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Marat Terterov: Armenia's long term security will be better served by
strengthening economic security, rather than defining national
security on the basis of the Tsarist Russian catch-cry `armiya i flot'
ArmInfo's interview with Dr. Marat Terterov, Director of European
Geopolitical Forum (EGF)
by David Stepanyan
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid§719420-BE17-11E2-8CB9F6327207157C
Thursday, May 16, 14:58
Armenia gradually turns into an area of purpose-oriented cooperation
of leading geopolitical actors having quite different interests when
it comes to other issues. Many analysts say that Yerevan's inertial
foreign policy should be stopped sooner or later, as the country needs
breakthrough decisions given the acute economic and political
challenges. What do you think of that?
I am not sure that we will see any `breakthrough tendencies' emerging
out of Armenian foreign policy at any time soon. Despite the fact that
I would agree with the view that Armenia - and more so the entire
South Caucasus region - has evolved as a playground for larger
geopolitical forces, both Armenia and its immediate neighbourhood have
become subject to a certain `power balance' in terms of foreign
policy. Armenia holds the territorial and military high ground in
relation to the unresolved conflict over Karabakh, whilst also
entertaining a strong axis with Iran.
Azerbaijan, whilst clearly unsatisfied over the current state of
affairs with Karabakh, has emerged as the region's energy locomotive,
and is unlikely to risk war with Yerevan lest it loses the gains the
country has made with respect to its energy economy. Georgia too has
entrenched its position in the region, and despite the recent election
of an evidently more Russia-friendly Prime Minister, Tbilisi continues
to advocate its pro-EU path. None of these regional stakeholder states
are likely to risk any major foreign policy adventures - or change of
course - at any time soon. Armenia, in particular, is likely to
continue favouring the status quo and exercise an extremely cautious
foreign policy.
Maintaining the status quo over Karabakh provides the current
political elite in power in Yerevan with a certain degree of
legitimacy and as long as links with Moscow remain strong, I cannot
see any territorial or other types of concessions which Armenia could
be compelled to make to Azerbaijan. Neither is Armenia an EU
membership candidate country, although it is seeking to modernise
based on European standards, this is clear.
This means that there is not really much leverage that Brussels has
over Yerevan to make concessions, particularly in regional foreign
policy making. All of this points to more conservative foreign policy
making coming out of Yerevan, looking ahead, rather than any
breakthroughs or audacious steps. I would only see scope for radical
change in Armenian foreign policy if the region is hit by some form of
major crisis (such as a major spill-over of the Syrian conflict into
the region, particularly that which may involve Iran), or regime
change either in Armenia or some of the neighbouring countries.
Do you see any upward trends in the influence of the USA and Europe
in the South Caucasus amid Russia's policy, which is assessed as
inconsistent and uncoordinated even by Russian experts?
I think that most Western experts of the region's geopolitics would
agree that the South Caucasus is not exactly the top foreign policy
priority for Washington, Brussels or the top EU member states. This
has been quite clear since the time of the late Bush presidency (US),
in contrast to earlier years, when Washington was placing visible
political capital behind the Saakashvili regime in Georgia. Many
experts would agree - I feel - that the August 2008 war was a kind of
watershed in terms of regional geopolitics - the return of Russia and
the departure of the West.
While this may not exactly be the case (one can argue that the West is
still there, and that Turkey, remains largely a pro-Western state in
the region), we have certainly been seeing a more active role played
by Russia, as well as Turkey, in the region's geopolitics (esp in the
area of the wider Black Sea). The more important point regarding this
question lies well beyond the Caucasus, however. The South Caucasus is
clearly a very important geopolitical arena for a number of external
powers. However the region today does not exactly constitute one of
the world's `hot spots' in terms of military conflict, civil war, etc.
When it comes to major foreign policy questions, the physical time of
high level Western policy makers today still remains dedicated to the
regions of the world which have been an arena of crisis for much of
the Cold War period - the Middle East (in 2011 Libya, in 2012 and
today: Syria), the Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. Today, even
countries like Mali demand more time from top foreign policy makers in
London and Paris than does the Caucasus. The states of the South
Caucasus are not bereft of their problems, but the sad truth is that
the region needs another war to really `buy into the time' of the top
Western foreign policy makers.
Would you make any forecasts on Armenia's most probable vector of integration?
I really don't think this is a question capable of sparking any real
excitement among specialists on the region at the present time, as I
don't really think that it's a choice of East Vs West for Armenia.
