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Milli Gazete, Turkey
Nov 15 2013
The Deep Messages of Brother Aliyev's Visit
by Mehmet Seyfettin Erol
Azeri President Ilham Aliyev paid his first foreign visit since being
elected to Turkey. This was important in terms of burying the last
remnants of the "normalization crisis" between the two countries and
signalling new quests for "unity." The messages that the two sides
sent and the immediate reaction from Armenia amply affirm this
conclusion.
Indeed, the working visit Armenian President Serzh Sargsian paid to
occupied Nagorno Karabakh during the same hours that Aliyev was
visiting Turkey is another indicator of this importance.
Obviously, Sargsian's reaction was not motivated only by Aliyev's
visit to Turkey. Only a short time before Aliyev's visit, Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made the following comments that had strong
resonance in Azerbaijan: "Our activities aimed at 2015 [100th
anniversary of "Armenian genocide"] are continuing at full speed. We
want them to withdraw from Karabakh. We are waiting for a development
in that regard. If this happens, [Turkey's] border [with Armenia] can
open, the railway can start operating, and many other relations can
develop. However, we want to do this together with Azerbaijan."
The Armenian side is probably tickled with the sentence, "we are
waiting for a development in this regard" - which Davutoglu mentioned
surreptitiously - and the word "surprise" that was mentioned elsewhere
in Davutoglu's remarks. In addition, the sentence "we want to do this
together with Azerbaijan" has apparently generated questions and
concerns in Yerevan.
Until recently, Turkey and Azerbaijan were in a deep crisis in their
bilateral relations because of Armenia. Now, these relations appear to
have returned to their historical course.
Process Needs Attention
As will be recalled, Turkey tried to regain the initiative in the
[Caucasus] by making a move via Armenia as part the "overture" process
in its foreign policy. It did this at a time when Russia had gained
substantial strategic superiority after the Russia-Georgia war of
August 2008.
However, the process that became known as "soccer diplomacy" not only
failed to end the crisis with Armenia but also resulted in tensions
between Ankara and Baku. The "crisis of confidence" that erupted as a
result had a profound effect on multidimensional relations with the
ultimate goal of integration. Subsequently, provocative attempts were
made to deepen this crisis further.
Obviously, overcoming the crisis was not easy. As a result, the sides
are now being much more careful in the steps they take so that they do
not fall prey to another "communication crisis."
Another point that should not be ignored in this regard is the change
in Turkey's foreign policy as a consequence of the Arab Spring and how
this has been perceived by the states of the region. Evidently, the
change in Turkey's posture with regard to its surroundings since May
2013 has not escaped Baku's attention either.
To state it another way, the positive abrupt change in Turkey's
"changing" or "transforming" role in the BOP [Greater Middle East
Policy] is now bearing fruit. For example, the role Turkey played in
the most recent elections [in Azerbaijan] and its preference for
stability has evidently pleased Baku very much.
Ankara's return to its own course will evidently resonate even more in
the process we will see unfolding in the region in the near future.
'Fraternal Ally'
Aliyev's visit was also important in terms of the signals it sent with
regard to the new direction in Baku's foreign policy. Aliyev said that
relations with Turkey are ranked at the top of Azerbaijan's foreign
policy. His key remarks in this regard were: "Turkey is our closest
friend. It is a fraternal ally. In recent years, this fraternity has
turned into a new union. Turkish-Azeri relations have turned into a
pact that is significant for the two countries, the region, and the
world. Political, economic, and energy agreements should bind us even
more tightly." These remarks had the intended effect on certain
capitals.
When we look at the timing of the visit from Azerbaijan's vantage
point, we notice the following background issues: (1) Russia's "near
abroad" policy and its customs union project aimed directly at the EU;
(2) the inclusion of Armenia in this process and the growing pressure
on Azerbaijan to join [the customs union] also; (3) the
Kremlin-controlled "racism" crisis [Azerbaijan] is experiencing with
Russia; (4) more active [Azeri] collaboration with the West and
Israel; (5) the purge of pro-Russia figures from the system [in
Azerbaijan]; and (6) agreements on new projects related to energy
routes and alternative markets.
The inevitable result of all this is a further deepening of Azeri
relations with Turkey. Indeed, the strategic collaboration areas
Aliyev has mentioned support this assessment. Examples of these areas
are the Organization of Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with
Military Status (TAKM [Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia]), the
Turkic Council, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
energy projects, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and the
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP).
Turkish-Azeri relations are now on a long and delicate course. It is
important to avoid a new "normalization crisis" and to take a
"fraternal stand" against any bilateral crisis. After all, very little
time is left before 2015.
[Translated from Turkish]
Nov 15 2013
The Deep Messages of Brother Aliyev's Visit
by Mehmet Seyfettin Erol
Azeri President Ilham Aliyev paid his first foreign visit since being
elected to Turkey. This was important in terms of burying the last
remnants of the "normalization crisis" between the two countries and
signalling new quests for "unity." The messages that the two sides
sent and the immediate reaction from Armenia amply affirm this
conclusion.
Indeed, the working visit Armenian President Serzh Sargsian paid to
occupied Nagorno Karabakh during the same hours that Aliyev was
visiting Turkey is another indicator of this importance.
Obviously, Sargsian's reaction was not motivated only by Aliyev's
visit to Turkey. Only a short time before Aliyev's visit, Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made the following comments that had strong
resonance in Azerbaijan: "Our activities aimed at 2015 [100th
anniversary of "Armenian genocide"] are continuing at full speed. We
want them to withdraw from Karabakh. We are waiting for a development
in that regard. If this happens, [Turkey's] border [with Armenia] can
open, the railway can start operating, and many other relations can
develop. However, we want to do this together with Azerbaijan."
The Armenian side is probably tickled with the sentence, "we are
waiting for a development in this regard" - which Davutoglu mentioned
surreptitiously - and the word "surprise" that was mentioned elsewhere
in Davutoglu's remarks. In addition, the sentence "we want to do this
together with Azerbaijan" has apparently generated questions and
concerns in Yerevan.
Until recently, Turkey and Azerbaijan were in a deep crisis in their
bilateral relations because of Armenia. Now, these relations appear to
have returned to their historical course.
Process Needs Attention
As will be recalled, Turkey tried to regain the initiative in the
[Caucasus] by making a move via Armenia as part the "overture" process
in its foreign policy. It did this at a time when Russia had gained
substantial strategic superiority after the Russia-Georgia war of
August 2008.
However, the process that became known as "soccer diplomacy" not only
failed to end the crisis with Armenia but also resulted in tensions
between Ankara and Baku. The "crisis of confidence" that erupted as a
result had a profound effect on multidimensional relations with the
ultimate goal of integration. Subsequently, provocative attempts were
made to deepen this crisis further.
Obviously, overcoming the crisis was not easy. As a result, the sides
are now being much more careful in the steps they take so that they do
not fall prey to another "communication crisis."
Another point that should not be ignored in this regard is the change
in Turkey's foreign policy as a consequence of the Arab Spring and how
this has been perceived by the states of the region. Evidently, the
change in Turkey's posture with regard to its surroundings since May
2013 has not escaped Baku's attention either.
To state it another way, the positive abrupt change in Turkey's
"changing" or "transforming" role in the BOP [Greater Middle East
Policy] is now bearing fruit. For example, the role Turkey played in
the most recent elections [in Azerbaijan] and its preference for
stability has evidently pleased Baku very much.
Ankara's return to its own course will evidently resonate even more in
the process we will see unfolding in the region in the near future.
'Fraternal Ally'
Aliyev's visit was also important in terms of the signals it sent with
regard to the new direction in Baku's foreign policy. Aliyev said that
relations with Turkey are ranked at the top of Azerbaijan's foreign
policy. His key remarks in this regard were: "Turkey is our closest
friend. It is a fraternal ally. In recent years, this fraternity has
turned into a new union. Turkish-Azeri relations have turned into a
pact that is significant for the two countries, the region, and the
world. Political, economic, and energy agreements should bind us even
more tightly." These remarks had the intended effect on certain
capitals.
When we look at the timing of the visit from Azerbaijan's vantage
point, we notice the following background issues: (1) Russia's "near
abroad" policy and its customs union project aimed directly at the EU;
(2) the inclusion of Armenia in this process and the growing pressure
on Azerbaijan to join [the customs union] also; (3) the
Kremlin-controlled "racism" crisis [Azerbaijan] is experiencing with
Russia; (4) more active [Azeri] collaboration with the West and
Israel; (5) the purge of pro-Russia figures from the system [in
Azerbaijan]; and (6) agreements on new projects related to energy
routes and alternative markets.
The inevitable result of all this is a further deepening of Azeri
relations with Turkey. Indeed, the strategic collaboration areas
Aliyev has mentioned support this assessment. Examples of these areas
are the Organization of Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with
Military Status (TAKM [Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia]), the
Turkic Council, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
energy projects, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and the
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP).
Turkish-Azeri relations are now on a long and delicate course. It is
important to avoid a new "normalization crisis" and to take a
"fraternal stand" against any bilateral crisis. After all, very little
time is left before 2015.
[Translated from Turkish]