartime propaganda,
known as the Blue Book, and its author, James Bryce, who had called
for Armenian rebellion since the 1870s, in constructing the Armenian
narrative is a prime example of this characteristic. A recent example
would be Akçam's use of forged documents to promote Sarkis Torossian's
story.
12) Slanted presentation of great-power involvement. The Armenian
narrative is selectively critical of the politics of the international
powers. Ã`ngör says that the great powers were `driven by
self-interest' when after the war was over `the Americans, French and
British forgot their Armenian business partners,' yet to him they were
anything but self-interested when they encouraged Armenians to rebel
before World War I and supported national self-determination for
Christians in Ottoman territory. This is based on a Turcophobic
conviction that cooperation with the Armenians is morally sound but
cooperation with the Turks is political.
13) The massacres were religious or racial in nature. The Armenian
narrative shows the massacres as either religious, to rally Christian
support, or racial, to provoke Nazi connotations. Being that there
were no deportations of Armenians in certain areas and that there were
no massacres prior to Armenian rebellion, it would be reasonable to
consider that political reasons and security concerns caused the
change. However, the Armenian narrative looks away from these
historical aspects, possibly because the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not recognize political
massacres as genocide.
Turkish diplomats' assassination rationalized
14) The assassinations of Turkish diplomats are rationalized. In order
to protect its perceived moral leverage from suffering as a result of
the violent assassinations of innocent Turks and non-Turks, the
Armenian narrative seeks to rationalize these terrible actions. Ã`ngör
offers no mention or detailed discussion of the Armenian Secret Army
for the Liberation of Armenia, but, instead, conveniently explains the
assassinations by saying that `surviving family members of the victims
felt deeply insulted by these politics of denial, which prompted a
violent response from Armenian nationalists in the 1970s.' The idea
that somehow there is an element of good reason in the assassinations,
or that they were caused by Turkish politics, is Turcophobic.
15) The Turks are denialists. This is the most telling of the
characteristics. The idea is to liken Turks to Holocaust deniers.
There is a growing number of Turks who are willing to succumb to this
pressure because they have been convinced that that is the responsible
thing to do. However, denial is about refusal to believe, and the
Turks who are at odds with the Armenian narrative are actually more
eager than anybody else to tell the narrative of the events as they
truly unfolded and without ignoring any aspect of Armenian loss.
The idea that the Turks should be excluded from commenting on their
own memory, that they are so distrusted so as to always be suspected
of undermining historical truths, is not only reflective of
Turcophobia in the strongest of ways, but its popularity reflects how
little awareness there is today of Turcophobia and its meaning.
Turcophobia is so widely ignored that even Microsoft's spellchecker
does not recognize it as a word.
How long will Turks suffer from accusations of denialism? Is the only
way forward to disregard history and accept how the Turk is described
in biased Western historiography, of which the Armenian narrative is
only an extension? The modern Armenian narrative in the West was
initiated by Bryce, who, since 1877, repeatedly stated in writing that
Armenian nationalist endeavors should be supported because the
Armenians are racially and religiously superior to Turks. To accept
this aspect of Western historiography is to accept the Turcophobic
beliefs that the Turk is inherently immoral and corrupt, excluded or
looked down upon for not being of a European race and for not being of
a European religion. To accept this false narrative because of current
calls of denialism is to accept the Turk's position as the `other' who
has no access to a Christian European tale. Turks have the right to
explain that they are not in denial of Armenian suffering but that
they are most certainly resolved to deny and weed out the Turcophobic
roots of the current Armenian narrative.
History is filled with cruelty. Turcophobia, however, is the main
reason why genocidal claims are still being made against Turks in the
name of Christian Europe, Western historiography and Armenian
nationalism. Where would one find similar genocide-related pressure
over the bloody `Christian' crimes against Africans, Jews, Indians and
Native Americans known as Indians?
It is time for the Turkish narrative on the history of European
Turcophobia to emerge. The current accusation of denial is one chapter
in this narrative, for it shows how the Turks are treated as outsiders
who are told to shut up and accept the terrible things that are said
about them, and are condemned when they vocalize their view of the
past. It is time for Turks to be insiders, authors of their own
narrative and masters of their own history.
*Tal Buenos has a master of theological studies from Harvard Divinity
School (2005).
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-314870-15-characteristics-of-the-armenian-narrativeby-tal-buenos-.html