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Pause Or Time Of Developments
As previously assumed, the events and processes in Central Asia will
have serious implications on the situation in the South Caucasus.
However, the withdrawal or significant reduction of NATO forces in
Afghanistan, as well as a variety of problems in relation with NATO
countries in the region, led to a pause in the activity of the
alliance and, above all, of the United States.
Americans and their partners are forced, when solving the issue on the
withdrawal of troops, to interpret at the same time new formats of
presence and participation in regional processes. It has now become
evident that such tasks, like ensuring the current level of
`stability' in Afghanistan and in other countries of Central Asia,
can't be considered as determining in the formation of the new U.S.
strategy. Stability and security in the region can become
self-sufficient goals and, most likely, will demand integration into
other, more global problems.
For the U.S., the global problem is still the repression of China's
ambitions in all directions including the Western one, hence in the
Central Asia direction too. The implementation of this task requires
the presence of regional partners, but it will be a disaster, because
none of the states of Eurasia, including Russia, wishes to become an
element or a participant in the strategy, and enters even in an
indirect confrontation with China.
Beyond curtailment of political and geopolitical strategies of Europe,
the curtailment of U.S. military presence in Europe and partly in the
Middle East, as well as the `translation' of accents of strategy in
the Asia-Pacific region leads to a certain isolation of the U.S. from
its traditional partners in Europe which are going to continue to cut
military costs.
If the states of Southeast Asia and the Far East, fearing China's
expansions, agree, actually with all initiatives of the U.S. in the
sphere of global and regional security, then the states of the Central
Asia are evidently not ready and, apparently, will never be ready to
such initiatives. A different game will be carried out in this region,
not similar to the Pacific and the Far East, and the `Chinese problem'
of the U.S. will be presented here in a veiled form.
Nevertheless, Central Asia will participate in the political processes
of Eurasia and the world, and the U.S. namely will become its
locomotive and will carry out the role of the `insurance company' for
the countries of the region. On this arena, the realization of foreign
political and geo-economic ambitions of India will happen, which is
becoming a more important partner of the U.S. in Asia. The
strengthening of positions of Iran and the U.S. in the Central Asia,
not only in Afghanistan but also relating to the solution of issues
related to Pakistan is not ruled out at all.
There is no country now which is more interested in cooperation with
Iran than the U.S. For Iran, the decrease of tension and certain
cooperation with the U.S. could be decisive for many issues in the
sphere of economy and security. Neither Turkey, nor Russia managed and
wanted to continue supporting Iran; while the events in Syria showed
unprecedented similarity and proximity of the interests of the U.S.
and Iran in the long term. U.S. realized that without a partnership
with Shiite countries of the Middle East the priorities cannot be
achieved.
The American establishment, both in the left-liberal and
right-conservative camps, understands that the settlement of relations
with Iran will allow significantly cutting military costs of the U.S.
in regions and ensure many plots in the global and regional security.
Like previously, Turkey will fail to achieve stronger positions in
Central Asia, but it is not even interested in this.
The policies of Russia in Central Asia are evidently disproportionate,
taking into account the fact that in case of quite convincing military
presence and influence, the economic positions are extremely
insufficient. Central Asia states will prefer a more or less neutral
situation, but they understand that the main provider of security in
perspective will remain the U.S. and NATO despite the successful
cooperation with CSTO.
However, the transit route of the South Caucasus, after the decision
on the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan will be reduced, and this
will be the beginning of formation of the new features of the region.
Now it is the time to think about the new format of the coexistence of
the South Caucasus with the leading centers of power. It is clear that
in the South Caucasus reshaping of the balance of forces, the
emergence of new political-military ligaments began, which is very
unexpected bearing in mind the previous confrontational period.
Everyone chooses their own goals and priorities, in any case, it is
alleged so.
There is enough time, but time is not waiting.
15:55 27/05/2013
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/29982
From: A. Papazian
As previously assumed, the events and processes in Central Asia will
have serious implications on the situation in the South Caucasus.
However, the withdrawal or significant reduction of NATO forces in
Afghanistan, as well as a variety of problems in relation with NATO
countries in the region, led to a pause in the activity of the
alliance and, above all, of the United States.
Americans and their partners are forced, when solving the issue on the
withdrawal of troops, to interpret at the same time new formats of
presence and participation in regional processes. It has now become
evident that such tasks, like ensuring the current level of
`stability' in Afghanistan and in other countries of Central Asia,
can't be considered as determining in the formation of the new U.S.
strategy. Stability and security in the region can become
self-sufficient goals and, most likely, will demand integration into
other, more global problems.
For the U.S., the global problem is still the repression of China's
ambitions in all directions including the Western one, hence in the
Central Asia direction too. The implementation of this task requires
the presence of regional partners, but it will be a disaster, because
none of the states of Eurasia, including Russia, wishes to become an
element or a participant in the strategy, and enters even in an
indirect confrontation with China.
Beyond curtailment of political and geopolitical strategies of Europe,
the curtailment of U.S. military presence in Europe and partly in the
Middle East, as well as the `translation' of accents of strategy in
the Asia-Pacific region leads to a certain isolation of the U.S. from
its traditional partners in Europe which are going to continue to cut
military costs.
If the states of Southeast Asia and the Far East, fearing China's
expansions, agree, actually with all initiatives of the U.S. in the
sphere of global and regional security, then the states of the Central
Asia are evidently not ready and, apparently, will never be ready to
such initiatives. A different game will be carried out in this region,
not similar to the Pacific and the Far East, and the `Chinese problem'
of the U.S. will be presented here in a veiled form.
Nevertheless, Central Asia will participate in the political processes
of Eurasia and the world, and the U.S. namely will become its
locomotive and will carry out the role of the `insurance company' for
the countries of the region. On this arena, the realization of foreign
political and geo-economic ambitions of India will happen, which is
becoming a more important partner of the U.S. in Asia. The
strengthening of positions of Iran and the U.S. in the Central Asia,
not only in Afghanistan but also relating to the solution of issues
related to Pakistan is not ruled out at all.
There is no country now which is more interested in cooperation with
Iran than the U.S. For Iran, the decrease of tension and certain
cooperation with the U.S. could be decisive for many issues in the
sphere of economy and security. Neither Turkey, nor Russia managed and
wanted to continue supporting Iran; while the events in Syria showed
unprecedented similarity and proximity of the interests of the U.S.
and Iran in the long term. U.S. realized that without a partnership
with Shiite countries of the Middle East the priorities cannot be
achieved.
The American establishment, both in the left-liberal and
right-conservative camps, understands that the settlement of relations
with Iran will allow significantly cutting military costs of the U.S.
in regions and ensure many plots in the global and regional security.
Like previously, Turkey will fail to achieve stronger positions in
Central Asia, but it is not even interested in this.
The policies of Russia in Central Asia are evidently disproportionate,
taking into account the fact that in case of quite convincing military
presence and influence, the economic positions are extremely
insufficient. Central Asia states will prefer a more or less neutral
situation, but they understand that the main provider of security in
perspective will remain the U.S. and NATO despite the successful
cooperation with CSTO.
However, the transit route of the South Caucasus, after the decision
on the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan will be reduced, and this
will be the beginning of formation of the new features of the region.
Now it is the time to think about the new format of the coexistence of
the South Caucasus with the leading centers of power. It is clear that
in the South Caucasus reshaping of the balance of forces, the
emergence of new political-military ligaments began, which is very
unexpected bearing in mind the previous confrontational period.
Everyone chooses their own goals and priorities, in any case, it is
alleged so.
There is enough time, but time is not waiting.
15:55 27/05/2013
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/29982
From: A. Papazian