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US Official News
May 14, 2013 Tuesday
Washington: Freedom of the Press and Expression in Turkey
Washington
The Center for American Progress has issued the following news release:
The issues of press freedom and freedom of expression in Turkey have
for several years attracted a great deal of attention and provoked
extensive debate both in Turkey and in other Western countries. Dozens
of journalists critical of the government have been jailed, and hefty
fines have been levied against media outlets seen as opposing the
ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP. The perceived
deterioration of the situation has raised concerns about the course
and character of Turkish democratic development.
This brief provides political context, historical background, and
strategic analysis of this problem, and offers steps that the United
States can take to help address the situation. The intention is to
broaden the discussion and improve understanding of the issue among a
wider audience, particularly in Washington, D.C., in the hopes of
encouraging greater U.S. engagement. What follows is based on
secondary research, extensive interviews with Turkish journalists,
editors, and outside experts, and working-group meetings in Istanbul
and Washington, bringing together prominent Turkish journalists and
U.S. and European experts.
Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive exploration of the current
state of press or media freedom in Turkey, nor is it to provide new
data on the exact number of jailed journalists or the character of
their alleged crimes. There are a number of informative reports that
provide those details and include insights on the current state of
press freedom in Turkey. Marc Pierini, a former EU ambassador to
Turkey, has perhaps the most up-to-date and balanced study. The
Committee to Protect Journalists plays an important role in tracking
the exact number of jailed journalists, monitoring their legal status,
and advocating on their behalf; their website and recent reports have
detailed breakdowns of these issues. The Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe and the U.S. Department of State both
exhaustively track the trials of journalists and evaluate the broader
human-rights environment in Turkey, and their periodic reports contain
a wealth of information.
By understanding the historical sensitivities feeding the current
political crisis in Turkey, outlining the suppression of certain forms
of political discourse, and examining the issue in the context of U.S.
engagement with Turkey and the wider region, a new picture emerges.
The United States wants Turkey to be a capable and secure democratic
partner with whom it can engage the broader Middle East, and therefore
it should more clearly voice its concerns about the deterioration of
press freedom and freedom of expression in the domestic political
context. Given the wave of popular mobilization in the region and the
careful negotiations between the Turkish government and Kurdish
separatists, it is more important than ever to preserve the democratic
nature of the `Turkish model,' which we discuss in more detail below.
Historical context
To understand the current political situation and the importance of
reinforcing democratic principles over the coming years, it is
necessary to provide some historical context of press freedom and
freedom of expression in Turkey.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, journalists were targeted and
sometimes killed by actors ranging from ultranationalists to
Islamists, far leftists to the Kurdish Workers' Party, or PKK, who
seek Kurdish autonomy and greater legal and cultural protections.
Current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an's AKP has successfully
defused much of the violence that characterized the extreme
polarization of Turkish society in those years since coming to power
in 2003. But the 2007 murder of Turkish-Armenian editor Hrant Dink,
shot outside his newspaper's offices in Istanbul for advocating
official recognition of the Armenian genocide, served as a reminder
that the violence underlying political tensions and freedom of
expression in Turkey has not disappeared.
The Kurdish issue
The `Kurdish issue,' as it is delicately referred to in Turkey, is one
major historical legacy shaping the current political environment and
affecting press freedom. Approximately 15 million Kurds'an ethnic and
linguistic minority inhabiting parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and
Iran'live in Turkey today, with the vast majority being fully
integrated into Turkish society and many living in major urban
centers, particularly Istanbul.
Despite widespread acceptance of Kurds and their integration with
broader Turkish society, for decades the ultranationalist Turkish
state attempted to suppress Kurdish cultural and linguistic diversity,
banning, for example, the use of the Kurdish language until 1991. The
remnants of this repression remain visible, as the politics
surrounding the Kurdish language and culture are still hotly debated,
particularly in the heavily Kurdish southeast, and nationalists
continue to use fears of Kurdish autonomy to appeal politically to
older Turks raised on strict Kemalist doctrine. The PKK, a far-left
guerilla group labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United
States, and the European Union, has also exploited these fears to
continue their decades-long struggle for Kurdish independence and
autonomy. More than 40,000 people have died in this fight since the
1980s. Several peace initiatives have been introduced and failed over
the past decade, and violence, while down from its peak in the
mid-1990s, has continued.
The AKP has worked to address some of the cultural concerns of the
Kurdish minority, allowing the use of Kurdish language and permitting
peaceful Kurdish political mobilization. Nonetheless, most Turks have
been educated in highly nationalist curriculums and remember the
violence of the PKK movement, and are thus deeply wary of any hint of
separatism. This has led to pressure on the AKP to continue security
operations against the PKK and to avoid concessions to the Kurds. The
extreme sensitivity of the Kurdish issue in Turkish politics means it
bleeds into areas such as freedom of the press. Many reporters or
editors reporting on PKK activities or discussing Kurdish cultural or
political activities have faced censorship, arrest, threats, or
outright violence.
In this context, shaping a lasting and peaceful solution to the
Kurdish issue has proved difficult. The past six months have seen
considerable progress, however: A ceasefire negotiated between the
government and Abdullah Ó¦calan, the PKK's jailed leader, has led to a
wider peace initiative and the best chance for a settlement since the
conflict began.
Since the AKP's electoral success in 2002, the country has seen a
remarkable period of economic growth, political reform, and relative
stability. This has given the party the chance to institutionalize the
changes it has brought to the Turkish state such as greater legal and
cultural recognition of Kurdish and Armenian minorities. The party was
formed as a broad alliance of religious conservative parties that were
previously banned under Turkey's secular constitution, members of the
newly emergent Anatolian middle class, social conservatives, and
liberal elements that were frustrated with the incumbent Republican
People's Party, or CHP.
Electoral success and economic growth has also made Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an one of the most influential leaders in the Middle East. This
clout was visible during his tour of the Arab world following the
upheavals of 2011'he was greeted by cheering throngs at nearly every
step. His and Turkey's popularity increased talk of a `Turkish model'
of democratic development, secular government compatible with Islamic
conservatism, and economic growth. The Turkish model means many things
to many people throughout the region but is undoubtedly one narrative
open to moderates seeking to shape new political cultures in the wake
of the Arab Spring.
The AKP's rise to power was a manifestation of trends that began in
the 1980s, when center-right Prime Minister Turgut Ã-zal'later
president from 1989 to 1993'oversaw the opening of new economic
markets and the modernization of the Turkish economy. This process had
unintended consequences for the country's established elites'the
far-right Nationalist Action Party, civilian administrators, powerful
Istanbul oligarchs, and influential military leadership'who had long
benefited from the strong state and military apparatus built by
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The macroeconomic conditions, liberalization of
the Turkish economy resulting from Ã-zal's reforms, and deepening trade
ties to the Middle East all contributed to rapid urban growth in
Anatolia and the rise of an Anatolian business class, which would
become a crucial constituency for the AKP. By 2011, when ErdoÄ?an's AKP
secured 50 percent of the popular vote, more than 20 cities in central
and eastern Turkey were each generating more than $1 billion of trade.
The emergence of these new centers of economic power in Anatolia over
the past two decades has had profound political repercussions. Many
among the new Anatolian business classes resented the clientelist
nature of the Kemalist elite, centered on patronage and loyalty to
statist doctrine, and came to closely associate with the political
coalition behind the AKP's rise and electoral success. The more
virulently nationalist elements of the Kemalist camp only contributed
to these suspicions and resentments by attempting to stifle dissent
and freedom of expression by outlawing Islamist political parties and
banning symbols of cultural or religious diversity such as the
headscarf or the Kurdish language.
The Kemalist old guard could claim the mantle of constitutional
legitimacy for much of this process, defending the constitution that
is still in place today'written under military rule in the early
1980s'which limits cultural and political liberties, requires the
country to be governed `loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk,' and
assures the military considerable political influence. Despite this
veneer of legitimacy, democratic principles were repeatedly ignored
through this process. In 1997, for example, the military forced out
the government of the AKP-predecessor Welfare Party in the so-called
post-modern coup, arguing that the religious conservative movement had
become a threat to Turkish security. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an himself,
then the mayor of Istanbul, was imprisoned for a short time in 1998
for reciting a poem protesting the ban of the Welfare Party, which
authorities deemed was inciting religious hatred.
Despite these hurdles, the reconstituted and modernized
religious-conservative-reform movement, now under the umbrella of the
AKP, managed to win a large majority in parliament in 2002, due in
part to widespread anger at official corruption and the state of the
economy. Given the historical fear of the Turkish deep state'the
conspiratorial statist and corporatist elements that many Turks still
believe run the military and intelligence apparatuses'the legacy of
repeated military coups, and the recent memory of the 1997 military
intervention and subsequent banning of the Welfare Party, it is
unsurprising that upon gaining power in 2002 the AKP moved quickly to
curb the influence of the military and other branches of the Kemalist
establishment that it felt hindered the burgeoning democracy and
threatened the party. The party's reforms, accomplished over many
years, included abolishing the military courts that had been
influential in stifling dissent, loosening restrictions on the press
and religious or cultural expression, asserting civilian authority
over military commanders, and pushing to rewrite the constitution.