Armenia's main domestic policy challenge at the present time is
modernisation of the state and commensurate institutions: which type
of political and economic strategy to implement in order to put the
country onto a more effective development path so that the Armenian
people can start to realise their maximum human development
capacities. I do not see this question being answered by a choice of
`we either join the Russian-led project or promote deeper economic
integration with the EU. One should not be seen in total exclusion of
the other: it is just as inconceivable that Armenians based in Russia
will stop channelling capital into the country as Diaspora Armenians
living outside of the ex-USSR. The Armenian Diaspora is the real
driver for foreign capital coming into the country, and the real
bridge between Yerevan and the outside world. None of this is
contingent on Armenia having to make a choice: East or West. The
patronages that the Diaspora creates within the country have become
rather strong since the end of the Cold War, although they should not
necessary be seen as a panacea for the county's problems. I see this
scenario as largely continuing into the future, continuing to
underscore Armenia's close political and economic ties with both East
and West. One should also take into account Armenia's special
geographical position as it is seen by Armenian national patriots, and
the need to securitize it: the fact that the `300 Spartans are
surrounded by Xerxes and the armies of Asia' should not be taken
lightly. Despite the fact that Armenia since the end of the USSR has
often been seen as a weak state due to its lack of economic progress,
it is security issues, rather than the economy, which have shaped
Armenia's foreign policy in recent years.
The OSCE Minsk Group is said to have exhausted its opportunities to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Do you see any alternatives to
it? What if Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh's independence? What
effect will it have on the process?
Yes, people tend to ridicule the Minsk Group now days and widely
refer to its incapacity of conflict resolution over Karabakh. This
position is often brought up by Azerbaijan, since the Minsk Group is
often seen as unable to break the status quo over Karabkah, by which
Azerbaijan feels discriminated. In fact Baku would most likely prefer
to change the entire architecture around the Karabakh peace process -
bring it within the framework of the UN, involve more Muslim
countries, as well as the EU, etc. This is quite normal from Baku's
perspective: it feels that it has lost territory and desires its
return. However Armenia will not budge an inch in the present climate.
Yerevan stands behind the Minsk Group and the so-called Madrid
Principles as the primary means of promoting conflict resolution. It
is likely to continue doing so. This is also normal (from an
international relations theory perspective) - Armenia has the high
ground and wants to keep itself there. Hence we have stalemate over
Karabakh and the Minsk Group led peace process - as a peace process -
is going largely nowhere. This scenario is likely to remain as long as
the current architecture remains in place and as long as Russia has a
commanding `equity stake' in the process.
In terms of alternatives, well, if we are serious about resolving the
conflict (or at least convince people that we want to move into that
direction), we need to radically alter our approach to the game
altogether. We need to push for a new breed of external stakeholders
to become far more actively - even audaciously - involved. My
colleague George Niculescu and I recently wrote a study about how
economic incentives (through the promotion of regional energy and
infrastructure projects) might contribute towards breaking the
stalemate over Karabakh (see: www.gpf-europe.com). I have also briefed
Armenian decision makers on the `possible merits' of economic
incentives at a conference in Yerevan last November.
I argued that Armenia's long term security will be better served by
strengthening the country's longer term economic security, rather than
defining national security purely on the basis of the Tsarist Russian
catch-cry `armiya i flot'.
Would you dwell upon the necessary instruments and mechanisms?
In this context it is fundamentally important to start building the
type of regional economic space in the entire South Caucasus that
large scale foreign investment and the international community would
like to see: highly interdependent regional economies, open borders,
free movement of people, a more relaxed approach to the concept of
state sovereignty in a region comprised of both states and entities.
Throwing in a gas pipeline project connecting Azerbaijan to Armenia
and Turkey would be the ideal scenario for long term peace building,
as unrealistic as it may seem at present. This approach would include
Armenia making concessions to Azerbaijan, possibly even returning some
territory, or granting territorial concessions of some kind.
Azerbaijan would then have to be bound by security guarantees and
non-aggression towards Armenia. The Minsk Group - which I don't think
should be disbanded - would then serve its real mandate of separating
the sides and keeping them from waging war against one another.
Further international engagement could come from not just the
traditional stakeholders like Moscow, Washington or Brussels/EU
national capital, but totally new actors such as the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), which could be used to promote foreign
investment and regional economic integration, and dis-incentivise
conflict altogether. We need to revive the spirit of Baron Pierre de
Coubertin, Founder of the modern Olympic movement at the end of the
19th Century, and the Olympic Games as the ultimate symbol of peace.
However, this is not just utopia. The IOC could act as a broker, not
just a symbol, of peace. An Olympiad typically brings billions of
dollars to the host cities and countries where the games are held.
