Tweet
WHERE THE ISSUE OF KURDISTAN IS LIKELY TO GO
Radikal (in Turkish), Turkey
Nov 21 2013
by Cengiz Candar
One of the most dramatic commentaries about the use of the word
"Kurdistan" by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in Diyarbakir--a move
that continues to shake the Turkey's political foundation and public
opinion--was published in Taraf yesterday. The comments appeared in a
column entitled "The Fraternity Tax and Kurdistan" by Mucahit Bilici,
a (Kurdish) writer with Islamist leanings.
[The article says:]
"The AKP [Justice and Development Party] government is trying to grant
the rights of the Kurds as much as it can without letting the Turks
know. In other words, the Turks do not have to pay a price for more
freedom for Kurds.
"Kurds have been providing fraternal services throughout the history
of Turkey and are tired of it. Now though, the myth of fraternity
is, for the first time, giving signals of transforming into a
contract of fraternity in the symbolic domain. This is because,
for the first time in Turkey, Turks have been presented with a bill
for fraternity. What was that bill? The Prime Minister's referred
to Kurdistan as 'Kurdistan' and thus brought an end to the state
tradition of denying Kurdistan.
"Not just neonationalists but also a significant proportion of
religious Turks were perturbed by the truth this word expresses. They
put cruel labels on people to make sure that this word would not see
the light of day. For the first time, these religious people paid a
price and did not criticize the Prime Minister for saying this word.
They were forced to stomach it. In other words, for the first time,
they paid a symbolic price about the existence of Kurds.
"From my perspective, this is the most important aspect of this event.
By using the word 'Kurdistan,' the Prime Minister unleashed among
people numerous worshippers of the state who were waiting for the
state to call a right a 'right.' Kurdistan, which was legitimate,
is now official. (I wish quick recovery to all religious people who
called people like me 'Kurdish nationalists,' 'separatists,' and
'racists' for using the word 'Kurdistan' and the writers who were
afraid to pronounce this word out of fear for their terror.)"
One of the top issues over which Erdogan or the AKP government
have taken pride is "ending the denial of Kurds." Although the
government keeps dragging its feet over some basic Kurdish rights like
"education in the mother tongue," "ending the denial of identity"
is considered a very important development. Mas'ud Barzani and his
circle pointed out the importance of this on several occasions in
our private conversations.
The denial of the Kurdish landscape could not continue while ending the
denial of Kurds. From that standpoint, Bilici's comment that "the Prime
Minister's referred to Kurdistan as 'Kurdistan' and thus brought an end
to the state tradition of denying Kurdistan" is absolutely on the mark.
One might argue that the Prime Minister was referring to the area
of sovereignty of the "Kurdistan Regional Government" with the word
"Kurdistan." This is probably true. However, when a Turkish prime
minister pronounces this word openly, in Diyarbakir, and in the
presence of a person who carries the title "President of Kurdistan,"
he "breaks a Turkish state taboo" with regard to that word and
"ends the state tradition" in this regard. These are likely to have
consequences beyond what the Prime Minister intended and, indeed,
this is what happened.
Henceforth, can the AKP government drag [Diyarbakir Mayor] Osman
Baydemir or anyone else through courts for using the phrase "Turkish
Kurdistan"? Only two days ago, Kurds who are not part of the BDP
[Peace and Democracy Party] and who, on the contrary, oppose the PKK
[Kurdistan People's Congress, KGK] and the BDP and sympathize with
Barzani, announced that they will form the "Kurdistan Democratic Party
[KDP] of Turkey" soon after the 2014 local elections. The person who
issued the statement in this regard is Sertac Bucak, the son of Faik
Bucak, who is the first general chairman of KDP Turkey. Apart from the
formation of this party, even the preparations for founding the party
will inevitably extend the use of "Kurdistan" to Turkey. (After all,
did not the Prime Minister say in Diyarbakir that a one-party system
cannot be established in the Southeast?)
The license granted for the use of the word "Kurdistan" in Turkey
thanks to the "green light" given by the Prime Minister represents
the last nail in the coffin of the "denial of the Kurdish identity."
However, it does not define what "Kurdistan" is. After all, there has
not been much consensus about what area within today's Turkey borders
constitutes "Kurdistan." This consensus has never existed. "Kurdistan"
is not a "political reality" of Asia Minor or Anatolia but, rather,
a "variable geographical concept" or an "emotional state."
The word acquires meaning when it refers to a broader landscape. This
is why it is often pronounced with the qualifiers "North, South, West,
and East." The venue for which the use of the descriptor "Kurdistan"
has never been controversial in history and which has been referenced
by this name in many maps is today's Iraqi Kurdistan. In some maps
published two to three years ago, the provinces of Hakkari, Sirnak,
Siirt and partly Van and Diyarbakir, are included in the general area
referenced as "Kurdistan." More than half of the area that Turkish
Kurds reference as "Turkish Kurdistan" or "the North" was inscribed
with "Armenia" in many of these maps in the past. Like maps, places
described by concepts are also changing.
The Treaty of Sevres was the only treaty that was not implemented
after World War I and was hence relegated to the dustbin of history.
The "Kurdistan" that was delineated as the territory of an independent
state in that treaty was a much smaller and more restricted area
than the "Kurdistan" to which Kurds refer today. In any event, that
concept never became a "political reality."
Based on these, we need to understand that the significance of the word
"Kurdistan" for Kurds is "emotional" in the sense that it expresses
"an end to the denial of their identity." Without this development,
a "contract of fraternity" between Turks and Kurds in our country
would not be possible. As Bilici correctly points out: "Kurds have
been providing fraternal services throughout the history of Turkey and
are tired of it. Now though, the myth of fraternity is, for the first
time, giving signals of transforming into a contract of fraternity
in the symbolic domain."
In addition, the step the Prime Minister has taken suggests strongly
that it will go beyond the "symbolic price" the Turks--especially
religious Turks--will pay the Kurds.
What else does it suggest?
If the "Turkish state" is accepting the existence of a Kurdistan
in Iraq, it is also acknowledging that the Sykes-Picot agreement
partitioned the region after World War I and split the Kurds into four
separate pieces. Indeed, this is case. In view of this, there can be
neither practical nor moral objections to the implementation of the
"structure" or "administrative format" that exists in Iraqi Kurdistan
in the other "areas of Kurdistan" where Kurds live "without changing
the political borders" of the countries that incorporate them.
For example, you cannot object to the "Kurdish autonomous region"
in Syria. Consequently, why and how can a Turkish prime minister who
has pronounced the word "Kurdistan" and who has embraced Barzani so
warmly object to "self-rule" for Kurds in Turkey? If Turkey will open
up to Iraqi Kurdistan in a way that will integrate the two economies
and that will make borders meaningless--in other words if it will
"grow," let alone "split up"--then it makes no sense not to do the
same with respect to Rojava [Kurdish term for west, used in reference
to northern Syria].
If you oppose a Kurdish administration in Rojava, you cannot sustain
the "peace process" in Turkey. This is because the Kurds that will most
likely run Rojava are the same Kurds who are the direct negotiating
partners in Turkey's "peace process."
Furthermore, [opposition to Kurdish rule in Rojava] would mean
insistence on the policy of "divide and rule" with respect to Kurds
and this would make the rapprochement with Barzani "unsustainable."
However, no government can do this any longer.
Nor should any government do it. Doing the right thing, as we pointed
out in our article yesterday, will bring relief to Turkey. In the
light of these parameters, what happened in Diyarbakir last weekend,
including Erdogan's use of the word "Kurdistan," was of "historic"
significance.
Let me finish by re-quoting Bilici's following comments, with which
I more than agree:
"By using the word 'Kurdistan,' the Prime Minister unleashed among
people numerous worshippers of the state who were waiting for the
state to call a right a 'right.' Kurdistan, which was legitimate,
is now official. (I wish quick recovery to all religious people who
called people like me 'Kurdish nationalists,' 'separatists,' and
'racists' for using the word 'Kurdistan' and the writers who were
afraid to pronounce this word out of fear for their terror.)"
[Translated from Turkish]
Radikal (in Turkish), Turkey
Nov 21 2013
by Cengiz Candar
One of the most dramatic commentaries about the use of the word
"Kurdistan" by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in Diyarbakir--a move
that continues to shake the Turkey's political foundation and public
opinion--was published in Taraf yesterday. The comments appeared in a
column entitled "The Fraternity Tax and Kurdistan" by Mucahit Bilici,
a (Kurdish) writer with Islamist leanings.
[The article says:]
"The AKP [Justice and Development Party] government is trying to grant
the rights of the Kurds as much as it can without letting the Turks
know. In other words, the Turks do not have to pay a price for more
freedom for Kurds.
"Kurds have been providing fraternal services throughout the history
of Turkey and are tired of it. Now though, the myth of fraternity
is, for the first time, giving signals of transforming into a
contract of fraternity in the symbolic domain. This is because,
for the first time in Turkey, Turks have been presented with a bill
for fraternity. What was that bill? The Prime Minister's referred
to Kurdistan as 'Kurdistan' and thus brought an end to the state
tradition of denying Kurdistan.
"Not just neonationalists but also a significant proportion of
religious Turks were perturbed by the truth this word expresses. They
put cruel labels on people to make sure that this word would not see
the light of day. For the first time, these religious people paid a
price and did not criticize the Prime Minister for saying this word.
They were forced to stomach it. In other words, for the first time,
they paid a symbolic price about the existence of Kurds.
"From my perspective, this is the most important aspect of this event.
By using the word 'Kurdistan,' the Prime Minister unleashed among
people numerous worshippers of the state who were waiting for the
state to call a right a 'right.' Kurdistan, which was legitimate,
is now official. (I wish quick recovery to all religious people who
called people like me 'Kurdish nationalists,' 'separatists,' and
'racists' for using the word 'Kurdistan' and the writers who were
afraid to pronounce this word out of fear for their terror.)"
One of the top issues over which Erdogan or the AKP government
have taken pride is "ending the denial of Kurds." Although the
government keeps dragging its feet over some basic Kurdish rights like
"education in the mother tongue," "ending the denial of identity"
is considered a very important development. Mas'ud Barzani and his
circle pointed out the importance of this on several occasions in
our private conversations.
The denial of the Kurdish landscape could not continue while ending the
denial of Kurds. From that standpoint, Bilici's comment that "the Prime
Minister's referred to Kurdistan as 'Kurdistan' and thus brought an end
to the state tradition of denying Kurdistan" is absolutely on the mark.
One might argue that the Prime Minister was referring to the area
of sovereignty of the "Kurdistan Regional Government" with the word
"Kurdistan." This is probably true. However, when a Turkish prime
minister pronounces this word openly, in Diyarbakir, and in the
presence of a person who carries the title "President of Kurdistan,"
he "breaks a Turkish state taboo" with regard to that word and
"ends the state tradition" in this regard. These are likely to have
consequences beyond what the Prime Minister intended and, indeed,
this is what happened.
Henceforth, can the AKP government drag [Diyarbakir Mayor] Osman
Baydemir or anyone else through courts for using the phrase "Turkish
Kurdistan"? Only two days ago, Kurds who are not part of the BDP
[Peace and Democracy Party] and who, on the contrary, oppose the PKK
[Kurdistan People's Congress, KGK] and the BDP and sympathize with
Barzani, announced that they will form the "Kurdistan Democratic Party
[KDP] of Turkey" soon after the 2014 local elections. The person who
issued the statement in this regard is Sertac Bucak, the son of Faik
Bucak, who is the first general chairman of KDP Turkey. Apart from the
formation of this party, even the preparations for founding the party
will inevitably extend the use of "Kurdistan" to Turkey. (After all,
did not the Prime Minister say in Diyarbakir that a one-party system
cannot be established in the Southeast?)
The license granted for the use of the word "Kurdistan" in Turkey
thanks to the "green light" given by the Prime Minister represents
the last nail in the coffin of the "denial of the Kurdish identity."
However, it does not define what "Kurdistan" is. After all, there has
not been much consensus about what area within today's Turkey borders
constitutes "Kurdistan." This consensus has never existed. "Kurdistan"
is not a "political reality" of Asia Minor or Anatolia but, rather,
a "variable geographical concept" or an "emotional state."
The word acquires meaning when it refers to a broader landscape. This
is why it is often pronounced with the qualifiers "North, South, West,
and East." The venue for which the use of the descriptor "Kurdistan"
has never been controversial in history and which has been referenced
by this name in many maps is today's Iraqi Kurdistan. In some maps
published two to three years ago, the provinces of Hakkari, Sirnak,
Siirt and partly Van and Diyarbakir, are included in the general area
referenced as "Kurdistan." More than half of the area that Turkish
Kurds reference as "Turkish Kurdistan" or "the North" was inscribed
with "Armenia" in many of these maps in the past. Like maps, places
described by concepts are also changing.
The Treaty of Sevres was the only treaty that was not implemented
after World War I and was hence relegated to the dustbin of history.
The "Kurdistan" that was delineated as the territory of an independent
state in that treaty was a much smaller and more restricted area
than the "Kurdistan" to which Kurds refer today. In any event, that
concept never became a "political reality."
Based on these, we need to understand that the significance of the word
"Kurdistan" for Kurds is "emotional" in the sense that it expresses
"an end to the denial of their identity." Without this development,
a "contract of fraternity" between Turks and Kurds in our country
would not be possible. As Bilici correctly points out: "Kurds have
been providing fraternal services throughout the history of Turkey and
are tired of it. Now though, the myth of fraternity is, for the first
time, giving signals of transforming into a contract of fraternity
in the symbolic domain."
In addition, the step the Prime Minister has taken suggests strongly
that it will go beyond the "symbolic price" the Turks--especially
religious Turks--will pay the Kurds.
What else does it suggest?
If the "Turkish state" is accepting the existence of a Kurdistan
in Iraq, it is also acknowledging that the Sykes-Picot agreement
partitioned the region after World War I and split the Kurds into four
separate pieces. Indeed, this is case. In view of this, there can be
neither practical nor moral objections to the implementation of the
"structure" or "administrative format" that exists in Iraqi Kurdistan
in the other "areas of Kurdistan" where Kurds live "without changing
the political borders" of the countries that incorporate them.
For example, you cannot object to the "Kurdish autonomous region"
in Syria. Consequently, why and how can a Turkish prime minister who
has pronounced the word "Kurdistan" and who has embraced Barzani so
warmly object to "self-rule" for Kurds in Turkey? If Turkey will open
up to Iraqi Kurdistan in a way that will integrate the two economies
and that will make borders meaningless--in other words if it will
"grow," let alone "split up"--then it makes no sense not to do the
same with respect to Rojava [Kurdish term for west, used in reference
to northern Syria].
If you oppose a Kurdish administration in Rojava, you cannot sustain
the "peace process" in Turkey. This is because the Kurds that will most
likely run Rojava are the same Kurds who are the direct negotiating
partners in Turkey's "peace process."
Furthermore, [opposition to Kurdish rule in Rojava] would mean
insistence on the policy of "divide and rule" with respect to Kurds
and this would make the rapprochement with Barzani "unsustainable."
However, no government can do this any longer.
Nor should any government do it. Doing the right thing, as we pointed
out in our article yesterday, will bring relief to Turkey. In the
light of these parameters, what happened in Diyarbakir last weekend,
including Erdogan's use of the word "Kurdistan," was of "historic"
significance.
Let me finish by re-quoting Bilici's following comments, with which
I more than agree:
"By using the word 'Kurdistan,' the Prime Minister unleashed among
people numerous worshippers of the state who were waiting for the
state to call a right a 'right.' Kurdistan, which was legitimate,
is now official. (I wish quick recovery to all religious people who
called people like me 'Kurdish nationalists,' 'separatists,' and
'racists' for using the word 'Kurdistan' and the writers who were
afraid to pronounce this word out of fear for their terror.)"
[Translated from Turkish]