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Sergey Grinyaev: Russia's decision on Nagorno-Karabakh depends on
Armenia's decision on South Ossetia and Abkhazia
ArmInfo's Interview with Sergey Grinyaev, Director General of the
Russian Center of Strategic Assessment and Forecasts
by David Stepanyan
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=9538F0E0-38C0-11E3-A45A0EB7C0D21663
Saturday, October 19, 17:15
What are the prospects of the Russian policy on creation of the Eurasian area?
I think the prospects of the Eurasian policy conducted by Russia today
are rather positive. Such optimism is based on impartial facts - the
integration processes are backed as they have been developing on the
ways of the integration ties available earlier. The industrial and
social ties of the USSR will be restored in some cases. This will
reduce expenses for integration much. Moreover, despite the years of
independent development, today the true and potential participants in
the Eurasian integration processes are much closer to each other by
their historic roots, than it seems at first sight. Using an example
of fast extension rates of the European Union for the last decades,
today we can see that absence of historical affinity and the gap in
the social and culture surroundings between the newcomer-states and
"old term residents" give birth not to the integration but
assimilation processes. As a rule, as a result of such unification,
new members of the EU lose their national identity.
Some experts say that despite its declared commitment to join the
Customs Union, the Armenian elite still represents the interests of
the West. Do you think this opinion meets the realities?
Unfortunately, I do. In the last years Armenia has been actively
pro-Western. This policy is welcomed by most Armenian communities
abroad even though Russia too has a big Armenian community. This is
mostly the fault of Russia, who has neglected the South Caucasus and
Central Asia in the last years. Today Israel and Turkey have much more
influence in the region than some 5-10 years ago, let alone China and
the United States. So, it would be wrong to expect that everything
will change the moment Armenia joins the Customs Union. In fact, it
was more the personal initiative of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan.
What economic benefits may Armenia get from its accession to the
Customs Union? Are these benefits commensurable with those from
signing the AA/DCFTA with the EU?
I think the question is asked in the wrong way. I would offer to turn
it around - what is Armenia ready to bring to the Customs Union to be
useful to that and to ensure its own prosperity? I am absolutely
confident that the current stage of integration is based on the
conditions of mutual pragmatic usefulness. The times have passed when
Russia shouldered problems of its close allies only to ensure their
false "integration". Few allies appreciated Russia's "kind will
gestures". As a rule, they were striving to gain profit both from
Moscow and other geo-political centers simultaneously. So Yerevan's
profit will depend on the fact how Armenia will display itself in the
new union, what it is ready to bring to it, and how much interesting
it will be to other partners. Only preserving of the current
status-quo at the labor market and preserving an opportunity of the
non-visa trips to the Customs Union member-states will allow Armenia
to preserve significant share of the foreign currency receipts, to
avoid unemployment at the local labor market, and as a result, to
preserve certain social stability. Europe cannot replace Russia's
labor market. And taking into account the failure of multi-culturalism
policy, the reorientation of the European policy towards the national
objectives, one should wait for tightening of the migration policy in
the EU countries.
Many experts, including Russian ones, think that the major goal of
Moscow's integration projects is Ukraine rather than Armenia or
Moldova. What can Moscow offer Kyiv to prevent Ukraine's European
integration?
I am one of those specialists who consider Ukraine as one of the key
participants in the Eurasian integration process, without offence.
Since the Soviet period, Ukraine has been the basis of the country's
industrial and agricultural might. Big well-educated human resources,
fruitful soil, potential in high-tech industry have really made that
country one of the most desirable candidates for Eurasian integration.
Without Ukraine, this integration process will be incomplete. The West
tries its best to prevent rapprochement of Moscow and Kyiv, he said.
