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Today's Zaman, Turkey
May 21 2013
Herman Van Rompuy in EU-Turkey relations
by Ali Yurttagül*
21 May 2013 /
The European Union took an important step forward with the Treaty of
Lisbon when it decided to elect a high representative who would serve
as foreign minister as well as a head of council who would have a
two-and-a-half-year term and would make the EU visible within and
without the union, in an attempt to overcome the term presidency
chosen for a period of six months and allow for more permanent
representation of the EU in an international platform.
As in all processes of institutionalization in the EU, it was clear
that this important step would bring some new political dynamics and
that the politicians elected to this post would determine the future
structure of the union. For this reason, influential names within the
EU including Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker and former
British Prime Minister Tony Blair were the leading candidates in the
first instance. Leaders such as Nicolas Sarkozy, however, made moves
to ensure that these leading names would not assume this role, and as
a result, relatively weak figures were proposed for this post. Thus,
the name of Herman Van Rompuy, who had been serving as Belgian prime
minister for a few months due to the internal struggle there and is
not well known, popped up. This politician was subsequently elected
the European Council president.
A weak and unknown politician
Like the European press, the Turkish media also referred to this
politician as weak and unknown and made negative remarks about him. He
must have found some time in his second term as president of the
European Council when he decided to make his first visit to Turkey on
May 23. Güven Ã-zalp, the Milliyet daily's Brussels correspondent,
announced his decision to make the visit; this politician has in the
past expressed his view suggesting that Turkey will never become an EU
member; and he has visited countries such as Azerbaijan and Armenia
over the past three years, whereas he stressed that he boycotted
Turkey; this is actually a coincidence. Before dealing with his
approach vis-Ã-vis Turkey, let me focus on the institutional problems
of the EU in general terms.
The number of member states in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed
was six, whereas the number of EU member states now is 27; it is
already certain that it will become 30 with the admission of some
Balkan states. Politicians have always been aware of the need for
institutional reform during the enlargement processes; however, they
have been unable to take the necessary steps. The bold steps taken
under the Treaty of Lisbon, the most recent reform project, have met
with strong resistance from the nation-states. There is no need to be
an expert to see that a 27-member club in which the members put
emphasis on their national interests actually needs a structure that
promotes the common interests. Reforms to strengthen the EU Commission
and the European Parliament were urgently necessary, and the council
presidency and the high representative set up by this treaty would be
responsible for the common interests.
Van Rompuy, who was elected president, remained non-influential in
this post where he narrowly interpreted his powers specified in the
treaties and relevant legislation. The member states, in an attempt to
show that the practice of the term presidency still remains, have
shaped the council working programs as six-month intervals as usual.
And they referred these programs to the public and to the parliament
by reliance on the former methods. Van Rompuy did not offer a
political program for the first or the second term presidency; he even
went unnoticed in the term presidency ceremonies. In addition, he did
not even exercise powers relevant to the presidency on shaping and
determining the agenda. Sadly, this reluctant and hesitant attitude
remains an illness in all EU institutions and bodies. Almost all EU
officials including bureaucrats and commissioners fail to exercise
their authority and power under the treaties in an attempt not to
offend the member states; they even fail to honor their obligations to
properly implement the treaties. For this reason, the common interests
of the EU often go unnoticed and unattended. Many examples could be
cited. Let me try to elaborate on the weakness of the EU with
reference to the negotiation process and to the fate of the decisions
on Turkey.
It is certain that Turkey's relations with the EU and its EU
membership bid are not easy matters. Turkey is not just any country
whose admission could be easily adjusted and absorbed given its
history, economy, size and culture. It is clear that an EU where
Turkey would be a member would have an entirely different political
identity. For this reason, it is only normal to witness anti-Turkey
groups and opposition including the far right and conventional
political actors. For instance, a politician like Van Rompuy, who
believes that the EU should espouse Christian values, would not
welcome Turkey's EU membership. For this reason, Turkey's acquisition
of candidature status in December 1999 and start of membership talks
in December 2004 were not easy achievements in the EU Council. Despite
this, the EU member states unanimously cleared the way for membership
talks, and the negotiation process officially started on Oct. 3, 2005.
