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UKRAINE'S PATH NOT TAKEN
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Nov 28 2013
by Charles Tannock*
28 November 2013 /BRUSSELS
Sometimes history can be too ironic. This week, as Ukraine marked
the 80th anniversary of the Holodomor, Stalin's engineered famine
in Ukraine, President Viktor Yanukovich's government announced that
it would not sign a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with
the European Union at a summit in Vilnius on Nov. 28. Just like that,
Ukraine's chance to transcend its tortured history appears to have
been thrown away.
The ostensible issue that forced Yanukovich to balk was the EU's
demand that former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, now serving
a seven-year prison sentence, be permitted to travel to Germany
for medical treatment. Though the European Court of Human Rights
has ruled her imprisonment politically motivated, Yanukovich --
whose power to pardon is absolute -- has refused to countenance her
release, desiring above all to prevent her candidacy in the Ukrainian
presidential election due in 2015.
Perhaps Yanukovich's retreat from Europe should have been foreseen,
given behavior -- like locking up his political opponents -- that has
been difficult to reconcile with European values and democratic norms.
But it was his recent series of secret meetings with Russian President
Vladimir Putin that sealed the fate of the agreement with the EU.
Former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski once observed
that in Russian eyes, Russia without Ukraine was a normal nation-state,
but Russia with Ukraine was an empire. But Russians who believe that
Yanukovich's retreat from Europe represents a great victory should
think again. Just as Putin's gross mismanagement of the economy
has led even the economics minister to predict stagnation for the
rest of this decade, his geopolitical nostalgia is poised to saddle
Russians with the same dysfunctional empire that impoverished them
under the Soviets. Worse still, it seems that only the same system --
in which siloviki (secret policemen) are in charge -- appears capable
of holding together such a ramshackle economic empire.
Putin can preen, but the fact remains that Ukraine's economy is in
far worse shape than Russia's. A demographically declining empire of
crony capitalists, from which the most talented and educated flee --
some 300,000 left Russia last year alone -- is hardly likely to be a
serious strategic challenger to either the United States or China. On
the contrary, China covets much of eastern Russia, lands taken from
it during its years of "humiliation" in the 19th century.
Having recently traveled to Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, I saw
firsthand the splits in the political class and in public opinion
concerning whether these countries should hitch their economies and
security to Europe and the US, or submit to Russia through membership
in its Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). The Russian system
vaguely resembles Imperial Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere in both its rhetoric and its aim of subordinating neighbors.
Armenia was the first ex-Soviet state to succumb to Putin's pressure
and shun the EU Eastern Partnership. After four years of negotiations,
Putin warned President Serzh Sargsyan that the price of Russian gas
would be doubled, Russian security guarantees would be withdrawn
(Armenia is locked in a bitter dispute with oil-rich Azerbaijan),
and the large Armenian diaspora in Russia would no longer be as
welcome to work and live in the country as before.
Similar attempts to bully Georgia were made, and former Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili talked about joining Putin's customs union. But,
following the overwhelming defeat of the overtly pro-Russia
candidate Nino Burjanadze in the recent presidential election,
the ruling Georgian Dream party decided to stay the Euro-Atlantic
course, particularly as Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions
remain under Russian occupation. (Russia has also tried heavy-handed
tactics on Moldova by threatening to ban the country's wine exports
to Russia and to recognize the independence of the breakaway territory
of Transnistria.)
The West can diminish the force of Russian bullying by assuring
ex-Soviet countries that the Eastern Partnership is not dead, and that
something short of the envisioned free-trade areas will emerge. The
EU can also continue to work for greater access to visas and,
eventually, full visa-free travel. It can remain engaged on cooperation
agreements affecting aviation, trade, academic exchanges, transport,
infrastructure, tourism and agriculture and rural development.
Moreover, it can provide renewed help for democratic
institution-building: assisting judicial reform, raising
anti-corruption awareness and encouraging prosecution of even
high-ranking offenders, as well as supporting engagement by
civil-society groups. Perhaps most critically, countries such as
Austria, where members of the Yanukovich clique have created obscure
companies to hide their ill-gotten assets, can stop turning a blind
eye to the plundering of countries like Ukraine.
Unfortunately, in an era of budgetary austerity and lingering eurozone
fragility, EU member states were unable to neutralize Russia's
economic threats against Ukraine, particularly the loss of the Russian
market. Perhaps a more radical solution to Russian bullying might have
been to match Russia's recent arbitrary ban on Ukrainian chocolate
exports with a ban on Russian vodka exports to the EU.
In the end, it may be the oligarchs who have bankrolled Yanukovich's
career -- particularly Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest man -- who
will make the ultimate decision about Ukraine's fate. As Ukraine's
European prospects diminish, the economy -- and thus the oligarchs'
fortunes -- will be exposed to the Russian siloviki's untender
mercies. Perhaps once Akhmetov and his ilk comprehend the long-term
risks to their businesses and wealth, they will induce MPs that are
beholden to them to switch sides and unite with pro-EU forces to
restore Ukraine's European future.