I have participated in four Olympiads and have seen what the games
have done to Barcelona and Athens from that perspective. Could Armenia
and Azerbaijan swallow their pride and move towards a regional peace
if the IOC would be persuaded that the Olympics should be jointly held
in Baku and Yerevan in 2024 ? The IOC, working in coordination with
the Minsk Group and the UN, have the power to radically alter the
existing peace building architecture in the region. They also have the
clout to demand that both Armenia and Azerbaijan keep the peace in
exchange for the 50 billion or so dollars that an Olympiad could bring
to the region.
strengthening economic security, rather than defining national
security on the basis of the Tsarist Russian catch-cry `armiya i flot'
ArmInfo's interview with Dr. Marat Terterov, Director of European
Geopolitical Forum (EGF)
by David Stepanyan
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid§719420-BE17-11E2-8CB9F6327207157C
Thursday, May 16, 14:58
Armenia gradually turns into an area of purpose-oriented cooperation
of leading geopolitical actors having quite different interests when
it comes to other issues. Many analysts say that Yerevan's inertial
foreign policy should be stopped sooner or later, as the country needs
breakthrough decisions given the acute economic and political
challenges. What do you think of that?
I am not sure that we will see any `breakthrough tendencies' emerging
out of Armenian foreign policy at any time soon. Despite the fact that
I would agree with the view that Armenia - and more so the entire
South Caucasus region - has evolved as a playground for larger
geopolitical forces, both Armenia and its immediate neighbourhood have
become subject to a certain `power balance' in terms of foreign
policy. Armenia holds the territorial and military high ground in
relation to the unresolved conflict over Karabakh, whilst also
entertaining a strong axis with Iran.
Azerbaijan, whilst clearly unsatisfied over the current state of
affairs with Karabakh, has emerged as the region's energy locomotive,
and is unlikely to risk war with Yerevan lest it loses the gains the
country has made with respect to its energy economy. Georgia too has
entrenched its position in the region, and despite the recent election
of an evidently more Russia-friendly Prime Minister, Tbilisi continues
to advocate its pro-EU path. None of these regional stakeholder states
are likely to risk any major foreign policy adventures - or change of
course - at any time soon. Armenia, in particular, is likely to
continue favouring the status quo and exercise an extremely cautious
foreign policy.
Maintaining the status quo over Karabakh provides the current
political elite in power in Yerevan with a certain degree of
legitimacy and as long as links with Moscow remain strong, I cannot
see any territorial or other types of concessions which Armenia could
be compelled to make to Azerbaijan. Neither is Armenia an EU
membership candidate country, although it is seeking to modernise
based on European standards, this is clear.
This means that there is not really much leverage that Brussels has
over Yerevan to make concessions, particularly in regional foreign
policy making. All of this points to more conservative foreign policy
making coming out of Yerevan, looking ahead, rather than any
breakthroughs or audacious steps. I would only see scope for radical
change in Armenian foreign policy if the region is hit by some form of
major crisis (such as a major spill-over of the Syrian conflict into
the region, particularly that which may involve Iran), or regime
change either in Armenia or some of the neighbouring countries.
Do you see any upward trends in the influence of the USA and Europe
in the South Caucasus amid Russia's policy, which is assessed as
inconsistent and uncoordinated even by Russian experts?
I think that most Western experts of the region's geopolitics would
agree that the South Caucasus is not exactly the top foreign policy
priority for Washington, Brussels or the top EU member states. This
has been quite clear since the time of the late Bush presidency (US),
in contrast to earlier years, when Washington was placing visible
political capital behind the Saakashvili regime in Georgia. Many
experts would agree - I feel - that the August 2008 war was a kind of
watershed in terms of regional geopolitics - the return of Russia and
the departure of the West.
While this may not exactly be the case (one can argue that the West is
still there, and that Turkey, remains largely a pro-Western state in
the region), we have certainly been seeing a more active role played
by Russia, as well as Turkey, in the region's geopolitics (esp in the
area of the wider Black Sea). The more important point regarding this
question lies well beyond the Caucasus, however. The South Caucasus is
clearly a very important geopolitical arena for a number of external
powers. However the region today does not exactly constitute one of
the world's `hot spots' in terms of military conflict, civil war, etc.
When it comes to major foreign policy questions, the physical time of
high level Western policy makers today still remains dedicated to the
regions of the world which have been an arena of crisis for much of
the Cold War period - the Middle East (in 2011 Libya, in 2012 and
today: Syria), the Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. Today, even
countries like Mali demand more time from top foreign policy makers in
London and Paris than does the Caucasus. The states of the South
Caucasus are not bereft of their problems, but the sad truth is that
the region needs another war to really `buy into the time' of the top
Western foreign policy makers.
Would you make any forecasts on Armenia's most probable vector of integration?
I really don't think this is a question capable of sparking any real
excitement among specialists on the region at the present time, as I
don't really think that it's a choice of East Vs West for Armenia.