The AKP's democratic initiatives had a number of positive outcomes.
First, because the religious-conservative movement had been stifled
through many of the same tools that the security apparatus used to
repress Turkey's Kurdish minority, the AKP broke down many of the
taboos that had surrounded discussion of the Kurdish issue. Second,
real progress was made on the longstanding Turkish intentions to join
the European Union. The AKP frequently turned to the European Court of
Human Rights and made significant progress implementing the reforms
needed for EU membership, often using the EU accession process as a
way to counter the influence of the old elite, particularly within the
judiciary. Finally, in part because the AKP's electoral victory was
such a watershed event in Turkish political history, and in part
because the party had so recently experienced censorship and
repression, the AKP accession prompted a profound opening of the
Turkish political debate. From 2002 to 2009 numerous topics of
discussion that had previously been banned from public discourse'such
as the status of the Kurdish minority, Turkey's history with Armenia,
and the role of the military in politics'were openly and vigorously
debated in parliament.
The AKP's consolidation of civilian control and its breaking down of
religious and cultural taboos was deeply disruptive and threatening to
many of the elite Turks raised on the strict Kemalist doctrine of
secularism, statism, and military prestige. This shaped a situation of
mutual paranoia, wherein all sides of the political debate harbored
deep suspicions regarding the motives of their opponents, and
longstanding grudges'often intensely personal'animated many political
actions.
This mutual suspicion is still strong in Turkey today. Kemalists and
many secular Turks express fear of a creeping Islamist takeover or
concern about conservative religious groups' presence in the police
forces and the judiciary. Meanwhile, fears of the deep state and
mistrust of the military remain powerful among AKP circles, despite
considerable improvements in civilian control of the military. It is
in this context that concerns have grown that the cycle through which
the AKP oversaw a necessary retrenchment of the Kemalist security
apparatus has gone too far, and that the AKP has begun to assume some
of the repressive characteristics of the regime in whose shadow it was
originally formed. Against this backdrop, and because so much of the
AKP's coalition was formed around a critique of illegitimate use of
power, Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's increasingly aggressive responses to
criticism from the press is especially troubling.
Strategic concerns trump democratization issues
Strategic concerns have dominated policy discussions of Turkey in
Washington, D.C., for several years. President Barack Obama's
administration has worked hard since 2009 to renew ties with Turkey
and cultivate Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's AKP as an important partner and
interlocutor in the region. As such, U.S. officials and policy
analysts focused on defining a cooperative regional agenda, improving
security ties, widening economic access, and working to resolve the
longstanding Kurdish issue. Questions surrounding Turkey's ongoing
democratization, including issues of press freedom and freedom of
expression, were therefore often sidelined.
The diplomatic thinking was sound in 2009'Turkey was, and is, a NATO
ally, a democracy, an important regional military power, and a
fast-growing economy with increasing ties to the Levant. The
relationship between the two nations had deteriorated during the
George W. Bush administration and needed renewal. Turkey had held
successive free and fair elections for nearly a decade, overseen
important economic reforms, made important and highly symbolic
concessions to its Kurdish minority, and was beginning the process of
rewriting and updating its constitution. Additionally, due to economic
ties and the Kurdish population in the southeast region of the
country, Turkey was likely to play an important role in shaping the
future of Iraq after the American withdrawal. The possibility of
escalating tensions with Iran regarding its nuclear program also
loomed on the horizon. Despite being a close U.S. ally and regional
counterweight to Iran, Turkey is dependent on Iranian energy resources
and therefore crucial to any tightening of sanctions on Tehran to
complement the Obama administration's diplomatic efforts.
For all of these reasons, the Obama administration placed strategic
concerns at the heart of the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship. The
United States did not explicitly sideline issues of democratization,
but these issues were superseded by more pressing concerns. This
strategic focus was lent further urgency by the political upheavals
that swept the region in 2010 and 2011 and by the continuing violence
in Syria, which left the United States searching for stable allies in
the region.
As a result, issues of democratic reform lost significance for many in
the policymaking establishment. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's repeated
electoral victories'increasing the AKP's share of the vote in both
2007 and 2011'and his growing personal dominance of Turkish politics
elicited concern from civil-society activists, who worried about his
rigidity in response to criticism, but officials in Washington and
Ankara largely relegated such concerns to second-tier status.
The sidelining of press freedom, minority rights, and judicial reform
now threatens to impact the joint strategic project being advanced by
the United States and Turkey to establish secure and democratic
governance in the region and foster economic growth. The fact that
Turkey has regressed on issues of press freedom and stalled on
judicial reforms undermines the persuasive power of the Turkish
democratic model in the wider region. In a parliamentary system,
public opinion is an important check on political power. The
legitimacy of elected governments is tied to the free exchange of
opinions, ideas, and criticism'this is how the public compels
political authorities to remain accountable on a daily basis. If Prime
Minister ErdoÄ?an and the AKP are serious about overcoming Turkey's
undemocratic traditions, then maintaining and deepening freedom of
expression and permitting dissenting voices in the public sphere is
critical.
Given the turmoil in the region, with many nascent political movements
searching to define their future paths, Turkey cannot afford to come
across as undemocratic or as cracking down on freedom of expression.
The issue of press freedom is at the core of Turkey's development as a
modern democracy. Vigorous'and often controversial'internal debate is
necessary to help reinforce Turkish leadership in the region and the
strategic partnership with the United States.
A key juncture in Turkish politics
The next two years will be tremendously important in directing the
next phase of Turkish democracy, with the rewriting of the
constitution, the proposed shift to a system embracing a strong
presidency, the ongoing reform of the judiciary, and continuing
outreach to PKK leader Abdullah Ã-calan and negotiations with field
elements of the PKK all currently underway. Each of these processes
requires a strong and vigilant press to voice criticism and provide
oversight, meaning it is crucial that the freedom of the press be
protected.
The role of the press is lent further importance by the current lack
of serious political opposition to the AKP. The primary opposition
party'the CHP'is still undergoing a long-term reshuffling to widen its
appeal beyond the urban elites and remove some of the old guard, who
have so closely associated the party with the excesses of the old
Kemalist structure. The extended period of AKP dominance has allowed
it to consolidate control of the courts and weaken the military's
political influence. But this consolidation, even if necessary or
natural after a decade of rule, has left the press as the only
government oversight body and as such has perhaps helped make it a
target for the AKP, which has developed an increasingly
confrontational relationship with critical journalists and news
outlets.
The stalled EU accession process has also played a role in
establishing this dynamic. Throughout the early 2000s, this process
had incentivized Turkey to undertake important reforms and protect
democratic processes, but the European Union's economic hardships and
the wariness of many European politicians to support Turkey's bid have
together made accession a less-enticing prospect than it was for much
of the past decade. This has meant that progress on meeting the EU
membership requirements has slowed and that criticism from the
European Union, which had previously been influential in pushing
Turkish reforms, is increasingly ignored. Given the United States'
relative silence on press freedom in Turkey and clear prioritization
of other issues in the region, there are few outside voices holding
the AKP accountable.
Political journalism in Turkey
The issues outlined above have led the Turkish administration to
assert increasing control over the political debate in the country and
have led to meaningful lapses in democratic governance. Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an wants to be remembered as a transformative leader who
established legitimate democratic governance'the bookend to Atatürk
himself in modern Turkish history'and intends to establish a
presidential system wherein he can continue to govern after term
limits end his time as prime minister in 2015.
Despite these goals and his record of accomplishments since 2002,
Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an has come to view any criticism of his
government as a personal attack. Despite the measured reforms and
removal of many taboos, Turkish political culture and journalism are
both intensely personal. For many in Turkey, political disagreements
end with participants debating a person rather than an idea and
engaging in ad hominem attacks. Sometimes provoked by journalists'
vitriolic attacks, politicians'including the prime minister
himself'often mention critics by name in print or in speeches, which
can lead to threats or intimidation from unscrupulous supporters. The
prime minister has also filed five libel suits against journalists for
personal attacks since 2005. While some of the criticism for which
Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an has sued is distasteful'depictions of the prime
minister as an animal, for example'the political power of his office
is such that these lawsuits have a chilling effect on legitimate
political debate. Given his overwhelming political power, Prime
Minister ErdoÄ?an would do better to rise above such slights and work
to cement a new precedent for political leadership.
So far, the government's behavior has tended toward greater
repression. But a disclaimer is necessary before delving into the
details of the imprisonment of journalists and media ownership, as
well as direct and indirect censorship in Turkey. While these are very
serious concerns demanding attention and resolution, comparisons of
Turkey to authoritarian countries such as Iran, China, or North Korea
are off base. Some organizations monitoring the situation in Turkey
have drawn such comparisons in order to attract attention to the
plight of imprisoned journalists, and while their motives may be good,
such overreach undermines the wider political effort to ensure reform,
as it provides the government with the opportunity to dismiss all
outside criticism as overhyped. Turkey today is more democratic than
in the past, if perhaps less socially liberal. The country has, in
many ways, a healthy civil society, enshrined civilian authority, and
a vibrant political debate. While there is still work to be done, we
should not dismiss how far the country has come since the
`post-modern' coup of 1997.