What Moscow offers Ukraine is development of economic ties between
Russian and Ukrainian enterprises. Unlike Europe, Russia is interested
in Ukrainian aircrafts and potential in the field. Besides Russia, the
only country that is interested in, at least, preservation of
Ukraine's industrial potential is China, and not Europe. The global
financial-economic crisis showed that the real sector is the only
pillar even for a developed country. And the Customs Union offers
development and protection of domestic markets through preferential
internal taxation and high foreign taxes. Integration ties of Russia
and Ukraine will be lost if their relations deteriorate. And what
then? Is Europe ready to support the aircraft and space engineering,
and agriculture industry of Ukraine? I am afraid, not. All the above
sectors are just rivals for Europe. What happened to the industry and
agriculture of the countries of Eastern Europe that joined the EU:
GDR, Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic States? Did they manage
to sustain competition with of their European rivals? No, they
didn't. Does Armenia need such perspectives? I think there is much to
think about.
After Armenia had taken a decision to join the Customs Union, Russian
experts started speaking of possible recognition of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. They also
say that Azerbaijan can prevent this by Eurasian integration only. How
promising is this policy of `soft pressure' on Baku?
Russia's decision on Nagorno-Karabakh depends on Armenia's decision on
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As regards Azerbaijan, I would not say
that Russia is trying to force anybody to do join the Customs Union.
This is a pragmatic project. If Azerbaijan decides that it is good for
it, it is free to join. All territorial disputes must be solved before
the accession to the Customs Union lest they might cause tension in
it. This is what the EU does. They refuse to admit a country if it
has territorial disputes.
Global politics is experiencing sharp fluctuations directly affecting
the South Caucasus and the neighboring regions. The Syrian situation
is one of the examples. What can these fluctuations do to a small
country such as Armenia?
Even though Armenia is a small country, it must be tougher in
defending the rights and freedoms of Armenians living in Syria. I
regret that the strong Armenian Diaspora is doing nothing to solve the
Syrian problem. Pressured by the United States and the United Kingdom,
Armenia prefers being neutral on this problem, and this is in strong
contrast to the pro-American positions of Georgia and Azerbaijan. I
believe that Armenia and Russia must have a common stance on the
Syrian problem. Russia has managed to stabilize the situation in
Syria, but we are still far from peace. In this context, the
assistance of the Armenian Diaspora would be really invaluable. Their
support for our efforts would help us not only to stop the civil war
in Syria but also to save the lives of its citizens, many of whom
Armenians.
Armenia's decision on South Ossetia and Abkhazia
ArmInfo's Interview with Sergey Grinyaev, Director General of the
Russian Center of Strategic Assessment and Forecasts
by David Stepanyan
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=9538F0E0-38C0-11E3-A45A0EB7C0D21663
Saturday, October 19, 17:15
What are the prospects of the Russian policy on creation of the Eurasian area?
I think the prospects of the Eurasian policy conducted by Russia today
are rather positive. Such optimism is based on impartial facts - the
integration processes are backed as they have been developing on the
ways of the integration ties available earlier. The industrial and
social ties of the USSR will be restored in some cases. This will
reduce expenses for integration much. Moreover, despite the years of
independent development, today the true and potential participants in
the Eurasian integration processes are much closer to each other by
their historic roots, than it seems at first sight. Using an example
of fast extension rates of the European Union for the last decades,
today we can see that absence of historical affinity and the gap in
the social and culture surroundings between the newcomer-states and
"old term residents" give birth not to the integration but
assimilation processes. As a rule, as a result of such unification,
new members of the EU lose their national identity.
Some experts say that despite its declared commitment to join the
Customs Union, the Armenian elite still represents the interests of
the West. Do you think this opinion meets the realities?
Unfortunately, I do. In the last years Armenia has been actively
pro-Western. This policy is welcomed by most Armenian communities
abroad even though Russia too has a big Armenian community. This is
mostly the fault of Russia, who has neglected the South Caucasus and
Central Asia in the last years. Today Israel and Turkey have much more
influence in the region than some 5-10 years ago, let alone China and
the United States. So, it would be wrong to expect that everything
will change the moment Armenia joins the Customs Union. In fact, it
was more the personal initiative of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan.
What economic benefits may Armenia get from its accession to the
Customs Union? Are these benefits commensurable with those from
signing the AA/DCFTA with the EU?
