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Azerbaijan won't cease hostilities to Karabakh, says ex-mediator
12:55 - 13.05.13
A former co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Vladimir Kazimirov, has
shared his concerns over the continuing conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh. In an article published in the Russian Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, the retired diplomat particularly focuses his attention on the
possible war threats in the light of Azerbaijan's continuing
hostilities and the attempts to involve Turkey in the process.
The article, entitled Threats of New War and Lessons of Past, is
presented below:
The efforts to stop the massive bloodsheds in Nagorno-Karabakh were
crowned with success on May 12, 1993. A ceasefire accord was signed
under the auspices of Russia, without imposing fixed terms upon the
parties. Nineteen years have passed, but no real progress is observed
in the negotiation process. What's even more, the threats of renewed
military operations are not yet overcome, in spite of all the
documents that have been adopted and signed.
The country's ruling elite, which considers itself a loser in the war,
gasps for revenge now, unleashing an arms race and poisoning new
generations with the miasmas of hostility and hatred. The
international community and the mediators - Russia, the United States
and France - openly reject a military solution, persistently proposing
ways of compromise to the parties. The stalemate in the negotiations
continues as the sides keep clinging to overrated, unrealistic
demands.
The unacceptability of the status quo is widely discussed. But that's
the accumulated negative of the conflict, including the stake of a new
war, not just the fact that it is not to the advantage of either of
the parties. War is not better - and even no worse - than the status
quo. It is time for the sides, which have entrusted the OSCE with the
peaceful conflict settlement, to conclude agreements on the
unacceptability of force. That's logical, while Azerbaijan's refusal
to agree to that creates a tense atmosphere harming the peace talks
and the efforts towards seeking a reaching trust.
In the recent years, Baku has been often appealing to the four
resolutions by the UN Security Council, but what it does is to
actually snatch out what is advantageous to itself, i.e. the
withdrawal of the Armenian-Karabakh troops. President of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev recently made strange statements. Stressing the
importance of a quick implementation of such documents, he was angered
by the fact that the resolutions on Karabakh still remain on paper. In
an effort to crash the Armenians, Baku wouldn't, in any way, comply
with their primary, key requirement, i.e. to stop the military
operations.
Such was the case with the very first resolution, 822, adopted twenty
years ago upon the initiative of Azerbaijan (which allegedly approved
the deal). But when Russia, US, Turkey and the chairing country of
OSCE Minsk conference, Italy, urged the three parties to the conflict
to fully and immediately enact the resolution, Stepanakert and Yerevan
gave consent, whereas Baku did not even respond not to halt the
military operations. The uncertainty dragged on a whole year
notwithstanding the victims, the loss of territories and the three
resolutions proposed by the Security Council.
The Azerbaijani side declined the peacekeepers' proposal, inventing
preconditions, and agreeing to suspend the military operations in very
rare cases. Four times it violated the ceasefire and the other
agreements. In the winter of 1993-1994 (with all the four resolutions
on table), Baku launched large-scale military operations which led to
the colossal losses. Occupation is the result of long-lasting military
operations. And who continued them? Concluding a truce for the
implementation of the Security Council resolutions did not succeed
either. Is that an `undelayed measure' after a year?
In the meantime, it is the military operations, not the warfare that
has been suspended. But there are lots of incidents; Baku agreed to
the forces' stationing and later breached the agreement. As for its
hostile operations (blockade, etc.), it never ceased them, and is now
involving Turkey in the process. It is a long time they have been
violating the ceasefire strengthening accord, regardless of the fact
that the document was signed under President Heydar Aliyev's direct
instruction. Ilham Aliyev likes to repeat that Azerbaijan is a
reliable partner. But how that could be linked to the steep zigzag
curves and the recall of the undertaken and officially signed
commitments? Perhaps he speaks of what will happen ...
The frustration and the devaluation of its solution caused the UN
Security Council to cease adopting resolutions on Karabakh. Russia, as
a mediator, had to conclude reconciliation on a different ground - the
Declaration on the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] State
Leaders (dated April 15, 1994). That document, which is very little
known even to political analysts and journalists, got the Security
Council resolutions under way. The Bishkek Protocol and the Ceasefire
Agreement were later signed in support of it.
It is important to note that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was
personally involved in the editing of the declaration. It put a
tougher emphasis on the ceasefire, as a key priority, and imperative
of [conflict] settlement. The elimination of the conflict consequences
was in direct dependence upon it. That also bears a direct
relationship to the withdrawal of forces from the occupied lands. And
is it possible to think that the ceasefire requirement was reliably
fixed? It's not quite like that. Baku undermines that, often to its
own detriment. The cult of the force, axe policies (whose symbol is
Safarov, though the problem is a more complicated and extensive one)
so to say, won't leave Baku at peace. The official hatred, threats and
arrogance do not exhaust the list of the negative phenomena in the
policies of Baku, which is in clear contrast to the material resources
of the city's elite and external glamour. Can the society realize -
even in the run-up of key elections - the costs and risks of such
obnoxious policies?
