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CRISIS GROUP ON THE KARABAKH CONFLICT
New Eastern Europe
Oct 15 2013
Author: Michael Kambeck .
Syria and Iran currently dominate our agenda, but the nearby
developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the conflict area
of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) have become increasingly worrying. This
so-called frozen conflict shows clear signs of unfreezing and
has the potential to unleash a much larger scale of warfare,
including geo-political tectonic shifts and human suffering. Now,
the International Crisis Group (ICG), a key NGO flagging conflict
warnings worldwide, has published a new report on this conflict in
the South Caucasus. "Terms like 'Blitzkrieg', 'pre-emptive strike'
and 'total war' have gained currency with both sides' planners," the
report's authors say, although war scenarios are much more dominant
in the Azerbaijani public than in Armenia.
Misusing conflict to distract from internal problems
The report is very timely, and considers potential unrest in both
countries. Azerbaijan's presidential elections which have just passed,
although most observers expected a staged renewal of the Aliyev
family's autocratic rule, may inspire uprisings. Armenia's decision
to join the Russian-dominated Customs Union may also provoke internal
unrest, the ICG assume, and both countries may be tempted to use
the NK conflict to distract from their internal problems. Previous
elections in Azerbaijan have produced heightened military tensions
on the border with Armenia and NK. Yet Armenia's internal situation
with the next elections due in 2017 seems incomparable and large-scale
unrest unlikely. Russia's reinforced strategic partnership with Armenia
could even prevent a possible war. These ICG conclusions, therefore,
try too hard to see parallels where actually the situations differ.
They call upon the international community to work with the sides to
maintain a "quiet period during which both sides dial down rhetoric",
to avoid accidental war. The report recommends re-establishing a
"crisis hotline" in order to lessen chances of a military escalation
and an efficient arms embargo regime for the conflict zone. These
positive suggestions have been put forward by the expert community
from time to time, including the book Europe's next avoidable war -
Nagorno-Karabakh (Palgrave, 2013).
No confidence, no peace?
The report's weakness is the attempt to balance out the unbalanced.
For example, the authors criticise Azerbaijan for being the driving
force in the arms race, for their regular hate speeches, including
those by President Ilham Aliyev, and for the extradition of the axe
murderer Ramil Safarov from Hungary and his immediate pardon and
public glorification in Baku as an anti-Armenian hero. The ICG report
additionally notes the NK authorities' intention to re-launch civilian
flights between their Stepanakert Airport and Yerevan, a project which
would reduce transportation times, but not change anything else with
respect to current road transport. It would have been better to point
out this imbalance: both sides in the conflict clearly could do more
for peace, but currently mainly one side publicly works against it.
However, the report is a comprehensive resource for all the key facts,
even providing its own original sources, and admits that "since
mediation efforts have stalled, Baku has increasingly emphasised a
military solution, publicly and privately."
The authors analyse that "time is neither side's ally"; and this
is correct. For Azerbaijan, the arms race is based on the country's
massive oil and gas revenues, which analysts say have already peaked.
For Armenia and NK, the economic costs of the isolation orchestrated
by Turkey and Azerbaijan make it difficult to keep up in this arms
race. While these points explain the urgency for action, they do
not provide for an artificial balance: Armenia has no incentive to
start any military adventure, while Azerbaijan is even creating such
incentives for itself, in particular by impeding the OSCE's Minsk
Group mediations. During the years, these mediations have produced a
road map for peace already agreed by both sides' foreign ministers,
for the summit in Kazan (in 2011), as well as a list of confidence
building measures (CBMs). However, President Aliyev renounced the road
map negotiated by his foreign minister in Kazan, effectively stalling
the deal, and Baku still refuses all proposed CBMs, demanding that
NK first withdraw from the buffer zone, which is actually one point
contained in the road map Aliyev rejected. In this way, Baku torpedoes
the Minsk Group process and then complains about its ineffectiveness -
all the while accelerating its arms acquisitions and declaring that
even Armenia's capital, Yerevan, is allegedly positioned on "ancient
Azeri soil".
A question of leverage
The urgency of CBMs cannot be underlined enough. The ICG mentions NK's
recent call for cooperation regarding the Sarsang water reservoir,
which Baku again turned down. This reservoir could be misused by
either side to cause a military escalation, for example through acts
of sabotage. Re-establishing the hotline connection and denouncing
the propaganda of hate are also vital components to allow for a
breakthrough in the peace process. The question will be how the
international community, especially the European Union, can exercise
leverage on the side that so far blocks these CBMs, i.e. Azerbaijan.
Waiting for a change of government in Baku may take too long.
Azerbaijani lobbyists are currently re-floating an idea in Brussels
to condition the EU's Association Agreements (AA) to progress in the
NK conflict resolution, knowing that Azerbaijan does not seek an AA
and that Baku would thus receive a veto over Armenia's relations
with the EU. However, reformulated, this idea could work. First,
it must include all sorts of agreements that the EU negotiates
with both sides, including the energy partnership that Azerbaijan
currently seeks with the EU. Secondly, the country in question needs
to be able to fulfil the conditions alone, without depending on the
other conflict party in its relationship with the EU. For example,
the EU could help establish the Minsk Group's proposed investigation
mechanism for shooting incidents, even deploy observers. This CBM,
accomplishable by each conflict party alone, could be a condition
for contractual agreements with the EU.
Michael Kambeck is co-founder of European Friends of Armenia and
its Secretary General. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the
University of Bonn and an MA in European Studies from the University
of Leeds.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/974
New Eastern Europe
Oct 15 2013
Author: Michael Kambeck .
