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ARMENIA'S CHOICE OF THE EURASIAN UNION: A STUNNING END TO ITS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?
04-10-2013 17:52:21 | | Articles and Analyses
George Vlad Niculescu
Head of Research, The European Geopolitical Forum The announcement at
the beginning of September 2013, in Moscow, by President Serzh Sargsyan
of Armenia's decision to join the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union
(ECU) apparently took many by surprise.
Firstly, because in July 2013 Armenia concluded a lengthy four years
negotiation on essential agreements, meant to upgrade its ties with
the European Union (EU), which would be incompatible with joining the
ECU. Secondly, because until recently (i.e. the run-up to the Vilnius
Eastern Partnership summit to be held this fall) enlargement didn't
seem a top priority for the ECU, the focus being more on making the
customs union mechanisms effectively work for the existing membership.
Thirdly, because the Armenian government didn't make heard any noises
announcing the intention to join the ECU prior to the statement by
President Sargsyan, as the diplomatic practice would have required.
The unexpected character of the Armenian President's announcement was
widely reflected in the headlines of the international media. For
example, the Wall Street Journal commented on 4 September that:
"European diplomats were stunned this week by word that Armenia, which
had been heading toward strengthening ties with the European Union,
will instead join a customs union led by Russia-handing the Kremlin a
victory in its tug of war with Brussels for influence in the region"1.
After the dispelling of the initial surprise, high level officials,
political analysts, and members of the civil society have started to
look at the causes, meaning, and implications of this strategic shift
in Armenian foreign policy. The skeptics qualified the move as the
"end of complementarity in Armenia's foreign policy"2 and warned that
"This pressure [to join the ECU] concerns all four countries (including
Armenia) on the road to association. It's part of the wider picture,
and the fear that it might provoke a domino effect".3 Armenia-friendly
civil society claimed that "reforms and achievements in the fields of
democracy, trade regulations and modernizing the administration have
clearly been noticed by the EU and above all represent a great benefit
for the country."4 Furthermore, solving some of the socio-economic
problems facing Armenia today would actually be "a vital interest
shared by Armenia, Russia and the EU which cannot be ignored"5.
However, experts with a thorough knowledge of the South Caucasus,
and in particular of Armenia's foreign and security policies goals
and constraints, weren't astonished as much by the content of the
announcement of the President, as by the unexpected and hasty way
for making it public. For many years, it had been known that Armenia
almost irremediably linked its security and economy, in particular
its energy sector, to Russia. Yerevan chose to partially sacrifice
its independence and sovereignty for the sake of keeping a convenient
status quo in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict against
a shifting strategic balance in favor of an increasingly self confident
and internationally influent Azerbaijan.
To balance its overreliance on Russia, as well as Azerbaijani
strides to get Western support for its cause in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Armenia has cultivated its Western ties while pursuing the European
integration path. In this vein, Elmar Brok, the Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, commented on
the Armenian President's decision: "We know that Armenia is under
incredible pressure from Russia because of the difficult situation
towards Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. It is very important that
Nagorno-Karabakh should be solved in a way that such a small country
can find a solution with Azerbaijan on that question in order to
overcome the problems in the region. The European Union, which has
not done it till now, should take much more interest in the solution
of such a frozen conflict".6 Consequently, a lesson learned from the
Armenian decision to join the ECU might suggest that the EU should
get more involved into finding solutions to the protracted conflicts
in the South Caucasus and Transnistria.
Conspicuously, European integration has had a positive impact on the
political, administrative and socio-economic reforms within Armenia
itself. Therefore, it looks wise that the EU doesn't put a political
end to Armenia's European integration path in revenge for its choice
of the Eurasian Union. This way, the EU could:
maintain significant leverage on Armenia, which might prove useful in
bringing up a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;
avoid playing the dangerous game of drawing new dividing lines
in Europe's Eastern neighborhood with all its potential security
implications; promote the mutually tolerant co-existence of both the
European and Eurasian integration processes in the strategically
important, but politically sensitive South Caucasus; regional
cooperation could also play a significant role in symbiotically
welding the two integrationist processes together.
However, while Armenia's sovereign choice to subdue its national
security and economy to Russia needs to be respected, it shouldn't
be either ignored or sanctioned by the EU. Adapting the Eastern
Partnership policy to the new realities regarding the status of the
country should be high on the agenda of EU's bilateral relations with
Armenia. The EU should therefore find a realistic way to continue to
nurture Armenia's European aspirations, while accommodating them with
the requirements of its prospective Eurasian integration. This might
include a revision of Armenia's Association Agreement to reflect the
new reality, and an assessment of the potential for making the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement ( DCFTA) compatible with Armenia's
obligations as future member of the ECU. At the end of the day,
inclusion is one of the central features of the Eastern Partnership.
