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AMBIVALENT RUSSIA
New Eastern Europe
Oct 1 2013
Author: Nika Sikharulidze .
"Our unit had an order to attack the Azerbaijanis' positions;
however, another order came from the top to change the target and
attack the Armenians' positions. These kind of contradictive orders
were ordinary in this war," says a Georgian former soldier who served
in the Soviet/Russian army located on Armenian territory during the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between 1988-1991. The theory says that
a conflict between neighbouring states can emerge on the grounds
of ethnic tensions, religious differences, border uncertainty,
spilling-over of internal problems and other factors. Additionally,
conflicts can also be instigated by a third party. These types of
conflicts are the most complex to solve and the solution normally
depends on political tradeoffs, big political games that are a matter
of political logrolling or exchange.
For Russia, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caucasus
never lost its significant importance. As a former metropolis of the
Soviet Union, Russia still retains its influence over the region. To
understand Russia's dualistic approach to its foreign policy and its
Near Abroad in particular, we should glance through the history of
tsarist Russia, continued in the same manner by the communists and
finally Putin's re-emerged informal doctrine of neo-imperialism.
The Russian Empire, which reached the peak of its magnificence
in the first half of the 18th century, adopted a classical and
common to all empires approach to its neighbours, lands, peoples
and competing powers. Empires were always driven by the ambivalent
stimulus of acting, rationally and irrationally. In the case of the
Russian Empire, the examples of rational behaviour were to expand its
influence over Azerbaijan as a bridge-head to Persia in the beginning
of the 19th century, and later to do the same due to its energy rich
territory. Controversially, the occupation of the Baltic states
in the mid-20th century, and the bloody response to the Hungarian
Revolution of 1956 had a huge component of the Russian Empire's
irrational behaviour.
As today's Russian Federation is a successor of the Soviet Union,
and the Soviet Union itself is a successor of the Russian Empire, it
is easy to understand that its foreign-policy behaviour is a rudiment
of the old imperialistic approach which still remains in the brains
of the Russian ruling elite of the old school KGB nomenclature.
Russian participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a fusion of
the above-mentioned rational and irrational behaviour. By aggravating
this conflict, Russia was able to accomplish a number of objectives:
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and Georgia's neutral position in
this situation makes the hypothetical integration of the South Caucasus
region impossible, therefore undermining the possibility of turning it
into a huge geopolitical centre with likely joint foreign aspirations.
The only way for Russia to retain its military presence in Gyumri,
Armenia, is to be a guarantor of Armenian security and defence. Thus,
due to the conflict, landlocked Armenia is forced to seek allies as
it is surrounded by Turkey, with whom it has no diplomatic relations,
Azerbaijan with whom it is in a state of war, Iran from the south and
Georgia from the north that for certain reasons cannot be considered
as reliable strategic partners. Therefore, Armenia's pro-Russian
orientation is determined by the geopolitical situation on the one
hand, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the other.
The Russian political establishment also hopes that the existing
conflict provides more advantages for Russia in its relations with
Azerbaijan. The existing political configuration of the conflict
allows for Russia's prolongation of possession and operation of
the Gabala Radar Station, which is extremely important for Russia
to control 6,000 kilometres of Azerbaijan's border. Azerbaijani
politicians take into consideration that Armenia is in an alliance
with Russia in the format of Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), which operates similar to NATO's 5th article principle saying
that an attack on one of the members of the alliance is considered an
attack on all members. This particular circumstance makes Azerbaijan's
policy more accurate and in some cases loyal to Russia.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been somewhat of a guarantee for
Russia that the two countries would not express any NATO aspirations,
which is a very sensitive issue for Russia. Russia can have a full
control over the situation if one of the conflict sides shows any
interest to NATO. Russia has great leverage to stop NATO enlargement
to the East and particularly in the South Caucasus by retaining the
status quo of the existing conflict. Russia uses the same leverage
with regards to the EU enlargement policy.
At the beginning of September 2013, during a visit to Moscow, the
Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan, announced Armenia's readiness to
join the Russian-led Customs Union: "I confirmed Armenia's decision to
join the Customs Union and participate in the processes of formation
of the Eurasian economic union," said Sargsyan, which proves that the
Armenians greatly depend on Russia, especially with regard to their
foreign policy aspirations.
Russia also hopes that by controlling the situation in the South
Caucasus it can manipulate the energy policy and in particular hinder
further development of alternative energy channels to Europe. Central
Asian and Caspian energy resources are considered one of the ways
of ensuring European energy security that would result in Russia's
losing its monopoly position in the European energy market.
These and some other vested interests that are driven by Russia's
policy in the South Caucasus could be considered rational. However,
there are irrational incentives that make Russian policy obscure
and difficult to understand because of its emotional origins. These
emotions are remnants of Russian imperialism which seriously restrain
its development and transformation into Western culture. The expansion
of Russian borders as far as is possible, washing the Russian sapog
(boot) in the Indian Ocean, expanding its influence in Europe and
making the whole world scared of Russia, are all the neo-imperialistic
dreams of the Russian political elites.
Until the new generation of Russian policymakers realise that this
kind of political romanticism should be replaced by the real politics,
rational behaviour and respect towards common international rules,
Russia will not reach the level of stable development and prosperity.