The suspension of eight chapters
However, the EU member states, in an effort to satisfy the then-newly
admitted member Cyprus, suspended eight chapters of negotiation talks
one year later. Turkey, while being legally unjustified in insisting
on not observing its obligations under the customs union, was,
however, politically justified because the EU member states failed to
implement their own decisions and resolutions seeking to lift the
isolation and embargo on the Turks in Cyprus who voted in favor of the
Annan plan on April 26, 2004. The Greek Cypriots were also able to,
through using the EU, make Turkey and the Turks submit to their terms
and expectations. The Greek Cypriots unilaterally vetoed six chapters
in the negotiations. Sarkozy also vetoed five chapters in an effort to
extend support to the Greeks and send a message to the far right in
France; after this, the negotiation process became less serious.
Despite political changes on the island, nothing substantial has
changed in the status of Cyprus. However, no institution in Brussels
has adopted a position to recommend implementation of the agreements
and legal rules. For this reason, the EU is responsible for the lack
of a resolution in Cyprus and the deadlock in the relations with
Turkey.
If we look at this matter from Turkey's perspective, we could say the
situation is not so dramatic because Turkey has been making enormous
progress in the field of economy since the Helsinki decision and has
been experiencing a process of huge reforms over the past decade. The
EU remained an important factor in this process up to 2005; however,
it has never played any role at all over the past eight years. The
people do not find the EU membership perspective serious or tangible,
and the politicians do not even make reference to the EU membership
requirements. Because they realize that a serious negotiation process
would become painful for Ankara, they are not complaining about this
situation. However, the EU side gives a dramatic impression and fails
to do whatever it needs to do to protect its interests.
For instance, you cannot find any politician within the EU who does
not believe that relations with Turkey are important in terms of the
energy security of Europe. However, the chapter on energy policy is
not open for negotiation. If the EU is able to resume this chapter --
there is no technical barrier before this -- it would be able to hold
institutional dialogue on energy security and foreign and common
defense policies. It is not hard to think that keeping these two
chapters closed in the relations with Turkey, which is a NATO member,
is not a smart thing to do.
As if she is unaware that these chapters have been vetoed and blocked
before, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy Lady Ashton has been in a visible and strong dialogue
with Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu; this dialogue is so extensive
that it is almost unprecedented in EU history. Even though this is
positive for the EU, it is possible to say this is emerging as an EU
policy and that the dialogue between Ashton and the capital cities is
not working well. We know that the number of bilateral meetings
between US President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
ErdoÄ?an over the last five years is more than 10. However, ErdoÄ?an has
never been invited to the EU summits over the past decade, and he has
not met with the council president during this period.
In fact, the situation looks pretty grave and even hilarious. In
almost every decision and resolution on Turkey, the EU made reference
to the rule of law and fundamental rights, as well as the need for
respect of these rights. Of course, this is a necessary and proper
attitude. However, the same EU fails to resume the chapters on
fundamental rights and justice, and as a result, it is unable to
inform Turkey of what it needs to do to attain the EU norms and
standards in this field. The situation is grave because Turkey is
currently dealing with its most intricate political issue, the making
of a new constitution. The EU, which is supposed to play a
constructive and influential role in this process, is not helping at
all. Have you ever heard European Council President Herman van
Rompuy's statement and call for member states to act consistently and
respect the joint resolutions and treaties? Not only did the people
not hear such a warning in the EU halls, but we didn't, either. Most
probably for this reason, the EU still remains an object and toy in
the hands of this small member state. And this, unfortunately, is not
limited to policy vis-Ã-vis Turkey.
*Ali Yurttagül is a political advisor for the Greens in the European Parliament.