Regarding the potential implications of Armenia's decision at the wider
regional level, experts have already warned for a couple of years that
the ECU might evolve in the future in a way that might be challenging
the European Union as a "normative power" in its "shared neighborhood"
with Russia. Consequently, "the dilemma of the post-Soviet states:
European vs. Eurasian integration" emerged, placing "third parties,
such as Ukraine [and Armenia, indeed], in the uncomfortable position
of having to choose between joining the Eurasian Customs Union and
setting up free trade with the EU, while focusing both Russia and
the West on competition rather than on cooperation."7 Furthermore,
"the evolving challenges in Eurasia", including also the growing
ideological gap between Russia and the West, and the protracted
conflicts have pulled Russia and the West into a new geopolitical
competition, potentially resembling a regional Cold War.
Within this broader strategic context, the Armenian decision to join
the ECU might be just another episode further entangling Eurasia
into that geopolitical competition. It might be seen as a residual
outcome of EU's and Russia's shortsighted regional integration policies
undertaking parallel, non-harmonized processes in the same geographical
area. From this perspective, Armenia might have been the first victim
of competitive European and Eurasian integration processes. Unless
the emerging challenges in Eurasia are effectively addressed by
Russia, the United States and the European powers, including Turkey,
within a comprehensive political, economic and strategic dialogue
potentially leading to common approaches and cooperation, sooner or
later, other EU Eastern partners, most notably Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine, might follow in Armenia's footsteps while being
pushed into a hasty, though fundamental decision on whether their
future lies with Europe or with Moscow. At that time, the prospects
for redrawing new dividing lines in Europe's Eastern neighborhood
might have become overwhelming!
1
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/09/04/eu-stunned-by-armenia-u-turn/#!
2 V. Socor- "The end of "complementarity" in Armenia's foreign policy"
in the Eurasian Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Volume 10,
Issue 165- 18 September 2013
3 Statement by Polish MEP Jacek Sarius-Wolski, quoted by
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/09/04/eu-stunned-by-armenia-u-turn/#!
4 Statement by Michael Kambeck, Secretary General, the European
Friends of Armenia (EuFOA).
5 Ibidem.
6 From
http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-customs-union-elmar-brok-russia/25094796.html
7 G. Niculescu -"The Evolving Challenges in Eurasia" from
http://www.cseea.ro/publicatii/view/brief-analysis/the-evolving-challenges-in-eurasia
- Articles and Analyses News from Armenia and Diaspora - Noyan Tapan -
See more at: http://www.nt.am/en/news/186991/#sthash.oARkWd5e.dpuf
From: Baghdasarian
04-10-2013 17:52:21 | | Articles and Analyses
George Vlad Niculescu
Head of Research, The European Geopolitical Forum The announcement at
the beginning of September 2013, in Moscow, by President Serzh Sargsyan
of Armenia's decision to join the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union
(ECU) apparently took many by surprise.
Firstly, because in July 2013 Armenia concluded a lengthy four years
negotiation on essential agreements, meant to upgrade its ties with
the European Union (EU), which would be incompatible with joining the
ECU. Secondly, because until recently (i.e. the run-up to the Vilnius
Eastern Partnership summit to be held this fall) enlargement didn't
seem a top priority for the ECU, the focus being more on making the
customs union mechanisms effectively work for the existing membership.
Thirdly, because the Armenian government didn't make heard any noises
announcing the intention to join the ECU prior to the statement by
President Sargsyan, as the diplomatic practice would have required.
The unexpected character of the Armenian President's announcement was
widely reflected in the headlines of the international media. For
example, the Wall Street Journal commented on 4 September that:
"European diplomats were stunned this week by word that Armenia, which
had been heading toward strengthening ties with the European Union,
will instead join a customs union led by Russia-handing the Kremlin a
victory in its tug of war with Brussels for influence in the region"1.
After the dispelling of the initial surprise, high level officials,
political analysts, and members of the civil society have started to
look at the causes, meaning, and implications of this strategic shift
in Armenian foreign policy. The skeptics qualified the move as the
"end of complementarity in Armenia's foreign policy"2 and warned that
"This pressure [to join the ECU] concerns all four countries (including
Armenia) on the road to association. It's part of the wider picture,
and the fear that it might provoke a domino effect".3 Armenia-friendly
civil society claimed that "reforms and achievements in the fields of
democracy, trade regulations and modernizing the administration have
clearly been noticed by the EU and above all represent a great benefit
for the country."4 Furthermore, solving some of the socio-economic
problems facing Armenia today would actually be "a vital interest
shared by Armenia, Russia and the EU which cannot be ignored"5.
However, experts with a thorough knowledge of the South Caucasus,
and in particular of Armenia's foreign and security policies goals
and constraints, weren't astonished as much by the content of the
announcement of the President, as by the unexpected and hasty way
for making it public. For many years, it had been known that Armenia
almost irremediably linked its security and economy, in particular
its energy sector, to Russia. Yerevan chose to partially sacrifice
its independence and sovereignty for the sake of keeping a convenient
status quo in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict against
a shifting strategic balance in favor of an increasingly self confident
and internationally influent Azerbaijan.