Jailed journalists
As of the end of 2012, Turkey had imprisoned at least 49 journalists
for their reporting'more than any other country in the world. As Joel
Simon, executive director of the Committee to Protect Journalists, has
written, `Turkey has no business being the world's leading jailer of
journalists.' Turkish civil society is vibrant; its television shows
are enjoyed throughout the Middle East. And the AKP has grown its
share of the popular vote in three successive, legitimate national
elections. What reasonable explanation could there be for such
widespread imprisonment of journalists?
A study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shows that
the jailing of journalists is linked to the lack of a resolution of
two larger issues: the ongoing Kurdish unrest and the role of the
military in Turkish politics. Of course, those two issues are in turn
associated with the judicial-reform process and the drafting of a new
constitution to replace problematic remnants of the military
constitution that still governs the country. The existing
constitution's broadly defined laws governing national security and
territorial integrity provide ample room for abuse by overzealous
prosecutors, while the twin fears of the military deep state and
Kurdish separatism lead to prosecutions of those who may be engaged in
legitimate reporting or political advocacy.
The majority of imprisoned journalists are Kurds charged under the
remit of Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Code or under the Turkish
Anti-Terror Law. According to the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe's most recent study of the issue in August
2012, 68 percent of Turkish journalists in prison were jailed on
charges related to the Kurdish issue; 13 percent were related to the
ongoing Ergenekon trial of alleged right-wing coup plotters; and 19
percent were jailed on assorted other charges.
Both Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Code and the Turkish
Anti-Terror Law are overly broad and poorly defined, leaving them open
to abuse by prosecutors and judges for a wide array of reasons. The
Turkish Anti-Terror Law, for example, declares it a crime to `print or
publish declarations or announcements of terrorist organisations.' The
law is intended to target those dispensing terrorist propaganda but
leaves open the possibility of prosecution for any number of
journalists trying to cover the activities of the PKK or other
terrorist groups. The Anti-Terror Law also deems anyone a terrorist if
he or she is a member of an `organisation with the aim of changing the
attributes of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, the
political, legal, social, secular or economic system.' Of course, the
current constitution was written under military rule, and any number
of legitimate political actors want to `change the attributes of the
Republic as specified in the Constitution,' making this a particularly
problematic clause for a modern democracy.
Turkish government officials are quick to point out that some of the
imprisoned journalists were probably members of the PKK, labeled a
terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European
Union. Equally, there are journalists imprisoned who are clearly not
members of the PKK or even advocating on the organization's behalf.
Even delving into the details of individual cases, it is very
difficult to know the truth, and therein lies another central
problem'the lack of transparency surrounding the process. Government
sources claim that a number of jailed journalists were in fact engaged
in illegal activities, while the Committee to Protect Journalists
found that there was not sufficient evidence to determine guilt,
according to their investigation. The fact that this is a matter of
debate between government officials and their supporters and a
nongovernmental organization is in itself a condemnation of the lack
of transparency and due process under the law when it comes to
prosecuting journalists.
The abuse of the Anti-Terror Law's broad provisions has provoked
criticism from the U.S. Department of State, the European Commission,
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Turkish government has
every right to defend Turkish citizens, the state, and its territorial
integrity and to prosecute terrorists. The impasse, however, is rooted
in what has been, until recently, a mostly military approach to the
Kurdish issue. The criticism comes about because of the frequency with
which prosecutions tend to target those who could claim to be merely
reporting on PKK activities, a reasonable journalistic pursuit, while
not being members of the group themselves. As Marc Pierini, former EU
ambassador to Turkey, has written, the `judicial system tends to blur
the line between the intention to incite, praise, legitimize, or
relativize terrorist violence and the expression of an alternative,
critical, or even disturbing opinion.'
The solution to the issue of imprisoned journalists certainly lies in
the dual need for a new constitution and judicial reform. A new
constitution could eliminate the legal loopholes that allow for the
prosecution of political opponents under overly broad legal
justifications. The other issues linked to imprisonment are largely a
result of badly needed judicial reform and proper due process. Many
journalists are charged and then held in prison for extremely long
periods of pretrial detention, and their release on bail is uneven and
unpredictable. Defendants and their lawyers repeatedly complain of a
lack of access to evidence, while those trying to monitor the trials
are foiled by the utter lack of overall transparency. A new
constitution could also contribute to the permanent peaceful
resolution of the Kurdish issue through constitutional protections for
minority rights.
It is time for Turkey to truly embrace the role of a confident
democracy by allowing the open debate of these issues, particularly
the Kurdish question. The AKP is the dominant force in Turkish
politics, enjoying electoral legitimacy and broad popularity, and
therefore should be encouraging such discourse rather than stifling it
through the shadowy use of outdated security laws or judicial
malpractice.
Media ownership
Turkey's crisis of press freedom extends beyond the outright silencing
of journalists through imprisonment. The government and its allies
have also utilized more subtle forms of pressure in recent years. Much
of the problem stems from the consolidation of major media holdings
over the past two decades and the cross-ownership of media outlets by
large conglomerates. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights, the European Commission's 2012 Progress Report, and the U.S.
State Department's Human Rights Report have all identified the
cross-ownership of media outlets as a threat to freedom of the press
in Turkey.
This cross-ownership of media entities'wherein large conglomerates
with major economic interests in other sectors such as construction or
energy control media outlets'can open up reporters, editors, and
owners to a variety of pressures. Companies with interests across
economic sectors often rely on government contracts or regulation,
leading to situations where they are asked or decide to apply pressure
to limit political criticism, which could jeopardize those interests
or contracts. While smaller companies are not as influenced by
potential pressure on wider business interests, big conglomerates are
under tremendous pressure. Numerous Turkish journalists cited
instances where they were told to tone down government criticism or
had columns pulled because of such concerns. This pressure manifests
itself in direct pressure on news-outlet owners from government
officials and more subtle forms of self-censorship from editors and
journalists afraid of dismissal.
Table 1
The independent think tank Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation, or TESEV, has documented that the Turkish media market
came to be dominated by several cross-sector companies through a
series of mergers following the end of the state monopoly over
broadcasting in the 1990s. As can be seen from the table above, this
consolidation of holdings has led several companies to dominate the
Turkish media scene, across different mediums.
The case of DoÄ?an Group illustrates this point most clearly. In 2009
the Turkish authorities levied a $2.5 billion fine against DoÄ?an
Group, then the largest media company in Turkey, for unpaid taxes. The
fine was widely viewed as a political move to punish DoÄ?an for its
media outlets' negative coverage of the AKP and Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an. For weeks before the fine was announced, Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an spoke publicly against the opposition press, telling his
supporters at rallies, `Don't buy these newspapers, they are full of
filth and lies,' adding that audiences should `sentence them to
poverty.' Such language, besides being inappropriate for the office of
prime minister, tends to undermine the tax authorities' claims to an
unbiased assessment of the DoÄ?an Group's alleged financial
improprieties.
Multiple sources in Turkey described the fine against the DoÄ?an Group
as having a `chilling effect' on journalists, editors, and media
owners. For some Turks, particularly those in the opposition media,
the DoÄ?an fine was the highest-profile incident in what seems to be a
trend of tax or bankruptcy proceedings intended to silence opponents
in the press. Skeptics point to the uncontested auction of the
ATV-Sabah media group in 2008, when the company held large shares of
both print and television markets, by the Turkish Savings Deposit
Insurance Fund, or TMSF, to allies of Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an,
including his son-in-law and brother, following bankruptcy proceedings
as a point of concern. The uncontested state auction of a large media
company to a close ally of Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an stoked fears that
the prime minister was seeking to assume informal control of the
media.
More systematic concerns exist as well, surrounding the leasing of
broadcast frequencies, issuance of journalist credentials, and the
problematic Media Law, which states that television broadcasters must
lease their frequencies from the government, as stipulated in Article
26 of the constitution, because they are regarded as finite resources,
meaning the rights can also be revoked by regulators at the Radio and
Television Supreme Council, or RTÃ`K. For journalists critical of the
government, obtaining press credentials can also become an issue; the
government periodically denies credentials to opposition newspapers.
Finally, under current law the government can prosecute and fine media
outlets and journalists, for example, for ill-defined offenses linked
to national security, decency standards, and libel. As with the
terrorism laws, such poorly defined legal standards open the door to
abuse and political prosecutions.
More subtle censorship
Faced with this array of pressures, many journalists and editors
practice varied forms of self-censorship. Because of the examples made
of critics through outright prosecution, fines, or public mention by
the prime minister or other officials, many conclude that it's not
worth the risk to explore sensitive issues such as the PKK or the
Ergenekon trial. Several sources in Turkey reported receiving death
threats in the wake of public criticism of the government or in
response to particularly controversial columns on traditional
political taboos such as discussion of Kurdish political activities or
the death of more than 1 million Armenians during and after the First
World War.
Journalists and editors also report pressure on content from owners,
leading to fears of dismissal. Indeed, there are countless instances
of columnists or journalists being dismissed for refusing to tone down
criticism or for breaking controversial stories. Most recently,
veteran journalist Hasan Cemal was dismissed from Milliyet newspaper
for defending the publication of minutes from a meeting between
representatives of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, or BDP,
and the PKK leader Abdullah Ó¦calan. The leaked minutes provided fodder
for nationalist critics of the peace process, angering Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an, who publicly criticized Milliyet and condemned Cemal's column
on the subject, declaring, `If this is journalism, down with it!' Such
public condemnation from a sitting prime minister brought tremendous
pressure to bear on Milliyet's owner, who refused to publish a
subsequent column and then fired Cemal.