May 21 2013
Herman Van Rompuy in EU-Turkey relations
by Ali Yurttagül*
21 May 2013 /
The European Union took an important step forward with the Treaty of
Lisbon when it decided to elect a high representative who would serve
as foreign minister as well as a head of council who would have a
two-and-a-half-year term and would make the EU visible within and
without the union, in an attempt to overcome the term presidency
chosen for a period of six months and allow for more permanent
representation of the EU in an international platform.
As in all processes of institutionalization in the EU, it was clear
that this important step would bring some new political dynamics and
that the politicians elected to this post would determine the future
structure of the union. For this reason, influential names within the
EU including Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker and former
British Prime Minister Tony Blair were the leading candidates in the
first instance. Leaders such as Nicolas Sarkozy, however, made moves
to ensure that these leading names would not assume this role, and as
a result, relatively weak figures were proposed for this post. Thus,
the name of Herman Van Rompuy, who had been serving as Belgian prime
minister for a few months due to the internal struggle there and is
not well known, popped up. This politician was subsequently elected
the European Council president.
A weak and unknown politician
Like the European press, the Turkish media also referred to this
politician as weak and unknown and made negative remarks about him. He
must have found some time in his second term as president of the
European Council when he decided to make his first visit to Turkey on
May 23. Güven Ã-zalp, the Milliyet daily's Brussels correspondent,
announced his decision to make the visit; this politician has in the
past expressed his view suggesting that Turkey will never become an EU
member; and he has visited countries such as Azerbaijan and Armenia
over the past three years, whereas he stressed that he boycotted
Turkey; this is actually a coincidence. Before dealing with his
approach vis-Ã-vis Turkey, let me focus on the institutional problems
of the EU in general terms.
The number of member states in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed
was six, whereas the number of EU member states now is 27; it is
already certain that it will become 30 with the admission of some
Balkan states. Politicians have always been aware of the need for
institutional reform during the enlargement processes; however, they
have been unable to take the necessary steps. The bold steps taken
under the Treaty of Lisbon, the most recent reform project, have met
with strong resistance from the nation-states. There is no need to be
an expert to see that a 27-member club in which the members put
emphasis on their national interests actually needs a structure that
promotes the common interests. Reforms to strengthen the EU Commission
and the European Parliament were urgently necessary, and the council
presidency and the high representative set up by this treaty would be
responsible for the common interests.
Van Rompuy, who was elected president, remained non-influential in
this post where he narrowly interpreted his powers specified in the
treaties and relevant legislation. The member states, in an attempt to
show that the practice of the term presidency still remains, have
shaped the council working programs as six-month intervals as usual.
And they referred these programs to the public and to the parliament
by reliance on the former methods. Van Rompuy did not offer a
political program for the first or the second term presidency; he even
went unnoticed in the term presidency ceremonies. In addition, he did
not even exercise powers relevant to the presidency on shaping and
determining the agenda. Sadly, this reluctant and hesitant attitude
remains an illness in all EU institutions and bodies. Almost all EU
officials including bureaucrats and commissioners fail to exercise
their authority and power under the treaties in an attempt not to
offend the member states; they even fail to honor their obligations to
properly implement the treaties. For this reason, the common interests
of the EU often go unnoticed and unattended. Many examples could be
cited. Let me try to elaborate on the weakness of the EU with
reference to the negotiation process and to the fate of the decisions
on Turkey.
It is certain that Turkey's relations with the EU and its EU
membership bid are not easy matters. Turkey is not just any country
whose admission could be easily adjusted and absorbed given its
history, economy, size and culture. It is clear that an EU where
Turkey would be a member would have an entirely different political
identity. For this reason, it is only normal to witness anti-Turkey
groups and opposition including the far right and conventional
political actors. For instance, a politician like Van Rompuy, who
believes that the EU should espouse Christian values, would not
welcome Turkey's EU membership. For this reason, Turkey's acquisition
of candidature status in December 1999 and start of membership talks
in December 2004 were not easy achievements in the EU Council. Despite
this, the EU member states unanimously cleared the way for membership
talks, and the negotiation process officially started on Oct. 3, 2005.
