A FESTERING SORE : THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
The Economist
Oct 3 2013
Oct 3rd 2013, 11:53 by G.E. | TBILISI
IT IS 25 years since conflict broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-majority region inside Azerbaijan,
and 19 years since a shaky ceasefire came into effect. To much of the
outside world, it is a "frozen" conflict that merits little attention.
Yet as the International Crisis Group (ICG) shows in a recent briefing,
the situation is much more fluid and unpredictable than that tag
might suggest.
Skirmishes between the two sides are frequent, with hundreds, even
thousands of ceasefire violations reported every month. Dozens of
deaths and injuries occur each year. For years, the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which is
co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States, has been trying to
resolve the conflict. But with negotiations hitting deadlock in 2011,
the geographical scope of the clashes has spread to places far away
from Nagorno-Karabakh.
The arms race between the two sides continues. Oil-rich Azerbaijan's
defence budget for 2013 is $3.7 billion, almost one billion more than
Armenia's entire state budget. Armenia increased its own defence
spending by 25% this year, to $450m. With the military balance
shifting towards Azerbaijan's capital Baku, each side's rhetoric has
changed. The Azerbaijanis talk increasingly of a military solution
to the conflict; Armenians speak of a preventive strike.
The provocations go deeper. Just over a year ago, Azerbaijan secured
the return of military officer Ramil Safarov from Hungary, where
he was serving a 20-year prison sentence for murdering an Armenian
soldier on a NATO-led language course. Yet far from serving out the
remainder of his sentence in an Azerbaijani prison, he was released
upon arrival in Baku, promoted and hailed as a hero. An outraged
Armenia broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary.
Meanwhile, Armenians increasingly refer to the Azerbaijani territories
that its troops occupy adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh as "liberated".
The Armenian capital Yerevan has said it will re-open a refurbished
airport in Nagorno-Karabakh for fixed-wing flights, claiming it
would be a humanitarian move to improve the lives of the region's
inhabitants. Baku responded by threatening to shoot such flights down.
Both sides may experience domestic political pressures over the next
few months. Economic dissatisfaction and continued complaints over the
elections in February 2013 have led to calls for political protests
in Armenia. Although the re-election of Ilham Aliyev as president
of Azerbaijan on October 9th is almost a foregone conclusion, some
post-election disorder remains a possibility. The danger, the ICG
warns, is that such pressures could exacerbate the military situation
and heighten the possibility of violent escalation.
There is only so much the outside world can do. Preventing the conflict
from escalating is already an achievement, especially given the
nightmare scenario that would draw in regional powers such as Russia,
Turkey and Iran. Yet with the Minsk process looking distinctly tired,
continued prevention (let alone conflict resolution) is not assured.
Russia's desire to assert its hegemony in the South Caucasus
complicates matters further. Earlier this year, its relationship
with Armenia grew frosty over Yerevan's moves towards an association
agreement with the European Union. When Serzh Sargsyan, Armenia's
president, rejected Moscow's alternative Eurasian Union, Russia
increased the price of the natural gas it sold to Armenia, and
delivered $1 billion worth of weaponry to Baku. On a trip to Moscow
at the beginning of September, Mr Sargsyan bowed to the Kremlin's
pressure and reversed his decision, throwing Armenia's European
aspirations into confusion.
Protracted conflict has high costs for both countries, including
hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, bereaved relatives and
closed borders. Thomas de Waal, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, describes another cost: "the more intangible
toxic effect of war on political discourse and the media, the way it
renders a society incapable of looking at the future, while it dwells
on the past."
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/nagorno-karabakh-conflict
From: Baghdasarian
The Economist
Oct 3 2013
Oct 3rd 2013, 11:53 by G.E. | TBILISI
IT IS 25 years since conflict broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-majority region inside Azerbaijan,
and 19 years since a shaky ceasefire came into effect. To much of the
outside world, it is a "frozen" conflict that merits little attention.
Yet as the International Crisis Group (ICG) shows in a recent briefing,
the situation is much more fluid and unpredictable than that tag
might suggest.
Skirmishes between the two sides are frequent, with hundreds, even
thousands of ceasefire violations reported every month. Dozens of
deaths and injuries occur each year. For years, the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which is
co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States, has been trying to
resolve the conflict. But with negotiations hitting deadlock in 2011,
the geographical scope of the clashes has spread to places far away
from Nagorno-Karabakh.
The arms race between the two sides continues. Oil-rich Azerbaijan's
defence budget for 2013 is $3.7 billion, almost one billion more than
Armenia's entire state budget. Armenia increased its own defence
spending by 25% this year, to $450m. With the military balance
shifting towards Azerbaijan's capital Baku, each side's rhetoric has
changed. The Azerbaijanis talk increasingly of a military solution
to the conflict; Armenians speak of a preventive strike.
The provocations go deeper. Just over a year ago, Azerbaijan secured
the return of military officer Ramil Safarov from Hungary, where
he was serving a 20-year prison sentence for murdering an Armenian
soldier on a NATO-led language course. Yet far from serving out the
remainder of his sentence in an Azerbaijani prison, he was released
upon arrival in Baku, promoted and hailed as a hero. An outraged
Armenia broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary.
Meanwhile, Armenians increasingly refer to the Azerbaijani territories
that its troops occupy adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh as "liberated".
The Armenian capital Yerevan has said it will re-open a refurbished
airport in Nagorno-Karabakh for fixed-wing flights, claiming it
would be a humanitarian move to improve the lives of the region's
inhabitants. Baku responded by threatening to shoot such flights down.
Both sides may experience domestic political pressures over the next
few months. Economic dissatisfaction and continued complaints over the
elections in February 2013 have led to calls for political protests
in Armenia. Although the re-election of Ilham Aliyev as president
of Azerbaijan on October 9th is almost a foregone conclusion, some
post-election disorder remains a possibility. The danger, the ICG
warns, is that such pressures could exacerbate the military situation
and heighten the possibility of violent escalation.
There is only so much the outside world can do. Preventing the conflict
from escalating is already an achievement, especially given the
nightmare scenario that would draw in regional powers such as Russia,
Turkey and Iran. Yet with the Minsk process looking distinctly tired,
continued prevention (let alone conflict resolution) is not assured.
Russia's desire to assert its hegemony in the South Caucasus
complicates matters further. Earlier this year, its relationship
with Armenia grew frosty over Yerevan's moves towards an association
agreement with the European Union. When Serzh Sargsyan, Armenia's
president, rejected Moscow's alternative Eurasian Union, Russia
increased the price of the natural gas it sold to Armenia, and
delivered $1 billion worth of weaponry to Baku. On a trip to Moscow
at the beginning of September, Mr Sargsyan bowed to the Kremlin's
pressure and reversed his decision, throwing Armenia's European
aspirations into confusion.
Protracted conflict has high costs for both countries, including
hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, bereaved relatives and
closed borders. Thomas de Waal, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, describes another cost: "the more intangible
toxic effect of war on political discourse and the media, the way it
renders a society incapable of looking at the future, while it dwells
on the past."
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/nagorno-karabakh-conflict
From: Baghdasarian