I think the question is asked in the wrong way. I would offer to turn
it around - what is Armenia ready to bring to the Customs Union to be
useful to that and to ensure its own prosperity? I am absolutely
confident that the current stage of integration is based on the
conditions of mutual pragmatic usefulness. The times have passed when
Russia shouldered problems of its close allies only to ensure their
false "integration". Few allies appreciated Russia's "kind will
gestures". As a rule, they were striving to gain profit both from
Moscow and other geo-political centers simultaneously. So Yerevan's
profit will depend on the fact how Armenia will display itself in the
new union, what it is ready to bring to it, and how much interesting
it will be to other partners. Only preserving of the current
status-quo at the labor market and preserving an opportunity of the
non-visa trips to the Customs Union member-states will allow Armenia
to preserve significant share of the foreign currency receipts, to
avoid unemployment at the local labor market, and as a result, to
preserve certain social stability. Europe cannot replace Russia's
labor market. And taking into account the failure of multi-culturalism
policy, the reorientation of the European policy towards the national
objectives, one should wait for tightening of the migration policy in
the EU countries.
Many experts, including Russian ones, think that the major goal of
Moscow's integration projects is Ukraine rather than Armenia or
Moldova. What can Moscow offer Kyiv to prevent Ukraine's European
integration?
I am one of those specialists who consider Ukraine as one of the key
participants in the Eurasian integration process, without offence.
Since the Soviet period, Ukraine has been the basis of the country's
industrial and agricultural might. Big well-educated human resources,
fruitful soil, potential in high-tech industry have really made that
country one of the most desirable candidates for Eurasian integration.
Without Ukraine, this integration process will be incomplete. The West
tries its best to prevent rapprochement of Moscow and Kyiv, he said.
What Moscow offers Ukraine is development of economic ties between
Russian and Ukrainian enterprises. Unlike Europe, Russia is interested
in Ukrainian aircrafts and potential in the field. Besides Russia, the
only country that is interested in, at least, preservation of
Ukraine's industrial potential is China, and not Europe. The global
financial-economic crisis showed that the real sector is the only
pillar even for a developed country. And the Customs Union offers
development and protection of domestic markets through preferential
internal taxation and high foreign taxes. Integration ties of Russia
and Ukraine will be lost if their relations deteriorate. And what
then? Is Europe ready to support the aircraft and space engineering,
and agriculture industry of Ukraine? I am afraid, not. All the above
sectors are just rivals for Europe. What happened to the industry and
agriculture of the countries of Eastern Europe that joined the EU:
GDR, Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic States? Did they manage
to sustain competition with of their European rivals? No, they
didn't. Does Armenia need such perspectives? I think there is much to
think about.
After Armenia had taken a decision to join the Customs Union, Russian
experts started speaking of possible recognition of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. They also
say that Azerbaijan can prevent this by Eurasian integration only. How
promising is this policy of `soft pressure' on Baku?
Russia's decision on Nagorno-Karabakh depends on Armenia's decision on
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As regards Azerbaijan, I would not say
that Russia is trying to force anybody to do join the Customs Union.
This is a pragmatic project. If Azerbaijan decides that it is good for
it, it is free to join. All territorial disputes must be solved before
the accession to the Customs Union lest they might cause tension in
it. This is what the EU does. They refuse to admit a country if it
has territorial disputes.
Global politics is experiencing sharp fluctuations directly affecting
the South Caucasus and the neighboring regions. The Syrian situation
is one of the examples. What can these fluctuations do to a small
country such as Armenia?
Even though Armenia is a small country, it must be tougher in
defending the rights and freedoms of Armenians living in Syria. I
regret that the strong Armenian Diaspora is doing nothing to solve the
Syrian problem. Pressured by the United States and the United Kingdom,
Armenia prefers being neutral on this problem, and this is in strong
contrast to the pro-American positions of Georgia and Azerbaijan. I
believe that Armenia and Russia must have a common stance on the
Syrian problem. Russia has managed to stabilize the situation in
Syria, but we are still far from peace. In this context, the
assistance of the Armenian Diaspora would be really invaluable. Their
support for our efforts would help us not only to stop the civil war
in Syria but also to save the lives of its citizens, many of whom
Armenians.