The suspension of eight chapters
However, the EU member states, in an effort to satisfy the then-newly
admitted member Cyprus, suspended eight chapters of negotiation talks
one year later. Turkey, while being legally unjustified in insisting
on not observing its obligations under the customs union, was,
however, politically justified because the EU member states failed to
implement their own decisions and resolutions seeking to lift the
isolation and embargo on the Turks in Cyprus who voted in favor of the
Annan plan on April 26, 2004. The Greek Cypriots were also able to,
through using the EU, make Turkey and the Turks submit to their terms
and expectations. The Greek Cypriots unilaterally vetoed six chapters
in the negotiations. Sarkozy also vetoed five chapters in an effort to
extend support to the Greeks and send a message to the far right in
France; after this, the negotiation process became less serious.
Despite political changes on the island, nothing substantial has
changed in the status of Cyprus. However, no institution in Brussels
has adopted a position to recommend implementation of the agreements
and legal rules. For this reason, the EU is responsible for the lack
of a resolution in Cyprus and the deadlock in the relations with
Turkey.
If we look at this matter from Turkey's perspective, we could say the
situation is not so dramatic because Turkey has been making enormous
progress in the field of economy since the Helsinki decision and has
been experiencing a process of huge reforms over the past decade. The
EU remained an important factor in this process up to 2005; however,
it has never played any role at all over the past eight years. The
people do not find the EU membership perspective serious or tangible,
and the politicians do not even make reference to the EU membership
requirements. Because they realize that a serious negotiation process
would become painful for Ankara, they are not complaining about this
situation. However, the EU side gives a dramatic impression and fails
to do whatever it needs to do to protect its interests.
For instance, you cannot find any politician within the EU who does
not believe that relations with Turkey are important in terms of the
energy security of Europe. However, the chapter on energy policy is
not open for negotiation. If the EU is able to resume this chapter --
there is no technical barrier before this -- it would be able to hold
institutional dialogue on energy security and foreign and common
defense policies. It is not hard to think that keeping these two
chapters closed in the relations with Turkey, which is a NATO member,
is not a smart thing to do.
As if she is unaware that these chapters have been vetoed and blocked
before, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy Lady Ashton has been in a visible and strong dialogue
with Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu; this dialogue is so extensive
that it is almost unprecedented in EU history. Even though this is
positive for the EU, it is possible to say this is emerging as an EU
policy and that the dialogue between Ashton and the capital cities is
not working well. We know that the number of bilateral meetings
between US President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
ErdoÄ?an over the last five years is more than 10. However, ErdoÄ?an has
never been invited to the EU summits over the past decade, and he has
not met with the council president during this period.
In fact, the situation looks pretty grave and even hilarious. In
almost every decision and resolution on Turkey, the EU made reference
to the rule of law and fundamental rights, as well as the need for
respect of these rights. Of course, this is a necessary and proper
attitude. However, the same EU fails to resume the chapters on
fundamental rights and justice, and as a result, it is unable to
inform Turkey of what it needs to do to attain the EU norms and
standards in this field. The situation is grave because Turkey is
currently dealing with its most intricate political issue, the making
of a new constitution. The EU, which is supposed to play a
constructive and influential role in this process, is not helping at
all. Have you ever heard European Council President Herman van
Rompuy's statement and call for member states to act consistently and
respect the joint resolutions and treaties? Not only did the people
not hear such a warning in the EU halls, but we didn't, either. Most
probably for this reason, the EU still remains an object and toy in
the hands of this small member state. And this, unfortunately, is not
limited to policy vis-Ã-vis Turkey.
*Ali Yurttagül is a political advisor for the Greens in the European Parliament.