________________________________
*Charles Tannock is foreign affairs coordinator for the European
Conservatives and Reformists in the European Parliament. © Project
Syndicate 2013
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Nov 28 2013
by Charles Tannock*
28 November 2013 /BRUSSELS
Sometimes history can be too ironic. This week, as Ukraine marked
the 80th anniversary of the Holodomor, Stalin's engineered famine
in Ukraine, President Viktor Yanukovich's government announced that
it would not sign a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with
the European Union at a summit in Vilnius on Nov. 28. Just like that,
Ukraine's chance to transcend its tortured history appears to have
been thrown away.
The ostensible issue that forced Yanukovich to balk was the EU's
demand that former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, now serving
a seven-year prison sentence, be permitted to travel to Germany
for medical treatment. Though the European Court of Human Rights
has ruled her imprisonment politically motivated, Yanukovich --
whose power to pardon is absolute -- has refused to countenance her
release, desiring above all to prevent her candidacy in the Ukrainian
presidential election due in 2015.
Perhaps Yanukovich's retreat from Europe should have been foreseen,
given behavior -- like locking up his political opponents -- that has
been difficult to reconcile with European values and democratic norms.
But it was his recent series of secret meetings with Russian President
Vladimir Putin that sealed the fate of the agreement with the EU.
Former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski once observed
that in Russian eyes, Russia without Ukraine was a normal nation-state,
but Russia with Ukraine was an empire. But Russians who believe that
Yanukovich's retreat from Europe represents a great victory should
think again. Just as Putin's gross mismanagement of the economy
has led even the economics minister to predict stagnation for the
rest of this decade, his geopolitical nostalgia is poised to saddle
Russians with the same dysfunctional empire that impoverished them
under the Soviets. Worse still, it seems that only the same system --
in which siloviki (secret policemen) are in charge -- appears capable
of holding together such a ramshackle economic empire.
Putin can preen, but the fact remains that Ukraine's economy is in
far worse shape than Russia's. A demographically declining empire of
crony capitalists, from which the most talented and educated flee --
some 300,000 left Russia last year alone -- is hardly likely to be a
serious strategic challenger to either the United States or China. On
the contrary, China covets much of eastern Russia, lands taken from
it during its years of "humiliation" in the 19th century.
Having recently traveled to Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, I saw
firsthand the splits in the political class and in public opinion
concerning whether these countries should hitch their economies and
security to Europe and the US, or submit to Russia through membership
in its Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). The Russian system
vaguely resembles Imperial Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere in both its rhetoric and its aim of subordinating neighbors.
Armenia was the first ex-Soviet state to succumb to Putin's pressure
and shun the EU Eastern Partnership. After four years of negotiations,
Putin warned President Serzh Sargsyan that the price of Russian gas
would be doubled, Russian security guarantees would be withdrawn
(Armenia is locked in a bitter dispute with oil-rich Azerbaijan),
and the large Armenian diaspora in Russia would no longer be as
welcome to work and live in the country as before.
Similar attempts to bully Georgia were made, and former Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili talked about joining Putin's customs union. But,
following the overwhelming defeat of the overtly pro-Russia
candidate Nino Burjanadze in the recent presidential election,
the ruling Georgian Dream party decided to stay the Euro-Atlantic
course, particularly as Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions
remain under Russian occupation. (Russia has also tried heavy-handed
tactics on Moldova by threatening to ban the country's wine exports
to Russia and to recognize the independence of the breakaway territory
of Transnistria.)
The West can diminish the force of Russian bullying by assuring
ex-Soviet countries that the Eastern Partnership is not dead, and that
something short of the envisioned free-trade areas will emerge. The
EU can also continue to work for greater access to visas and,
eventually, full visa-free travel. It can remain engaged on cooperation
agreements affecting aviation, trade, academic exchanges, transport,
infrastructure, tourism and agriculture and rural development.
Moreover, it can provide renewed help for democratic
institution-building: assisting judicial reform, raising
anti-corruption awareness and encouraging prosecution of even
high-ranking offenders, as well as supporting engagement by
civil-society groups. Perhaps most critically, countries such as
Austria, where members of the Yanukovich clique have created obscure
companies to hide their ill-gotten assets, can stop turning a blind
eye to the plundering of countries like Ukraine.
Unfortunately, in an era of budgetary austerity and lingering eurozone
fragility, EU member states were unable to neutralize Russia's
economic threats against Ukraine, particularly the loss of the Russian
market. Perhaps a more radical solution to Russian bullying might have
been to match Russia's recent arbitrary ban on Ukrainian chocolate
exports with a ban on Russian vodka exports to the EU.
In the end, it may be the oligarchs who have bankrolled Yanukovich's
career -- particularly Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest man -- who
will make the ultimate decision about Ukraine's fate. As Ukraine's
European prospects diminish, the economy -- and thus the oligarchs'
fortunes -- will be exposed to the Russian siloviki's untender
mercies. Perhaps once Akhmetov and his ilk comprehend the long-term
risks to their businesses and wealth, they will induce MPs that are
beholden to them to switch sides and unite with pro-EU forces to
restore Ukraine's European future.
________________________________
*Charles Tannock is foreign affairs coordinator for the European
Conservatives and Reformists in the European Parliament. © Project
Syndicate 2013