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WHAT TURKEY AND RUSSIA HAVE AGREED ON
Armenia has appeared in the middle of culmination of absurd, and
it was impossible not to notice this despite the West's minimum
attention. Russia toughly and bluntly pointed Armenia to its place
in the zone of defense of the Russian national interests. No matter
how this situation is presented in semi-official statements (there
have been no official statements), Armenia is an opponent and enemy
to NATO and the United States.
The Armenian society cannot realize what has happened, especially
that the majority of the Armenian mass media were working for Russia's
interests. It would be strange if the West treated Armenia otherwise,
but this will be stated officially when the right time comes.
In addition, the West has never taken CSTO seriously because there is
no such a military alliance, whereas Armenia's commitments to Russia
and its capacity of a vassal is serious in terms of the defense and
national interests of the West. CSTO fell from the first shot, whereas
Armenia will be the target in a possible military conflict. Aside from
several statements by the State Department on the U.S. intentions to
develop relations with Armenia, Armenia is not listed in the Congress
resolution on the Russian pressure on the members of the Eastern
Partnership beside Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This is not an
accident. In fact, Armenia is currently excluded from the intentions
of the United States regarding the Eastern Partnership. However, the
United States and NATO still have some intentions relating to the South
Caucasus, and these goals cannot be limited to short-term frameworks.
The notion "corridor" has not been used in regard to the South
Caucasus it's been a decade. However, there can be a corridor when
there are two states, i.e. Russia in the north and Turkey and Iran
in the South. In this case, Iran does not have a key importance. The
clash of interests of Russia and Turkey and the space in the South
Caucasus that is free from their influence was and is concerned. This
has not been achieved properly but eventually a lot has been done
despite such strong Turkish influence on Turkey and Russia.
Not having enough political experience, the Georgian government has
been able to configure successfully its relations with both the West
and Russia. Azerbaijan will remain under the Western aegis until it
runs out of oil, and after that it will pass under Turkish protection
(currently it is in place but partly). However, neither Georgia,
nor Azerbaijan will be able to curb Turkish expansion because it is
not in their cardinal interests.
This goal is assigned to Armenia. In addition, the Russian military
base in Armenia is viewed by the United States as a component of
containment of Turkey. (It would be possible to notice that the West
has never expressed a "wish" on withdrawal of the Russian base from
Armenia.)
The current state of affairs is in line with the interests of the West
to ensure the balance of forces and oppose Turkey and Russia. Whether
Russia wants it or not, its military presence in Armenia is a function
planned by the West, at least in line with its interests.
Under different objectives and problems, the Russian policy relating to
Turkey involves a u-turn in strategies, i.e. ending their confrontation
and considering their military and political positions as a factor
vs. NATO and the United States. Turkey also aspires to this but
it fears even an insignificant distance from the United States and
NATO. Without these relations its international status will plummet.
In this regard, in the West's strategy Armenia is a factor of
resistance to Turkey and Russia though this circumstance may be
overcome successfully. The game is complicated by Turkey's NATO
membership although their relations are close to a crisis.
If the EU experiences discomfort and even a sense of loss in the
result of Russian pressure on the EaP member states, for the United
States this is not an emergency. Like the state of Georgia did not
change much after the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008,
Armenia has not changed much since it has been becoming a vassal.
Speaking in a newspaper language, neither before, nor after the
shameful act of September 3 was decision making in Armenia sovereign
and depended heavily on Russia. Unlike modern Europe, the United States
runs into such tricks in international politics for many times, and is
hardly ever surprised. At the same time, unlike its neighbors in the
South Caucasus, Armenia has mental peculiarities and motivation for
implementing certain tasks that the strategies of the United States
and the West require.
Furthermore, the conditions and approaches in the current U.S. foreign
policy, cardinal change in foreign political means, limitation of
large-scale foreign intervention supposes the growing role of new
partners to NATO, i.e. countries which are not members but cooperate
actively. In the next summit in the U.K. in November 2014 major
corrections will be made to the program of cooperation with new
partners, and a new program may be adopted. At any rate, NATO is
actively working out proposals on these issues.
Having an active participation in the IPAP, Armenia has achieved
certain limits, and limitation of its further cooperation would mean
blunt and tough intervention of Russia in the affairs of a country
though there must be such expectations. Russia is trying to force
Armenia to give away its cooperation with NATO. And this would be
an unpleasant precedent for the alliance. Therefore, it is possible
that this time the game is worth the candles, and the United States
will try to prevent such a scandalous decision by Armenia.
Of course, the United States and their European partners are not
likely to view Armenia as a factor of Turkey's containment but to use
Armenia's problems to pressure Russia. First and foremost, the West
intends to try to "normalize" relations between Turkey and Armenia
and unblock its way towards the West. At the same time, there will
be initiatives or rather pressure relating to the Karabakh topic.
Russia is known to fear loss of initiative regarding both issues,
as well as deployment of peacekeepers of NATO member states in
the Karabakh conflict area. The West had a different position until
"September 3". The European Union worked towards opening the Abkhazian
railway to minimize Turkey's political resources relating to its
problems with Armenia. Now the situation has changes, and the West
is hardly interested in opening the Abkhazian railway.
There is only one point for optimism in this game - if the United
States and Iran agree at some stage to create new communications for
Armenia. And Russia is aware of this. So what is awaiting us in this
aspect? The goals are corrected promptly, especially that all the
options have been worked out a long time ago. However, whatever the
possible options, now and for a long term, the leading partner of the
United States, NATO and the West in the South Caucasus is Azerbaijan.
Armenia is not a partner; Armenia is a factor and an instrument but
not a partner.
The game is getting complicated, which would allow even the small
players to play but one needs sovereignty to play.
