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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Nov 15 2013
Different Policy, Same Neighbourhood
by Yavuz Baydar
It has become clear once again that the highest priority in Turkey's
"reset" regional foreign policy has shifted from being one driven by
sectarian-based, neo-Ottoman motives to one driven by economic growth
needs - energy dependency.
The latest overtures to Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG), marked by a rapprochement with the government of Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the current visit of KRG President
Massoud [Mas'ud] Barzani, are based on this rethinking.
The second development, in parallel with this, is the reassertion of
Turkish-Azerbaijani ties, again with bold emphasis on energy deals.
As the previous line of sectarian-based, assertive foreign policy on
its southern border had not-so-successful results, the thaw with
Baghdad may signal a much more positive era, calming the tension along
the Sunni-Shia-Kurdish divides, given that, most certainly, Ankara
will go further with domestic reforms related to the Kurdish conflict
at home.
But, it is another story in the Caucasus. The signals coming out of
the meetings Ilham Aliyev, the re-elected president of Azerbaijan, had
with President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
indicate further isolation of Armenia, pushing for greater hostility,
increasing Russian influence and reduced Western visions of a win-win
solution.
Furthermore, the energy-based drive behind Ankara-Baku relations has
been aimed at encouraging Ankara to stay away from dealing with the
issue of the Great Armenian Tragedy in 1915.
Aliyev, who according to WikiLeaks does not seem to have a high regard
for Erdogan, was happy to hear that the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government reasserted that the Nagorno-Karabakh region - under
Armenian occupation for 20 years - as Erdogan expressed it, "Is not
just Azerbaijan's problem, but also Turkey's problem." For his part,
Aliyev said that Azerbaijan has full trust in Turkey when it comes to
the case of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Both agreed that relations remain "excellent." Gul, who also
emphasized that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity is "our national
interest," exchanged state honours with Aliyev: He gave him Turkey's
Order of the Republic and received Azerbaijan's Haydar Aliyev Order.
Beyond the top-level symbolism, there are also concrete steps. Trade,
energy and defence head the list of cooperation.
"[Trade volume] is $4.2 billion. By 2020, the trade volume between
Turkey and Azerbaijan will reach $15 billion. We have opportunities to
make joint investments in natural gas in the Balkans," said Erdogan
recently, who was also keen to note that the responsibility of "one
nation, two states" is a key point.
Ankara has high hopes for the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which,
when completed in 2018, will have a capacity of around 16 billion
cubic meters of natural gas per year. Ankara says around 6 billion
cubic meters will be consumed by Turkey; the rest will be sent to
Europe. Sources say Azerbaijan will become Turkey's largest energy
investor with the commissioning of the Star refinery next year.
With normalization with Armenia shelved and the possibility of having
to face the tsunami of the anniversary of 1915 in sight, Ankara seems
now to be once again on the diplomatic offensive. Today's Zaman
reported that Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu asked Switzerland to
mediate on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
"If Armenia starts to leave the occupied territories and does this by
presenting a clear timeline of withdrawal that will also be accepted
by Baku, we are ready to put the protocols into practice. We are
waiting for your help to convince the Armenian administration of this
solution," he told Swiss officials. The initial reaction from Yerevan
is that "Ankara is bluffing again."
Nevertheless, after a long time, Aliyev and Armenian President Serge
Sarksyan will meet on Nov. 19 in Vienna or Zurich. Though given the
deadlock, not much is expected from the meeting, if or when it takes
place.
If the energy project proceeds as planned, Ankara will certainly try
to convert its advantages into diplomacy. Armenia will surely be
strained, but whether or not it will pull out from a couple of pockets
of Karabakh is hard to predict, given its domestic equations.
A zero-sum game seems more likely, since a win-win for Ankara-Baku may
be sabotaged by Russia, which obviously has benefited from the current
deadlock. In its turn, it too, may help boost pretexts for Ankara to
ignore facing 1915.
Nov 15 2013
Different Policy, Same Neighbourhood
by Yavuz Baydar
It has become clear once again that the highest priority in Turkey's
"reset" regional foreign policy has shifted from being one driven by
sectarian-based, neo-Ottoman motives to one driven by economic growth
needs - energy dependency.
The latest overtures to Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG), marked by a rapprochement with the government of Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the current visit of KRG President
Massoud [Mas'ud] Barzani, are based on this rethinking.
The second development, in parallel with this, is the reassertion of
Turkish-Azerbaijani ties, again with bold emphasis on energy deals.
As the previous line of sectarian-based, assertive foreign policy on
its southern border had not-so-successful results, the thaw with
Baghdad may signal a much more positive era, calming the tension along
the Sunni-Shia-Kurdish divides, given that, most certainly, Ankara
will go further with domestic reforms related to the Kurdish conflict
at home.
But, it is another story in the Caucasus. The signals coming out of
the meetings Ilham Aliyev, the re-elected president of Azerbaijan, had
with President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
indicate further isolation of Armenia, pushing for greater hostility,
increasing Russian influence and reduced Western visions of a win-win
solution.
Furthermore, the energy-based drive behind Ankara-Baku relations has
been aimed at encouraging Ankara to stay away from dealing with the
issue of the Great Armenian Tragedy in 1915.
Aliyev, who according to WikiLeaks does not seem to have a high regard
for Erdogan, was happy to hear that the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government reasserted that the Nagorno-Karabakh region - under
Armenian occupation for 20 years - as Erdogan expressed it, "Is not
just Azerbaijan's problem, but also Turkey's problem." For his part,
Aliyev said that Azerbaijan has full trust in Turkey when it comes to
the case of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Both agreed that relations remain "excellent." Gul, who also
emphasized that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity is "our national
interest," exchanged state honours with Aliyev: He gave him Turkey's
Order of the Republic and received Azerbaijan's Haydar Aliyev Order.
Beyond the top-level symbolism, there are also concrete steps. Trade,
energy and defence head the list of cooperation.
"[Trade volume] is $4.2 billion. By 2020, the trade volume between
Turkey and Azerbaijan will reach $15 billion. We have opportunities to
make joint investments in natural gas in the Balkans," said Erdogan
recently, who was also keen to note that the responsibility of "one
nation, two states" is a key point.
Ankara has high hopes for the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which,
when completed in 2018, will have a capacity of around 16 billion
cubic meters of natural gas per year. Ankara says around 6 billion
cubic meters will be consumed by Turkey; the rest will be sent to
Europe. Sources say Azerbaijan will become Turkey's largest energy
investor with the commissioning of the Star refinery next year.
With normalization with Armenia shelved and the possibility of having
to face the tsunami of the anniversary of 1915 in sight, Ankara seems
now to be once again on the diplomatic offensive. Today's Zaman
reported that Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu asked Switzerland to
mediate on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
"If Armenia starts to leave the occupied territories and does this by
presenting a clear timeline of withdrawal that will also be accepted
by Baku, we are ready to put the protocols into practice. We are
waiting for your help to convince the Armenian administration of this
solution," he told Swiss officials. The initial reaction from Yerevan
is that "Ankara is bluffing again."
Nevertheless, after a long time, Aliyev and Armenian President Serge
Sarksyan will meet on Nov. 19 in Vienna or Zurich. Though given the
deadlock, not much is expected from the meeting, if or when it takes
place.
If the energy project proceeds as planned, Ankara will certainly try
to convert its advantages into diplomacy. Armenia will surely be
strained, but whether or not it will pull out from a couple of pockets
of Karabakh is hard to predict, given its domestic equations.
A zero-sum game seems more likely, since a win-win for Ankara-Baku may
be sabotaged by Russia, which obviously has benefited from the current
deadlock. In its turn, it too, may help boost pretexts for Ankara to
ignore facing 1915.