Armenia's main domestic policy challenge at the present time is
modernisation of the state and commensurate institutions: which type
of political and economic strategy to implement in order to put the
country onto a more effective development path so that the Armenian
people can start to realise their maximum human development
capacities. I do not see this question being answered by a choice of
`we either join the Russian-led project or promote deeper economic
integration with the EU. One should not be seen in total exclusion of
the other: it is just as inconceivable that Armenians based in Russia
will stop channelling capital into the country as Diaspora Armenians
living outside of the ex-USSR. The Armenian Diaspora is the real
driver for foreign capital coming into the country, and the real
bridge between Yerevan and the outside world. None of this is
contingent on Armenia having to make a choice: East or West. The
patronages that the Diaspora creates within the country have become
rather strong since the end of the Cold War, although they should not
necessary be seen as a panacea for the county's problems. I see this
scenario as largely continuing into the future, continuing to
underscore Armenia's close political and economic ties with both East
and West. One should also take into account Armenia's special
geographical position as it is seen by Armenian national patriots, and
the need to securitize it: the fact that the `300 Spartans are
surrounded by Xerxes and the armies of Asia' should not be taken
lightly. Despite the fact that Armenia since the end of the USSR has
often been seen as a weak state due to its lack of economic progress,
it is security issues, rather than the economy, which have shaped
Armenia's foreign policy in recent years.
The OSCE Minsk Group is said to have exhausted its opportunities to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Do you see any alternatives to
it? What if Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh's independence? What
effect will it have on the process?
Yes, people tend to ridicule the Minsk Group now days and widely
refer to its incapacity of conflict resolution over Karabakh. This
position is often brought up by Azerbaijan, since the Minsk Group is
often seen as unable to break the status quo over Karabkah, by which
Azerbaijan feels discriminated. In fact Baku would most likely prefer
to change the entire architecture around the Karabakh peace process -
bring it within the framework of the UN, involve more Muslim
countries, as well as the EU, etc. This is quite normal from Baku's
perspective: it feels that it has lost territory and desires its
return. However Armenia will not budge an inch in the present climate.
Yerevan stands behind the Minsk Group and the so-called Madrid
Principles as the primary means of promoting conflict resolution. It
is likely to continue doing so. This is also normal (from an
international relations theory perspective) - Armenia has the high
ground and wants to keep itself there. Hence we have stalemate over
Karabakh and the Minsk Group led peace process - as a peace process -
is going largely nowhere. This scenario is likely to remain as long as
the current architecture remains in place and as long as Russia has a
commanding `equity stake' in the process.
In terms of alternatives, well, if we are serious about resolving the
conflict (or at least convince people that we want to move into that
direction), we need to radically alter our approach to the game
altogether. We need to push for a new breed of external stakeholders
to become far more actively - even audaciously - involved. My
colleague George Niculescu and I recently wrote a study about how
economic incentives (through the promotion of regional energy and
infrastructure projects) might contribute towards breaking the
stalemate over Karabakh (see: www.gpf-europe.com). I have also briefed
Armenian decision makers on the `possible merits' of economic
incentives at a conference in Yerevan last November.
I argued that Armenia's long term security will be better served by
strengthening the country's longer term economic security, rather than
defining national security purely on the basis of the Tsarist Russian
catch-cry `armiya i flot'.
Would you dwell upon the necessary instruments and mechanisms?
In this context it is fundamentally important to start building the
type of regional economic space in the entire South Caucasus that
large scale foreign investment and the international community would
like to see: highly interdependent regional economies, open borders,
free movement of people, a more relaxed approach to the concept of
state sovereignty in a region comprised of both states and entities.
Throwing in a gas pipeline project connecting Azerbaijan to Armenia
and Turkey would be the ideal scenario for long term peace building,
as unrealistic as it may seem at present. This approach would include
Armenia making concessions to Azerbaijan, possibly even returning some
territory, or granting territorial concessions of some kind.
Azerbaijan would then have to be bound by security guarantees and
non-aggression towards Armenia. The Minsk Group - which I don't think
should be disbanded - would then serve its real mandate of separating
the sides and keeping them from waging war against one another.
Further international engagement could come from not just the
traditional stakeholders like Moscow, Washington or Brussels/EU
national capital, but totally new actors such as the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), which could be used to promote foreign
investment and regional economic integration, and dis-incentivise
conflict altogether. We need to revive the spirit of Baron Pierre de
Coubertin, Founder of the modern Olympic movement at the end of the
19th Century, and the Olympic Games as the ultimate symbol of peace.
However, this is not just utopia. The IOC could act as a broker, not
just a symbol, of peace. An Olympiad typically brings billions of
dollars to the host cities and countries where the games are held.
I have participated in four Olympiads and have seen what the games
have done to Barcelona and Athens from that perspective. Could Armenia
and Azerbaijan swallow their pride and move towards a regional peace
if the IOC would be persuaded that the Olympics should be jointly held
in Baku and Yerevan in 2024 ? The IOC, working in coordination with
the Minsk Group and the UN, have the power to radically alter the
existing peace building architecture in the region. They also have the
clout to demand that both Armenia and Azerbaijan keep the peace in
exchange for the 50 billion or so dollars that an Olympiad could bring
to the region.