Igor Muradyan 13:23 25/11/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
Armenia has appeared in the middle of culmination of absurd, and
it was impossible not to notice this despite the West's minimum
attention. Russia toughly and bluntly pointed Armenia to its place
in the zone of defense of the Russian national interests. No matter
how this situation is presented in semi-official statements (there
have been no official statements), Armenia is an opponent and enemy
to NATO and the United States.
The Armenian society cannot realize what has happened, especially
that the majority of the Armenian mass media were working for Russia's
interests. It would be strange if the West treated Armenia otherwise,
but this will be stated officially when the right time comes.
In addition, the West has never taken CSTO seriously because there is
no such a military alliance, whereas Armenia's commitments to Russia
and its capacity of a vassal is serious in terms of the defense and
national interests of the West. CSTO fell from the first shot, whereas
Armenia will be the target in a possible military conflict. Aside from
several statements by the State Department on the U.S. intentions to
develop relations with Armenia, Armenia is not listed in the Congress
resolution on the Russian pressure on the members of the Eastern
Partnership beside Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This is not an
accident. In fact, Armenia is currently excluded from the intentions
of the United States regarding the Eastern Partnership. However, the
United States and NATO still have some intentions relating to the South
Caucasus, and these goals cannot be limited to short-term frameworks.
The notion "corridor" has not been used in regard to the South
Caucasus it's been a decade. However, there can be a corridor when
there are two states, i.e. Russia in the north and Turkey and Iran
in the South. In this case, Iran does not have a key importance. The
clash of interests of Russia and Turkey and the space in the South
Caucasus that is free from their influence was and is concerned. This
has not been achieved properly but eventually a lot has been done
despite such strong Turkish influence on Turkey and Russia.
Not having enough political experience, the Georgian government has
been able to configure successfully its relations with both the West
and Russia. Azerbaijan will remain under the Western aegis until it
runs out of oil, and after that it will pass under Turkish protection
(currently it is in place but partly). However, neither Georgia,
nor Azerbaijan will be able to curb Turkish expansion because it is
not in their cardinal interests.
This goal is assigned to Armenia. In addition, the Russian military
base in Armenia is viewed by the United States as a component of
containment of Turkey. (It would be possible to notice that the West
has never expressed a "wish" on withdrawal of the Russian base from
Armenia.)
The current state of affairs is in line with the interests of the West
to ensure the balance of forces and oppose Turkey and Russia. Whether
Russia wants it or not, its military presence in Armenia is a function
planned by the West, at least in line with its interests.
Under different objectives and problems, the Russian policy relating to
Turkey involves a u-turn in strategies, i.e. ending their confrontation
and considering their military and political positions as a factor
vs. NATO and the United States. Turkey also aspires to this but
it fears even an insignificant distance from the United States and
NATO. Without these relations its international status will plummet.
In this regard, in the West's strategy Armenia is a factor of
resistance to Turkey and Russia though this circumstance may be
overcome successfully. The game is complicated by Turkey's NATO
membership although their relations are close to a crisis.
If the EU experiences discomfort and even a sense of loss in the
result of Russian pressure on the EaP member states, for the United
States this is not an emergency. Like the state of Georgia did not
change much after the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008,
Armenia has not changed much since it has been becoming a vassal.
Speaking in a newspaper language, neither before, nor after the
shameful act of September 3 was decision making in Armenia sovereign
and depended heavily on Russia. Unlike modern Europe, the United States
runs into such tricks in international politics for many times, and is
hardly ever surprised. At the same time, unlike its neighbors in the
South Caucasus, Armenia has mental peculiarities and motivation for
implementing certain tasks that the strategies of the United States
and the West require.
Furthermore, the conditions and approaches in the current U.S. foreign
policy, cardinal change in foreign political means, limitation of
large-scale foreign intervention supposes the growing role of new
partners to NATO, i.e. countries which are not members but cooperate
actively. In the next summit in the U.K. in November 2014 major
corrections will be made to the program of cooperation with new
partners, and a new program may be adopted. At any rate, NATO is
actively working out proposals on these issues.
Having an active participation in the IPAP, Armenia has achieved
certain limits, and limitation of its further cooperation would mean
blunt and tough intervention of Russia in the affairs of a country
though there must be such expectations. Russia is trying to force
Armenia to give away its cooperation with NATO. And this would be
an unpleasant precedent for the alliance. Therefore, it is possible
that this time the game is worth the candles, and the United States
will try to prevent such a scandalous decision by Armenia.
Of course, the United States and their European partners are not
likely to view Armenia as a factor of Turkey's containment but to use
Armenia's problems to pressure Russia. First and foremost, the West
intends to try to "normalize" relations between Turkey and Armenia
and unblock its way towards the West. At the same time, there will
be initiatives or rather pressure relating to the Karabakh topic.
Russia is known to fear loss of initiative regarding both issues,
as well as deployment of peacekeepers of NATO member states in
the Karabakh conflict area. The West had a different position until
"September 3". The European Union worked towards opening the Abkhazian
railway to minimize Turkey's political resources relating to its
problems with Armenia. Now the situation has changes, and the West
is hardly interested in opening the Abkhazian railway.
There is only one point for optimism in this game - if the United
States and Iran agree at some stage to create new communications for
Armenia. And Russia is aware of this. So what is awaiting us in this
aspect? The goals are corrected promptly, especially that all the
options have been worked out a long time ago. However, whatever the
possible options, now and for a long term, the leading partner of the
United States, NATO and the West in the South Caucasus is Azerbaijan.
Armenia is not a partner; Armenia is a factor and an instrument but
not a partner.
The game is getting complicated, which would allow even the small
players to play but one needs sovereignty to play.
Igor Muradyan 13:23 25/11/2013 Story from Lragir.am News: