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IRAN-U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT - WHAT'S IN IT FOR ISRAEL / SAUDI ARABIA?
IPS - Inter Press Service
November 22, 2013 Friday
Mark N. Katz
WASHINGTON, Nov 22 2013
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and some of the other Arab Gulf states are
deeply sceptical of the Barack Obama administration's efforts to
reach a deal with Iran limiting its nuclear program and to improve
U.S.-Iranian relations generally.
Washington's traditional Middle Eastern allies warn that the Islamic
Republic cannot be trusted, and that Washington must not reach
a deal with Iran that either fails to adequately limit Iranian
nuclear ambitions, or which Tehran has no intention of abiding by
even if it does. Better ties offer the best opportunity to change how
Tehran calculates the costs and benefits of hostile behavior toward
Washington's traditional allies in the Middle East.
Israeli and Saudi leaders in particular are adamant about this, and
are frustrated, angry, and mystified that the Obama administration
knows of their concerns about Iran, but is attempting to reach an
agreement with it anyway. What their behavior reveals is that it is
not just Iran whom Israeli and Saudi leaders don't trust, but also
the Obama administration and Washington more generally.
While Israel and Saudi Arabia (among others) have had good reason
to fear the Islamic Republic of Iran in the past, the strong degree
of Iranian-U.S. hostility motivated Washington to contain Iran -
and its doing so benefited Israel and Saudi Arabia. What Israeli
and Saudi leaders now fear is that if Iranian-U.S. relations improve
significantly, Washington will no longer act so strongly to contain
Iran.
Indeed, the U.S. may press Israel and Saudi Arabia to soften their own
policies toward Iran so as not to hinder the process of Iranian-U.S.
rapprochement or Tehran's progress in "rejoining the international
community."
Something like this may well occur. And it might not just be the
Obama administration doing this. Because U.S. sanctions against
Iran have been so very tight and because U.S. public opinion has
viewed Iran so negatively for so very many years, there have been
few vested interests in the U.S. (apart from a portion of the small
Iranian-American community) willing to lobby for improved ties between
Washington and Tehran.
But as Iranian-U.S. relations improve, this will change. U.S.
corporations - especially petroleum firms - have long wanted to do
business with Iran, but sanctions and Iran's negative image prevented
this. Improved Iranian-U.S. relations will result in U.S. business
being more willing to lobby for reducing sanctions (which, they will
argue, mainly benefit their competitors in Europe, Russia, and China).
Further, the prospect of improved Washington-Tehran ties may free the
Armenian-American lobby to argue that better Iranian-U.S. relations
would greatly help their homeland escape its over-dependence on Russia
vis-a-vis Turkey and Azerbaijan (neighbors with which Armenia has
long had difficult relations).
And despite its differences with Armenia, Azerbaijan - as well as
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and U.S. petroleum companies active in them -
would welcome the opportunity to export petroleum via Iran. Further,
the U.S. military and all those concerned with containing the Taliban
may see a friendly Iran as a better route for supplying Afghan
government forces than either unreliable Pakistan or the long and
expensive route through Russia and Central Asia.
And being a professor, I cannot help but note that cash-strapped U.S.
universities would very much like to see the return of large numbers
of full tuition-paying Iranian students.
If all these - and probably other unanticipated - constituencies with
a strong interest in friendly Iranian-U.S. relations in the U.S.
arise, then Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others who now fear Iran will
find it difficult to press Washington to resume a tougher policy
toward Iran in the future. Anticipation of this state of affairs is
undoubtedly an important factor motivating Israeli and Saudi leaders to
try to forestall an Iranian-U.S. rapprochement now before this occurs.
What they do not appreciate, though, is that improved Iranian-U.S.
relations will lead to a similar process unfolding in Iran. The
prospect of improved Iranian-U.S. relations will allow those who
would benefit from it to argue in favor of this process and against
policies that undermine it.
While it is difficult for Iranian actors to argue against the position
that Iran must remain ever vigilant against U.S. hostility when U.S.
policy toward Iran is indeed hostile, it will be easier for them to do
so if they can point to a real prospect of an improved relationship,
or better yet, an actually improved relationship that has provided
benefits they do not want to lose.
To put it bluntly: when the ayatollahs and even the leadership of the
Revolutionary Guards can travel to and own property in the U.S., send
their children to college there, and earn money as consultants to and
partners with U.S. corporations, it is doubtful that they will want
to risk losing all this for the dubious benefits of issuing nuclear
threats or supporting ungrateful and unprofitable allies such as Hamas,
Hezbollah, or Assad.
Fearful Israelis and Saudis (along with their U.S. supporters)
reading this will undoubtedly claim that the Iranians want to "have
their cake and eat it too" through benefiting from improved economic
ties with the West in order to more easily build up their military
strength and support their militant allies.
But while those who fear Iran may believe otherwise, it will simply be
impossible for Tehran to build and maintain good relations with the
U.S. while at the same time pursuing hostile policies toward Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and others. The rapprochement process - and all of Iran's
benefits from it - would quickly end if it did despite the growing
U.S. and Iranian domestic constituencies seeking better relations.
The growth of these constituencies, though, could be powerful forces
acting to forestall counter-productive Iranian behaviour.
Hostile Iranian-U.S. relations have not served to put an end to
hostile Iranian policies toward Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past,
and are unlikely to do so in the future. An improved Iranian-U.S.
relationship will not lead to Iran becoming friends with Israel
and Saudi Arabia (which, of course, are not exactly friends with
each other).
Better ties between Washington and Tehran, though, offer the best
opportunity to change how Tehran calculates the costs and benefits
of hostile behaviour (if not hostile statements) toward Washington's
traditional allies in the Middle East.
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George
Mason University in Fairfax, VA. He is the author of many books and
articles, including Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after
Iraq and Afghanistan (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).