To balance its overreliance on Russia, as well as Azerbaijani
strides to get Western support for its cause in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Armenia has cultivated its Western ties while pursuing the European
integration path. In this vein, Elmar Brok, the Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, commented on
the Armenian President's decision: "We know that Armenia is under
incredible pressure from Russia because of the difficult situation
towards Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. It is very important that
Nagorno-Karabakh should be solved in a way that such a small country
can find a solution with Azerbaijan on that question in order to
overcome the problems in the region. The European Union, which has
not done it till now, should take much more interest in the solution
of such a frozen conflict".6 Consequently, a lesson learned from the
Armenian decision to join the ECU might suggest that the EU should
get more involved into finding solutions to the protracted conflicts
in the South Caucasus and Transnistria.
Conspicuously, European integration has had a positive impact on the
political, administrative and socio-economic reforms within Armenia
itself. Therefore, it looks wise that the EU doesn't put a political
end to Armenia's European integration path in revenge for its choice
of the Eurasian Union. This way, the EU could:
maintain significant leverage on Armenia, which might prove useful in
bringing up a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;
avoid playing the dangerous game of drawing new dividing lines
in Europe's Eastern neighborhood with all its potential security
implications; promote the mutually tolerant co-existence of both the
European and Eurasian integration processes in the strategically
important, but politically sensitive South Caucasus; regional
cooperation could also play a significant role in symbiotically
welding the two integrationist processes together.
However, while Armenia's sovereign choice to subdue its national
security and economy to Russia needs to be respected, it shouldn't
be either ignored or sanctioned by the EU. Adapting the Eastern
Partnership policy to the new realities regarding the status of the
country should be high on the agenda of EU's bilateral relations with
Armenia. The EU should therefore find a realistic way to continue to
nurture Armenia's European aspirations, while accommodating them with
the requirements of its prospective Eurasian integration. This might
include a revision of Armenia's Association Agreement to reflect the
new reality, and an assessment of the potential for making the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement ( DCFTA) compatible with Armenia's
obligations as future member of the ECU. At the end of the day,
inclusion is one of the central features of the Eastern Partnership.
Regarding the potential implications of Armenia's decision at the wider
regional level, experts have already warned for a couple of years that
the ECU might evolve in the future in a way that might be challenging
the European Union as a "normative power" in its "shared neighborhood"
with Russia. Consequently, "the dilemma of the post-Soviet states:
European vs. Eurasian integration" emerged, placing "third parties,
such as Ukraine [and Armenia, indeed], in the uncomfortable position
of having to choose between joining the Eurasian Customs Union and
setting up free trade with the EU, while focusing both Russia and
the West on competition rather than on cooperation."7 Furthermore,
"the evolving challenges in Eurasia", including also the growing
ideological gap between Russia and the West, and the protracted
conflicts have pulled Russia and the West into a new geopolitical
competition, potentially resembling a regional Cold War.
Within this broader strategic context, the Armenian decision to join
the ECU might be just another episode further entangling Eurasia
into that geopolitical competition. It might be seen as a residual
outcome of EU's and Russia's shortsighted regional integration policies
undertaking parallel, non-harmonized processes in the same geographical
area. From this perspective, Armenia might have been the first victim
of competitive European and Eurasian integration processes. Unless
the emerging challenges in Eurasia are effectively addressed by
Russia, the United States and the European powers, including Turkey,
within a comprehensive political, economic and strategic dialogue
potentially leading to common approaches and cooperation, sooner or
later, other EU Eastern partners, most notably Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine, might follow in Armenia's footsteps while being
pushed into a hasty, though fundamental decision on whether their
future lies with Europe or with Moscow. At that time, the prospects
for redrawing new dividing lines in Europe's Eastern neighborhood
might have become overwhelming!
1
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/09/04/eu-stunned-by-armenia-u-turn/#!
2 V. Socor- "The end of "complementarity" in Armenia's foreign policy"
in the Eurasian Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Volume 10,
Issue 165- 18 September 2013
3 Statement by Polish MEP Jacek Sarius-Wolski, quoted by
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/09/04/eu-stunned-by-armenia-u-turn/#!
4 Statement by Michael Kambeck, Secretary General, the European
Friends of Armenia (EuFOA).
5 Ibidem.
6 From
http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-customs-union-elmar-brok-russia/25094796.html
7 G. Niculescu -"The Evolving Challenges in Eurasia" from
http://www.cseea.ro/publicatii/view/brief-analysis/the-evolving-challenges-in-eurasia
- Articles and Analyses News from Armenia and Diaspora - Noyan Tapan -
See more at: http://www.nt.am/en/news/186991/#sthash.oARkWd5e.dpuf
From: Baghdasarian