The concerns of critics and outside observers should not shroud the
fact that many owners, editors, and journalists are quite happy to
self-censor or cooperate with the authorities. The motivations for
this cooperation can vary from political proximity and personal ties,
to business interests and a desire for access to information, to a
genuine yearning for unity on issues of national security. The blame
for such censorship does not lie squarely with the government but also
has its roots in the varying quality of journalistic training and
ethics across the profession in Turkey.
Solutions for a freer press in Turkey
Turkey has made some progress in the past six months to address the
issue of press freedom, but fundamental reforms are still needed.
Perhaps responding to international and domestic political pressure,
the number of jailed journalists dropped sharply from 61 to 49 in
December 2012 due to a number of releases, according to the Committee
to Protect Journalists. Helping this process was progress on the
Kurdish front, with direct negotiations between the AKP government and
Abdullah Ó¦calan yielding a historic ceasefire announcement from the
jailed PKK leader, who declared on March 21 that it was time to `solve
the arms problem without losing time or another life.' This opening
may help ease one of the points of tension resulting in many of the
charges against journalists'the Kurdish issue'and prompt the
government to embrace a broader alleviation of censorship.
The most recent positive development is an amendment to the
Anti-Terror Law passed on April 11, 2013. The Turkish Parliament
passed several AKP initiatives to narrow the definitions of
prosecutable offenses, which are now limited to those who voice
opinions deemed `a clear and an imminent danger to public order' or
those who promote violent acts. While this limited step does not
address the fundamental problems with the judicial system or the
constitution and still leaves room for abuse under the `public order'
clause, it is nevertheless a positive development.
Numerous reports have outlined in detail the steps necessary for
Turkey to overcome this problem and fully institutionalize a vibrant
and free press. First, Turkey's EU accession process was a unifying
thread that helped incentivize democratic governance, prevent the
excesses of the security apparatus, and encourage reforms through the
early AKP years'and hope is needed on that front. While politicians in
Turkey have soured on EU accession of late because of Europe's
economic woes and the dismissive attitude of certain European leaders,
Turkey's entry into the union is in the interest of all parties.
Second, Turkey needs a new constitution. A modern democracy has no
business being governed by a constitution written under military rule.
The new constitution must prioritize the protection of minority rights
and freedom of expression. This is not just meant as a protection for
Kurds and other minorities, but also represents the only path to a
peaceful, democratic Turkey, and will unleash new economic potential
in previously marginal areas. Further, constitutional reform should
include the removal of the most problematic `catch-all' phrases and
clauses in the current constitution, particularly those regarding
insulting the state or `Turkishness.' If Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an wants
to be remembered as Turkey's democratic leader, then this should be
his overarching goal.
Third, alongside the process of constitutional reform, the AKP must
continue to pursue the evenhanded reform of the broken judicial
system. The four judicial-reform packages passed since 2002 represent
incremental progress, but the government would now be best served by
bringing its full attention and resources to bear on the problem. As
it stands, people accused of crimes spend far too long in jail
awaiting trial, and release pending a trial is uneven and unfair.
Related to this problem, trials proceed too slowly, contributing to
the problem of long pretrial detentions and leading to financial and
personal strain on the accused. Too often in Turkey, the accused are
treated as guilty before due process has been served. The accused and
their legal counsel must have full access to evidence, and the cloud
of secrecy surrounding politically sensitive prosecutions should be
removed. This will allow for greater accountability and will prevent
overzealous prosecutors, often eager to gain favor by going after
critics of the government, from abusing the broad definitions within
the media law or the Anti-Terror Law.
Fourth, the Kurdish issue must be addressed through negotiation;
military force alone will not solve the problem. To its credit, the
AKP has begun this process, and negotiations continue with the
departure of PKK fighters from Turkish soil pending a broader amnesty
agreement. Much can still go wrong in this fraught political process,
but the AKP has finally acknowledged that the only real way to end
this struggle is to win the debate'not resort to force. And, of
course, in order to win the debate, the AKP must allow the debate to
take place.
Finally, the United States can and should do more to encourage its
partner to more fully embrace its role as a modern democracy. All
reports from both sides indicate that Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an values
his relationship with President Obama very highly. Beyond this
personal relationship, Turkey and the United States share many
strategic goals and a valuable military alliance. While policymakers
must assess the value of public pronouncements given the political
situations in both countries, private or personal appeals from
President Obama might prompt action from Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an.
President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and other members of
the U.S. government should make clear to Turkish officials that the
partnership does not end with military or strategic considerations.
While making clear that Turkish democracy will continue to reflect
Turkish culture and history, U.S. leaders must show that they consider
freedom of the press to be non-negotiable.
Conclusion
The course of constitutional and legal reform in Turkey over the next
two years, along with the fate of the PKK negotiations, will likely
decide whether the events of the past five years represent either a
necessary, if sometimes unpleasant, correction after so many years of
military and Kemalist domination or a longer-term deterioration of
democratic norms in Turkey. The 2014 presidential elections may also
reveal the extent to which the current controversies are the product
of specific leadership personalities or a case of the familiar tools
of power wielded by new hands. It is unclear whether a figure less
dominant than the prime minister would exert less control over the
press or if the problem is more institutional.
But the blame must not be placed solely on the government, which is
laboring under an outdated constitution and must deal with a stubborn
opposition that mistrusts its intentions. Turkish politics must
continue to address the wider problem of a political culture where the
line between personal insult and outdated notions of honor and
legitimate criticism or debate is blurred. Turkish society has also
not fundamentally decided what balance of security and freedom of
expression is right for their country'should reporting on bombings or
carrying the statements of separatists be considered criminal? The
question of media ownership is also thorny, with no indication that
the trend toward consolidated ownership of news outlets by large
conglomerates is slowing.
The owners of large media companies also often have a wide range of
business interests with the government and fear that critiquing the
AKP could negatively impact government contracts or other business
operations. These overlapping interests and owners' fears of
government backlash have undoubtedly contributed to the current crisis
of press freedom, with many proprietors applying pressure to
journalists or editors who criticize the government. Indeed, a 2011
survey of top journalists by Bilgi University demonstrated the twin
pressures facing journalists and editors, with 95 percent of those
surveyed reporting government interference in news production and 85
percent reporting intervention by media owners.
What is certain is the central importance of press freedom to the
entrenchment of democratic norms in Turkey. For nongovernmental
organizations there is room to help monitor the situation and provide
venues and support for independent journalism. Funding freelancers or
helping set up independent publishing outlets along the lines of
ProPublica could help circumvent many of the pressures placed on
journalists in Turkey. A form of such adaptation is already going on
with the rise of social media and the large online followings top
journalists have acquired, but financial and institutional support are
still lacking.
The United States has a clear interest in ensuring press freedom in
Turkey. This interest extends beyond any general desire to promote
democratic governance and freedom of expression and encompasses
important strategic concerns. And the United States can be forthright
in expecting more from Turkey's leaders. Veteran U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey Frank Ricciardone has been outspoken on the subject of
political intervention in the Turkish press and has said that there is
no need for high-level Turkish officials to constantly intervene.
Ambassador Ricciardone is right to question the governing party's
efforts to suppress opinion.
Given Turkey's history of coups and censorship, and the pluralism and
diversity present in the early years of the AKP government, it is hard
to understand why the prime minister and some of his cabinet members
would risk those achievements, prompt a backlash from Turkish society,
and damage the country's international reputation by attempting to
stifle dissent. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an and the AKP are strong enough
and enjoy sufficient legitimacy to allow dissent and debate. Cracking
down on such activities is a sign of weakness, not strength.
Furthermore, the prime minister and his party have the opportunity to
set a new tone in the political debate and to entrench a more open
political culture.
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that, `The struggle
for human rights begins by telling the truth over and over again,'
affirming that the `United States will stand with those who seek to
advance the causes of democracy and human rights wherever they may
live.' This discussion represents the finest American tradition'even
when there are political costs to advancing such issues'and it is in
the U.S. interest to defend freedom of speech in close strategic
allies such as Turkey.
Foreign policy and bilateral relations have become increasingly
democratized in this modern era, requiring more debate and engagement
on questions of legitimacy, and `intermestic' concerns have gained
prominence. Secretary Clinton's drive to engage societies in addition
to governments recognized this phenomenon, and this approach should be
more fully extended to Turkey. That is precisely why President Obama
and Secretary of State Kerry should consistently raise the subject in
meetings with Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an and Foreign Minister Ahmet
DavutoÄ?lu. If personal assurances are not backed up by substantive
action, more public exhortations may be necessary.
The United States and Turkey have a solid strategic partnership on
which to build, but in the long run, deepening this association'which
is in both countries' national interest and is sought by many on both
sides'will require a shared understanding of freedom of expression and
freedom of the press.
For more information please visit: http://www.americanprogress.org/as
From: A. Papazian
May 14, 2013 Tuesday
Washington: Freedom of the Press and Expression in Turkey
Washington
The Center for American Progress has issued the following news release:
The issues of press freedom and freedom of expression in Turkey have
for several years attracted a great deal of attention and provoked
extensive debate both in Turkey and in other Western countries. Dozens
of journalists critical of the government have been jailed, and hefty
fines have been levied against media outlets seen as opposing the
ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP. The perceived
deterioration of the situation has raised concerns about the course
and character of Turkish democratic development.
This brief provides political context, historical background, and
strategic analysis of this problem, and offers steps that the United
States can take to help address the situation. The intention is to
broaden the discussion and improve understanding of the issue among a
wider audience, particularly in Washington, D.C., in the hopes of
encouraging greater U.S. engagement. What follows is based on
secondary research, extensive interviews with Turkish journalists,
editors, and outside experts, and working-group meetings in Istanbul
and Washington, bringing together prominent Turkish journalists and
U.S. and European experts.
Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive exploration of the current
state of press or media freedom in Turkey, nor is it to provide new
data on the exact number of jailed journalists or the character of
their alleged crimes. There are a number of informative reports that
provide those details and include insights on the current state of
press freedom in Turkey. Marc Pierini, a former EU ambassador to
Turkey, has perhaps the most up-to-date and balanced study. The
Committee to Protect Journalists plays an important role in tracking
the exact number of jailed journalists, monitoring their legal status,
and advocating on their behalf; their website and recent reports have
detailed breakdowns of these issues. The Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe and the U.S. Department of State both
exhaustively track the trials of journalists and evaluate the broader
human-rights environment in Turkey, and their periodic reports contain
a wealth of information.
By understanding the historical sensitivities feeding the current
political crisis in Turkey, outlining the suppression of certain forms
of political discourse, and examining the issue in the context of U.S.
engagement with Turkey and the wider region, a new picture emerges.
The United States wants Turkey to be a capable and secure democratic
partner with whom it can engage the broader Middle East, and therefore
it should more clearly voice its concerns about the deterioration of
press freedom and freedom of expression in the domestic political
context. Given the wave of popular mobilization in the region and the
careful negotiations between the Turkish government and Kurdish
separatists, it is more important than ever to preserve the democratic
nature of the `Turkish model,' which we discuss in more detail below.
Historical context
To understand the current political situation and the importance of
reinforcing democratic principles over the coming years, it is
necessary to provide some historical context of press freedom and
freedom of expression in Turkey.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, journalists were targeted and
sometimes killed by actors ranging from ultranationalists to
Islamists, far leftists to the Kurdish Workers' Party, or PKK, who
seek Kurdish autonomy and greater legal and cultural protections.
Current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an's AKP has successfully
defused much of the violence that characterized the extreme
polarization of Turkish society in those years since coming to power
in 2003. But the 2007 murder of Turkish-Armenian editor Hrant Dink,
shot outside his newspaper's offices in Istanbul for advocating
official recognition of the Armenian genocide, served as a reminder
that the violence underlying political tensions and freedom of
expression in Turkey has not disappeared.
The Kurdish issue
The `Kurdish issue,' as it is delicately referred to in Turkey, is one
major historical legacy shaping the current political environment and
affecting press freedom. Approximately 15 million Kurds'an ethnic and
linguistic minority inhabiting parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and
Iran'live in Turkey today, with the vast majority being fully
integrated into Turkish society and many living in major urban
centers, particularly Istanbul.
Despite widespread acceptance of Kurds and their integration with
broader Turkish society, for decades the ultranationalist Turkish
state attempted to suppress Kurdish cultural and linguistic diversity,
banning, for example, the use of the Kurdish language until 1991. The
remnants of this repression remain visible, as the politics
surrounding the Kurdish language and culture are still hotly debated,
particularly in the heavily Kurdish southeast, and nationalists
continue to use fears of Kurdish autonomy to appeal politically to
older Turks raised on strict Kemalist doctrine. The PKK, a far-left
guerilla group labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United
States, and the European Union, has also exploited these fears to
continue their decades-long struggle for Kurdish independence and
autonomy. More than 40,000 people have died in this fight since the
1980s. Several peace initiatives have been introduced and failed over
the past decade, and violence, while down from its peak in the
mid-1990s, has continued.
The AKP has worked to address some of the cultural concerns of the
Kurdish minority, allowing the use of Kurdish language and permitting
peaceful Kurdish political mobilization. Nonetheless, most Turks have
been educated in highly nationalist curriculums and remember the
violence of the PKK movement, and are thus deeply wary of any hint of
separatism. This has led to pressure on the AKP to continue security
operations against the PKK and to avoid concessions to the Kurds. The
extreme sensitivity of the Kurdish issue in Turkish politics means it
bleeds into areas such as freedom of the press. Many reporters or
editors reporting on PKK activities or discussing Kurdish cultural or
political activities have faced censorship, arrest, threats, or
outright violence.
In this context, shaping a lasting and peaceful solution to the
Kurdish issue has proved difficult. The past six months have seen
considerable progress, however: A ceasefire negotiated between the
government and Abdullah Ó¦calan, the PKK's jailed leader, has led to a
wider peace initiative and the best chance for a settlement since the
conflict began.
Since the AKP's electoral success in 2002, the country has seen a
remarkable period of economic growth, political reform, and relative
stability. This has given the party the chance to institutionalize the
changes it has brought to the Turkish state such as greater legal and
cultural recognition of Kurdish and Armenian minorities. The party was
formed as a broad alliance of religious conservative parties that were
previously banned under Turkey's secular constitution, members of the
newly emergent Anatolian middle class, social conservatives, and
liberal elements that were frustrated with the incumbent Republican
People's Party, or CHP.
Electoral success and economic growth has also made Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an one of the most influential leaders in the Middle East. This
clout was visible during his tour of the Arab world following the
upheavals of 2011'he was greeted by cheering throngs at nearly every
step. His and Turkey's popularity increased talk of a `Turkish model'
of democratic development, secular government compatible with Islamic
conservatism, and economic growth. The Turkish model means many things
to many people throughout the region but is undoubtedly one narrative
open to moderates seeking to shape new political cultures in the wake
of the Arab Spring.
The AKP's rise to power was a manifestation of trends that began in
the 1980s, when center-right Prime Minister Turgut Ã-zal'later
president from 1989 to 1993'oversaw the opening of new economic
markets and the modernization of the Turkish economy. This process had
unintended consequences for the country's established elites'the
far-right Nationalist Action Party, civilian administrators, powerful
Istanbul oligarchs, and influential military leadership'who had long
benefited from the strong state and military apparatus built by
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The macroeconomic conditions, liberalization of
the Turkish economy resulting from Ã-zal's reforms, and deepening trade
ties to the Middle East all contributed to rapid urban growth in
Anatolia and the rise of an Anatolian business class, which would
become a crucial constituency for the AKP. By 2011, when ErdoÄ?an's AKP
secured 50 percent of the popular vote, more than 20 cities in central
and eastern Turkey were each generating more than $1 billion of trade.
The emergence of these new centers of economic power in Anatolia over
the past two decades has had profound political repercussions. Many
among the new Anatolian business classes resented the clientelist
nature of the Kemalist elite, centered on patronage and loyalty to
statist doctrine, and came to closely associate with the political
coalition behind the AKP's rise and electoral success. The more
virulently nationalist elements of the Kemalist camp only contributed
to these suspicions and resentments by attempting to stifle dissent
and freedom of expression by outlawing Islamist political parties and
banning symbols of cultural or religious diversity such as the
headscarf or the Kurdish language.
The Kemalist old guard could claim the mantle of constitutional
legitimacy for much of this process, defending the constitution that
is still in place today'written under military rule in the early
1980s'which limits cultural and political liberties, requires the
country to be governed `loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk,' and
assures the military considerable political influence. Despite this
veneer of legitimacy, democratic principles were repeatedly ignored
through this process. In 1997, for example, the military forced out
the government of the AKP-predecessor Welfare Party in the so-called
post-modern coup, arguing that the religious conservative movement had
become a threat to Turkish security. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an himself,
then the mayor of Istanbul, was imprisoned for a short time in 1998
for reciting a poem protesting the ban of the Welfare Party, which
authorities deemed was inciting religious hatred.
Despite these hurdles, the reconstituted and modernized
religious-conservative-reform movement, now under the umbrella of the
AKP, managed to win a large majority in parliament in 2002, due in
part to widespread anger at official corruption and the state of the
economy. Given the historical fear of the Turkish deep state'the
conspiratorial statist and corporatist elements that many Turks still
believe run the military and intelligence apparatuses'the legacy of
repeated military coups, and the recent memory of the 1997 military
intervention and subsequent banning of the Welfare Party, it is
unsurprising that upon gaining power in 2002 the AKP moved quickly to
curb the influence of the military and other branches of the Kemalist
establishment that it felt hindered the burgeoning democracy and
threatened the party. The party's reforms, accomplished over many
years, included abolishing the military courts that had been
influential in stifling dissent, loosening restrictions on the press
and religious or cultural expression, asserting civilian authority
over military commanders, and pushing to rewrite the constitution.
The AKP's democratic initiatives had a number of positive outcomes.
First, because the religious-conservative movement had been stifled
through many of the same tools that the security apparatus used to
repress Turkey's Kurdish minority, the AKP broke down many of the
taboos that had surrounded discussion of the Kurdish issue. Second,
real progress was made on the longstanding Turkish intentions to join
the European Union. The AKP frequently turned to the European Court of
Human Rights and made significant progress implementing the reforms
needed for EU membership, often using the EU accession process as a
way to counter the influence of the old elite, particularly within the
judiciary. Finally, in part because the AKP's electoral victory was
such a watershed event in Turkish political history, and in part
because the party had so recently experienced censorship and
repression, the AKP accession prompted a profound opening of the
Turkish political debate. From 2002 to 2009 numerous topics of
discussion that had previously been banned from public discourse'such
as the status of the Kurdish minority, Turkey's history with Armenia,
and the role of the military in politics'were openly and vigorously
debated in parliament.
The AKP's consolidation of civilian control and its breaking down of
religious and cultural taboos was deeply disruptive and threatening to
many of the elite Turks raised on the strict Kemalist doctrine of
secularism, statism, and military prestige. This shaped a situation of
mutual paranoia, wherein all sides of the political debate harbored
deep suspicions regarding the motives of their opponents, and
longstanding grudges'often intensely personal'animated many political
actions.
This mutual suspicion is still strong in Turkey today. Kemalists and
many secular Turks express fear of a creeping Islamist takeover or
concern about conservative religious groups' presence in the police
forces and the judiciary. Meanwhile, fears of the deep state and
mistrust of the military remain powerful among AKP circles, despite
considerable improvements in civilian control of the military. It is
in this context that concerns have grown that the cycle through which
the AKP oversaw a necessary retrenchment of the Kemalist security
apparatus has gone too far, and that the AKP has begun to assume some
of the repressive characteristics of the regime in whose shadow it was
originally formed. Against this backdrop, and because so much of the
AKP's coalition was formed around a critique of illegitimate use of
power, Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's increasingly aggressive responses to
criticism from the press is especially troubling.
Strategic concerns trump democratization issues
Strategic concerns have dominated policy discussions of Turkey in
Washington, D.C., for several years. President Barack Obama's
administration has worked hard since 2009 to renew ties with Turkey
and cultivate Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's AKP as an important partner and
interlocutor in the region. As such, U.S. officials and policy
analysts focused on defining a cooperative regional agenda, improving
security ties, widening economic access, and working to resolve the
longstanding Kurdish issue. Questions surrounding Turkey's ongoing
democratization, including issues of press freedom and freedom of
expression, were therefore often sidelined.
The diplomatic thinking was sound in 2009'Turkey was, and is, a NATO
ally, a democracy, an important regional military power, and a
fast-growing economy with increasing ties to the Levant. The
relationship between the two nations had deteriorated during the
George W. Bush administration and needed renewal. Turkey had held
successive free and fair elections for nearly a decade, overseen
important economic reforms, made important and highly symbolic
concessions to its Kurdish minority, and was beginning the process of
rewriting and updating its constitution. Additionally, due to economic
ties and the Kurdish population in the southeast region of the
country, Turkey was likely to play an important role in shaping the
future of Iraq after the American withdrawal. The possibility of
escalating tensions with Iran regarding its nuclear program also
loomed on the horizon. Despite being a close U.S. ally and regional
counterweight to Iran, Turkey is dependent on Iranian energy resources
and therefore crucial to any tightening of sanctions on Tehran to
complement the Obama administration's diplomatic efforts.
For all of these reasons, the Obama administration placed strategic
concerns at the heart of the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship. The
United States did not explicitly sideline issues of democratization,
but these issues were superseded by more pressing concerns. This
strategic focus was lent further urgency by the political upheavals
that swept the region in 2010 and 2011 and by the continuing violence
in Syria, which left the United States searching for stable allies in
the region.
As a result, issues of democratic reform lost significance for many in
the policymaking establishment. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's repeated
electoral victories'increasing the AKP's share of the vote in both
2007 and 2011'and his growing personal dominance of Turkish politics
elicited concern from civil-society activists, who worried about his
rigidity in response to criticism, but officials in Washington and
Ankara largely relegated such concerns to second-tier status.
The sidelining of press freedom, minority rights, and judicial reform
now threatens to impact the joint strategic project being advanced by
the United States and Turkey to establish secure and democratic
governance in the region and foster economic growth. The fact that
Turkey has regressed on issues of press freedom and stalled on
judicial reforms undermines the persuasive power of the Turkish
democratic model in the wider region. In a parliamentary system,
public opinion is an important check on political power. The
legitimacy of elected governments is tied to the free exchange of
opinions, ideas, and criticism'this is how the public compels
political authorities to remain accountable on a daily basis. If Prime
Minister ErdoÄ?an and the AKP are serious about overcoming Turkey's
undemocratic traditions, then maintaining and deepening freedom of
expression and permitting dissenting voices in the public sphere is
critical.
Given the turmoil in the region, with many nascent political movements
searching to define their future paths, Turkey cannot afford to come
across as undemocratic or as cracking down on freedom of expression.
The issue of press freedom is at the core of Turkey's development as a
modern democracy. Vigorous'and often controversial'internal debate is
necessary to help reinforce Turkish leadership in the region and the
strategic partnership with the United States.
A key juncture in Turkish politics
The next two years will be tremendously important in directing the
next phase of Turkish democracy, with the rewriting of the
constitution, the proposed shift to a system embracing a strong
presidency, the ongoing reform of the judiciary, and continuing
outreach to PKK leader Abdullah Ã-calan and negotiations with field
elements of the PKK all currently underway. Each of these processes
requires a strong and vigilant press to voice criticism and provide
oversight, meaning it is crucial that the freedom of the press be
protected.
The role of the press is lent further importance by the current lack
of serious political opposition to the AKP. The primary opposition
party'the CHP'is still undergoing a long-term reshuffling to widen its
appeal beyond the urban elites and remove some of the old guard, who
have so closely associated the party with the excesses of the old
Kemalist structure. The extended period of AKP dominance has allowed
it to consolidate control of the courts and weaken the military's
political influence. But this consolidation, even if necessary or
natural after a decade of rule, has left the press as the only
government oversight body and as such has perhaps helped make it a
target for the AKP, which has developed an increasingly
confrontational relationship with critical journalists and news
outlets.
The stalled EU accession process has also played a role in
establishing this dynamic. Throughout the early 2000s, this process
had incentivized Turkey to undertake important reforms and protect
democratic processes, but the European Union's economic hardships and
the wariness of many European politicians to support Turkey's bid have
together made accession a less-enticing prospect than it was for much
of the past decade. This has meant that progress on meeting the EU
membership requirements has slowed and that criticism from the
European Union, which had previously been influential in pushing
Turkish reforms, is increasingly ignored. Given the United States'
relative silence on press freedom in Turkey and clear prioritization
of other issues in the region, there are few outside voices holding
the AKP accountable.
Political journalism in Turkey
The issues outlined above have led the Turkish administration to
assert increasing control over the political debate in the country and
have led to meaningful lapses in democratic governance. Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an wants to be remembered as a transformative leader who
established legitimate democratic governance'the bookend to Atatürk
himself in modern Turkish history'and intends to establish a
presidential system wherein he can continue to govern after term
limits end his time as prime minister in 2015.
Despite these goals and his record of accomplishments since 2002,
Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an has come to view any criticism of his
government as a personal attack. Despite the measured reforms and
removal of many taboos, Turkish political culture and journalism are
both intensely personal. For many in Turkey, political disagreements
end with participants debating a person rather than an idea and
engaging in ad hominem attacks. Sometimes provoked by journalists'
vitriolic attacks, politicians'including the prime minister
himself'often mention critics by name in print or in speeches, which
can lead to threats or intimidation from unscrupulous supporters. The
prime minister has also filed five libel suits against journalists for
personal attacks since 2005. While some of the criticism for which
Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an has sued is distasteful'depictions of the prime
minister as an animal, for example'the political power of his office
is such that these lawsuits have a chilling effect on legitimate
political debate. Given his overwhelming political power, Prime
Minister ErdoÄ?an would do better to rise above such slights and work
to cement a new precedent for political leadership.
So far, the government's behavior has tended toward greater
repression. But a disclaimer is necessary before delving into the
details of the imprisonment of journalists and media ownership, as
well as direct and indirect censorship in Turkey. While these are very
serious concerns demanding attention and resolution, comparisons of
Turkey to authoritarian countries such as Iran, China, or North Korea
are off base. Some organizations monitoring the situation in Turkey
have drawn such comparisons in order to attract attention to the
plight of imprisoned journalists, and while their motives may be good,
such overreach undermines the wider political effort to ensure reform,
as it provides the government with the opportunity to dismiss all
outside criticism as overhyped. Turkey today is more democratic than
in the past, if perhaps less socially liberal. The country has, in
many ways, a healthy civil society, enshrined civilian authority, and
a vibrant political debate. While there is still work to be done, we
should not dismiss how far the country has come since the
`post-modern' coup of 1997.
Jailed journalists
As of the end of 2012, Turkey had imprisoned at least 49 journalists
for their reporting'more than any other country in the world. As Joel
Simon, executive director of the Committee to Protect Journalists, has
written, `Turkey has no business being the world's leading jailer of
journalists.' Turkish civil society is vibrant; its television shows
are enjoyed throughout the Middle East. And the AKP has grown its
share of the popular vote in three successive, legitimate national
elections. What reasonable explanation could there be for such
widespread imprisonment of journalists?
A study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shows that
the jailing of journalists is linked to the lack of a resolution of
two larger issues: the ongoing Kurdish unrest and the role of the
military in Turkish politics. Of course, those two issues are in turn
associated with the judicial-reform process and the drafting of a new
constitution to replace problematic remnants of the military
constitution that still governs the country. The existing
constitution's broadly defined laws governing national security and
territorial integrity provide ample room for abuse by overzealous
prosecutors, while the twin fears of the military deep state and
Kurdish separatism lead to prosecutions of those who may be engaged in
legitimate reporting or political advocacy.
The majority of imprisoned journalists are Kurds charged under the
remit of Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Code or under the Turkish
Anti-Terror Law. According to the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe's most recent study of the issue in August
2012, 68 percent of Turkish journalists in prison were jailed on
charges related to the Kurdish issue; 13 percent were related to the
ongoing Ergenekon trial of alleged right-wing coup plotters; and 19
percent were jailed on assorted other charges.
Both Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Code and the Turkish
Anti-Terror Law are overly broad and poorly defined, leaving them open
to abuse by prosecutors and judges for a wide array of reasons. The
Turkish Anti-Terror Law, for example, declares it a crime to `print or
publish declarations or announcements of terrorist organisations.' The
law is intended to target those dispensing terrorist propaganda but
leaves open the possibility of prosecution for any number of
journalists trying to cover the activities of the PKK or other
terrorist groups. The Anti-Terror Law also deems anyone a terrorist if
he or she is a member of an `organisation with the aim of changing the
attributes of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, the
political, legal, social, secular or economic system.' Of course, the
current constitution was written under military rule, and any number
of legitimate political actors want to `change the attributes of the
Republic as specified in the Constitution,' making this a particularly
problematic clause for a modern democracy.
Turkish government officials are quick to point out that some of the
imprisoned journalists were probably members of the PKK, labeled a
terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European
Union. Equally, there are journalists imprisoned who are clearly not
members of the PKK or even advocating on the organization's behalf.
Even delving into the details of individual cases, it is very
difficult to know the truth, and therein lies another central
problem'the lack of transparency surrounding the process. Government
sources claim that a number of jailed journalists were in fact engaged
in illegal activities, while the Committee to Protect Journalists
found that there was not sufficient evidence to determine guilt,
according to their investigation. The fact that this is a matter of
debate between government officials and their supporters and a
nongovernmental organization is in itself a condemnation of the lack
of transparency and due process under the law when it comes to
prosecuting journalists.
The abuse of the Anti-Terror Law's broad provisions has provoked
criticism from the U.S. Department of State, the European Commission,
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Turkish government has
every right to defend Turkish citizens, the state, and its territorial
integrity and to prosecute terrorists. The impasse, however, is rooted
in what has been, until recently, a mostly military approach to the
Kurdish issue. The criticism comes about because of the frequency with
which prosecutions tend to target those who could claim to be merely
reporting on PKK activities, a reasonable journalistic pursuit, while
not being members of the group themselves. As Marc Pierini, former EU
ambassador to Turkey, has written, the `judicial system tends to blur
the line between the intention to incite, praise, legitimize, or
relativize terrorist violence and the expression of an alternative,
critical, or even disturbing opinion.'
The solution to the issue of imprisoned journalists certainly lies in
the dual need for a new constitution and judicial reform. A new
constitution could eliminate the legal loopholes that allow for the
prosecution of political opponents under overly broad legal
justifications. The other issues linked to imprisonment are largely a
result of badly needed judicial reform and proper due process. Many
journalists are charged and then held in prison for extremely long
periods of pretrial detention, and their release on bail is uneven and
unpredictable. Defendants and their lawyers repeatedly complain of a
lack of access to evidence, while those trying to monitor the trials
are foiled by the utter lack of overall transparency. A new
constitution could also contribute to the permanent peaceful
resolution of the Kurdish issue through constitutional protections for
minority rights.
It is time for Turkey to truly embrace the role of a confident
democracy by allowing the open debate of these issues, particularly
the Kurdish question. The AKP is the dominant force in Turkish
politics, enjoying electoral legitimacy and broad popularity, and
therefore should be encouraging such discourse rather than stifling it
through the shadowy use of outdated security laws or judicial
malpractice.
Media ownership
Turkey's crisis of press freedom extends beyond the outright silencing
of journalists through imprisonment. The government and its allies
have also utilized more subtle forms of pressure in recent years. Much
of the problem stems from the consolidation of major media holdings
over the past two decades and the cross-ownership of media outlets by
large conglomerates. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights, the European Commission's 2012 Progress Report, and the U.S.
State Department's Human Rights Report have all identified the
cross-ownership of media outlets as a threat to freedom of the press
in Turkey.
This cross-ownership of media entities'wherein large conglomerates
with major economic interests in other sectors such as construction or
energy control media outlets'can open up reporters, editors, and
owners to a variety of pressures. Companies with interests across
economic sectors often rely on government contracts or regulation,
leading to situations where they are asked or decide to apply pressure
to limit political criticism, which could jeopardize those interests
or contracts. While smaller companies are not as influenced by
potential pressure on wider business interests, big conglomerates are
under tremendous pressure. Numerous Turkish journalists cited
instances where they were told to tone down government criticism or
had columns pulled because of such concerns. This pressure manifests
itself in direct pressure on news-outlet owners from government
officials and more subtle forms of self-censorship from editors and
journalists afraid of dismissal.
Table 1
The independent think tank Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation, or TESEV, has documented that the Turkish media market
came to be dominated by several cross-sector companies through a
series of mergers following the end of the state monopoly over
broadcasting in the 1990s. As can be seen from the table above, this
consolidation of holdings has led several companies to dominate the
Turkish media scene, across different mediums.
The case of DoÄ?an Group illustrates this point most clearly. In 2009
the Turkish authorities levied a $2.5 billion fine against DoÄ?an
Group, then the largest media company in Turkey, for unpaid taxes. The
fine was widely viewed as a political move to punish DoÄ?an for its
media outlets' negative coverage of the AKP and Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an. For weeks before the fine was announced, Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an spoke publicly against the opposition press, telling his
supporters at rallies, `Don't buy these newspapers, they are full of
filth and lies,' adding that audiences should `sentence them to
poverty.' Such language, besides being inappropriate for the office of
prime minister, tends to undermine the tax authorities' claims to an
unbiased assessment of the DoÄ?an Group's alleged financial
improprieties.
Multiple sources in Turkey described the fine against the DoÄ?an Group
as having a `chilling effect' on journalists, editors, and media
owners. For some Turks, particularly those in the opposition media,
the DoÄ?an fine was the highest-profile incident in what seems to be a
trend of tax or bankruptcy proceedings intended to silence opponents
in the press. Skeptics point to the uncontested auction of the
ATV-Sabah media group in 2008, when the company held large shares of
both print and television markets, by the Turkish Savings Deposit
Insurance Fund, or TMSF, to allies of Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an,
including his son-in-law and brother, following bankruptcy proceedings
as a point of concern. The uncontested state auction of a large media
company to a close ally of Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an stoked fears that
the prime minister was seeking to assume informal control of the
media.
More systematic concerns exist as well, surrounding the leasing of
broadcast frequencies, issuance of journalist credentials, and the
problematic Media Law, which states that television broadcasters must
lease their frequencies from the government, as stipulated in Article
26 of the constitution, because they are regarded as finite resources,
meaning the rights can also be revoked by regulators at the Radio and
Television Supreme Council, or RTÃ`K. For journalists critical of the
government, obtaining press credentials can also become an issue; the
government periodically denies credentials to opposition newspapers.
Finally, under current law the government can prosecute and fine media
outlets and journalists, for example, for ill-defined offenses linked
to national security, decency standards, and libel. As with the
terrorism laws, such poorly defined legal standards open the door to
abuse and political prosecutions.
More subtle censorship
Faced with this array of pressures, many journalists and editors
practice varied forms of self-censorship. Because of the examples made
of critics through outright prosecution, fines, or public mention by
the prime minister or other officials, many conclude that it's not
worth the risk to explore sensitive issues such as the PKK or the
Ergenekon trial. Several sources in Turkey reported receiving death
threats in the wake of public criticism of the government or in
response to particularly controversial columns on traditional
political taboos such as discussion of Kurdish political activities or
the death of more than 1 million Armenians during and after the First
World War.
Journalists and editors also report pressure on content from owners,
leading to fears of dismissal. Indeed, there are countless instances
of columnists or journalists being dismissed for refusing to tone down
criticism or for breaking controversial stories. Most recently,
veteran journalist Hasan Cemal was dismissed from Milliyet newspaper
for defending the publication of minutes from a meeting between
representatives of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, or BDP,
and the PKK leader Abdullah Ó¦calan. The leaked minutes provided fodder
for nationalist critics of the peace process, angering Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an, who publicly criticized Milliyet and condemned Cemal's column
on the subject, declaring, `If this is journalism, down with it!' Such
public condemnation from a sitting prime minister brought tremendous
pressure to bear on Milliyet's owner, who refused to publish a
subsequent column and then fired Cemal.