IPS - Inter Press Service
November 22, 2013 Friday
Mark N. Katz
WASHINGTON, Nov 22 2013
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and some of the other Arab Gulf states are
deeply sceptical of the Barack Obama administration's efforts to
reach a deal with Iran limiting its nuclear program and to improve
U.S.-Iranian relations generally.
Washington's traditional Middle Eastern allies warn that the Islamic
Republic cannot be trusted, and that Washington must not reach
a deal with Iran that either fails to adequately limit Iranian
nuclear ambitions, or which Tehran has no intention of abiding by
even if it does. Better ties offer the best opportunity to change how
Tehran calculates the costs and benefits of hostile behavior toward
Washington's traditional allies in the Middle East.
Israeli and Saudi leaders in particular are adamant about this, and
are frustrated, angry, and mystified that the Obama administration
knows of their concerns about Iran, but is attempting to reach an
agreement with it anyway. What their behavior reveals is that it is
not just Iran whom Israeli and Saudi leaders don't trust, but also
the Obama administration and Washington more generally.
While Israel and Saudi Arabia (among others) have had good reason
to fear the Islamic Republic of Iran in the past, the strong degree
of Iranian-U.S. hostility motivated Washington to contain Iran -
and its doing so benefited Israel and Saudi Arabia. What Israeli
and Saudi leaders now fear is that if Iranian-U.S. relations improve
significantly, Washington will no longer act so strongly to contain
Iran.
Indeed, the U.S. may press Israel and Saudi Arabia to soften their own
policies toward Iran so as not to hinder the process of Iranian-U.S.
rapprochement or Tehran's progress in "rejoining the international
community."
Something like this may well occur. And it might not just be the
Obama administration doing this. Because U.S. sanctions against
Iran have been so very tight and because U.S. public opinion has
viewed Iran so negatively for so very many years, there have been
few vested interests in the U.S. (apart from a portion of the small
Iranian-American community) willing to lobby for improved ties between
Washington and Tehran.
But as Iranian-U.S. relations improve, this will change. U.S.
corporations - especially petroleum firms - have long wanted to do
business with Iran, but sanctions and Iran's negative image prevented
this. Improved Iranian-U.S. relations will result in U.S. business
being more willing to lobby for reducing sanctions (which, they will
argue, mainly benefit their competitors in Europe, Russia, and China).
Further, the prospect of improved Washington-Tehran ties may free the
Armenian-American lobby to argue that better Iranian-U.S. relations
would greatly help their homeland escape its over-dependence on Russia
vis-a-vis Turkey and Azerbaijan (neighbors with which Armenia has
long had difficult relations).
And despite its differences with Armenia, Azerbaijan - as well as
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and U.S. petroleum companies active in them -
would welcome the opportunity to export petroleum via Iran. Further,
the U.S. military and all those concerned with containing the Taliban
may see a friendly Iran as a better route for supplying Afghan
government forces than either unreliable Pakistan or the long and
expensive route through Russia and Central Asia.
And being a professor, I cannot help but note that cash-strapped U.S.
universities would very much like to see the return of large numbers
of full tuition-paying Iranian students.
If all these - and probably other unanticipated - constituencies with
a strong interest in friendly Iranian-U.S. relations in the U.S.
arise, then Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others who now fear Iran will
find it difficult to press Washington to resume a tougher policy
toward Iran in the future. Anticipation of this state of affairs is
undoubtedly an important factor motivating Israeli and Saudi leaders to
try to forestall an Iranian-U.S. rapprochement now before this occurs.
What they do not appreciate, though, is that improved Iranian-U.S.
relations will lead to a similar process unfolding in Iran. The
prospect of improved Iranian-U.S. relations will allow those who
would benefit from it to argue in favor of this process and against
policies that undermine it.
While it is difficult for Iranian actors to argue against the position
that Iran must remain ever vigilant against U.S. hostility when U.S.
policy toward Iran is indeed hostile, it will be easier for them to do
so if they can point to a real prospect of an improved relationship,
or better yet, an actually improved relationship that has provided
benefits they do not want to lose.
To put it bluntly: when the ayatollahs and even the leadership of the
Revolutionary Guards can travel to and own property in the U.S., send
their children to college there, and earn money as consultants to and
partners with U.S. corporations, it is doubtful that they will want
to risk losing all this for the dubious benefits of issuing nuclear
threats or supporting ungrateful and unprofitable allies such as Hamas,
Hezbollah, or Assad.
Fearful Israelis and Saudis (along with their U.S. supporters)
reading this will undoubtedly claim that the Iranians want to "have
their cake and eat it too" through benefiting from improved economic
ties with the West in order to more easily build up their military
strength and support their militant allies.
But while those who fear Iran may believe otherwise, it will simply be
impossible for Tehran to build and maintain good relations with the
U.S. while at the same time pursuing hostile policies toward Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and others. The rapprochement process - and all of Iran's
benefits from it - would quickly end if it did despite the growing
U.S. and Iranian domestic constituencies seeking better relations.
The growth of these constituencies, though, could be powerful forces
acting to forestall counter-productive Iranian behaviour.
Hostile Iranian-U.S. relations have not served to put an end to
hostile Iranian policies toward Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past,
and are unlikely to do so in the future. An improved Iranian-U.S.
relationship will not lead to Iran becoming friends with Israel
and Saudi Arabia (which, of course, are not exactly friends with
each other).
Better ties between Washington and Tehran, though, offer the best
opportunity to change how Tehran calculates the costs and benefits
of hostile behaviour (if not hostile statements) toward Washington's
traditional allies in the Middle East.
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George
Mason University in Fairfax, VA. He is the author of many books and
articles, including Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after
Iraq and Afghanistan (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).