Nika Sikharulidze is the Chief Advisor with the Office of the National
Security Council of Georgia.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/960
New Eastern Europe
Oct 1 2013
Author: Nika Sikharulidze .
"Our unit had an order to attack the Azerbaijanis' positions;
however, another order came from the top to change the target and
attack the Armenians' positions. These kind of contradictive orders
were ordinary in this war," says a Georgian former soldier who served
in the Soviet/Russian army located on Armenian territory during the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between 1988-1991. The theory says that
a conflict between neighbouring states can emerge on the grounds
of ethnic tensions, religious differences, border uncertainty,
spilling-over of internal problems and other factors. Additionally,
conflicts can also be instigated by a third party. These types of
conflicts are the most complex to solve and the solution normally
depends on political tradeoffs, big political games that are a matter
of political logrolling or exchange.
For Russia, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caucasus
never lost its significant importance. As a former metropolis of the
Soviet Union, Russia still retains its influence over the region. To
understand Russia's dualistic approach to its foreign policy and its
Near Abroad in particular, we should glance through the history of
tsarist Russia, continued in the same manner by the communists and
finally Putin's re-emerged informal doctrine of neo-imperialism.
The Russian Empire, which reached the peak of its magnificence
in the first half of the 18th century, adopted a classical and
common to all empires approach to its neighbours, lands, peoples
and competing powers. Empires were always driven by the ambivalent
stimulus of acting, rationally and irrationally. In the case of the
Russian Empire, the examples of rational behaviour were to expand its
influence over Azerbaijan as a bridge-head to Persia in the beginning
of the 19th century, and later to do the same due to its energy rich
territory. Controversially, the occupation of the Baltic states
in the mid-20th century, and the bloody response to the Hungarian
Revolution of 1956 had a huge component of the Russian Empire's
irrational behaviour.
As today's Russian Federation is a successor of the Soviet Union,
and the Soviet Union itself is a successor of the Russian Empire, it
is easy to understand that its foreign-policy behaviour is a rudiment
of the old imperialistic approach which still remains in the brains
of the Russian ruling elite of the old school KGB nomenclature.
Russian participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a fusion of
the above-mentioned rational and irrational behaviour. By aggravating
this conflict, Russia was able to accomplish a number of objectives:
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and Georgia's neutral position in
this situation makes the hypothetical integration of the South Caucasus
region impossible, therefore undermining the possibility of turning it
into a huge geopolitical centre with likely joint foreign aspirations.
The only way for Russia to retain its military presence in Gyumri,
Armenia, is to be a guarantor of Armenian security and defence. Thus,
due to the conflict, landlocked Armenia is forced to seek allies as
it is surrounded by Turkey, with whom it has no diplomatic relations,
Azerbaijan with whom it is in a state of war, Iran from the south and
Georgia from the north that for certain reasons cannot be considered
as reliable strategic partners. Therefore, Armenia's pro-Russian
orientation is determined by the geopolitical situation on the one
hand, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the other.
The Russian political establishment also hopes that the existing
conflict provides more advantages for Russia in its relations with
Azerbaijan. The existing political configuration of the conflict
allows for Russia's prolongation of possession and operation of
the Gabala Radar Station, which is extremely important for Russia
to control 6,000 kilometres of Azerbaijan's border. Azerbaijani
politicians take into consideration that Armenia is in an alliance
with Russia in the format of Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), which operates similar to NATO's 5th article principle saying
that an attack on one of the members of the alliance is considered an
attack on all members. This particular circumstance makes Azerbaijan's
policy more accurate and in some cases loyal to Russia.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been somewhat of a guarantee for
Russia that the two countries would not express any NATO aspirations,
which is a very sensitive issue for Russia. Russia can have a full
control over the situation if one of the conflict sides shows any
interest to NATO. Russia has great leverage to stop NATO enlargement
to the East and particularly in the South Caucasus by retaining the
status quo of the existing conflict. Russia uses the same leverage
with regards to the EU enlargement policy.
At the beginning of September 2013, during a visit to Moscow, the
Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan, announced Armenia's readiness to
join the Russian-led Customs Union: "I confirmed Armenia's decision to
join the Customs Union and participate in the processes of formation
of the Eurasian economic union," said Sargsyan, which proves that the
Armenians greatly depend on Russia, especially with regard to their
foreign policy aspirations.
Russia also hopes that by controlling the situation in the South
Caucasus it can manipulate the energy policy and in particular hinder
further development of alternative energy channels to Europe. Central
Asian and Caspian energy resources are considered one of the ways
of ensuring European energy security that would result in Russia's
losing its monopoly position in the European energy market.
These and some other vested interests that are driven by Russia's
policy in the South Caucasus could be considered rational. However,
there are irrational incentives that make Russian policy obscure
and difficult to understand because of its emotional origins. These
emotions are remnants of Russian imperialism which seriously restrain
its development and transformation into Western culture. The expansion
of Russian borders as far as is possible, washing the Russian sapog
(boot) in the Indian Ocean, expanding its influence in Europe and
making the whole world scared of Russia, are all the neo-imperialistic
dreams of the Russian political elites.
Until the new generation of Russian policymakers realise that this
kind of political romanticism should be replaced by the real politics,
rational behaviour and respect towards common international rules,
Russia will not reach the level of stable development and prosperity.
Nika Sikharulidze is the Chief Advisor with the Office of the National
Security Council of Georgia.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/960