Syria and Iran currently dominate our agenda, but the nearby
developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the conflict area
of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) have become increasingly worrying. This
so-called frozen conflict shows clear signs of unfreezing and
has the potential to unleash a much larger scale of warfare,
including geo-political tectonic shifts and human suffering. Now,
the International Crisis Group (ICG), a key NGO flagging conflict
warnings worldwide, has published a new report on this conflict in
the South Caucasus. "Terms like 'Blitzkrieg', 'pre-emptive strike'
and 'total war' have gained currency with both sides' planners," the
report's authors say, although war scenarios are much more dominant
in the Azerbaijani public than in Armenia.
Misusing conflict to distract from internal problems
The report is very timely, and considers potential unrest in both
countries. Azerbaijan's presidential elections which have just passed,
although most observers expected a staged renewal of the Aliyev
family's autocratic rule, may inspire uprisings. Armenia's decision
to join the Russian-dominated Customs Union may also provoke internal
unrest, the ICG assume, and both countries may be tempted to use
the NK conflict to distract from their internal problems. Previous
elections in Azerbaijan have produced heightened military tensions
on the border with Armenia and NK. Yet Armenia's internal situation
with the next elections due in 2017 seems incomparable and large-scale
unrest unlikely. Russia's reinforced strategic partnership with Armenia
could even prevent a possible war. These ICG conclusions, therefore,
try too hard to see parallels where actually the situations differ.
They call upon the international community to work with the sides to
maintain a "quiet period during which both sides dial down rhetoric",
to avoid accidental war. The report recommends re-establishing a
"crisis hotline" in order to lessen chances of a military escalation
and an efficient arms embargo regime for the conflict zone. These
positive suggestions have been put forward by the expert community
from time to time, including the book Europe's next avoidable war -
Nagorno-Karabakh (Palgrave, 2013).
No confidence, no peace?
The report's weakness is the attempt to balance out the unbalanced.
For example, the authors criticise Azerbaijan for being the driving
force in the arms race, for their regular hate speeches, including
those by President Ilham Aliyev, and for the extradition of the axe
murderer Ramil Safarov from Hungary and his immediate pardon and
public glorification in Baku as an anti-Armenian hero. The ICG report
additionally notes the NK authorities' intention to re-launch civilian
flights between their Stepanakert Airport and Yerevan, a project which
would reduce transportation times, but not change anything else with
respect to current road transport. It would have been better to point
out this imbalance: both sides in the conflict clearly could do more
for peace, but currently mainly one side publicly works against it.
However, the report is a comprehensive resource for all the key facts,
even providing its own original sources, and admits that "since
mediation efforts have stalled, Baku has increasingly emphasised a
military solution, publicly and privately."
The authors analyse that "time is neither side's ally"; and this
is correct. For Azerbaijan, the arms race is based on the country's
massive oil and gas revenues, which analysts say have already peaked.
For Armenia and NK, the economic costs of the isolation orchestrated
by Turkey and Azerbaijan make it difficult to keep up in this arms
race. While these points explain the urgency for action, they do
not provide for an artificial balance: Armenia has no incentive to
start any military adventure, while Azerbaijan is even creating such
incentives for itself, in particular by impeding the OSCE's Minsk
Group mediations. During the years, these mediations have produced a
road map for peace already agreed by both sides' foreign ministers,
for the summit in Kazan (in 2011), as well as a list of confidence
building measures (CBMs). However, President Aliyev renounced the road
map negotiated by his foreign minister in Kazan, effectively stalling
the deal, and Baku still refuses all proposed CBMs, demanding that
NK first withdraw from the buffer zone, which is actually one point
contained in the road map Aliyev rejected. In this way, Baku torpedoes
the Minsk Group process and then complains about its ineffectiveness -
all the while accelerating its arms acquisitions and declaring that
even Armenia's capital, Yerevan, is allegedly positioned on "ancient
Azeri soil".
A question of leverage
The urgency of CBMs cannot be underlined enough. The ICG mentions NK's
recent call for cooperation regarding the Sarsang water reservoir,
which Baku again turned down. This reservoir could be misused by
either side to cause a military escalation, for example through acts
of sabotage. Re-establishing the hotline connection and denouncing
the propaganda of hate are also vital components to allow for a
breakthrough in the peace process. The question will be how the
international community, especially the European Union, can exercise
leverage on the side that so far blocks these CBMs, i.e. Azerbaijan.
Waiting for a change of government in Baku may take too long.
Azerbaijani lobbyists are currently re-floating an idea in Brussels
to condition the EU's Association Agreements (AA) to progress in the
NK conflict resolution, knowing that Azerbaijan does not seek an AA
and that Baku would thus receive a veto over Armenia's relations
with the EU. However, reformulated, this idea could work. First,
it must include all sorts of agreements that the EU negotiates
with both sides, including the energy partnership that Azerbaijan
currently seeks with the EU. Secondly, the country in question needs
to be able to fulfil the conditions alone, without depending on the
other conflict party in its relationship with the EU. For example,
the EU could help establish the Minsk Group's proposed investigation
mechanism for shooting incidents, even deploy observers. This CBM,
accomplishable by each conflict party alone, could be a condition
for contractual agreements with the EU.
Michael Kambeck is co-founder of European Friends of Armenia and
its Secretary General. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the
University of Bonn and an MA in European Studies from the University
of Leeds.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/974