Armenian News - Tert.am
12:55 - 13.05.13
A former co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Vladimir Kazimirov, has
shared his concerns over the continuing conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh. In an article published in the Russian Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, the retired diplomat particularly focuses his attention on the
possible war threats in the light of Azerbaijan's continuing
hostilities and the attempts to involve Turkey in the process.
The article, entitled Threats of New War and Lessons of Past, is
presented below:
The efforts to stop the massive bloodsheds in Nagorno-Karabakh were
crowned with success on May 12, 1993. A ceasefire accord was signed
under the auspices of Russia, without imposing fixed terms upon the
parties. Nineteen years have passed, but no real progress is observed
in the negotiation process. What's even more, the threats of renewed
military operations are not yet overcome, in spite of all the
documents that have been adopted and signed.
The country's ruling elite, which considers itself a loser in the war,
gasps for revenge now, unleashing an arms race and poisoning new
generations with the miasmas of hostility and hatred. The
international community and the mediators - Russia, the United States
and France - openly reject a military solution, persistently proposing
ways of compromise to the parties. The stalemate in the negotiations
continues as the sides keep clinging to overrated, unrealistic
demands.
The unacceptability of the status quo is widely discussed. But that's
the accumulated negative of the conflict, including the stake of a new
war, not just the fact that it is not to the advantage of either of
the parties. War is not better - and even no worse - than the status
quo. It is time for the sides, which have entrusted the OSCE with the
peaceful conflict settlement, to conclude agreements on the
unacceptability of force. That's logical, while Azerbaijan's refusal
to agree to that creates a tense atmosphere harming the peace talks
and the efforts towards seeking a reaching trust.
In the recent years, Baku has been often appealing to the four
resolutions by the UN Security Council, but what it does is to
actually snatch out what is advantageous to itself, i.e. the
withdrawal of the Armenian-Karabakh troops. President of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev recently made strange statements. Stressing the
importance of a quick implementation of such documents, he was angered
by the fact that the resolutions on Karabakh still remain on paper. In
an effort to crash the Armenians, Baku wouldn't, in any way, comply
with their primary, key requirement, i.e. to stop the military
operations.
Such was the case with the very first resolution, 822, adopted twenty
years ago upon the initiative of Azerbaijan (which allegedly approved
the deal). But when Russia, US, Turkey and the chairing country of
OSCE Minsk conference, Italy, urged the three parties to the conflict
to fully and immediately enact the resolution, Stepanakert and Yerevan
gave consent, whereas Baku did not even respond not to halt the
military operations. The uncertainty dragged on a whole year
notwithstanding the victims, the loss of territories and the three
resolutions proposed by the Security Council.
The Azerbaijani side declined the peacekeepers' proposal, inventing
preconditions, and agreeing to suspend the military operations in very
rare cases. Four times it violated the ceasefire and the other
agreements. In the winter of 1993-1994 (with all the four resolutions
on table), Baku launched large-scale military operations which led to
the colossal losses. Occupation is the result of long-lasting military
operations. And who continued them? Concluding a truce for the
implementation of the Security Council resolutions did not succeed
either. Is that an `undelayed measure' after a year?
In the meantime, it is the military operations, not the warfare that
has been suspended. But there are lots of incidents; Baku agreed to
the forces' stationing and later breached the agreement. As for its
hostile operations (blockade, etc.), it never ceased them, and is now
involving Turkey in the process. It is a long time they have been
violating the ceasefire strengthening accord, regardless of the fact
that the document was signed under President Heydar Aliyev's direct
instruction. Ilham Aliyev likes to repeat that Azerbaijan is a
reliable partner. But how that could be linked to the steep zigzag
curves and the recall of the undertaken and officially signed
commitments? Perhaps he speaks of what will happen ...
The frustration and the devaluation of its solution caused the UN
Security Council to cease adopting resolutions on Karabakh. Russia, as
a mediator, had to conclude reconciliation on a different ground - the
Declaration on the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] State
Leaders (dated April 15, 1994). That document, which is very little
known even to political analysts and journalists, got the Security
Council resolutions under way. The Bishkek Protocol and the Ceasefire
Agreement were later signed in support of it.
It is important to note that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was
personally involved in the editing of the declaration. It put a
tougher emphasis on the ceasefire, as a key priority, and imperative
of [conflict] settlement. The elimination of the conflict consequences
was in direct dependence upon it. That also bears a direct
relationship to the withdrawal of forces from the occupied lands. And
is it possible to think that the ceasefire requirement was reliably
fixed? It's not quite like that. Baku undermines that, often to its
own detriment. The cult of the force, axe policies (whose symbol is
Safarov, though the problem is a more complicated and extensive one)
so to say, won't leave Baku at peace. The official hatred, threats and
arrogance do not exhaust the list of the negative phenomena in the
policies of Baku, which is in clear contrast to the material resources
of the city's elite and external glamour. Can the society realize -
even in the run-up of key elections - the costs and risks of such
obnoxious policies?
Armenian News - Tert.am