The concerns of critics and outside observers should not shroud the
fact that many owners, editors, and journalists are quite happy to
self-censor or cooperate with the authorities. The motivations for
this cooperation can vary from political proximity and personal ties,
to business interests and a desire for access to information, to a
genuine yearning for unity on issues of national security. The blame
for such censorship does not lie squarely with the government but also
has its roots in the varying quality of journalistic training and
ethics across the profession in Turkey.
Solutions for a freer press in Turkey
Turkey has made some progress in the past six months to address the
issue of press freedom, but fundamental reforms are still needed.
Perhaps responding to international and domestic political pressure,
the number of jailed journalists dropped sharply from 61 to 49 in
December 2012 due to a number of releases, according to the Committee
to Protect Journalists. Helping this process was progress on the
Kurdish front, with direct negotiations between the AKP government and
Abdullah Ó¦calan yielding a historic ceasefire announcement from the
jailed PKK leader, who declared on March 21 that it was time to `solve
the arms problem without losing time or another life.' This opening
may help ease one of the points of tension resulting in many of the
charges against journalists'the Kurdish issue'and prompt the
government to embrace a broader alleviation of censorship.
The most recent positive development is an amendment to the
Anti-Terror Law passed on April 11, 2013. The Turkish Parliament
passed several AKP initiatives to narrow the definitions of
prosecutable offenses, which are now limited to those who voice
opinions deemed `a clear and an imminent danger to public order' or
those who promote violent acts. While this limited step does not
address the fundamental problems with the judicial system or the
constitution and still leaves room for abuse under the `public order'
clause, it is nevertheless a positive development.
Numerous reports have outlined in detail the steps necessary for
Turkey to overcome this problem and fully institutionalize a vibrant
and free press. First, Turkey's EU accession process was a unifying
thread that helped incentivize democratic governance, prevent the
excesses of the security apparatus, and encourage reforms through the
early AKP years'and hope is needed on that front. While politicians in
Turkey have soured on EU accession of late because of Europe's
economic woes and the dismissive attitude of certain European leaders,
Turkey's entry into the union is in the interest of all parties.
Second, Turkey needs a new constitution. A modern democracy has no
business being governed by a constitution written under military rule.
The new constitution must prioritize the protection of minority rights
and freedom of expression. This is not just meant as a protection for
Kurds and other minorities, but also represents the only path to a
peaceful, democratic Turkey, and will unleash new economic potential
in previously marginal areas. Further, constitutional reform should
include the removal of the most problematic `catch-all' phrases and
clauses in the current constitution, particularly those regarding
insulting the state or `Turkishness.' If Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an wants
to be remembered as Turkey's democratic leader, then this should be
his overarching goal.
Third, alongside the process of constitutional reform, the AKP must
continue to pursue the evenhanded reform of the broken judicial
system. The four judicial-reform packages passed since 2002 represent
incremental progress, but the government would now be best served by
bringing its full attention and resources to bear on the problem. As
it stands, people accused of crimes spend far too long in jail
awaiting trial, and release pending a trial is uneven and unfair.
Related to this problem, trials proceed too slowly, contributing to
the problem of long pretrial detentions and leading to financial and
personal strain on the accused. Too often in Turkey, the accused are
treated as guilty before due process has been served. The accused and
their legal counsel must have full access to evidence, and the cloud
of secrecy surrounding politically sensitive prosecutions should be
removed. This will allow for greater accountability and will prevent
overzealous prosecutors, often eager to gain favor by going after
critics of the government, from abusing the broad definitions within
the media law or the Anti-Terror Law.
Fourth, the Kurdish issue must be addressed through negotiation;
military force alone will not solve the problem. To its credit, the
AKP has begun this process, and negotiations continue with the
departure of PKK fighters from Turkish soil pending a broader amnesty
agreement. Much can still go wrong in this fraught political process,
but the AKP has finally acknowledged that the only real way to end
this struggle is to win the debate'not resort to force. And, of
course, in order to win the debate, the AKP must allow the debate to
take place.
Finally, the United States can and should do more to encourage its
partner to more fully embrace its role as a modern democracy. All
reports from both sides indicate that Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an values
his relationship with President Obama very highly. Beyond this
personal relationship, Turkey and the United States share many
strategic goals and a valuable military alliance. While policymakers
must assess the value of public pronouncements given the political
situations in both countries, private or personal appeals from
President Obama might prompt action from Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an.
President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and other members of
the U.S. government should make clear to Turkish officials that the
partnership does not end with military or strategic considerations.
While making clear that Turkish democracy will continue to reflect
Turkish culture and history, U.S. leaders must show that they consider
freedom of the press to be non-negotiable.
Conclusion
The course of constitutional and legal reform in Turkey over the next
two years, along with the fate of the PKK negotiations, will likely
decide whether the events of the past five years represent either a
necessary, if sometimes unpleasant, correction after so many years of
military and Kemalist domination or a longer-term deterioration of
democratic norms in Turkey. The 2014 presidential elections may also
reveal the extent to which the current controversies are the product
of specific leadership personalities or a case of the familiar tools
of power wielded by new hands. It is unclear whether a figure less
dominant than the prime minister would exert less control over the
press or if the problem is more institutional.
But the blame must not be placed solely on the government, which is
laboring under an outdated constitution and must deal with a stubborn
opposition that mistrusts its intentions. Turkish politics must
continue to address the wider problem of a political culture where the
line between personal insult and outdated notions of honor and
legitimate criticism or debate is blurred. Turkish society has also
not fundamentally decided what balance of security and freedom of
expression is right for their country'should reporting on bombings or
carrying the statements of separatists be considered criminal? The
question of media ownership is also thorny, with no indication that
the trend toward consolidated ownership of news outlets by large
conglomerates is slowing.
The owners of large media companies also often have a wide range of
business interests with the government and fear that critiquing the
AKP could negatively impact government contracts or other business
operations. These overlapping interests and owners' fears of
government backlash have undoubtedly contributed to the current crisis
of press freedom, with many proprietors applying pressure to
journalists or editors who criticize the government. Indeed, a 2011
survey of top journalists by Bilgi University demonstrated the twin
pressures facing journalists and editors, with 95 percent of those
surveyed reporting government interference in news production and 85
percent reporting intervention by media owners.
What is certain is the central importance of press freedom to the
entrenchment of democratic norms in Turkey. For nongovernmental
organizations there is room to help monitor the situation and provide
venues and support for independent journalism. Funding freelancers or
helping set up independent publishing outlets along the lines of
ProPublica could help circumvent many of the pressures placed on
journalists in Turkey. A form of such adaptation is already going on
with the rise of social media and the large online followings top
journalists have acquired, but financial and institutional support are
still lacking.
The United States has a clear interest in ensuring press freedom in
Turkey. This interest extends beyond any general desire to promote
democratic governance and freedom of expression and encompasses
important strategic concerns. And the United States can be forthright
in expecting more from Turkey's leaders. Veteran U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey Frank Ricciardone has been outspoken on the subject of
political intervention in the Turkish press and has said that there is
no need for high-level Turkish officials to constantly intervene.
Ambassador Ricciardone is right to question the governing party's
efforts to suppress opinion.
Given Turkey's history of coups and censorship, and the pluralism and
diversity present in the early years of the AKP government, it is hard
to understand why the prime minister and some of his cabinet members
would risk those achievements, prompt a backlash from Turkish society,
and damage the country's international reputation by attempting to
stifle dissent. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an and the AKP are strong enough
and enjoy sufficient legitimacy to allow dissent and debate. Cracking
down on such activities is a sign of weakness, not strength.
Furthermore, the prime minister and his party have the opportunity to
set a new tone in the political debate and to entrench a more open
political culture.
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that, `The struggle
for human rights begins by telling the truth over and over again,'
affirming that the `United States will stand with those who seek to
advance the causes of democracy and human rights wherever they may
live.' This discussion represents the finest American tradition'even
when there are political costs to advancing such issues'and it is in
the U.S. interest to defend freedom of speech in close strategic
allies such as Turkey.
Foreign policy and bilateral relations have become increasingly
democratized in this modern era, requiring more debate and engagement
on questions of legitimacy, and `intermestic' concerns have gained
prominence. Secretary Clinton's drive to engage societies in addition
to governments recognized this phenomenon, and this approach should be
more fully extended to Turkey. That is precisely why President Obama
and Secretary of State Kerry should consistently raise the subject in
meetings with Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an and Foreign Minister Ahmet
DavutoÄ?lu. If personal assurances are not backed up by substantive
action, more public exhortations may be necessary.
The United States and Turkey have a solid strategic partnership on
which to build, but in the long run, deepening this association'which
is in both countries' national interest and is sought by many on both
sides'will require a shared understanding of freedom of expression and
freedom of the press.
For more information please visit: http://www.americanprogress.org/as
From: A. Papazian